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Hell and Back
[Dante Alighieri]
‘Good Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?’ the rich
man asks Jesus. ‘Sell all that thou hast, and distribute unto the
poor,’ is the reply, ‘and thou shalt have treasure in heaven.’ At
which the rich man is sorrowful and turns away. ‘It is easier,’
Jesus remarks to his disciples, ‘for a camel to go through the eye
of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of
God.’
Some 1,300 years later, banished from his native Florence and
thus largely bereft of this world’s goods, Dante Alighieri,
politician, poet and philosopher, was nevertheless still having
trouble threading the eye of that needle. It seems there are other
attachments aside from wealth that make it difficult for us to turn
our backs on this world. Passion for one: Dante had loved a
woman who rejected him, married someone else, then com-
pounded the affront by dying young and thus remaining for ever
desirable. Ambition was another: aside from a cycle of secular
love poems, Dante had written a provocative work of political
philosophy suggesting the kind of state in which man would be
free to pursue perfection. It was not a scenario in which divine
grace appeared to be very important. Now, quite suddenly, he
found himself confused, disoriented:
Midway in the journey of our life
I came to myself in a dark wood,
for the straight way was lost.
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So begins the Inferno. It’s a feeling that many approaching
forty, as Dante was when he wrote the lines, will recognise. How
to proceed? As daylight breaks in the dark wood, the poet sees a
mountain before him. It is Purgatory, it is the way to Paradise. All
is well. But suddenly three ferocious beasts are blocking his
path. The needle’s eye is defended by a wolf, a leopard, a lion. They
are lust, pride and avarice, say some commentators. They are
incontinence, malice and mad brutishness say others. They
are Dante’s Florentine enemies, the French monarchy and the
papacy, say yet others. Whatever or whoever, they are insuper-
able.
Just as the poet despairs, a figure emerges from the gloom and
offers an unusual alternative. By special intercession of his dear
departed Beatrice, now in Paradise, Dante is to be given the
opportunity to approach the blessed place through Hell. A vision
of the damned will surely teach him to turn away from the things
of this world. After some hesitation, he agrees. It was a fatal
decision. Hell would never be the same again.
‘For all of us,’ Borges wrote, ‘allegory is an aesthetic mistake.’
Schopenhauer, Benedetto Croce and D.H. Lawrence all concur.
‘I hated, even as a child, allegory,’ writes Lawrence. Reduced to a
series of equivalences, he complained – white horse equals
faithfulness and truth – a work of literature is explained away. It
does no more than state a position. We read it once and we never
need read it again.
The Divina Commedia, most celebrated of all poems, is almost
always presented to us as an allegory. Certainly this is the case
with the huge and heavily annotated edition my son is poring
over in high school in Verona. Who is the figure who appears to
Dante in the wood? He is Virgil, the great Roman poet of the
Aeneid, emblematic in the Middle Ages of the best that can be
achieved by reason and conscience. He will take Dante as far as
mere earthly knowledge can take a man. Who is Beatrice? The
personal embodiment of heavenly truth, say the commentaries.
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She will take over where Virgil, with his human limitations, is
obliged to leave off. And the pilgrim poet? Obviously he is
Everyman, or Christian as Bunyan was to call him. Would Bert
Lawrence, we wonder, have read a poem thus described even
once?
Yet long after the fires of Hell have burned themselves out, the
debate about the Divina Commedia rages on. Leafing through
the commentary that Robert Hollander has prepared to accom-
pany his new translation, one is immediately aware of a fierce rift
between different schools of opinion on the poem: the Roman-
tics, who were convinced that Dante sympathised with the
sufferers in Hell, thus subverting the Christian tradition, and
the traditionalists equally convinced that, while the pilgrim in the
poem sometimes wavers, the poet behind the work wholeheart-
edly endorsed every last lacerating pang of a misbegotten,
unrepentant humanity. The academic Hollander is decidedly
among the anti-Romantics and enters the fray with gusto.
Meanwhile, his poetess wife, who was responsible for establishing
the versification of the new translation, has recently written a
poem of her own, ‘A Mix Up in Dante’, that has two unrelated
characters from the Inferno, the Tuscan Francesca and the Greek
Odysseus, enjoying a casual affair in a mishmash of contemporary
settings; it’s a piece that implicitly supports her husband’s
position that these two figures, adored by so many, are nothing
more than incorrigible sinners. Until one has read the Inferno
itself, it is hard to understand why the debate is so heated.
The poet turns away from this world. He is going to descend
the nine circles of subterranean hell, shin down Satan’s hairy legs
to a hole (that needle’s eye?) at the very core of the planet,
squeeze through, then climb out of the globe at the antipodes,
scale the mountain of Purgatory and achieve Paradise. That is the
overall trajectory of our allegory: man in contact with sin, man
rejecting sin, man purifying himself, man returning to his maker.
But by virtue of this holy pilgrimage, Dante also intends to
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become one of the most famous poets of all time, human,
historical time. That is an integral part of his project, and he
doesn’t disguise the fact. What’s more, the journey will offer him
a chance to stage one last poignant meeting with the ever beloved
Beatrice. He will see and talk to her again.
So has he really turned away from this world? Well, yes and no.
The poem teems with contradictions and antithetical energies.
Virgil, we soon suspect, despite the commentaries, is not merely
the abstract apex of human piety and reason. More interestingly,
he is indeed the great poet whom Dante most sought to emulate,
a charming individual who is not to be admitted to Paradise for
the simple reason that he lived too early to accept Christ’s offer of
salvation. It’s an outrage.
Beatrice, meanwhile, is Beatrice Portinari whom Dante has
worshipped, despite rebuffs, since he was nine years old. And the
pilgrim poet, as it turns out, is not Everyman at all, but Dante
Alighieri in person. The same goes for the damned when we meet
them. Never merely murderers, thieves or pederasts, they are
magnificently, abjectly themselves, still sinning and suffering in a
place that, far from abstract or notional, is scorchingly, stinkingly
real.
But how can a living man go unscathed through Hell? And
how can a reader follow him? Will the poem be bearable?
‘Abandon all hope you who enter here,’ announce the words
above the gate. Hopefully, we go through. First, Dante sees the
wretched souls of those ‘who lived without disgrace yet without
praise’. Rushing aimlessly back and forth, they suffer because they
would rather be anyone but themselves. Well, we’re used to
people like that. Six hundred years later T.S. Eliot would watch
them flowing every day over London Bridge. ‘I could not believe
death had undone so many,’ Dante says. Nothing new here.
Then, across the River Acheron, in the limbo of the first circle
of hell, are other noble souls who, like Virgil, perished before
Christ got round to saving us. Homer and Plato are here, though
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sadly they don’t appear to be producing anything new. With
them are the souls of the tiny children who die unbaptised. It’s a
strange mix. Their only torment is that ‘without hope we live in
longing’. Again it’s not something the average reader will be
entirely unfamiliar with. Thus far we can handle it.
But these opening scenes are only a foretaste of what’s to
come, or perhaps a response to the exigencies of the encyclopae-
dic vocation of the poem (all the famous dead will have to be put
somewhere). Nevertheless, Dante is immeasurably sad as he
reflects that ‘beings of great worth were here suspended’. Already
we sense how difficult it is for the human mind to be in tune with
the divine will. Is it possible Homer isn’t in Heaven? The reader
notes with disquiet that having encountered all the greatest poets
before we’re barely inside the porch of Hell, Paradise is going to
have little to offer in that department.
Then the real horror begins, the souls tossed this way and that
on stormy winds, torn apart by a three-headed dog under endless
rain, sunk in bogs, sunk in boiling pitch, sunk in shit, sunk in
blistering tombs, sunk in solid ice. Dante sees sinners forever
unconsumed in consuming fire, forever scratching the scabs from
their flesh, forever metamorphosing into snakes and lizards,
forever upside down in filthy holes, forever brushing off burning
embers that sift constantly down onto scorching sand.
There is no change, no rest, no night nor day, no meal breaks.
And even more disturbing, when the damned are not being
whipped or clawed by demons, they are punishing each other,
shoving each other about, gnawing at each other’s necks,
insulting each other. L’enfer, c’est les autres. In short, if
Hollywood wishes to avoid legislation against excessive violence
on the big screen, the Inferno is not a picture to make during an
election period. How can Dante pass through it all unscathed?
And how can Robert Hollander conclude the introduction to his
and his wife’s new translation with the remark that ‘this is not a
bad place once you get used to it’?
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‘So as not to be hurt,’ says the Taittiriya Samhita ‘before
coming near the fire, he wraps himself in the metres.’ It’s a
formula often repeated in the Vedic texts. Whether ‘he’ be god,
priest or mere mortal man, in order to approach the sacrificial fire,
through which alone the heavens can be conquered, he must
‘wrap himself in the metres’. Such advice is more practical than it
may at first seem. The real punishment of Dante’s damned is not
this or that torture – many in Purgatory will face similar sufferings
– but the fact that the torture can know no solution. Neither
release nor oblivion are available. And while the body – in so far
as the damned have a body – is forever in pain, the mind revolves
unceasingly around a particular image or experience. An adulter-
ess is trapped for ever in her moment of passion, a suicide is
irretrievably marooned in the circumstances that led him to dash
his brains out against a prison wall. In this sense, Dante’s damned
are not unlike those ghosts who always appear in the same place
in the same clothes, conservative creatures shackled for eternity to
some experience they can never go beyond.
It is thus understandable that while the trials of Purgatory will
take place on a breezy mountainside open to the sky, the tortures
of the inferno must be closed inside an inverted subterranean
cone that funnels down in narrowing circles to the pit of ultimate
despair. It is a place of obsession, a place where time has stopped
and thought has become its own prison. To get through such
horror, we must wrap ourselves in the metres, for metre obliges
us to keep moving on.
Now perhaps we see why Dante chooses a poet as a guide, a
poet renowned for the perfection of his verse. What is Virgil’s role
throughout the Inferno? As he leads Dante from circle to circle,
he first directs his attention, inviting him to engage with the
damned – after all, he must learn from his experience – but then,
and this is crucial, he decides exactly how long he is to be allowed
to stay and talk in any one place. ‘We must not linger here,’ he
says. ‘Let your talk be brief.’ The constant danger is that the poet
6
Hell and Back
will find himself paralysed, blocked as the damned are blocked,
and as he himself was at the beginning of the poem.
The many people and their ghastly wounds
did so intoxicate my eyes
that I was moved to linger there and weep.
So says the pilgrim poet at the opening to Canto 29. It’s an
understandable response when you’ve just spoken to a decapi-
tated nobleman holding his head by the hair. But Virgil is having
none of it. ‘What are you staring at . . . the time we are allotted
soon expires and there is more to see.’
In short, Virgil sets the pace. It is not that we now need to start
thinking of him as a personification of metre. Just that he
understands as no one else does the mutually tensing, only
apparently contradictory vocations of poetry: to take us, yes, to
the core of things, through evocation, but then to get us out on
the other side unscathed, with the reassuring, even anaesthetis-
ing, progress of verse.
The metre Dante chose to wrap himself in involved the
arrangement of hendecasyllables, lines of eleven syllables, in a
verse pattern known as terza rima. That is: the poem progresses
three lines at a time, the first and the third rhyming and the
second setting up the rhyme for the opening line of the next
threesome, each stanza, if they can be called that, standing alone,
pausing a moment, but in that very pause passing the baton to
what quickly follows. Once we have a sense of the role this
structure is to play in the story – how it thrusts us before what is
too awful to contemplate, then snatches us away from it – we can
begin to appreciate how difficult the Inferno is to translate, and
how all-determining the initial decision: What form am I going to
use?
A dozen and more modern translations are strewn on the desk
before me, too many to analyse in detail, each with its merits and
7
Hell and Back
its drawbacks, each the fruit of enormous labours. The choice of
staying with Dante’s terza rima is, of course, only for the boldest,
or perhaps one might say the most reckless. Here is Dorothy L.
Sayers, Christian, scholar and detective writer, giving us the
speech in which that epitome of recklessness, Ulysses, confesses
that he was not a family man and remembers his fatal, hubristic
voyage through the pillars of Hercules:
No tenderness for my son, nor piety
To my old father, nor the wedded love
That should have comforted Penelope
Could conquer in me the restless itch to rove
And rummage through the world exploring it,
All human worth and wickedness to prove.
So on the deep and open sea I set
Forth, with a single ship and that small band
Of comrades that had never left me yet.
How the timbers strain here. One suspects the hero’s oarsmen
of being selected from among the worthy authors of Hymns
Ancient and Modern. Rove and rummage as the translator might
through the resources of Victorian verse, all too often the rhyme
clangs like a buoy in fog, rather than quietly chiming the passage
from one moment to the next.
No stranger himself to rhymed narrative, Longfellow saw the
danger and plumped for blank verse. Yet though this enables him
to shadow the original more closely, he too often seems to offer
little more than a review of nineteenth-century poetic diction.
Here he is among the miseries of Canto 5:
And as the cranes go chanting forth their lays,
Making in air a long line of themselves,
So saw I coming, uttering lamentations,
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Shadows borne onward by the aforesaid stress.
Whereupon said I: ‘Master, who are those
People, whom the black air so castigates?’
Over the thirty-four cantos and nearly five thousand lines of
the Inferno, the ‘aforesaid stress’ can only mount up.
More recently, Robert Pinsky, remarking on how much more
easily Italian can be rhymed than English and at the same time
appreciating the importance of the terza rima in the poem,
decided to go for a ‘terza half rima’, as it were; this together with
a versification so full of enjambment that the division into three-
line stanzas often appears quite arbitrarily imposed on the sense.
It seems appropriate to quote Pinsky as he deals with the subject
of mangling. Here we are in Canto 28 presenting Mohammed at
a time when there was no need to fear an ayatollah’s response.
No barrel staved-in
And missing its end-piece ever gaped as wide
As the man I saw split open from his chin
Down to the farting-place, and from the splayed
Trunk the spilled entrails dangled between his thighs.
I saw his organs, and the sack that makes the bread
We swallow turn to shit.
Despite Pinsky’s facility – and often the translation is fun – one
is everywhere aware of the effort required to achieve even these
half-rhymes, while in the process the focus of the verse is often
obliged to fall on the most unlikely of words. ‘Bread’, for
example, is not in the original and readers may be forgiven for
having the absurd impression, if only for a moment, that the
bread is made by ‘the sack’, the intestine. Then of course
everything becomes clear as the word ‘shit’ pulls us up brutally
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mid line. But this is something Dante never does, for of course
such effects break up the all-important flow.
In 1993, a book mistitled Dante’s Inferno presented the
translations of twenty contemporary poets, each tackling two or
three cantos. James Merrill’s introduction gives us a clue to the
uneasiness one feels with so many contemporary translations, and
not just of Dante. ‘The problem,’ he announces, ‘with most
translators is their limited command of the language – their own I
mean; they can always get help with the other. Hence the bright
idea of asking some of our finest poets to weave this garland.’
Leaving aside the self-congratulation and the inappropriate-
ness, surely, of referring to any edition of the Inferno as a
‘garland’, the notion that one can get somebody else to tell you
what the original means and how it feels, so that you can then
rewrite it, is suspect to say the least. Why read poetry at all if
someone else can tell you what it’s like? There is no substitute for
an intimate experience of the original and long immersion in the
culture that surrounds it. Invariably, the star poets work hard at
evocation and drama in their various individual styles, almost
always to the detriment of the overall rapidity and homogeneity
of the narrative. Here is Mark Strand leaving us in limbo:
There was no howling that I could hear,
nothing but sighs that rose
to shake the everlasting air
sighs of painless woe
from milling crowds of men and women
and children who would never know
relief.
The subordinate clause, ‘who would never know relief’, has been
added to the original and creates a most dramatic and mannered
stop right at the beginning of the next terzina. Meantime, the
crucial information that the children are very young – infanti –
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(they are the unbaptised) is omitted and instead we have a banal
standard formula, ‘men and women and children’, as if merely to
say, everybody. The danger of ‘poetic’ translations is that they
risk losing both an accurate account of the scene and a rapid
movement through it. When things go wrong we are up to our
ears in poetic effect and misery.
‘Prosa rimata’, Boccaccio called it, ‘rhymed prose’. One of the
poem’s first and greatest admirers, the author of the Decameron
praised Dante’s decision to write in the vernacular rather than in
Latin, and likewise to avoid the temptation of lavish poetic effect.
Hell is impressive enough without. It’s not surprising, then, to
find Pinsky making the observation that some of the most
effective translations of the Divina Commedia have been in prose.
Certainly the 1939 prose translation by the scholar John Sinclair
is still a very safe bet if you want to sit down, read the Inferno
right through and then get up again. But doesn’t this contradict
what I said earlier about the effect of the terza rima? ‘There are
verses, in the genre called prose,’ said Mallarme´, ‘sometimes
wonderful verses and in every rhythm.’ Here is Sinclair introduc-
ing us to the second circle:
I came to a place where all light was mute and where was
bellowing as of a sea in tempest that is beaten by conflicting
winds. The hellish storm, never resting, seizes and drives the
spirits before it; smiting and whirling them about, it torments
them. When they come before its fury there are shrieks,
weeping and lamentation, and they blaspheme the power of
God, and I learned that to such torment are condemned the
carnal sinners who subject reason to desire.
A little later one of those sinners speaks: it is the charming
adulteress, Francesca.
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O living creature gracious and friendly, who goest through the
murky air visiting us who stained the world with blood, if the
King of the universe were our friend we would pray to Him for
thy peace, since thou hast pity of our evil plight. Of that which
thou art pleased to hear and speak we will hear and speak with
you while the wind is quiet, as here it is.
These sentences have an austere rhythm of their own, while the
archaic diction and phrasing seems more acceptable without
the alarm bell of forced rhyme. Sinclair’s version is rapid, to the
point, almost always close to the original, and yet . . . if only
visually, there is something lacking. We miss the sense of constant
even division, of opening and of closure, the reassurance of
manifest artifice.
The new translation by Robert and Jean Hollander is, as an
introductory note tells us, a reworking in free verse of Sinclair’s
prose, reinforcing its rhythms, removing archaisms and awkward-
ness, often altering the interpretation where Sinclair is not
convincing. Here are their versions of the passages quoted above.
I reached a place mute of all light,
Which bellows as the sea in tempest
Tossed by conflicting winds.
The hellish squall, which never rests,
Sweeps the spirits in its headlong rush,
Tormenting, whirls and strikes them.
Caught in that path of violence,
They shriek, weep, and lament.
Then how they curse the power of God.
And again:
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Oh living creature, gracious and kind,
That comes through sombre air to visit us
Who stained the world with blood,
If the King of the universe were our friend
We would pray that He might give you peace,
Since you show pity for our grievous plight.
With any translation of the Inferno, one can quibble ad
infinitum, if only because the original just will not stay still; it
won’t be pinned down to any formula. That said, the Hollanders’
translation is definitely a welcome addition, and to my uncertain
ear, coming to all these versions fresh from a rereading of the
original, it certainly seemed the most accessible and the closest.
Unfortunately, as we shall see, the commentary Robert Hollander
offers to accompany the text is not so well pitched.
Whenever Indiana Jones enters an ancient temple or burial
ground, we know what is about happen. However much our hero
respects and venerates an antique past, this sacred place, frozen in
time, stacked with precious horrors and holy artefacts, is,
nevertheless, going to be utterly destroyed. As the edifice comes
crashing down, Jones, in the nick of time, will rush out of the
crumbling portals into the fresh air of a world where nothing is
sacred, except perhaps lucre and serial romance.
Although it would be facetious, even blasphemous, to suggest
that the same thing happens in the Inferno, still it has to be said
that over the centuries the effect of Dante’s passage through Hell
has been no less devastating. If the poet survives his journey
unscathed, the same cannot be said of the infernal abode. Its
ecology is too fragile for even this minimal tourism. While the
souls of the dead float weightlessly over this most artificial
environment, every step taken by the gravity-bound poet sets off
a little landslide. And if the first scholarly commentaries on the
Divina Commedia began to appear almost as soon as it was in
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circulation, that is partly because there was an immediate
apprehension that the place of punishment was in urgent need of
shoring up. Robert Hollander takes his turn at this ghoulish
maintenance duty with remarkable vigour.
Dante is sent through Hell in order to gain ‘greater knowl-
edge’, as Virgil says. Thus much of the poem is made up of
question and answer. As each new horror unfolds, we must
‘understand’ it. So we learn that on crossing the Acheron each
soul is assessed by the monster Minos who indicates which circle
he or she must go to by arranging his tail in the appropriate
number of coils. How Minos distinguishes, in the case, for
example, of the eighth circle, between the ten very different
ditches that await the dismayed sinner on arrival, we don’t know.
Does he uncoil and re-coil? It is a peculiarity of explanations that
they tend to invite further questions.
Meanwhile, other information is coming in thick and fast. We
learn that milder sins are punished in the upper circles and more
heinous crimes below, in the city of Dis whose gates in the fifth
circle mark the descent into ‘nether hell’. We learn that sins of
incontinence are less wicked than sins of will; that the sins of
sodomy, blasphemy and usury are punished together because
they all involve violence against God or His natural order. Who
would have thought? We learn that the dead are granted
knowledge of future events on earth, but not of the present
situation. Such a state of affairs involves the drawing of some
difficult lines, does it not? Presumably as time progresses and the
future becomes the present the dead must now forget what
shortly before they knew. Is this really an imaginable world?
But all these are minor points. Most importantly, and exhaus-
tively, we learn that each and every sinner is punished by being
subjected to a sort of intensification or symbolic inversion of his
dominant crime. Being eternally boiled in pitch, for example,
John Sinclair’s notes explain, is an appropriate punishment for
those who have accepted bribes in public office, because pitch is
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sticky, prevents clarity of vision and rarely allows the sinner to
surface. Diviners, on the other hand, who usurped God’s power
by looking into the future, are properly served by having their
heads reversed on their shoulders so that they are constantly
looking backwards. On three or four occasions the poet wonders
at this appropriateness:
O Supreme Wisdom, what great art you show
in heaven, on earth, and in the evil world,
and what true justice does your power dispense!
How reassuring, or at least distracting, such symmetry is. Then,
in so far as each crime can be presented as a breaking of bonds,
within family or society, or more seriously between creature and
creator, our exploration of hell’s bureaucracy leads quite naturally
to a discussion of the state of Italy, and in particular Florence,
where all these crimes, the poet assures us, are daily being
committed. Indeed Dante’s Florence and Dante’s Inferno often
seem contiguous in the poem, as if Hell were nothing more than
one more busy Tuscan metropolis.
So it is that among the underworld’s gay community, Dante
can profit from a long discussion on Florentine politics, past and
future. Since such matters, together with all the other Italian
gossip, are a key subject of the poem, the inclusion of informative
notes at the end of each canto is useful and welcome. In this
regard Hollander is impeccable. The text is presented generously
spaced – Italian on the left, English on the right – and with ample
commentary easily and unobtrusively available at the end of each
canto. As neatly organised as Hell itself.
Still, we should not lose sight of the fact that the attention to
current affairs, like the enchantment of the verse and the
intriguing topography of infernal justice, are part of a series of
strategies for preventing us from being overwhelmed by the
suffering of the damned. With similarly anaesthetic intent, Dante
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likes to toss in the odd conundrum from time to time to tease the
lively intellect. Sinclair, for example, becomes concerned because
he can’t quite see the appropriateness of the punishments of the
tenth ditch of the eighth circle. Hollander shares with us his
perplexity that a character in the fifth ditch seems to have come
straight to Hell, bypassing Minos’s sorting procedure. How can
this be? Screams of torture fade away behind the clamour of such
intriguing questions.
In Canto 29, when Dante mischievously tells us that the inner
part of the eighth circle is twenty-two miles in circumference,
Hollander manfully resists the temptation to engage in the
agitated algebra that has produced so many scale maps of
the poet’s Hell. But a few cantos on, an obscure reference to the
physical stature of Satan has our commentator rising beautifully
to the bait. Dante writes: ‘I in size am closer to a giant than giants
are when measured to his arms.’ Hollander informs:
That is ‘I am, proportionally, closer in size to a giant than a
giant is to Lucifer’. For the size of the giants, ca. Seventy feet,
see the note to Inferno XXX 58–66. Let us, merely for the
purposes of calculation, agree that Dante was six feet tall. The
equation is simple: 6/70=70/x;x = 817. Thus Lucifer is at the
very minimum 817 feet tall. Since both the giants and Satan
are only halfway out of the ice that leaves him towering from
the waist up, over the ice by at least 409 feet.
Fascinating, isn’t it, how mathematics can contribute to
matters metaphysical! But if we don’t want to concentrate on
mutilations and misery, we needn’t limit ourselves to elaborating
internal textual references. Dante knows he has set in motion a
system here that will amuse ad infinitum. This morning, for
example, my newspaper offers the announcement:
ASTROCARTOMANTE Alessandra riceve pomeriggi serate
16
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distintissimi. (Fortune teller – tarot and astrology – receives
real gents only afternoons and evenings.)
I ask myself: assuming Alessandra doesn’t repent, where is she
going to lodge in hell? If she is indeed a diviner, the fourth ditch
of the eighth circle and an eternally twisted neck await her. But in
the argot of Italy’s classified ads, ‘astrocartomante’ is code for
prostitute. This would put her in the sins of the flesh, perhaps,
somewhere in the milder upper rooms of Hell.
On the other hand, there is hypocrisy here, is there not?
Alessandra is a whore passing herself off as a fortune teller.
Hypocrisy would plunge her way back to the eighth circle, but
the sixth ditch this time, where she will drag her heels eternally
under the weight of a leaded mask with gilded surface. Dante, as
I recall, includes but one prostitute in the Inferno, inserting her,
rather surprisingly, into the ditch where the flatterers wallow in
shit. Why? Because when a lover would ask her, ‘Have I found
favour with you?’, the lady would reply: ‘Beyond all measure.’
Our poet is nothing if not witty.
‘Beyond all measure.’ It is measure and measurement that
make Hell ‘not a bad place once you get used to it’. The many
pleasing symmetries, between crime and punishment, between
landscape and spiritual reality, between life and afterlife, give us a
sense that all, even in Hell, is well.
Well, it isn’t. Suddenly, and dosing out the encounters with
great cunning, Dante brings us up against an individual. A figure
detaches itself from the crowd and tells a story of intense personal
experience. It is Francesca recalling her passion for Paolo, or it is
the noble Farinata rising erect from a scorching tomb. Pier delle
Vigne gives an account of his tragically blighted career and
suicide. His damnation seems incidental. Ulysses wonderfully
recreates the folly of his last and most glorious exploit. Who cares
what circle he is in?
At these and other moments, as pity, sympathy or even
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admiration swell in the poet’s breast, we know that for all the
satisfactions of moral pigeon-holing, nothing has been explained.
The individual, for better or worse, treacherous, Promethean or
merely unreasonable, is so much more than a single sin. There is a
fierce tension here. Hell’s ramparts tremble. Sensibly, Virgil
hurries us on.
Not so Hollander. Ominously, in his introduction, he has
already told us that: ‘Dante, not without risk, decided to entrust
to us, his readers, the responsibility for seizing upon the details in
the narratives told by the sinners, no matter how appealing their
words might be, in order to condemn them on the evidence that
issues from their own mouths.’
But if, after reading this, you are concerned you might get it
wrong, not to worry. Hollander, unlike Dante, won’t let you. He
uses his commentary not just to give us valuable information but
to make sure that we do indeed add our weighty condemnation
to God’s. Again and again he tells us what the poem means and
how we should feel about it. In his view of things this inevitably
means feeling rather less than we felt when we read the poem.
Ulysses, for example, Hollander tells us, despite being admired
for his Promethean spirit by so many poets and thinkers
(Tennyson, Benedetto Croce and Primo Levi are briefly listed) is
‘in common parlance, a con artist, and a good one too. He has
surely fooled a lot of people.’ But not our commentator. Of
Francesca, he warns us that, however poignant her words, she is
in fact entirely calculating; she just wants to win our pity while in
fact ‘it is pity itself that is here at fault’.
This challenging assertion looks forward to a key line in the
Inferno where, when Dante shows pity for the diviners, Virgil
protests: ‘Qui vive la pieta` quand’ e` ben morta.’ Literally: ‘Here
pity – or piety (pieta` can mean either or both) – lives when it is
good and dead.’ The Hollanders, determined to spare us
misunderstandings, translate, ‘Here piety lives when pity is quite
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dead.’ Sinclair more faithfully and enigmatically offers, ‘Here pity
lives when it is quite dead.’
But let us not quibble over the translation, since the Hollan-
ders’ version seems in fact the only contextually comprehensible
reading of the line. Let us also leave aside the ungenerous
reflection that Virgil, who himself shows pity elsewhere, has a
particular axe to grind with the diviners since his Aeneid was
frequently read, not as a poem, but as an instrument of
divination. Pity for them was not justice for him! Let us even
assume, as Hollander would wish us to, I think, that the
comment refers to the whole of Hell and not just to this
particular ditch. All the same, and however we phrase it, we
cannot escape the fact that Dante is drawing our attention here to
a scission within the very notion of what piety, or godliness, is.
The two qualities, pity/piety, stem from the same etymological
root; we had hoped they were inseparable. Instinctively, we seek
to keep them together. But a contemplation of Hell, where
God’s terrible vendetta is visited on the damned for all eternity,
obliges us to see that if we want an ordered cosmos with Paradise
on top and Hell at the bottom, then pity will have to go. Hell, a
pitiless place, is the price one pays for Paradise and more in
general for the delirium of believing that human actions can
reverberate for all eternity.
Looked at this way, Sayers’ translation of the thorny line is
intriguing. ‘Here pity, or here piety, must die,’ she writes,
acknowledging the interesting alternative that it might be pity
that lives, as it certainly does in Dante’s poem, while orthodox
piety and its grim fortifications collapse.
Another difficult and provocative remark makes it clear that
Dante appreciates the revolutionary potential of the tensions that
galvanise his tale. In Canto 12 the poet finds himself slithering
down a landslide that ‘shifted under my feet’. In the now familiar
tone of reassuring explanation, Virgil tells Dante that when Christ
came briefly down to Hell after his crucifixion, carrying off a
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select few in the process, the infernal place was severely shaken.
He goes on:
so that I thought the universe felt love,
by which, as some believe,
the world has many times been turned to chaos.
And at that moment this ancient rock,
Here and elsewhere, fell broken into pieces.
This is a very dangerous idea. The entrance to Hell bore the
claim that the place was founded by ‘primal love’, but here we
have a suggestion that love is alien to order. Love leads to chaos
because it tends to forgive, it isn’t interested in coiling tails and
carefully divided ditches.
Whether he originally intended it or not, Dante has found that
to bring pity into Hell makes for the most powerful poetry, as
qualities that stir our souls are infinitely punished by a system we
nevertheless feel we must accept as divine. Having happened
upon that formula, he cannot resist pursuing it. What could be
more seductive to an artist than the serendipitous discovery? But
each time he does so he exposes an essential tension at the core of
Christianity, a quarrel between rival visions of justice and of love
that has kept Western society uneasily on the move for centuries,
so much so that today it has become very hard for us to
contemplate inflicting pain of any kind. To read the Inferno is to
savour at its most elemental and intense one of the profound
moral conflicts that has shaped the contemporary psyche. If
twenty-first-century man went to Heaven he would soon be
demonstrating to have Hell abolished.
Point the infernal brickwork as he will, even Robert Hollander
is not immune from some chaotic sentiment. When Dante is
moved at the sight of his old homosexual friends and wishes to
greet them with an embrace, our commentator forgets to remind
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us that such affection for people God has eternally condemned is
out of place. Rather than castigating the fraudulent intentions of
a sinner who puts the blame for his sodomy on his ‘bestial wife’,
Hollander applauds the poet for ‘a remarkable lack of the typical
Christian heterosexual scorn for homosexuals’. It is a rare lapse,
but telling.
Whenever a magical world crumbles and its demons are put to
flight, you can be sure they will turn up again elsewhere, and
without the reassuring distance old boundaries guaranteed. So,
on reading Dante, one is powerfully struck by how present he is
in our modern literature. Hell is gone, but, like New York’s
mental patients, the damned have been let loose among us. They
are there in Eliot, in Kafka, in Borges, and above all in Beckett,
where they loom from the trash cans of Endgame, from the heap
of sand in Happy Days. And if, having read the Hollanders’
excellent translation, you are yearning for a more sophisticated
commentary on the Divina Commedia, you might do worse than
to turn to Beckett’s novel Watt, where he recreates for the
modern reader the Inferno’s strange force field of symmetry and
suffering, of a language that evokes and anaesthetises. Here is
Watt exploring a Hell in need of renovation:
This garden was surrounded by a high barbed wire fence,
greatly in need of repair, of new wire, of fresh barbs. Through
this fence, where it was not overgrown by briars and giant
nettles, similar gardens, similarly enclosed, each with its
pavilion, were on all sides distinctly to be seen. Now
converging, now diverging, these fences presented a striking
irregularity of contour. No fence was party, nor any part of any
fence. But their adjacence was such, at certain places, that a
broad-shouldered or broad-basined man, threading these
narrow straits, would have done so with greater ease and with
less jeopardy to his coat, and perhaps to his trousers, sideways
than frontways. For a big-bottomed man, on the contrary, or a
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big-bellied man, frontal motion would be an absolute neces-
sity, if he did not wish his stomach to be perforated, or his arse,
or perhaps both, by a rusty barb, or by rusty barbs. A big-
bottomed big-bosomed woman, an obese wet-nurse, for
example, would be under a similar necessity. While persons at
once broad-shouldered and big-bellied, or broad-basined and
big-bottomed, or broad-basined and big-bellied, or broad-
shouldered and big-bottomed, or big-bosomed and broad-
shouldered, or big-bosomed and broad-basined, would on no
account, if they were in their right senses, commit themselves
to this treacherous channel . . .
Both the horror and the humour of such a passage owe
everything to Dante, while the distance between the anguished
tension of the Inferno and the despairing hilarity of Watt can in
part be traced back to the corrosive powers that animate the
earlier work.
The damned, then, show no signs of making themselves scarce.
Like the poor, they are ever with us. But can the same be said of
Beatrice and the blessed? Alas, no. Clinging to the wreckage,
Ulysses and his sinful crew survive for a thousand reincarnations,
but the good ship Paradise, it seems, was lost with all hands.
Fortunately Dante was not aboard. Having threaded the world’s
most treacherous passage and dreamed up, for the other side, a
Purgatorio and Paradiso of great beauty and complexity but little
excitement, he then awoke to find himself once again under the
stars, where he remains with us to this day. It is a poor and
shadowy sort of immortality for a man who no doubt believed he
would be in the blazing light of Paradise with the saints and the
angels; but at least the commedia of literary fame, unlike that of
Heaven and Hell, is not one that need be underwritten by the
sufferings of the damned.
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The Universal Gentleman
[Jorge Luis Borges]
‘Romantic ego worship and loudmouthed individualism are . . .
wreaking a havoc on the arts,’ announces a twenty-three-year-old
Borges in the first essay of Selected Non-Fictions. The date is
1922. The piece is entitled ‘The Nothingness of the Personality’.
In bold, polemical spirit, he declares: ‘The self does not exist.’
Fifty-six years later, old, adored and blind, Borges finds himself
lecturing on the subject of immortality. He remarks: ‘I don’t
want to continue being Jorge Luis Borges; I want to be someone
else. I hope that my death will be total; I hope to die in body and
soul.’
In the first statement the self doesn’t exist; in the second it is
sufficiently real to be a burden, indeed the burden. It will not be
difficult to read all of Borges’s work as driven by the tension
generated between these two positions: self the merest invention,
easily dissolved and denied; self the most disturbing imposition,
frightening in its implications, appalling in its tenacity and
limitations. All the same, the curious thing in the later statement
is the confession: ‘I want to be someone else.’ Is that an option?
It is something we shall have to come back to.
Born a shy boy in 1899 in the macho town of Buenos Aires, the
young Borges must soon have had occasion to feel different from
others. His parents contrived to exacerbate his self-awareness in
all kinds of ways. Half-English, his father, Jorge Guillermo
Borges, had his children brought up bilingual. Here was
distinction. There was an English grandmother, an English
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nanny, above all a well-stocked English library where Jorge Luis
and his younger sister Norah did their first reading. Coddled at
home till the age of nine, Jorge Luis was then plunged, as if in
some perverse behavioural experiment, into a tough local school.
A bespectacled stammerer, eccentrically dressed in Eton blazer
and tie, he had five years here to learn about bullying before the
family was obliged to move to Switzerland to find a cure for Jorge
Guillermo’s incipient blindness.
Now Borges was the boy who didn’t know French and
German. He learned them. Living in Geneva, he spent his teens
reading voraciously in four languages, so that by the age of
twenty he had already discovered most of the writers who would
be important to him throughout his long career. The impressive
list that all accounts of his life must necessarily repeat (for Borges
always kept his sources to the fore) includes, among many others,
Berkeley, Hume, William James, Cervantes, Chesterton, Scho-
penhauer, Baudelaire, Carlyle, Wells, Nietzsche, Stevenson, Poe,
Whitman (in German) and the author of The Thousand and One
Nights.
The Thousand and One Nights was his declared favourite. But
having read and reread this Arab exotica in Burton’s lavishly
lubricious version, it must have been clear to the young Borges
that there was now another thing he didn’t know about, another
thing that threatened to set him apart: sex. Certainly his timidity
and innocence were evident to the other members of the family.
Jorge Guillermo, a compulsive philanderer, ever dependent on
and ever betraying his domineering wife, decided that the boy’s
education was not complete. Before returning to Argentina,
Jorge Luis must visit a European brothel. The matter was
arranged, but alas, this lesson was not so easily mastered. Wide
and adventurous reading would not be matched by wild
adventures and women. Unsettled, Jorge Luis settled at home
and, unlike Father, remained ever faithful to Leonor, his
remarkable mother.
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*
‘Intention’, begins the first essay. The word is given a paragraph
all to itself. It is a flourish, a cannon shot. We are about to read a
manifesto. The author wants ‘to tear down the exceptional pre-
eminence now generally awarded to the self’ and in its place to
‘erect . . . an aesthetic hostile to the psychologism inherited from
the last century’.
The tone is understandable. The 1920s were, after all, the
decade of manifestos. Borges had been in Spain, he considered
himself an Ultraist, a committed man. But it is marvellously
ironic and an indication of some wit on the editor’s part that this
new collection of his non-fiction should begin thus. For very soon
Borges would appreciate that a successful attack on the cults of
selfhood and personality would necessarily have to play down the
role of intention, since intention is one of the most obvious and
powerful manifestations of the self: ‘in art nothing is more
secondary than an author’s intentions’, he will be telling us in a
later essay. When speaking of achievements, literary or otherwise,
he loves to introduce such formulas as, ‘almost unwittingly’, or
‘without wanting to or suspecting he had done so’. ‘A great book
like the Divina Commedia,’ he typically concludes one piece ‘is
not the isolated or random caprice of an individual; many men
and many generations built towards it.’
Yet, ironically, the intention so succinctly stated on the
opening page of Selected Non-Fictions remains a fair description of
Borges’s own remarkable achievement in the years to come, an
achievement which is anything but unwitting. Intentionally, he
played down intention. He accomplished what he set out to do.
Even the man’s exemplary modesty, everywhere evident in these
essays and unfailingly celebrated by those who knew him, was, if
we can use the expression, an ‘engaged’ modesty, a pondered
modesty, and very much part of this determined and lifelong
project of ‘self-effacement. Whether or not we choose to see that
project as linked to Borges’s feelings of social and sexual
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inadequacy, or the fact that he remained emotionally and
economically dependent on his mother right into middle age is
irrelevant.
Borges’s career begins when he returns to Argentina in 1921 after
seven formative years in Europe. His parents tell him it’s OK to
stay home and write. He doesn’t need to go to university, he
doesn’t need to find a job. So he reads and writes, makes literary
friendships, and courts well-to-do young women who have no
intention of marrying him or making love to him. The more they
have no intention of loving him, the more he reads and writes.
When his father falls ill and eventually dies, Borges is obliged, in
his late thirties, to find work. He writes as a columnist for a
women’s magazine, appropriately entitled El Hogar, Home.
Eventually he is forced to accept a minor clerical job in an
overstaffed suburban library. Most of his nine years there will be
spent in the basement reading and writing and trying to avoid his
colleagues. Finally, in his early forties, he believes he has met the
woman of his life. He walks Estela Canto through the warm
Buenos Aires evenings, phoning Mother from call boxes at
regular intervals to reassure her he will be home soon. When
Estela rejects his offer of marriage, Borges steps up his reading
and writing.
So the output is considerable. Each of Viking’s recent
compendiums of the three major strands of Borges’s work –
poetry, short stories and essays – runs out at just above or just
below five hundred pages, and of the essays we are told that this
new collection contains only 161 out of a possible twelve
hundred. At the same time it’s worth noting that only a very few
of the pieces in any of the books exceed six or seven pages. The
long work was as alien to Borges as work in general was
compulsive. A rehearsal of one or two plots from the most
celebrated story collections, Fictions and The Aleph, may help us
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to understand why this was so and what was that ‘aesthetic hostile
to psychologism’ that Borges eventually hit upon.
A certain Pierre Menard, author of a miscellany of minor
philosophical, critical and poetical works (his ‘visible oeuvre’),
dedicates the greater part of his life to reproducing Cervantes’
Don Quixote word for word. This he does not by copying, nor by
immersing himself in Cervantes’ world, but by coming to the
story ‘through the experience of Pierre Menard’. ‘If I could just
be immortal, I could do it,’ he says. As it is, we are given but one
fragmentary example of his success in reproducing the original
(though how he himself can know this, if he won’t reread Don
Quixote for fear of copying, remains a mystery), as follows:
. . . truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of
deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the present,
and the future’s counsellor.
Our admiring narrator comments that while the words are banal
period rhetoric in the mouth of Cervantes, coming from Menard,
they are remarkable. ‘History, the mother of truth! – the idea is
staggering. Menard, a contemporary of William James, defines
history not as a delving into reality, but as the very fount of
reality.’
The implications of the story are as evident as its unravelling is
hilarious. If Menard can reproduce Cervantes then individuality is
quite superficial. ‘Every man should be capable of all ideas and I
believe in the future he shall be.’ History, far from being ‘the
mother of truth’ is mere clutter. We could all write everything
that has been written. And how fascinating if I can now see a
snippet of Don Quixote in praise of the military life as being
influenced by Pierre Menard’s reading of Friedrich Nietzsche!
Too intelligent to waste time arguing a position, Borges dazzles
by conflation. The most improbable writers are wondrously
superimposed. Humanity is one. Or maybe not. Pierre Menard is
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a typical example of Borges’s tendency to be ironic about a
position he finds congenial.
It is standard orthodoxy to praise Borges for bringing all kinds
of innovations to fiction, but in a way it may be easier to think of
him as working out the consequences of removing from it all the
innovations of the previous six or seven hundred years. Along
with our modern nominalism and our ingenuous belief in history
and individual character, the perplexing notion of personal
responsibility will likewise have to go. In ‘The Lottery in
Babylon’, we discover that everything that happens to people,
good or bad, is not the result of their psychology or relationships,
but rather the immensely complex working out of a state lottery
into which each citizen is automatically and periodically entered
and which, rather than dealing in money, dispenses happiness,
unhappiness and tedium in every imaginable form. The random
nature of their lives allows the Babylonians to enjoy all aspects of
experience and become, as it were, everybody. ‘Like all men of
Babylon, I have been proconsul; like all, I have been a slave. I
have known omnipotence, ignominy, imprisonment.’ Again the
accident of individuality is eliminated, there are no decisions, no
responsibility, no success, no failure, no self.
The same occurs in ‘The Immortal’. A group of men gain
immortality and as a result lose all interest in life, since over an
infinite period of time everything must happen to them, good
and bad. Any action becomes unimportant, no more than ‘the
echo of others that preceded it with no visible beginning, and the
faithful presage of others that will repeat it in the future, ad
vertiginem’. So there can be ‘no spiritual or intellectual merits’.
Homer has forgotten his Greek. What is the point of remember-
ing anything?
Typically, Borges revels in the elimination of what are normally
considered the inescapable conditions of our existence, but at the
same time never fails to underline the ludicrous or terrifying
consequences. As with any ghost story, ‘The Immortal’ gains its
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disturbing power from the unspoken message that it is better to
be either alive and engaged or dead and gone rather than, as
Cioran would put it, to ‘fall out of time’ altogether. Thus the
narrator of ‘The Immortal’, who has sought and gained eternal
life, now seeks to return to mortality, and is overjoyed when,
some sixteen hundred years later, he succeeds. The pain that
promises eventual death now becomes pleasure:
Incredulous, speechless, and in joy, I contemplated the
precious formation of a slow drop of blood. I am once more
mortal, I told myself over and over, again I am like all other
men. That night, I slept until daybreak.
The pattern in ‘The Aleph’ is the same. Overwhelmed by the
vision of a place in which all places simultaneously intersect, the
narrator urgently needs to forget in order to return to normality.
Again and again, the self seeks, or is granted, infinite extension, is
terrified, returns to the ‘ordinary’ world.
Ordinariness itself, on the other hand, is not a condition
Borges wishes to write about, except by exploring the implica-
tions of its opposite. Perhaps this is because the ‘ordinary’
situation he finds himself in is so unattractive. An ugly fascism has
conquered Europe. Officially neutral, Argentina is spiritually pro-
Nazi. This is ugly. Peronism is rampant. Estela no longer goes
out for walks with him. Mother continues to buy his clothes but
Borges doesn’t care for the maid she has hired. The library job is
unbearable, but, even more unbearable, in 1946 Borges finds
himself fired for having expressed his anti-Peronist views. He has
no income. The learnedly facetious detective stories he has
written with close friend Adolfo Bioy are not a solution. They
have generated more perplexity than royalties. Forced to take up
lecturing to make ends meet, Borges must visit, of all people, a
psychologist in an attempt to overcome his chronic shyness. He
cannot speak in public. The psychologist, needless to say, has a
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useful smattering of Freud, a man Borges has charmingly
dismissed in a single line of a story entitled ‘A Survey of the
Works of Herbert Quain’.
Taken one by one each of the short stories, at least of Fictions and
The Aleph, is striking, dazzling. Nevertheless, to read them all one
after another is to grow a little weary. Where the self is not
perilously extended by a brush with infinity, we have satires of
people whose individuality is exposed as a vain boast. The first
time we hear that two rivals die only to discover they are the same
person, we are fascinated. There is great insight here. The second
time something of the kind occurs, we admire again the
brilliance, the extraordinary wit, the admirable range of philo-
sophical reference with which this idea is worked out. The two
are theologians of the early Christian world. Or they are
Argentine painters, or they are gaucho knife fighters. Then they
are gaucho knife fighters again. By the time, in the later stories,
we reach the fifth or sixth presentation of two or more central
‘characters’ obliged to recognise a mysterious oneness, we have
realised that Borges has effectively eliminated the idea of a
diversified community (so useful when it comes to protracted
storytelling). There are now only two conditions: the single self
here and now, and all humanity throughout all time. Of course
these two conditions are actually the same: any antagonism is
cancelled out in the oneness of all human experience.
Putting it another way, we might say that Borges reaches out
to a transcendental oneness, the community of all men, but finds
himself constantly returned to Borges. There is nothing, or
nothing we would wish to contemplate, in the middle. Gradually,
he begins to tire of establishing the elaborate and multiform
disguises behind which oneness lurks. There are so many hats a
rabbit can be pulled from. Or rather: we begin to see the rabbit
before Borges pulls it out. We even begin to wish he would leave
it in there. And in fact this is what he eventually starts doing in
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the supposedly ‘more realistic stories’ of the collection Brodie’s
Report. But we see that rabbit all the same. It is time to turn to
the essays.
‘That crowded day,’ Borges writes in a piece entitled ‘A
Comment on August 23, 1944’ ‘gave me three distinct surprises:
the physical degree of joy I felt when they told me that Paris had
been liberated; the discovery that a collective emotion can be
noble; the puzzling and flagrant enthusiasm of many who were
supporters of Hitler.’
This is Borges writing inside history. He has not chosen the
subject matter, it is forced upon him; he is obliged to recognise
surprises. In particular, finding himself at one with public enthusi-
asm must have come as a big surprise indeed, for Borges.
Immediately, his brilliant mind sets to work to understand, to
place this experience, and particularly the inexplicable happiness
of these Nazi sympathisers, within the reference points of his
considerable erudition. Needless to say, he has no intention of
talking to those sympathisers. They are incoherent, they enjoy
only a low level of consciousness, any ‘uncertainty was preferable
to the uncertainty of a dialogue with these siblings of chaos’. For
Borges, the moral, intellectual and aesthetic are always insepar-
able.
After some reflection, the first conclusion he reaches is that
these people are merely succumbing to the reality of what has
happened, somewhat dazzled in the meanwhile by the power of
the symbols ‘Paris’ and ‘liberation’. But such a banal explanation
could not long satisfy a man like Borges, for whom it was always
important that an explanation be both profound and beautiful.
Happily, some nights later, he recalls that in Shaw’s Man and
Superman a character has a dream ‘where he affirms that the
horror of hell is its unreality’. Borges then has no difficulty
relating this idea to the doctrine, a thousand and more years
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before, of ‘John Scotus Erigena, who denied the substantive
existence of sin and evil’.
The writer then compares these textual references to his
memory of the day Paris was occupied. A Germanophile had
come to give Borges the news, announcing in stentorian tones
the imminent fall of London and the pointlessness of any
opposition. Behind the apparent enthusiasm, Borges had sensed,
with great psychological acumen, that the Nazi sympathiser was
himself terrified by the completeness of Hitler’s victory. Nazism,
he concludes, like Erigena’s hell, (or indeed, if it comes to that,
the worlds of ‘The Immortal’ and of ‘The Lottery of Babylon’)
‘suffers from unreality’. One can die for it and lie for it, but in the
end it is ‘uninhabitable’, one cannot actually want it. ‘Hitler is
blindly collaborating with the inevitable armies that will annihi-
late him, as the metal vultures and the dragon (which must have
known that they were monsters) collaborated, mysteriously, with
Hercules.’
In just a page and a half, then, Borges has brought a historical
experience, private and public, into line with his reading and with
his tendency to see antagonists as obeying a larger and ahistorical
design beyond their immediate intentions. Most of all, he has
redeemed reality, however unpromising his own personal situa-
tion may have been at the time. Whether we agree with what he
says or not (something largely irrelevant when reading Borges),
we find ourselves with a feast of ideas to consider and, above all,
the example of how a remarkable mind comes to grips with the
world in a constant back and forth between personal experience
and the ideas of others.
Borges is a great orchestrator. There is his name on the front
cover of the book and then, in the index at the back, the three
hundred or so names of his close collaborators, the authors he
constantly quotes and examines and uses to examine others:
sixteen entries for Walt Whitman, thirty-eight for Schopenhauer,
twenty-eight for De Quincey. This is the community Borges
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moves in, the orchestra he conducts and seeks at once to lose
himself in and to make his own. Twenty entries for Plato and
Platonism, twenty-four for Chesterton, thirteen for Benedetto
Croce. ‘The History of literature’ – this remark from Paul Vale´ry
appears on more than one occasion – ‘should not be the history
of authors and the course of their careers or of the career of their
works, but rather the history of the Spirit as the producer or
consumer of literature’. Borges’s essays attempt to invoke that
spirit by bringing the most disparate voices together. And what
better way to start than by showing that every quotation can be
corroborated by another? He follows Vale´ry with this remark
from Emerson:
I am very much struck in literature by the appearance that one
person wrote all the books . . . there is such equality and
identity both of judgement and point of view in the narrative
that it is plainly the work of one all-seeing all-hearing
gentleman.
How wonderful the word ‘gentleman’ is there. Perhaps this ‘one
person’ is the ‘someone else’ Borges claimed he wanted to be.
Over the sixty-four years of the production covered in Selected
Non-Fictions, Borges comes at a huge range of subjects – the
tango, suicide, the apocryphal Gospels, Argentinian literature,
translation, the paradoxes of Zeno, German literature in the Age
of Bach – plus dozens of biographical sketches of the most
disparate figures, and he never tires, never sinks into mannerism.
Again and again he takes on a new subject, marshals his reading,
his faithful friends of old, gives us fresh ways of seeing things,
suggests lucid, often conflicting, frequently bizarre ways of
understanding the world. It is astonishing. And though the
yearnings are ever the same – the desire to annihilate time, to
approach a transcendental perception of life, to grasp an
33
Hell and Back
ungraspable truth – Borges never stoops to wishful thinking.
Here he is speaking of Emerson’s monism and assuming a
position which seems an implicit criticism of much of his own
endeavour:
Our destiny is tragic because we are, irreparably, individuals,
restricted by time and by space; there is nothing, consequently,
more favourable than a faith that eliminates circumstances and
declares that every man is all men and that there is no one who
is not the universe. Those who profess such a doctrine are
generally unfortunate or mediocre, avid to annul themselves in
the cosmos . . .
Is this an ironic triumph of self-effacement? Or is it that Borges
feels he comes closest to that ‘all-seeing all-hearing gentleman’
when able to hold two conflicting views, if not simultaneously,
then almost? Here he is only two years on from the Emerson
piece leaning quite the other way over the question of Argentine
provincialism, its tendency to believe the country is cut off from
European tradition and must thus establish its own separate
world:
This opinion strikes me as unfounded. I understand why many
people accept it: such a declaration of our solitude, our
perdition, and our primitive character has, like existentialism,
the charms of poignancy. Many people may accept this
opinion because, having done so, they will feel themselves to
be alone, disconsolate and, in some way, interesting.
I am trying to suggest that while much of the work in the five
hundred-plus pages of Viking’s Collected Fictions actually detracts
from the marvellous achievement of the best stories, the opposite
is true of the essays. Here, accretion is of the essence as we watch
Borges twisting and turning to deal with new contingencies, to
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write for different kinds of publications, to accommodate
contradictory intuitions, to strike an impossible balance, to align a
film he has seen, a book he has read, a historical figure, a political
event, to an essential core of reading and its related force field of
ideas. Taken as a whole, Selected Non-Fictions is the more
interesting, more seductive book. Joyce is the twentieth century’s
great genius, but both Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, in so far as
they express the exasperation of a highly personal style, are
‘unreadable’ and parts of the latter actually ‘incompetent’.
‘Psychologism’ is anathema, but we have an entirely convincing
psychological reading of the Divina Commedia that prompts
Borges to field the provocation that the whole work was
undertaken to allow Dante to stage an imagined encounter with
the dead woman who had rejected him. All literature is the work
of the same spirit, but on rereading Shakespeare and his
contemporaries Borges has no difficulty in resolving that most
celebrated of authorship arguments: only Shakespeare could have
written Shakespeare. Pierre Menard take heed.
It is this process of Borges’s coming to terms with things, his
seeking, for example, to be outside Argentinian politics but then
finding himself involved in a visceral antagonism with Peron, that
makes the essays so engaging. As if, at last, and precisely because
they were not written to be collected, we had the sustained,
chronologically fascinating narrative that Borges never wrote, the
tale of his own self constantly seeking to shake off that self.
In fact, it occurs to me now that perhaps I was wrong at the
beginning of this essay to imagine that Borges achieved his
intended goal; perhaps he is right to go on claiming (in his
sixties) that ‘the true essence of a writer’s work is usually
unknown by that writer’. For as piece after piece in the collection
brings together dozens of quotations from all ages to suggest the
oneness of human experience, so we grow ever more aware of a
deep divide that separates him, and indeed us, from most of those
he cites.
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The phenomenon is most evident in a strand that runs
throughout the book and is, one suspects, the author’s favourite.
It involves the rapid consideration of this or that metaphysical
view of the world. So we have ‘A Defence of Basilides the False’,
who, in the second century believed human beings to be the
deficient improvisation of a lesser God. Borges justifies the idea
thus: ‘What better gift can we hope for than to be insignificant?
What greater glory for a God than to be absolved of the world?’
And Borges considers J.W. Dunne’s bizarre book Nothing
Dies, published in 1940, which claims that we already possess
eternity since the future is pre-existent. Our dreams are proof of
this. ‘In death we shall recover all the moments of our lives and
combine them as we please. God and our friends and Shakespeare
will collaborate with us.’ In a complex discussion Borges
dismisses Dunne’s reasoning, but concludes: ‘So splendid a thesis
makes any fallacy committed by the author insignificant.’
In short, and this occurs again and again, we are offered an
aesthetic appreciation of a metaphysical position, or a whole
philosophy, regardless, but never unaware of its probable truth.
So angels are attractive (‘I always imagine them at nightfall, in the
dusk of a slum or a vacant lot . . . with their backs to the sunset’)
while the Trinity is ‘an intellectual horror, a strangled specious
infinity, like facing mirrors’.
Borges is prodigiously generous with these savourings. The
doctrine, from Pythagoras to Nietzsche, of repeating cycles of
existence is shown to be ugly, but Phillip Henry Gosse’s theory
that at the moment of creation God created not only an infinite
future but an infinite past too, which explains why although the
world begins with Adam nevertheless that first man could have
come across the fossils of animals that had never been, is very
beautiful. What separates Borges from Gosse of course, and
indeed almost all the others he quotes, is that for Gosse what
mattered was whether his theory was true or not. These people
were fundamentalists, or at least believers, and always earnest
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scholars. Borges is not only incapable of fundamentalism and
traditional religious belief, but even incapable of attacking it per
se. He is as far removed from scholasticism as it is possible to be.
In this he declares his modernity. Butterfly-like, he sucks nectar
here and there, and finds it to be largely the same nectar. It is
difficult to imagine such an attitude being struck pre-Nietzsche.
The same underlying irony, though this is not unwitting,
emerges from Borges’s constant assault on history. Frequently a
date, the fifth century for example, is introduced with the
qualification ‘of our era’ (‘the fifth century of our era’) to remind
us of all the other fifth centuries. Frequently, a writer generally
celebrated for epitomising the avant-garde of his time is pre-
sented by Borges as, on the contrary, akin to some quite different
period. Apollinaire is close to the twelfth-century author of
Chanson de Roland: ‘He was so unmodern that modernity
seemed picturesque, and perhaps even moving, to him.’ Oscar
Wilde, far from being fin-de-sie`cle man par excellence, is actually a
creature of the eighteenth century, akin to Gibbon, Johnson and
Voltaire. But such claims, which pitch the beauty of imaginative
parallel against the ugly sloth of received ideas, largely serve to
illuminate the target they cannot destroy. Borges is kicking
against the pricks. His secret task, perhaps, was to remind us of
the limits of even the most powerful imagination.
Meanwhile, many beautiful and ugly things were happening in
the writer’s life. Having survived the first period of Peronism, he
was, to his astonishment, made Director of the Argentine
National Library by the generals who had ousted the dictator. It
was 1955. Borges had often thought of paradise as a library. But
exactly as the Pearly Gates were opened to him, his declining
sight, a consequence of a congenital condition, finally gave out.
‘No one,’ he wrote in ‘Poem of Gifts’, ‘should read self-pity or
reproach/into this statement of the majesty/of God, who with
such splendid irony/granted me books and blindness at one
touch.’
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Blindness and its attendant dependency, writes Borges’s bland
biographer, James Woodall, ‘was not a problem for Leonor’.
Mother accompanied the writer on his now frequent lecture
tours. Mother walked the streets with him, to hear his rehearsal of
performances that shyness still made a torture. But oddly, now
that he couldn’t see them, being with women was rather easier.
Often very young women. They were invited to intimate seminars
in pleasant cafe´s to learn Old English with him. Evidently the
writer’s imagination hadn’t deserted him. They collaborated on
anthologies and textbooks. Did Borges consider them his
intellectual equals? Was the all-seeing gentleman also a gentle-
woman? With its scores of literary biographies and book reviews
only a page and a half of Selected Non-Fictions is dedicated to a
woman: Virginia Woolf, a writer whose transcendental yearnings
are very close to Borges’s own. He had translated Orlando.
Famous now, finally secure economically, Borges was seized by
a longing for the domestic happiness that had always eluded him.
In 1967, he married an old friend and widow with whom he had
lost touch for twenty years. How long was it before he
appreciated that this was not the beautiful thing he had wanted?
The energetic and ambitious Norman Di Giovanni, Borges’s
translator and uncomfortably close collaborator over the next few
years, claimed that the writer was already unhappy when he, Di
Giovanni, first met him only months after his marriage. Crass
statements of the variety, ‘he had a lousy marriage – and I was
getting divorced from my first wife,’ give us a measure of the
distance between Di Giovanni and Borges.
Still, it is truly difficult to leave somebody in a beautiful and
gentleman-like fashion. Three years after their wedding, the
unsuspecting Elsa Borges went to the door to find, not her
husband back for lunch, as he had promised, but a lawyer and a
group of men from a removals company with instructions to
remove his books. The Thousand and One Nights was going back
to Mum. ‘A New Refutation of Time’, the essay in which Borges
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most energetically sets out to deny the reality of substance and
time, ends with a brutal, indeed breathtaking volte-face: ‘The
world unfortunately is real; I unfortunately am Borges.’ Here is
drama.
But what does Borges ultimately understand by the aesthetic?
What makes something beautiful? An essay entitled ‘The Wall
and the Books’ begins: ‘I read, a few days ago, that the man who
ordered the building of the almost infinite Chinese Wall was the
first Emperor, Shih Huang Ti, who also decreed the burning of
all the books that had been written before his time.’ Borges
ponders the relation between these two extraordinary gestures of
construction and destruction; are they complementary, or do
they cancel each other out? After much ingenious hypothesising,
he is obliged to concede that the enigma remains intact. But this
is never a problem for Borges, who enjoys ‘those things that can
enrich ignorance’. He concludes:
Music, states of happiness, mythology, faces worn by time,
certain twilights and certain places, all want to tell us
something, or have told us something we shouldn’t have lost,
or are about to tell us something; that imminence of revelation
as yet unproduced is, perhaps, the aesthetic fact.
The ‘imminence of revelation’. When do we most frequently
sense it? When reading. On three or four occasions in this
collection Borges fields the idea that ‘each time we repeat a line
by Dante or Shakespeare, we are, in some way, that instant when
Dante or Shakespeare created that line’. Reading is a transmigra-
tion of souls, the sacred act by which Borges can become, if only
for the period of the reading, somebody else. In its yearning for
and respect of another’s otherness, and likewise our shared
oneness, reading has a profound moral content. It is beautiful
and good. ‘A book is a thing among things . . . until it meets its
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reader . . . What then occurs is that singular emotion called
beauty, that lovely mystery which neither psychology nor
criticism can describe . . .’
Beauty is the superimposition of separate minds in the
experience of art. It is in this sense that we must understand
Borges modest boast, often repeated, that he was first and
foremost a reader not a writer. As the most immediate fruit of
that reading, bringing together the writer’s consumption and
creation of literature in the paradise of his personal library, the
essays are his greatest gift to us.
These reflections may help us to understand the relation
between Borges’s wonderfully lucid prose and his underlying
vision. In the early days he had been more baroque, he had
sought to amaze in each sentence. One or two of the early essays
in the collection give us a taste of this. He was excited by the
invention of compound words (imagining, for example, a word
that might mean at once sunset and the sound of cattle bells). But
later, and under the influence of his friend Bioy, he moved to a
prose at once simpler and more assured, and above all to a style
that erases, so far as is possible, everything personal. His quarrel
with Finnegans Wake, for example, is precisely its creation of a
personal language, largely through the invention of compound
words.
The result of this switch from the personal to the urbane, the
romantic to the classical, is that the complex and dazzling
connections that his mind was ever generating now come to the
fore with greater clarity, unencumbered with ‘literary’ ornament
or that tiresome ‘look-at-me’ cleverness that characterised so
much of the avant-garde writing of the period. In particular, in
the essays the style becomes, as it were, the pure transparent air
through which the echoes of all the writers he is exploring can be
heard. A medium in which many minds can meet.
Garrulous as he had once been shy, blessedly famous as he had
been obscure, Borges toured the globe, accepting countless
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literary honours, cheerfully chattering to hangers-on, determined
to redeem his early sin, as he described it, of having been
unhappy. Mother was dead at last. Well aware that his best work
was behind him, he dictated poetry and lectures to nice young
women. Were the girls more important to him than the pieces he
was composing? Certainly a great deal of the poetry would have
been better left out of the large and largely dull selection Viking
have put together, while only a process akin to sanctification
could account for the Harvard University Press’s decision to
publish in full the transcripts of his bumbling Norton Lectures. In
editing the selected non-fiction, however, Eliot Weinberger has
been sharper and kinder, offering us only such late material as is
as exciting as anything else in the collection. He also adds
sufficient biographical notes to spare most readers from looking
at James Woodall’s uninspired biography. It is amusing, however,
to discover from Woodall that Borges’s politics were such that he
was glad to accept the Grand Cross of the Order of Bernardo
O’Higgins from the hands of General Pinochet. This in 1976.
Ten years later, terminally ill, Borges made a final attempt to
extract himself from Argentine history, by going to Geneva to
die. At last he was back in the place of his early reading, the town
where he first met Schopenhauer and Berkeley and Cervantes.
Shortly before the music stopped, he married the young
companion then in the chair beside him, Maria Kodama.
But now that he is in paradise, with whom does Borges find he
shares his identity? To say his mother would be banal. Everybody
knew they were one throughout. To say his arch-antagonist
General Peron would be a mockery, though I suspect of the kind
that Borges himself, after a little time for adjustment, might have
proposed. Let me close with an act of conflation that I hope will
be understood as a tribute to the fascinating thought processes
which animate this wonderful writer’s work.
In 1961, Borges shared the first International Publishers Prize
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with Samuel Beckett. He never mentions Beckett in the Selected
Non-Fictions, nor from what I have been able to gather, did he
ever read him. Let us count the ways in which the two writers are
similar. Both men came from countries considered peripheral to
the cultural centre, countries undergoing periods of intense
nationalism, from which these writers largely dissociated them-
selves. Both suffered from chronic inhibitions. Both spoke the
same four languages: Spanish, French, English, German. Both
translated. Both had domineering mothers. Both were obsessed
with Dante. Both were theologians and atheists. Both were
writers whose adventurous fiction was largely fed by their
readings of philosophy (in many cases the same philosophy).
Both opposed Nazism in courageous ways. Both mocked modern
scholasticism and have been appropriated by it. Both were
fascinated by the extent to which language has an inertia of its
own, which speaks itself regardless of individual intentions. Both
were childless. Both concentrated on those experiences essential
to all men, rather than the dramas generated by different
characters and contingent circumstance. Both became fascinated
by the multiplicity of the self and the inability to escape the self.
Both wondered at the border between finite and infinite,
mathematics and metaphysics. Both lived more or less contem-
poraneously into highly praised old age. Both longed for
extinction.
‘Racine and Mallarme´,’ Borges claimed, ‘are the same writer.’
Now that they are ‘quite dead at last’, as Beckett’s Malone put it,
can we say as much of Borges and Beckett? ‘If people vary at all,’
writes Henry Green in Party Going, ‘it can only be in the
impressions they leave on others’ minds.’ To read Borges is an
entirely different experience, a different encounter, a different
transmigration, than to read Beckett. Whatever their status in a
bibliophile’s paradise, we can only wonder that two men who
insisted on the oneness of human experience and who themselves
had so much in common, should also have such sharply distinct,
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but equally enchanting voices. The all-seeing gentleman is a
genius of impersonation.
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Here Comes Salman
[Salman Rushdie]
‘The art [of the novel],’ wrote Schopenhauer, ‘lies in setting the
inner life into the most violent motion with the smallest possible
expenditure of outer life.’ Salman Rushdie would not agree. It is
not that there is no inner life in his novel The Ground Beneath
Her Feet. Nor indeed does one feel that Rushdie would require
any external occurrences at all to set his fertile mind in motion. It
is just that the sheer quantity of events that crowd these 575
pages is such as to overwhelm any depiction of inner life or any
mind’s attempt to grasp the half of them. For brevity’s sake, more
elaborate syntax will have to give way to the list – as so often it
does in Rushdie’s prose – if we are to offer the slightest idea of
what is between these covers.
We have, in the first third of the book: Bombay in the forties
and fifties, with the immensely complex shenanigans of various
extended families, scams, superstitions, Zoroastrianism, arson,
cricket, politics, suicides, murders, love at first sight, cinema
interiors, mythology, rock music and goat farming (the inner life
is present most strikingly in the form of bizarre psychic
experiences).
Then: London in the sixties with more of most of the above,
plus drugs, sex, pirate radio stations, music business entrepre-
neurs, a delightfully erotic young lady who can pass through
walls, Chelsea boutiques, record contracts, a car accident, deep
coma and intimations of a variety of catastrophes. In the Bombay
section I omitted to mention an earthquake and some lessons in
photography. We discover that Lou Reed is a woman and that
45
Hell and Back
Kennedy survived both Lee Harvey Oswald and the second
gunman on the grassy knoll, only to be murdered later by the
same bullet that slew his brother (and incumbent president)
Bobbie.
Finally we have New York and the US in general through the
seventies, eighties and nineties, with more selections of the above
(especially the mythology), plus some rock concerts (though still
fewer than the murders and earthquakes). There is stardom and
its penthouses, the discovery that ‘alternative worlds’ are in
‘tectonic collision’, a recording-contract dispute with global
ramifications, more extremely weird psychic experiences and even
Orphic expeditions to bring back the dead (though this may just
be a morbid form of voyeurism), and – to close – earthquake,
death, murder and, at the last – why not? – happy love.
In his novel Haroun and the Sea of Stories, Rushdie has his
charming young protagonist say: ‘I always thought storytelling
was like juggling . . . You keep a lot of different tales in the air,
and juggle them up and down, and if you’re good you don’t drop
any.’ In The Ground Beneath Her Feet Rushdie tosses up a great
many balls, most of them very large and decidedly colourful.
Certainly he is determined to dazzle. Whether he manages to
keep them usefully in the air or not is something it is hard at first
for the reader to judge, since the pages are very soon, with
respect, so full of balls that the mind can only boggle. Rushdie’s
dazzle is not of the variety that illuminates or clarifies. He seems
nervous of letting more than a page or two go by without some
melodramatic event to distract our attention. In the London
section, I see I forgot to mention a potion-brewing, fashion-
queen witch-murderer. I also forgot to say that the whole story is
told by one who declares himself one of the world’s great sceptics
and rationalists.
Along with a considerable school of critical thought, Rushdie is
among those who have sought over recent years to turn the
energy of the ‘multicultural’ and the hybrid into an elaborate
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aesthetic with a serious moral and political slant. Most readers will
be familiar with the way his books mix different narrative
traditions, confuse the historical and fantastical, East and West,
gods and men and, not least, characters and author. So when
something over halfway through The Ground Beneath Her Feet,
its Indian rock-star hero, now resident in England, finally records
the song that will make him famous, it is evident from the novel’s
discussion of this turning point that Rushdie is inviting analogies
with his own work. Shortly before the recording we read: ‘He
hasn’t fully grasped how to make of multiplicity an accumulating
strength rather than a frittery weakness.’
But when the breakthrough comes, with the psychic hero
boldly firing his support musicians and recording instrument after
instrument one over the other all on his own, the new star is able
to announce:
What I want the music to say is that I don’t have to choose . . .
I need it to show that I don’t have to be this guy or that guy,
the fellow from over there or the fellow from here, the person
within me that I call my twin, or whoever’s out there in
whatever it is I get flashes of beyond the sky; or just the man
standing in front of you right now. I’ll be all of them, I can do
that. Here comes everybody, right? That’s where it came from
the idea of playing all the instruments. It was to prove that
point.
The energy of the Rushdie aesthetic is thus to come from a
rejection of the pathos of choice, of that need, with which most
of us will be all too familiar, to become one thing or another,
‘this guy or that guy’, taking decisions from day to day. Instead,
everything is to be maintained in a fizz of promise, potential,
multiplicity and openness. It will be noted at once that such an
attitude, repeatedly expressed throughout Rushdie’s work, falls
easily into line with that area of contemporary culture which likes
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to associate its desire to remain for ever young with the political
ideals of tolerance and peaceful cohabitation. And indeed for
Rushdie, the hybrid, or simply the multiform, comes to be seen as
an antidote to that fundamentalism which has treated him so
scandalously. Of the Moor in The Moor’s Last Sigh, he remarked
in an interview, ‘he was a poetic type, which means, I suppose,
that he was someone in whom all the cultures flowed and
therefore was unable to take absolutist views’. Albeit with the
uncertain glue of that ‘I suppose’, the aesthetic and the political
are wedded together. Being ‘poetic’ has to do with entertaining
various cultures and remaining, as it were, suspended between
them and their various implications. In the confrontation
between ‘the pure and the impure, the sacred and the profane’,
Rushdie is, he tells us, ‘on the side of the profane’, the melting
pot.
The more one considers this line of argument, the more one
suspects that certain of its assumptions are flawed. In Haroun,
Rushdie posits a world where all the stories there are flow
together in beautiful harmony in one great ocean. An evil
‘cultmaster’ wishes to destroy this ocean. Novelist and critic
Hilary Mantel glossed the idea appreciatively thus: ‘This tyrant
hates stories because he aims to rule the world, and fiction creates
an alternative world, a multiplicity of worlds he can never
command.’ In this view of things – almost a critical orthodoxy
these days – storytelling is seen as inherently liberal in so far as it
offers alternatives to some outside-the-story reality. The story is
thus understood as of its nature a hybrid on the factual world we
know, its alternatives affording imaginative escape from that
world’s political powers.
But is this the case? Do stories flow together in tolerant
harmony distinct from our ‘factual’ world? Aren’t they rather,
with their rival visions, in urgent conflict with each other to
establish what the nature of our world is, what the ‘facts’ really
are? Aren’t evil ‘cultmasters’ themselves supported by elaborate
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stories within the terms of which they do not consider themselves
evil at all? Far from objecting to stories in general (usually they
will be well content to have people read innocuous tales that have
nothing to do with anything), don’t they rather object to those
particular stories that undermine their own? Good storytelling is
always seductive and potentially coercive (Midnight’s Children
was a most seductive tale). It draws us, powerfully, to its own
position, which, however complex and open to interpretation,
may be very far from compatible with other positions. Its
enchantments, like Prospero’s, are enchantments that bind as
much as they please, insisting that reality is this way or that. It is
in this sense that Shelley thought of poets, not as charmingly
sensitive people unwilling, as Rushdie’s Moor, to choose between
rival systems, but as ‘the unacknowledged legislators of the
World’.
‘The only leaps of faith I’m capable of,’ we read in The Ground
Beneath Her Feet, ‘are those required by the creative imagination,
by fictions that don’t pretend to be fact, and so end up telling the
truth.’ Perhaps when one begins to feel that it is enough to write
fiction to be engaged on the right side of some global moral
battle and indeed to ‘end up telling the truth’, then there is a risk
of growing careless. For just as it is notoriously difficult to do
anything without making choices and becoming this guy or that
(Rushdie’s musician, after all, becomes the guy who dismissed his
support musicians), so, and this is particularly true of writing, the
things one merely ‘ends up’ saying will rarely bear examination.
The Ground Beneath Her Feet is narrated in the first person by
the self-styled rationalist and war photographer Rai Merchant,
the secret third in a love triangle whose other members, Ormus
Cama and Vina Apsara, are the book’s larger-than-life rock-star
heroes. Vina dies in an earthquake at the beginning of the book
and Rai explains his decision to tell his tale thus:
We all looked to her [Vina] for peace, yet she herself was not at
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peace. And so I’ve chosen to write here, publicly, what I can
no longer whisper into her private ear: that is, everything. I
have chosen to tell our story, hers and mine and Ormus
Cama’s, all of it, every last detail, and then maybe she can find
a sort of peace here, on the page, in this underworld of ink and
lies, that respite which was denied her by life. So I stand at the
gate of the inferno of language, there’s a barking dog and a
ferryman waiting and a coin under my tongue for the fare.
Rushdie loves the grand narrative gesture and there is a sprint
for the portentous in his writing which often comes at the
expense of sense. Rai chooses to tell the story so that Vina can
find ‘peace on the page’. Presumably, as a man who insistently
pronounces himself a rationalist, he means so that he can find
peace (the dead, after all, for a rationalist, are beyond our reach).
As we approach the end of the book, however, we discover that
Rai is now blissfully happy with a new girlfriend. Why then is he
writing? Whose peace is at stake? And why, if the book is inspired
by a need to get a grip on their love triangle, will it have to
include so much extraneous material? Again, if the page is, as he
so melodramatically claims, an ‘underworld of ink and lies’, is it
reasonably a place where one would expect to find peace anyway?
Then what are we to make of the word ‘lies’ after Rai’s
confessional solemnity in the opening lines of the paragraph? And
why does he use the word ‘respite’, a temporary cessation of the
painful, if what we are talking about here is a final laying to rest?
The more one progresses with Rushdie’s novel the more one feels
that its most formidable enemy will not be any evil fundamental-
ism, but simply a moment’s attention on the part of the wakeful
reader.
There are further questions to ask about this passage. Since the
story of Orpheus has been amply introduced only a few pages
earlier with Vina singing Eurydice’s part from Gluck’s opera
shortly before disappearing, presumably swallowed up by the
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shaky ground beneath her feet, must we then understand the
narrator’s entry to the underworld as an Orphic expedition to
recover the lost lover rather than, as he claims, to lay her to rest?
What would Rai’s new girlfriend think about such a project? The
idea of a narrative as a doomed expedition of retrieval is one I find
fascinating, but this particular ball is quickly dropped, the analogy
is not repeated, and in any event we will shortly discover that Rai
is tone-deaf and hence hardly an Orpheus candidate. It is rather
his friend and rival, Ormus the musician, who will assume the roll
of Orpheus obsessively seeking the dead Vina (by casting about
for lookalikes) in the final chapters of the book. Why then was the
parallel so dramatically invited?
The love triangle is fairly static and its story is quickly told.
Growing up in Bombay, the awesomely handsome and musically
talented Ormus Cama fritters away his teens seducing the
local girls. After spending her early childhood in the USA, the
slightly younger Vina Apsara, of mixed Asian-Indian and Greek-
American parentage, comes to Bombay where she will eventually
find herself living with the family of the, again slightly younger,
Rai Merchant. Vina is awesomely beautiful and has an extra-
ordinary voice. The nine-year-old Rai falls immediately and
irretrievably in love with her. Shortly afterwards the twelve-year-
old Vina and the nineteen-year-old Ormus fall immediately and
irretrievably in love with each other.
From this point on, a series of delays stretches out develop-
ments over a lifetime (thus allowing Rushdie to fill the spaces
with all kinds of digressions and sub-plots). With surprising
chivalry, Ormus agrees to wait until Vina is sixteen before so
much as kissing her. Four years. They enjoy a night’s delirious
pleasure (which Rai is able to describe in detail), but then
Ormus’s hasty offer of marriage causes Vina to run off and the
following morning complicated coincidences lead the couple to
lose sight of each other for ten years, during which time Vina will,
if only fleetingly, become Rai’s lover. Having moved to America,
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Vina rediscovers Ormus when his first successful record is
released, but at this point, following a car accident that was
actually a murder attempt, the hero is in a coma in a house by the
Thames. At the sound of Vina’s voice Ormus immediately
reawakens and over the next year she nurses him back to health.
The two now team up as a super-successful rock band, but
again Ormus’s request of marriage (in this at least he knows who
he wants to be) is rejected. Despite her love, the sassy Vina has no
intention of renouncing her promiscuous nature. At this point
Ormus forces a pact on her: they will not touch each other for ten
years, during which time he will remain celibate, but at the end of
that period they will marry. Throughout these ten years Vina
continues to sleep with Rai, though Ormus, who is aware of her
more casual lovers, never knows this.
Finally, the now amazingly famous rock stars marry. All
continues as before without revelations, confrontations or any
particular development, until Ormus’s intensifying psychic obses-
sions eventually become too much for his wife. Ormus is
convinced that two worlds (apparently that of the book and our
own world outside the book) are involved in a progressive
collision that is causing socio-political upheaval and indeed
earthquakes. Vina walks out on him and Rai is encouraged to
believe he can at last break up the official couple and win his
woman. To this end he follows Vina on her first solo tour, but at
precisely the point where a decision must be made she disappears
in an earthquake in Mexico, thus somewhat validating her
husband’s nightmare prophecies.
The dynamic of the triangle has potential. All three characters
are presented as in search of the solid ground of identity. Of
himself the narrator says: ‘at my worst I have been a cacophony, a
mass of human noises that did not add up to the symphony of an
integrated self’. The racially mixed Vina with her miserable
infancy is ‘a rag bag of selves, torn fragments of people she might
have become’. Ormus has serious identity crises resulting from his
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belief that he is in some way inhabited by the personality of his
stillborn twin, Gayomart. These are less positive presentations of
the multiple self. All three protagonists sense that the dramatic
gesture of choice and (above all) exclusiveness in love will confer
a longed-for identity. But Vina in particular is also aware that
exclusive love can be coercive and limiting, and it is she who
allows the triangle to form and deliberately perpetuates it over
thirty years, thus keeping all three characters in a state of tension,
on the brink of an identity that is never quite established.
The scenario, as I said, is promising and from time to time
Rushdie launches into some penetrating reflections on the
conflicting claims of identity, love and trust, in life and in art. He
has read widely and thought a great deal. But he seems unable or
unwilling to dramatise these relationships in a way that would
allow us to savour their emotions and dilemmas. In the end
almost none of the book’s action or energy springs from them.
His twin vocations for multiplicity and hyperbole work against
the prolonged and concentrated meditation needed to bring the
inner life of a love triangle onto the page. Just as Ormus Cama is
reluctant to choose between conflicting personalities, so Rushdie
is determined not to settle on one form or another of the novel.
His choice of the first person, for example, with all its scope for
transmitting the pathos of a frustratingly limited knowledge,
offers an excellent approach to his story. But its conviction soon
dwindles when Rushdie allows his narrator inside other charac-
ters’ heads and starts using him, and them, as the merest of
mouthpieces for his own many ideas and areas of interest. A
section where the largely uneducated and very adolescent Vina is
allowed to be an authority on Bombay cinema interiors is
particularly unconvincing, and dull to boot. One moment we are
being given a lecture on Neoplatonism, then the narrative
suddenly slips into cartoon flippancy full of pun and rhyme, only
to clang out at the end of a paragraph with some portentous
eschatological warning. Rather than a convincing voice, or the
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continuation (for the claim is frequently made) of a satisfying oral
tradition, this only reminds us of certain prevailing and largely
literary notions of the modern. In short, and again like his rock
star Ormus, Rushdie makes no secrets of playing all the
instruments. ‘Here comes everybody’ – an improbable quotation
from Finnegans Wake, afforded through a first-person narrator
(not present when the words were spoken) to a young Indian
rock musician – thus tends to mean, here comes Salman.
While the mixed and hybrid is justified both by its liberal
openness and its reflection of a contemporary global situation,
Rushdie’s insistent use of hyperbole is to take us to those
extremes where nature may betray what lies beyond the ‘curtain
of maya’. The two vocations come together in the book’s use of
mythology. Inflated by frequent comparison to mythological
figures taken from both Western and Eastern traditions, Ormus
and Vina, Eastern practitioners of what we have always thought
of as a Western musical form, are to be held up as potential
archetypes, suggesting a deep pattern of truth beneath the
superficial clutter of daily reality. Typical passages read thus:
‘Glistening serpents of hair lay across the wooden veranda.
Medusa. It crossed my mind [Rai is referring to a time when he
was nine years old] that we should look at her [Vina’s] face only
in a burnished shield lest we be turned to stone.’ Or again: ‘Many
different versions of the first encounter between Vina Apsara and
Ormus Cama are presently in circulation . . . depending on which
journal you read you might have heard that he transformed
himself into a white bull and carried her away on his back . . .’
These mythological allusions are then set off against the
narrator’s declared scepticism to generate a dialectic between two
opposed interpretations of life, the one usually, though not
exclusively, associated with the mystical East, the other with the
rationalist tradition of the West. The two views come into most
immediate conflict in Rai’s relationship with the mythical and
myth-hungry Vina. Of her interest in the sacred music of India,
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the narrator announces: ‘I must conclude – and this is hard for a
lifelong sceptic like me to write – that what Vina wanted was a
glimpse of the unknowable.’
However interesting Rushdie’s intentions – and there can be
little doubt that he means this to be the intellectual core of the
book – the dialectic never convinces. The project is dogged by
two extravagant decisions, or perhaps they might best be
described, within the terms of Rushdie’s poetics, as protracted
‘indecisions’. The first involves the sheer weight of mythical
reference that is foisted upon the central characters (all of whom
are themselves remarkably well versed in both Western and
Eastern mythologies). Vina, for example, a girl whose father
turned gay and abandoned her mother who later hanged herself
after slaughtering her second husband and his family (Rushdie is
anything but ungenerous with background), a girl, then, whose
early life is presented along the lines of the most gruesome and
sensationalist ‘realism’, will be compared with (among others):
Medusa, Cinderella, Eurydice, the Egyptian Queen Hatshepsut,
Europa, Rati (wife of the Indian god of love), Helen of Troy, an
apsara (semi-divine nymph in Indian mythology), Pallas Athena,
Psyche, Dionysus, Galatea and Pygmalion.
The same wearisome profligacy of interconnection is afforded
both to other characters and to the book’s many events. (Of one
girl who predicts an earthquake we read: ‘If she was our
Cassandra, then maybe – just maybe – Bombay was about to fall
like Troy.’) Instead of finding a suggestive and potentially
convincing structure in myth, the reader begins to suspect only
fuzzy thinking and overkill. It may be that the problem of
establishing the characters’ identities is more Rushdie’s than
theirs.
The other obstacle set before our engagement with this
presentation of rival interpretations of reality is the decision to
have our sceptical narrator give credence to events that, if
accepted as factual, eliminate a priori the very possibility of
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scepticism. Of Ormus Cama we read that ‘within moments of his
birth (he) began making the strange, rapid finger movements
with both hands which any guitarist could have identified as
chord progressions’. These movements, Rai tells us, were filmed
and are now available on video. Later we learn that Ormus (his
name is a Latin hybridisation of the Zoroastrian god Ormazd or
Ahura Mazda), in contact with his dead twin Gayomart (another
Zoroastrian figure), is being given the words and music to many
of the greatest rock songs exactly two years, eight months and
twenty-eight days before they are released in the West. He
actually plays ‘Yesterday’ as his own song in a Bombay club
before it appears as the work of the Beatles. Rai remarks: ‘I am
the least supernaturally inclined of men, but this tall story I have
no option but to believe.’ While the inspiration here is presum-
ably comic, the result in terms of the book’s larger debate is that
the position of the sceptic is untenable and the proposed dialectic
spurious. It is rather as if Browning’s Karshish were to declare his
familiarity with well-documented miracles before being presented
with the enigma of the resurrected Lazarus.
Critics championing Rushdie will often suggest that we have
difficulty understanding him because we are unfamiliar with the
tradition he is working in (though they rarely remark that he is
most successful precisely where that tradition is least understood).
It would seem appropriate then to consider how he uses some of
his Indian material.
Alienated from family affections ‘like an astronaut floating away
from a space capsule’, Ormus Cama is saved by Vina Apsara’s
love. Rai remarks in a long parenthesis:
(It is said that when Kama, the love god, committed the crime
of trying to shoot mighty Shiva with a dart of love, the great
god burned him to ashes with a thunderbolt. Kama’s wife, the
goddess Rati, pleaded for his life, and softened Shiva’s heart.
In an inversion of the Orpheus myth, it was the woman who
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interceded with the deity and brought Love – Love itself –
back from the dead . . . So also Ormus Cama, exiled from love
by the parents whom he had failed to transfix with love’s
arrow, shrivelled by their lack of affection, is restored to the
world of love by Vina.)
Even those unfamiliar with Indian myth will have grounds for
suspecting that the analogy cannot hold. Kama’s attempt to shoot
a love dart at Shiva is presented as a crime, while it could hardly
be considered a crime for Ormus to seek affection from his
parents. The reference to darts should also alert us to the fact that
Kama is akin to the Greek Eros and has nothing at all to do with
filial love. One does not fire off Eros’s arrows at one’s folks (there
has been no suggestion of a desire for incest!). The parallel thus
becomes doubly inappropriate, indeed triply so if one further
considers that while Rati can only appeal to Shiva’s clemency,
Vina saves Ormus directly herself. Nor could it be claimed that
this distortion is a deliberate attempt on Rushdie’s part to
develop the character of his narrator Rai, whose erudition, on the
contrary, appears to be coextensive with his author’s and whose
point of view generally coincides with Rushdie’s as presented in
interviews. Some two hundred pages later Rushdie remembers
that his narrator is sceptical of these mythological interpretations
and gives us this: ‘When Vina starts with her fanciful mysteries, all
you can do is lie back and wait for her to lose interest, which
never takes too long. Here she is, back again at the story of Kama
and Rati.’ But previously it was Rai/Rushdie using this particular
analogy, not Vina/Rushdie.
The story of Kama and Rati is worth considering in a little
more detail. Warned by Brahma that they would be destroyed by
the anti-god Taraka unless Shiva bore a son to destroy him, the
gods begged Kama to shoot one of his darts at Shiva so that he
would fall in love with the girl Parvati who could then bear the
great creator and destroyer a son. The idea of crime doesn’t enter
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into it. Unimpressed, Shiva shrivelled Kama with a blaze from his
famous third eye (not with a thunderbolt). At this point versions
diverge, some suggesting Kama was brought back to life and
others saying not. But the two can be reconciled in the version
that tells us how Kama was brought back only to a dispersed and
invisible life. In his recent work on Indian mythology, Ka,
Roberto Calasso comments on the story thus: ‘Flowers, bees,
mangoes, cuckoos: it was into you that Desire [Kama] dispersed
when Shiva’s blaze consumed him. Henceforth a humming or a
birdcall, a flavour or a scent, would open a wound in those far
from their loved ones.’ Calasso concludes with a quotation from
the fifth-century poet Kalidasa. ‘And many were wounded if it is
true that “upon seeing things of great beauty or hearing sweet
sounds even a happy man may be seized by a fierce nostalgia.”’
The myth will perhaps help us to shift the debate on our
reaction to Rushdie’s work to more pertinent ground than that of
the sterile back and forth of whether or not we can appreciate
Indian tradition. Fantastical as it is, Kama’s story illuminates a
landscape we recognise all too well. There is an attempt, an erotic
attempt, to coerce the great power that drives the universe. It fails
miserably. Erotic love is helpless in the face of necessity. However
far from realism, myth, unlike some contemporary fiction, always
has a very strong sense of what is possible and what is not – hence
the irony of Rushdie’s using this story to suggest the power of
love, rather than its weakness. Yet something is gained from that
attempt and its defeat. The natural world takes on a splendid, if
painful sweetness. This too we recognise, and our recognition is
the token both of the myth’s conviction and its seduction. We
feel we inhabit the world it describes.
Do we expect our fiction, in whatever form it comes, to have
powers of clarification and evocation, to thrill us by getting close
to the grain of our inner life, our most intimate and enigmatic
experiences; or do we wish it merely to end up proclaiming that
famous one-word ‘prophesy’ Sal Paradise in On the Road
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imagines himself as bringing to his friends in a bar in downtown
Denver: ‘Wow!’? Again and again in The Ground Beneath Her
Feet, Rushdie deploys the rhetoric of clear-sightedness. Relent-
lessly and accurately he satirises, ‘the swallowing of various forms
of gibberish that has replaced the exercise of intelligence’. But
having satisfied readers, he hopes, that they are in the hands of
the world’s least credulous person, he then proceeds, equally
relentlessly, to offer nothing more than the most muddled and
spuriously mystical of melodramas, the very thing he had
appeared to be satirising.
Admirably energetic as he is alarmingly approximate, here is
our author towards the end of the book drawing on the work of
one of the sharpest minds the world ever produced: Plato. Vina’s
father Shetty has just remarked that if Ormus really wants to be
with his dead wife, the noble thing to do would be ‘to shoot
himself in the mouth’. Ever ready to instruct, narrator Rai
remarks:
Shetty doesn’t know it, but he’s echoing Plato. This is what
the great philosopher has Phaedrus say in the Symposium’s first
speech about love: The gods honour zeal and heroic excellence
towards love. But Orpheus . . . they sent back unfulfilled from
Hades, showing him a phantom of the woman . . . because he
seemed to them a coward . . . [who] didn’t venture to die for the
sake of love, as did Alcestis, but rather devised a means of
entering Hades while still alive. Orpheus, the despised cithar-
ode – the singer with the lyre or, let’s say guitarist – the
trickster who uses music and wiles to cross boundaries,
between Apollo and Dionysus, man and nature, truth and
illusion, reality and the imagination, even between life and
death, was evidently not to austere Plato’s taste. Plato, who
preferred martyrdom to mourning, Plato the ayatollah of love.’
We shall pass over the bullying techniques of agglomeration
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and inflation everywhere evident in this prose. Here it is the sheer
rashness of Rushdie’s writing that takes the breath away. I shall
not presume to come to Plato’s defence; the most cursory
reading of the Symposium, witty, fluent, ever as precise as it is
profound, will show how inappropriate these remarks are. In
contrast, the imprecision of Rushdie’s work – Alcestis is not a
martyr – is, at this point, no more than we expected. Yet one
would have thought that he would have hesitated a moment
before the word ‘ayatollah’. There at least, one would have
expected a moment’s attention, a truly pertinent comment. Not
so. The temptation of the flourish is too much for him. Plato is
the ‘ayatollah of love’. At one point in The Ground Beneath Her
Feet, a minor character speaks of myth as ‘the software of
universal consciousness’. Are we then to refer to Rushdie as ‘the
Bill Gates of mythology’? Or, since a good parallel should be
reversible, can we from now on think of the ayatollah as the Plato
of Islam?
We live in an age where initiation into the mysteries of a
religion or cult has very largely been replaced by initiation into
the notion that there is no such mystery into which to be
initiated. As it turns out this may prove to be the hardest
initiation of all into the most trying of mysteries. By making the
double gesture of appearing clear-sighted and then filling his
pages with supernatural incident and metaphysical muddle that
could mean anything or nothing, Rushdie appeals to those who,
while understandably unwilling to subscribe to any belief so well
defined as to be easily knocked down, nevertheless yearn to have
all the mystical balls kept perpetually spinning in the air before
them. Closet New Agers will be thrilled. The potential readership
is huge.
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[Giacomo Leopardi]
His mother rejoiced when her children died in infancy. They
would go straight to heaven and would not weigh upon the
family budget. Faith and thrift would always be problems for
Giacomo. His father, Count Monaldo Leopardi, had squandered
the family fortune through ‘generosity, pride, or folly’ and was
deprived by papal order of the right to handle money. Pious and
penny-pinching, his wife, Marchesa Adelaide, took over the
management of their estates. This was in 1803, on the dusty hills
above the southern Adriatic, scorching in summer, freezing in
winter. The noble couple were in their mid-twenties and their
first-born son just five.
To assert offended manhood, Monaldo cultivated literary
ambitions – an interminable production of bigoted and reaction-
ary tracts – which it was felt could not lead to the same economic
catastrophe as his previous sallies into politics and trade. Never-
theless, he lavished considerable sums on building up what, for
the very small town of Recanati, was a vast library of 25,000
volumes. Through this library he entered into a relationship with
young Giacomo that was at once one of complicity, against
Adelaide, and competition, with each other. For the next thirty
years, when Giacomo the poet asked Monaldo the pamphleteer
for money, Monaldo could make a point of surreptitiously
conceding it to a fellow sufferer behind his wife’s stiff back, or of
informing his young rival that he would have to confront the
formidable matriarch in person.
The story of Giacomo’s youth spent entirely in his father’s
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library has assumed legendary status in the history of Italian
literature. Rarely emerging to play with brothers and sister, the
boy had no companions at all outside the family and no interests
outside of books. By the age of ten he had mastered Latin, Greek,
German and French. Hebrew and English would soon follow.
Presumably destined for the priesthood, he received the tonsure
at twelve and donned a monkish habit. His tutors were
outstripped and admitted as much. Left to his own diligent if
random devices, he produced philological commentaries, son-
nets, tragedies, epigrams, philosophical dissertations, A History of
Astronomy, a Life of Plotinus, and any number of translations
from the classics. Adolescent self-consciousness was developed to
the point that ‘thinking about breathing’, as Monaldo later
wrote, ‘he would have difficulty getting his breath, reflecting on
the subtleties of urination he would be unable to pass water’.
Much pacing to and fro was required before he could steal from
himself ‘a moment’s inattention’.
All the same, when beautiful cousin Gertrude made a three-day
visit with her much older husband, the boy did manage to fall in
love. In a pattern that would repeat itself throughout his life, the
lady paid him no attention and left without saying goodbye.
Giacomo reacted with A Diary of First Love and a number of
Petrarchan sonnets. When the effect wore off, he embarked on a
translation of Hesiod’s Theogony.
It was grotesque and in his late teens Giacomo at last awoke to
find the outward sign of that grotesqueness. Under the priest’s
habit was a hunch, result of a long-untreated scoliosis. How
could he not have seen what was happening? The study that had
seemed the passport to his father’s respect and the scholastic
glory that must ensue had become his curse and set him apart for
ever. Beset by asthma and constipation, insulted by street urchins,
already aware that no woman would ever find him attractive,
Giacomo was more and more often afflicted by a death wish he
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had felt since earliest infancy. From the age of eighteen on, his
overriding obsession was escape.
Concomitant with this anguished awareness of lost youth came
what Giacomo would refer to as his three ‘conversions’: literary,
political and philosophical. From the arid erudition of his father
he moved almost overnight to an appreciation of the value of
beauty in poetry. Immediately, he set out on translations of the
first book of The Odyssey, the second of the Aeneid. This at
seventeen. A year later, he jettisoned Monaldo’s blind defence of
papal dictatorship and declared himself in favour of a united Italy.
Immediately, he wrote a number of long, patriotic hymns.
Finally, at twenty-one, he abandoned his parents’ and above all
his mother’s Christianity. Having once walked in superstitious
dread of treading on the crosses formed by paving stones, he now
discovered a world, as he put it, of ‘solid nothingness’. In the
cold light of reason, both religion and youthful illusion evapor-
ated and happiness became ‘forever unavailable’. Thus in 1819,
in one of the most backward towns of the most backward state in
a decidedly backward and obscurantist Italy, Giacomo Leopardi
stepped tentatively into the world of the absurd, a mechanistic
universe going nowhere and to no end.
Despite severe ophthalmia, another lifelong plague, the young
man’s busy pen was now occupied on three fronts: lyric poems,
invariably as sad as they were beautiful; brief philosophical
dialogues of bizarre whimsy and unparalleled pessimism; and
finally the pages of his Zibaldone, or day book, a diary of his
intellectual and emotional development that would ultimately
run to almost three thousand pages. In more and more open
conflict with his parents, he was now desperate to leave. But how
could Monaldo let this boy with his weak health, great talents and
dangerous views out into a world where liberalism and revolution
were everywhere in the air? How could Adelaide even contem-
plate the unnecessary expense of lodging him anywhere but
home? Giacomo attempted to acquire a passport and escape
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north with money stolen from the family safe but was foiled and
humiliated. His dream of a ‘land full of marvels’ away from the
‘living burial’ of Recanati would have to wait until he was twenty-
four when Monaldo finally relented and allowed his son to visit
Adelaide’s brother, Marchese Antici, in Rome.
Thus far the story of Giacomo Leopardi presents little problem
for biographers. The family palazzo and above all the library
where he grew up are still there to be visited. They present a small
and sharply defined world in which the poet’s youth and the
dynamic of those relationships that shaped it are well docu-
mented in an abundance of letters and memoirs. Most of all the
economy and direction of the story are obvious and our
sympathies undivided. The frail, sensitive if, alas, ugly genius will
finally escape his monstrous parents to spread his wings in the
wider and more generous society of those splendid Italian cities
that so inspired his English, French and German contemporaries.
It was not to be. Leopardi hated Rome, as later he would never
be on anything but the most uneasy terms with Milan, Bologna,
Florence and Naples. ‘All the greatness of Rome,’ he wrote to his
sister Paolina, ‘has no other purpose than to multiply the
distances and numbers of steps you have to climb to see anyone at
all.’ The place was dirty and noisy, the people stupid. On his first
day he met the elegant and erudite Abbot Cancellieri, a man not
only well placed to introduce Giacomo into Roman society, but
kind enough to have praised the young prodigy’s philological
studies in his own publications. ‘A prick,’ Giacomo wrote to his
brother Carlo, ‘an endless stream of gossip, the dullest and most
despair-inducing man on earth’. But surely, the envious Carlo
replied, in a big city ‘there’s always a pretty whore to look at’.
This was true, but would the whores look at a sickly hunchback?
‘The ugliest, crassest Recanati tart was better than all the
streetwalkers of Rome,’ came the poet’s improbable retort.
Despite winning the unqualified admiration of a number of
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scholars, and in particular the Prussian ambassador Niebuhr,
Leopardi was soon longing to be home. Monaldo was delighted
to have him back. Another week or two and the young man was
desperate to leave again.
It is at this point that most biographers, and critics, begin to
establish, as if in self-defence, a distance that will ultimately
amount to a gulf between Leopardi’s sublime poetry on the one
hand and his profound pessimism and capricious behaviour on
the other. Thus in Leopardi, A Study in Solitude, the only
substantial biography in English, now reprinted after many years,
Iris Origo remarks:
There are two Leopardis: the poet and the man. The man, as
he revealed himself in many of his letters and his diaries, was a
querulous, tortured invalid, mistrustful of his fellow men, with
a mind sometimes scornful and cantankerous and a heart
intolerably sad and lonely. But to this unhappy man was
granted a poet’s gift: a capacity for feeling so intense and an
imagination so sensitive and lively that he could perceive, in
the most common sights of daily life, the ‘heavenly originals’
of which, according to Plato, all earthly objects are but copies.
In an essay that appeared in the New York Review of Books the
scholar D.S. Carne-Ross wrote: ‘much as one must often pity
Leopardi, it is hard sometimes not to feel, with a certain
exasperation, that he deliberately made bad worse, as though to
prove a point about the inevitable wretchedness of existence’.
One of the consequences of taking this line is that Leopardi’s
poetry, and in particular the thirty-six lyric poems of the Canti, is
to be elevated to the highest of pedestals (‘English with all its
riches has nothing to set beside the best of these poems,’ says
Carne-Ross), while the reflections of the prose dialogues col-
lected as the Operette morali, or indeed of the quite extraordinary
Zibaldone, are to be dismissed, or damned with faint praise.
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Basing her remarks on an essay by Benedetto Croce, Origo
writes: ‘On the problems of life he [Leopardi] bestowed much
thought, and he clothed that thought in fine language, but the
conclusions which he reached cannot be said to possess any great
novelty.’ She then simplifies his vision thus: ‘The universe, he
says, is an enigma and an insoluble one; human life, when
weighed in the balance, is an unhappy affair, and the more highly
developed a man is in feeling and in intelligence, the less fitted he
is to live happily. Such happiness as men do enjoy is founded
upon “illusion”.’
Albeit with some bet-hedging, Carne-Ross reaches the same
conclusion. ‘I doubt . . . if too much independent value should
be claimed for his “philosophy”. In an entirely honorable sense, it
was rigged, as a poet’s thinking often is, to serve his art.’
How vigorously Leopardi would have disagreed! Indeed he did
disagree, for he frequently faced the same criticism during his
lifetime. Praising the style of Operette morali as ‘the finest prose
in Italian this century’, his arch-enemy, the supremely Catholic
Niccolo` Tommaseo nevertheless referred to Leopardi as ‘a frog
endlessly croaking “There is no God because I’m a hunchback,
there is no God because I’m a hunchback”’. Dutifully, Origo
documents Leopardi’s standard response to such attacks: that
critics should seek to confute his ideas (which actually are far
from simple) rather than blame his deformity. But one has to turn
to a very different kind of biography, Rolando Damiani’s All’
apparir del vero, (sadly unavailable in translation) to find the
poet’s most spirited rebuttal: on hearing, in 1834, that an article
in a German review had once again ascribed his negative thinking
to his desperate state of health, Leopardi wrote: ‘it seems people
have the same attitude to life that an Italian husband has to his
wife: he needs to go on believing she is faithful even when all the
evidence is to the contrary’.
The tension and ambiguity that everywhere galvanise Origo’s
fascinating biography spring from her attempt to reconcile an
66
Surviving Giacomo
honest account of Leopardi’s unhappy existence and corrosive
thought with this same, as the poet saw it, banal but absolutely
necessary desire to believe that ‘life is a beautiful thing’. The irony
she never quite grasps is that both the philosophy she largely
ignores and the poetry she loves are inspired by Leopardi’s
prolonged meditation on the same contradictory impulses that
are driving her pen as she seeks at once to tell her story truthfully
and escape its implications unscathed. In short, as Giacomo saw
it, Nature has endowed us with a reasoning faculty which
inevitably pushes us towards an awareness of the utter insignifi-
cance of our existence, yet at the same time, and paradoxically,
Nature also offers us considerable resources for putting that
reasoning faculty to sleep, and in particular for inventing all kinds
of grand ideas – national, religious, romantic and social – to keep
the brutal truth at bay. Such ideas and the adventures that sprang
from them were to be cultivated at all costs – hadn’t Leopardi
himself espoused the national cause, didn’t he fall in love on three
occasions, wasn’t his very writing driven by a ludicrous ambition
for literary glory? – yet he insisted to the end that such
aspirations, and indeed all the fruits of the imagination, whether
individual or collective, were ‘illusions’. The bottom line would
always be sickness and death. It is as if, sitting beside Coleridge as
he wrote his ‘Dejection: an Ode’, Leopardi had, yes, encouraged
him to rediscover ‘the beauty-making power of imagination’, but
then pointed out that whether he succeeded or not, he would all
too soon be back with ‘the inanimate cold world’ again, and
hence dejection. For ‘nothing is more reasonable than boredom’.
And after years of disillusionment and dejection, death could only
be welcome.
Interestingly, it was a death that prompted Iris Origo to write her
biography of Leopardi. As she emerges in her engaging autobiog-
raphy, Images and Shadows, this rich and beautiful daughter of
Berenson’s Chiantishire is almost the last person you would
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expect to take a serious interest in Leopardi. True, her father dies
young and her mother is neurotic and narcissistic to a degree –
not the perfect childhood – but loving grandparents give a sense
of solidity, the palatial family villa (originally built for Cosimo
Medici) is full of famous friends and lively conversation. To top
all, first love, when it comes, is wonderfully and romantically
requited: Antonio has an Italian title, Iris has American cash.
Who could ask for more? Together they buy an entire Tuscan
valley and set about turning it into productive arable land with a
system of farms run on the old mezzadria system where the
peasants give half their produce to the padrone. Fascism offered
subsidies for such developments. It was still possible at this point
to imagine the regime was benevolent. Within the year, a son,
Gianni was born. Inspired by a genuine spirit of philanthropy,
underpinned by a successful marriage, the Origos’ project
progressed to the benefit of everyone and the pages of her
account of those years turn to that scent of warm earth and
crushed olives that has sold so many books to the idle dreamers of
colder climes. Above all, Iris herself was overwhelmingly busy,
resourceful, powerful, happy. ‘I have never in my life found a day
too long,’ she tells us.
What on earth, you wonder, has such a woman to do with a
man reputedly determined to be wretched, a man who never got
further in love than holding a beloved’s hand, or collecting
autographs for her (how humiliating!), or playing go-between for
a rival (even worse!), a man who changed his shirt only once a
month, dribbled his food, smelt, ate on his own at ungodly
hours, ogled courting couples from his bedroom window,
accepted money for jobs he never meant to finish, ridiculed both
the liberal vision of progress and the consolations of religion?
Giacomo refused to read the newspapers, but briefly in the
summer of 1832, exactly 101 years before Origo began research
on his biography, the poet did toy with the idea of launching a
paper himself. It was to be called ‘Le flaneur’ – the time-waster.
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Its selling point would be its complete lack of any ‘positive ideas’,
‘non-political, non-philosophical, non-historical, non-fashionable,
non-artistic, non-scientific . . .’ Its imagined readership? Those
‘tolerant of all that is futile’. But at the first hint of problems with
the Florentine censors, Giacomo characteristically dropped his
project. An entertaining daydream, it had served its purpose.
What has the busy likes of Iris Origo to do with a man like this?
The terrible answer comes without warning in a chapter of
Images and Shadows harmlessly entitled, ‘Writing’. After explain-
ing that the big Tuscan farm left little opportunity to pursue
adolescent ambitions, Origo tells us, ‘Then, in 1933, after
Gianni’s death, in an effort to find some impersonal work which
would absorb at least part of my thoughts – I turned back to
writing again.’
Her eight-year-old son has died. No narrative, no explanation.
‘After Gianni’s death . . . impersonal work’. But how impersonal?
For what is Leopardi’s great theme if not death, and in particular
the death of young people, which is the cruellest unmasking of
life’s illusions.
nel fior degli anni estinta
Quand’e` il viver piu` dolce, e pria che il core
Certo si renda come’e` tutta indarno
L’umana speme. A desiar colei,
Che d’ogni affanno il tragge, ha poco andare
L’egro mortal; ma sconsolata arriva
La morte ai giovanetti . . .
(Cut off in the flower of my years
When life is sweetest, and before the heart
Can know how human hopes are all
In vain. It isn’t long before the afflicted
Learn to call on she
Who can save us from all affliction.
But death comes inconsolable to the young . . .)
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Cruelly, Origo has been dragged from her busy life to join
Leopardi where he always was, or imagined himself to be, at
death’s door. Embarking for the first time in her life on a
sustained project of scholarly research, she thus no doubt shared
the experience that had been Giacomo’s since adolescence, that
of seeking distraction in reading or translation only to find that
the content you were working on brought you inexorably back to
the pain that led you to seek distraction in the first place. Of
twelve children born to Giacomo’s mother, Origo is bound to
record in her opening chapter, only five survived, only one
outlived her.
Impersonal or otherwise as her approach may be, Iris Origo
certainly did sterling work. She sifted through a wealth of original
sources and above all the vast Zibaldone to give us an account of
Leopardi’s life that still holds up today. What she loses to the
overwhelmingly meticulous scholarship and acute psychological
insight of a more recent biography like Damiani’s, she makes up
in the at-once eager but anxious nature of her engagement with
the poet. Damiani, who edited and annotated the Zibaldone, is
clearly at home with Leopardi’s pessimism and entirely familiar
with such minds as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Cioran and
Beckett, to whom the Italian poet looks forward, familiar in short
with that whole strand of negative Western thought that opposes
to the enlightenment the simple reflection that ‘knowledge has
not helped us to live’. For Origo, in contrast, coming from a
quite different tradition, Leopardi is a risk, indeed a peril, a dark
sea she might never have plunged into had it not been for her
son’s death. She senses that Leopardi has more to say about that
death than perhaps anyone else, but it is not something she is
eager to focus on in her own writing. Recreating scenes of
Recanati life from fragments in the poetry, she tends to the
sentimental and picturesque; she also thrusts upon Leopardi’s
mature work a Platonism he entertained only briefly in his teens
and attacked savagely in the Operette; and she is clearly relieved to
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record Giacomo’s happier moments, notably sitting at cafe´ tables
greedily tucking into ice creams as he watched the world go by. It
is at these points that you feel Origo would be more at ease
describing the colourful bustle of Italian street life than Leopar-
di’s torturous lucubration. Yet faithfully she gives us the facts, she
quotes the very darkest passages from Zibaldone and even steels
herself for the story of Leopardi’s unshriven death, aged thirty-
eight.
Five years before, on almost the last page of the Zibaldone,
Leopardi had written: ‘there are two truths which most men
will never believe: one, that they know nothing, and the other,
that they are nothing. And there’s a third which proceeds from
the second – that there is nothing to hope for after death.’ This
conviction, and with it a pride in rejecting ‘all the vain hopes
with which men comfort children and themselves, all foolish
consolations’, remained with him to the end.
The word ‘pride’ discreetly registers Origo’s instinctive dissent.
Why is it that in a world long used to atheists and sceptics,
Leopardi, more than any other writer I can think of, is still to be
criticised for his negative vision? The answer, I suspect, will be the
same as answers to such questions as: Why did the poet’s
contemporaries frequently seek to blame his atheism on evil
influences, notably his early mentor, the revolutionary Pietro
Giordani? Why were people constantly putting about the rumour
that Giacomo had converted (to the extent at one point that
some pro-papal tracts published by his father were widely
assumed to be his own)? Why did a Jesuit priest publish a letter
claiming to have led Giacomo to Christ? Or again, why were the
Operette morali inscribed in the Vatican’s Index of Prohibited
Books and actually hunted down and destroyed after his death,
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while the Canti, which include the same ideas, were not? How
can it be that I libri dello spirito cristiano (Books of Christian
Spirit – a religious list within the Rizzoli group) published, as
recently as 1996, a collection of the Canti, claiming that they are
of Christian inspiration? Finally, how is it that in the still
profoundly Catholic Italian education system, an apparent nihilist
like Leopardi can be taught alongside Manzoni, the great pillar of
Catholic achievement in modern Italian literature? Origo records
Leopardi’s meeting with Manzoni at the Gabinetto Vieusseux in
1827. I promessi sposi had just been published to ecstatic praise;
an early edition of the Operette morali severely criticised.
Manzoni, the handsome libertine turned fervent Christian, was
surrounded by admirers; Leopardi, the erstwhile Christian turned
atheist, sat alone. ‘He had no good news to impart,’ observes
Origo.
The answer to all these questions lies, I believe, in the peculiar
nature of Leopardi’s achievement in the Canti. Towards the end
of her autobiography, Origo apologises for having said nothing
about her son Gianni’s death. She ‘cannot bear’ to write about it,
she tells us. Yet in a wealth of reflections on the inextricable
psychological tangle between pain and pleasure, happiness and
unhappiness, one of Leopardi’s central intuitions was of the way
suffering can be transformed, albeit briefly, precisely in the
mental construct of language. In a note in the Zibaldone, he thus
describes what was clearly his own aspiration as a poet:
Works of [literary] genius have this intrinsic quality, that even
when they capture exactly the nothingness of things, or vividly
reveal and make us feel life’s inevitable unhappiness, or express
the most acute hopelessness . . . they are always a source of
consolation and renewed enthusiasm.
Leopardi saw, that is, how it was possible to say two
contradictory things, or rather to make two contradictory
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gestures simultaneously – despair, consolation – thus acting out a
paradox he thought central to the core of human experience. But
how was this done? Here is his single most famous poem, learned
by heart by every Italian schoolboy.
A Silvia
Silvia, rimembri ancora
Quel tempo della tua vita mortale,
Quando belta` splendea
Negli occhi tuoi ridenti e fuggitivi
E tu, lieta e pensosa, il limitare
Di gioventu` salivi?
Sonavan le quiete
Stanze, e le vie dintorno,
Al tuo perpetuo canto,
Allor che all’opre femminili intenta
Sedevi, assai contenta
Di quel vago avvenir che in mente avevi.
Era il maggio odoroso: e tu solevi
Cosı` menare il giorno.
Io gli studi leggiadri
Talor lasciando e le sudate carte,
Ove il tempo mio primo
E di me si spendea la miglior parte,
D’in su i veroni del paterno ostello
Porgea gli orecchi al suon della tua voce,
Ed alla man veloce
Che percorrea la faticosa tela.
Mirava il ciel sereno,
Le vie dorate e gli orti,
E quinci il mar da lungi, e quindi il monte.
Lingua mortal non dice
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Quel ch’io sentiva in seno.
Che pensieri soavi,
Che speranze, che cori, o Silvia mia!
Quale allor ci apparia
La vita umana e il fato!
Quando sovviemmi di contanta speme,
Un affetto mi preme
Acerbo e sconsolato,
E tornami a doler di mia sventura.
O natura, o natura,
Perche´ non rendi poi
Quel che prometti allor? perche´ di tanto
Inganni i figli tuoi?
Tu pria che l’erbe inaridisse il verno,
Da chiuso morbo combattuta e vinta,
Perivi, o tenerella. E non vedevi
Il fior degli anni tuoi;
Non ti molceva il core
La dolce lode or delle negre chiome,
Or degli sguardi innamorati e schivi;
Ne´ teco le compagne ai dı` festivi
Ragionavan d’amore.
Anche peria fra poco
La speranza mia dolce: agli anni miei
Anche negaro i fati
La giovanezza. Ahi come,
Come passata sei,
Cara compagna del’eta mia nova,
Mia lacrimata speme!
Questo e` quel mondo? questi
I diletti, l’amor, l’opre, gli eventi
Onde cotanto ragionammo insieme?
Questa la sorte dell’umane genti?
All’apparir del vero
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Tu misera, cadesti: e con la mano
La fredda morte ed una tomba ignuda
Mostravi di lontano.
To Silvia
Silvia, do you remember still
The time of your mortal life
When beauty shone
In your fleeting eyes and smile
While brightly pensive you stepped
Up to the brink of youth?
The hushed rooms and
Outside the streets hummed
With your endless singing
As you bent over girlish tasks
Quite content with the hazy future
In your head. It was May,
That fragrant month,
And so you spent the day.
I’d stand up from the books
I loved, the pages I slaved over
Where my early years and the
Best part of me were spent
And from my father’s balcony
Listen for the sound of your voice
And your fingers’ swift back
And forth across the heavy loom.
I looked up at the blue sky,
The golden streets and gardens,
There the sea far away, here the high hill,
What I felt in my heart then
Mortal tongue cannot tell.
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What happy thoughts, what
Hopes, what hearts we had Silvia!
How human life and
Fate seemed to us then!
When all that hope floods back
Now, I’m overcome,
Bitter beyond consolation
And weep once more my own misfortune.
Oh nature, nature,
Why won’t you honour
What you promised then? Why play
Such cruel tricks on your children?
Before winter had withered the grass,
Baffled and beaten by secret sickness
You were dying, dear soul, didn’t see
Your best years blossom forth,
Didn’t hear the praise that melts
The heart, of your jet dark hair
The soft shy passion in your eyes;
Didn’t sit with friends on Sundays,
Brooding over love.
And soon my dear hopes
Had perished too: my youth too
The fates denied me. Oh
How utterly
Past you are now,
Best friend of better times,
My long-lamented hope!
Is this that world? These
The pleasures, love, adventures
We talked about so much?
Is this every man’s inevitable lot?
When the truth dawned
You faded wretchedly; and raising
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A hand showed me cold death
In the distance and a dark grave.
What a strange opening that is: ‘Silvia, do you remember still/
The time of your mortal life . . . ?’ The girl is dead ten years and
more. How can we address her? What would it mean for her to be
Silvia if she did not remember her mortal life? Does the word
‘still’ suggest there might have been a period when she did
remember, but now she has forgotten? In the Zibaldone Leopardi
remarked that the mind takes pleasure from situations where it
comes up against sensory limitations, intellectual enigmas or
merely sensory vagueness, because it is then free to fill in what is
empty or inexplicable. His simplest development of the theme
comes in the poem ‘L’infinito’ where, with his view of the
landscape blocked by a small hill, the poet is free to conjure
infinite spaces behind. Imagined immensity then allows for the
mind’s ‘sweet shipwreck’, an effect Leopardi was always eager to
achieve and is certainly looking for in this poem. At the same
time, though, teased as we may be by conundrums, we are never
allowed to forget that Silvia is dead, she died young, and that
there is no reasonable consolation for such a death.
Another note in the Zibaldone dwells at length on the curious
pleasure generated by anniversaries, however unhappy, or by
revisiting places where some important experience, however
negative, was had. The fact that the mind rehearses the memory
allows the event to relive, albeit as no more than a ‘shadow’,
giving us the illusion that not all has been lost. Thus his poems
frequently present a complex weave of present, past and above all
might-have-been. We look back on Silvia looking forward to the
future. She did not grow up and enjoy her lovers’ praises, but
here we have all the beauty of imagining her doing so, or, even
better, of imagining her imagining. Emblematic of man’s
insignificance as a peasant girl’s death may be, Silvia nevertheless
becomes, through the poem, one of the most celebrated figures
77
Hell and Back
of her time. Likewise the poet achieves the blessing of celebrity, if
only for having described his wretchedness so beautifully. It is as
if, after all these years, past and might-have-been can almost be
made to merge into each other.
A delicate play of antitheses underpins this mix of lament and
celebration. ‘Life’ is ‘mortal’ (but what else could it be?). The
eyes are ‘smiling’, but ‘fugitive’. Silvia is ‘happy’, but ‘pensive’.
The word ‘limitare’ sits ominously beside ‘gioventu`’, and so on
throughout the poem. Meanwhile, lexically and syntactically,
Leopardi matches his temporal back and forth with a language, at
once disarmingly intimate in its speaking voice and at the same
time unapproachably distant in its archaisms and Latinate
focusing. These are not archaisms that take us back to any one
time, and certainly not to any pre-existing style. Rather they fuse
with the voice to create something that is as timeless and as
beautiful a might-have-been as Silvia’s prospected amours.
It is this linguistic aspect of Leopardi’s poetry that has so far
defeated, as he himself foresaw, all attempts at felicitous transla-
tion. Subjects of great immediate emotion and infinite sadness are
allowed to take on a quiescent coolness, as if remembered from
some extraordinary and disembodied distance. Not only is youth
recovered in the musing limbo of the mind but the whole
extension of the Italian language is given a second if shadowy life.
After all, as this poem reminds us, where had Leopardi spent his
youth if not over archaic texts? The subtle deployment of the
archaic is a reminder of youth, of lost youth, for Leopardi.
It is for this achievement of looking unflinchingly at the very
worst and briefly recuperating it in a beautiful and breathless calm
– the calm, as it were, of someone who has survived his own
decease – that people come to Leopardi, perhaps especially a
young woman who has lost her child. Yet Giacomo never allows
us to forget that these poems are carefully constructed mental
pleasures, short-lived illusions. A spoilsport by vocation, he
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frequently finishes a poem with ‘l’apparir del vero’ (the dawning
of the truth), that is, a tomb.
In ‘Ginestra, o il fiore del deserto’ he offers as an image of his
art the scented broom that grows on the lava slopes of Vesuvius
above a ruined civilisation. The past passion of human life is
immensely, reassuringly distant. The broom flourishes and per-
fumes the air. But it will be the first to go, Leopardi tells us, when
the lava flows again. His claim for the paradoxical effect of ‘works
of genius’ – quoted above – concludes thus: ‘even if they have no
other subject than death, they give their reader back – at least for
a little while – the life he has lost’. After ‘the little while’ is over,
we are returned, of course, to the present – ‘the least poetic of
times’, Leopardi observed. Deprived of the enchantment of the
verse, the grim vision of life we have encountered and the death
wish that lurks beneath it is once again open to attack. But since
the experience of the Canti is so cherished – after all, a poem can
be read and reread – the guns are turned on the Operette.
Irretrievably insomniac, he enjoyed a long acquaintance with the
moon. Beneath the cold silver light it spread over so many of his
verses, Giacomo is the wakeful shepherd, while the rest of
humanity wallows in the stupor of unconsciousness. Servants
were infuriated when he demanded breakfast in the afternoon,
lunch at midnight. Seeking some form of employment that would
allow him to sever the umbilical cord with home, he wandered
uneasily from Milan to Bologna, Florence to Rome. There was
always a good reason for turning down what was offered. ‘I
haven’t even the strength to die,’ he joked. Rejected by women
(‘my dear, he stank’), he struck up a passionate friendship with
Antonio Ranieri, a handsome young Neapolitan, risking accusa-
tions of homosexuality to enjoy a vicarious experience of the
man’s tormented love affairs. With astonishing kindness, Ranieri
and his sister looked after Giacomo in the last years in Naples.
The sister talked to him about deodorants and hung his shirt out
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in the sun so that the washerwoman’s nose might not be
offended. Ranieri fought off a jeering crowd as the small
hunchback tucked into one of his extra large ice creams. In 1837,
an asthmatic fit ‘took his virginity’ as Ranieri put it, ‘intact unto
the grave’. He thus didn’t live to see the happy moment, in 1839,
when his mother Marchesa Adelaide would finally declare that
she had accomplished her dream and restored the Leopardi
fortunes to their former glory. ‘God forgive him,’ she would say
when her first-born was mentioned. He had lost both his faith
and a great deal of money.
Some eight years after publishing her biography, Iris Origo’s
dreams were shattered once again, this time by the collapse of the
Fascist regime and the allied bombings. She took in displaced
children, helped escaping British airmen, wrote an exciting war
diary. But even after the carnage was over, the dream couldn’t be
recaptured, for now the collective illusion of communism had
replaced that of fascism and the farmers would no longer accept
the mezzadria system. It was distressing that their aspirations
didn’t fit in with those of the Origos. In 1952, Iris returned to
her biography of Leopardi to make extensive revisions. A
considerable amount of new material had come to light, she tells
us. But one cannot quite quell the suspicion that she returned to
Giacomo to savour once again his miraculous expression of all
that she found intolerable to say, but could not sometimes help
feeling.
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[G.W. Sebald]
In the closing pages of Cervantes’ masterpiece, at last disabused
and disillusioned, a decrepit Don Quixote finds that there is
nothing for him beyond folly but death. When giants are only
windmills and Dulcinea a stout peasant lass who has no time for
knights errant, life, alas, is unlivable. ‘Truly he is dying,’ says the
priest who takes his confession ‘and truly he is sane.’ Sancho
Panza breaks down in tears: ‘Oh don’t die, dear master! . . . Take
my advice and live many years. For the maddest thing a man can
do in this life is to let himself die just like that, without anybody
killing him, but just finished off by his own melancholy.’
Centuries later, observing the loss of all illusion that he felt
characterised the modern world, the melancholic Giacomo
Leopardi wrote: ‘Everything is folly but folly itself.’ And again a
hundred and more years on arch-pessimist Emil Cioran rephrased
the reflection thus: ‘The true vertigo is the absence of folly.’ What
makes Don Quixote so much luckier than Leopardi and Cioran,
and doubtless Cervantes himself, is that, as the epitaph on his
tombstone puts it, ‘he had the luck . . . to live a fool and yet die
wise’. What on earth would have become of such a sentimental
idealist had he returned to his senses, as it were, a decade or two
earlier?
Vertigo – as indeed Sebald’s other works, The Emigrants and
the Rings of Saturn – tells the stories of those who reach
disillusionment long before the flesh is ready to succumb, men –
they are always men – engaged in a virtuoso struggle to generate
that minimum of folly, or we could call it love of life, or even
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engagement, that will prevent them from dying ‘just like that’,
‘finished off by their own melancholy’.
But perhaps I have got that wrong. Perhaps on the contrary we
should say that Sebald’s characters are men who ruthlessly
suppress folly the moment it does, insistently, raise its wild head.
So wary are they of engagement in life that actually they are
morbidly and masochistically in complicity with melancholy and
all too ready to be overwhelmed by it. There is a back and forth
in Sebald’s work between the wildest whimsy and bleakest
realism. One extreme calls to the other: the illusions of passion, in
the past; a quiet suicide, all too often, in the future. Mediating
between the two, image both of his art and of what fragile
nostalgic equilibrium may be available to his heroes, are the
grainy black-and-white photographs Sebald scatters throughout
his books. Undeniably images of something, something real that
is, they give documentary evidence of phenomena that, as we will
discover in the text, sparked off in the narrator or hero a moment
of mental excitement, of mystery, or folly, or alarm. They are the
wherewithal of an enchantment, at once feared and desired, and
above all necessary for staying alive. Not even in the grainiest of
these photos, however, will it be possible to mistake a windmill
for a giant.
There are four pieces in Vertigo. All of them involve a back and
forth across the Alps between northern Europe and Italy. The
first is entitled ‘Beyle, or Love is a Madness Most Discreet’ and it
is the only one to offer something like the whole trajectory of a
life through passion and engagement to disillusionment and
depression. By using what was in fact Stendhal’s baptismal name,
Marie Henri Beyle, Sebald alerts us at once, and far more
effectively than if he had used the writer’s pseudonym, to the
extent to which identity is invented as well as given and thus
involves continuous effort. Beyle created Stendhal, as Sen˜or
Quesada dreamed up Don Quixote. The identity was one with
the folly, its most positive achievement perhaps. But that is not to
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say that Beyle, whoever he was, did not live on, as even Quesada
re-emerged for extreme unction.
In his opening sentences Sebald loves to give us a robust
cocktail of date, place and purposeful action. Thus the Beyle
piece begins: ‘In mid-May of the year 1800, Napoleon and a
force of 36,000 men crossed the St Bernhard Pass . . .’ And the
second piece starts: ‘In October 1980 I travelled from England
. . . to Vienna, hoping that a change of place would help me get
over a particularly difficult period of my life.’ And the third: ‘On
Saturday the 6th of September, 1913, Dr K., the deputy
Secretary of the Prague Workers’ Insurance Company, is on his
way to Vienna to attend a congress on rescue services and
hygiene.’
It is so concrete, so promising! All too soon, however, and this
is one of the most effective elements of comedy in Sebald’s work,
the concrete will become elusive, the narrative thrust is dispersed
in a delta as impenetrable as it is fertile. Thus Beyle, who at the
age of seventeen was with Napoleon on that ‘memorable’
crossing, finds it impossible, aged fifty-three, to arrive at a
satisfactory recollection of events. ‘At times his view of the past
consists of nothing but grey patches then at others images appear
of such extraordinary clarity he feels he can scarcely credit them.’
He is right not to. His vivid memory of General Marchmont
beside the mountain track wearing the sky-blue robes of a
councillor must surely be wrong, since Marchmont was a general
at the time and would thus have been wearing his general’s
uniform. Italo Calvino reports making a similar error when
looking back on a battle fought with the partigiani against
the Fascists: ‘I concentrate on the faces I know best: Gino is in the
piazza: a thickset boy commanding our brigade, he looks into
the square and crouches shooting from a balustrade, black tufts of
beard round his tense jaw, small eyes shining under the peak of
his Mexican hat. I know that Gino had taken to wearing a
different hat at the time but . . . I keep seeing him with that big
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straw hat that belongs to a memory of the previous summer.’ If
crossing the St Bernhard with an army was, as Sebald concludes
his opening sentence, ‘an undertaking that had been regarded
until that time as next to impossible’, remembering that
undertaking, even for a man with a mind as formidable as
Stendhal’s, turns out to be not only ‘next to’ but truly impossible.
This is hardly news. That the difficulty of every act of memory
has a way of drawing our attention to the perversity of the mind
and the complicity between its creative and corrosive powers is a
commonplace. ‘And the last remnants memory destroys,’ we read
beneath the title of one of the pieces in The Emigrants. No, it is
Sebald’s sense of the role of this act of fickle memory in the
overall trajectory of his characters’ lives that makes the pieces in
Vertigo so engaging and compelling.
Beyle/Stendhal’s life as described by Sebald is as follows.
Crossing the Alps the adolescent dragoon is appalled by the dead
horses along the wayside, but later cannot remember why: ‘his
impressions had been erased by the very violence of their impact’.
Arriving in Italy he sees a performance of Cimarosa’s Il
matrimonio segreto, falls wildly in love with a plain if not ugly
prima donna, overspends on fashionable clothes, and finally
‘disburdens’ himself of his virginity with a prostitute. ‘After-
wards,’ we are told, ‘he could no longer recall the name or face of
the donna cattiva who had assisted him in this task.’ The word
‘task’ appears frequently and comically in Vertigo, and most often
in Thomas Bernhard’s sense of an action that one is simply and
irrationally compelled to do, not a social duty or act of gainful
employment.
Despite contracting syphilis in the city’s brothels, Beyle
cultivates ‘a passion of the most abstract nature’ for the mistress
of a fellow soldier. She ignores him, but eleven years on,
deploying an ‘insane loquacity’, he convinces her to yield on the
condition that he will then leave Milan at once. Exhilarated by his
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conquest, Beyle is overcome by melancholy. He sees Il matrimo-
nio segreto again and is entirely unimpressed by a most beautiful
and brilliant prima donna. Visiting the battlefield at Marengo, the
discrepancy between his frequent imaginings of the heroic battle
and the actual presence of the bleached bones of thousands of
corpses, generates a frightening vertigo, after which the shabby
monument to the fallen can only make a mean impression. Again
he embarks on a romantic passion, this time for the wife of a
Polish officer. His mad indiscretion leads her to reject him, but he
retains a plaster cast of her hand (we see a photograph) that was
to mean ‘as much to him as Metilde herself could ever have
done’.
Sebald now concentrates on Beyle’s account of his romantic
attachment to one Madame Gherardi, a ‘mysterious not to say
unearthly figure’, who may in fact have been only (only!) a
figment of his imagination. Usually sceptical of his romantic
vision of love, one day this ‘phantom’ lady does at last speak ‘of a
divine happiness beyond comparison with anything else in life’.
Overcome by ‘dread’ Beyle backs off. The last long paragraph of
the piece begins: ‘Beyle wrote his great novels between 1829 and
1842, plagued constantly by the symptoms of syphilis . . .’
The trajectory is clear enough. The effort of memory and of
writing begins, it seems, where the intensities of romance and
military glory end. It is the ‘task’ of the disillusioned, at once a
consolation and a penance. In 1829 Beyle turned forty-seven.
Sebald turned forty-seven in 1990, the year in which Vertigo, his
first ‘novel’, was published. Coincidences are important in this
writer’s work. Why?
The Beyle piece is followed by an account of two journeys
Sebald himself made in 1980 and 1987 to Venice, Verona and
Lake Garda (all places visited by Stendhal). The third piece
describes a similar journey apparently made by Franz Kafka in the
autumn of 1913, exactly a hundred years after the French writer
reports having visited the lake with the mysterious Madame
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Gherardi. As Stendhal was referred to only by his baptismal name
and not the name he invented, so Kafka, in what is the most
fantastical and ‘poetic’ piece in the book, is referred to only as K.,
the name used for the protagonists of The Trial and The Castle.
Or not quite. In fact Sebald refers to him as ‘Dr K., deputy
secretary of the Prague Workers’ Insurance Company’, thus
bringing together Kafka’s ‘professional’ existence as an insurance
broker and his fictitious creation, begging the question of the
‘identity’ of the man who lies between the two.
Beginning in Verona, the last piece, ‘Il ritorno in patria’, shows
the author interrupting ‘my various tasks’ to undertake a journey
that will take him back to the village of his childhood in Alpine
Bavaria and finally on to England where Sebald has his ‘pro-
fessional’ existence as a university lecturer. In all three of these
pieces the romantic and military adventures of the young Henri
Beyle are very much behind our now decidedly melancholic
characters, and yet they are ever present too. As if between Scylla
and Charybdis, when Dr K. sits down to eat at the Sanatorium on
Lake Garda, it is to find an ageing general on one side and an
attractive young lady on the other. Returning to the building
where he grew up, Sebald remembers his boyhood longing for
the company of the pretty waitress in the bar on the ground floor,
and the fact that he was forbidden to visit the top floor because of
the mysterious presence of a ‘grey chasseur’, presumably a ghost,
in the attic. Satisfying his curiosity forty years on, the narrator
climbs to the attic to discover a tailor’s dummy dressed in the
military uniform of the Austrian chasseurs. It is hard to steer a
course across the wild waters generated by these two somehow
complicit follies. Was it not, after all, a combination of distressed
damsels and military grandeur that did for Don Quixote? Vertigo
offers a number of images of ships heading for shipwrecks.
But to the question of coincidences. In the second piece,
entitled ‘All’estero’, we are introduced to a character who could
not be further from Sebald’s usually melancholic type, Giovanni
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Casanova. So far we have heard how the writer, in deep
depression, travels from England to Vienna, falls into a state of
mental paralysis and is on the brink of becoming a down-and-out,
when in desperation he sets out for Venice, a city so labyrinthine
that ‘you cannot tell what you will see next or indeed who will see
you the very next moment’. One of the things he sees in Venice
of course is the Doge’s Palace, which causes him to think of
Casanova.
With admirable reticence, Sebald has given us no reason for the
cause of his depression, but if only because we have just read the
Beyle piece – and there are various tiny hints scattered here and
there – we suspect that romance is at least part of the problem, or,
as Dr K. will think of it in the following piece: the impossibility of
leading ‘the only possible life, to live together with a woman,
each one free and independent’. Just to see the name Casanova,
then, to think of that great seducer and endlessly resourceful
schemer, generates a fierce contrast. Yet even Casanova experi-
enced a period of depression and mental paralysis. When? When,
like some hero of Kafka’s, he was imprisoned without explanation
in the Doge’s Palace. And how did he escape? With the help of a
coincidence.
In order to decide on what day he would attempt to break out
of his cell, Casanova used a complicated random system to
consult the Orlando Furioso, thus, incredibly, happening on the
words: ‘Between the end of October and the beginning of
November’. The escape was successful. Casanova fled to France,
where he later invented for himself the identity Chevalier de
Seingalt. But just as remarkable as this propitious consultation of
the Orlando Furioso is the fact that 31 October turns out to be
the very day upon which our author finds himself in Venice.
Sebald is amazed, alarmed, fascinated.
Most evident outcropping of the underlying mysteriousness of
our existence, coincidence, or uncanny repetition, seems to
possess the power, at once comic and alarming, of galvanising the
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paralysed melancholic, jerking him out of his inertia. It is as if,
disillusioned to the point where certain follies have become
unthinkable (and contemporary Europe, as Sebald showed in The
Emigrants, has good reason for being thus disillusioned), we can
only be set in motion by a fascination with life’s mysteries, the
which are simply forced upon us in all sorts of ways. Between, or
perhaps after, passion and glory lies the uncertain resource of
curiosity, the recurring emotions of amazement and alarm. Any
act of remembering will offer a feast.
Towards that midnight between October and November,
Sebald rows out on the Venetian lagoon with an acquaintance
who points out the city incinerator, the fires of which burn in
perpetuity, and explains that he has been thinking a great deal
about death and resurrection. ‘He had no answers,’ Sebald writes,
‘but believed the questions were quite sufficient to him.’ It is an
echo, conscious or otherwise, of Rilke’s advice to his ‘young poet’
to ‘have patience with everything unresolved and try to love the
questions themselves’. Rilke was another German writer who had
considerable problems both with military academies and with
love.
But it would be a mistake to imagine that Sebald presents
coincidence in a positive light. Extraordinary parallels may,
briefly, release the paralysed mind from its cell, get it sorting
through old diaries, or tracking down books in libraries, or
comically attempting on a bus, as in Sebald’s case, to take
photographs of twin boys who resemble exactly the adolescent
Kafka, but they do this in the way an alarm or a siren might.
There is a destructive side to coincidence. It has a smell of death
about it. What was the night ‘between the end of October and
the beginning of November’, if not the night before All Saints’
Day, I morti, the Day of the Dead?
Why is this? To ‘coincide’ is ‘to occupy the same place or time’,
says Chambers Dictionary, ‘to correspond, to be identical’. The
coincidence that Stendhal, Kafka and Sebald all take similar trips
88
The Hunter
at similar times of year, the first two exactly a century apart, may
set curiosity in motion. It also removes uniqueness from these
events; the recurrence diminishes the original, replaces it, falsifies
it, the way Beyle reports finding his memories of landscapes
destroyed by their painterly representations, the way even an old
photograph may be considered as stealing something of its
original. Here we are approaching the core of Sebald’s vision, the
spring at once of his pessimism, comedy and lyricism. Engage-
ment in the present inevitably involves devouring the past.
Waking up in his Venice hotel on 1 November, remarking on the
silence, Sebald contrasts it to the ceaseless surging of traffic he
hears in the hotels of other cities, the endless oceanic roar of cars
and trucks released wave upon wave from traffic lights. He
concludes his description: ‘For some time now I have been
convinced that it is out of this din that the life is being born
which will come after us and will spell our gradual destruction,
just as we have been gradually destroying what was there long
before us.’ To be set, with Casanova, in motion, is to be returned
to the business of destruction. The chasseur, or hunter, he who
consumes his own sport (and what was Casanova if not a
hunter?), is a recurring figure in this book. Occasionally Sebald
hears an arrow whistle past an ear.
It is uncanny, on reading a work that makes so much of
coincidences, to find it coinciding in unsettling ways with one’s
own life. Enviably adept at bringing together images and
anecdotes that will deliver his vision, Sebald now tells us of his
experiences in Verona, the town where I have lived for more than
twenty years. Eating in a gloomy pizzeria, he is unsettled by the
painting of a ship in peril on stormy seas. Trying to distract
himself he reads an article in the paper about the so-called ‘caso
Ludwig’. For some years a string of local murders were
accompanied by the claims of a group calling itself Ludwig. Some
of the victims were prostitutes. There were also various incendiary
attacks on discotheques, which the murderers felt to be dens of
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sin. Again the sexual and the military seem to have combined in
the most disturbing fashion. How could Sebald not be appalled
by the macabre German connection? And when the waiter brings
his bill, he reads in the small print (again we have a reproduction)
that the restaurant owner is one ‘Carlo Cadavero’, which is as
much as to say, Charles Corpse. This is too much and the author
flees on the night train to Innsbruck.
Aside from the fact that I was able to look up Carlo Cadavero’s
name in the Verona phone book, what struck me as uncanny was
a comment from later in this piece when, returning to Verona
seven years on, Sebald hears how the two adolescents, Wolfgang
Abel and Marco Furlan, who created this terrible identity
Ludwig, a sort of negative two-man Don Quixote, were tried and
imprisoned. He remarks that although the evidence against them
was ‘irrefutable’, ‘the investigation produced nothing that might
have made it possible to comprehend a series of crimes extending
over almost seven years’.
Irrefutable? It would have been about the same time as
Sebald’s second trip that, while carrying out English oral exams at
the University of Verona, I found myself looking at the ID of a
young woman whose surname was Furlan. Seeing my eyebrows
raise, she said, ‘Yes, I am his sister. And he is innocent.’ The exam
was a test of conversational skills and Signorina Furlan went on to
pass it in exemplary fashion explaining to me with the utmost
conviction that the whole thing was absurd and her brother the
sweetest most normal person on earth. Despite the irrefutable
evidence, she believed this, as no doubt the sisters of those who
later commit war crimes believe in all honesty that they are
growing up in the most normal of families. They are. Not for
nothing is Sebald’s writing frequently set alight with images of
terrible conflagrations that inexplicably consume everything,
leaving the world to start again from under a veil of ash. Never
mentioned, Shiva presides.
The time has come to say something about this writer’s
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extraordinary prose, without which his rambling plots and
ruminations would be merely clever and disturbing. Like the
coincidences he speaks of, it is a style that recovers, devours and
displaces the past. He has Bernhard’s love of the alarming
superlative, the tendency to describe states of the most devastat-
ing confusion with great precision and control. But the touch is
much lighter than Bernhard’s, the instrument more flexible.
Kafka is present here too, perhaps from time to time Walser, and
no doubt others as well. But all these predecessors have been
completely digested, destroyed and remade in Sebald and above
all in the magnificent descriptions which mediate so effectively
between casual incident and grand reflection. One suspects too
that Michael Hulse’s translation, which possesses a rare internal
coherence of register and rhythm, is itself the product of a long
process of digestion and recasting, a wonderful, as it were,
coincidence. Some of the English is breathtaking. All the same,
the most effective moments are often the more modest stylisti-
cally. Here is the author in a railway carriage with two beautiful
women; knowing what we know of him, any approach to them is
impossible, yet how attractive they are in their mystery!
Outside in the slanting sunlight of late afternoon, the poplars
and fields of Lombardy went by. Opposite me sat a Franciscan
nun of about thirty or thirty-five and a young girl with a
colourful patchwork jacket over her shoulders. The girl had
got on at Brescia, while the nun had already been on the train
at Desenzano. The nun was reading her breviary, and the girl,
no less immersed, was reading a photo story. Both were
consummately beautiful, both very much present and yet
altogether elsewhere. I admired the profound seriousness with
which each of them turned the pages. Now the Franciscan nun
would turn a page over, now the girl in the colourful jacket,
then the girl again and then the Franciscan nun once more.
Thus the time passed without my ever being able to exchange
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a glance with either the one or the other. I therefore tried to
practise a like modesty, and took out Der Beredte Italiener, a
handbook published in 1878 in Berne, for all who wish to
make speedy and assured progress in colloquial Italian.
Only Sebald, one suspects, would study an out-of-date phrase
book while missing the chance to speak to two attractive ladies.
The determinedly old-fashioned aura that hangs about all his
prose is part and parcel of his decidedly modern version of non-
engagement. Yet, from the ‘insane loquacity’ of the romantic
Beyle to the charming picture in the book’s last piece of the
schoolboy Sebald enamoured of his teacher and ‘filling my
exercise books with a web of lines and numbers in which I hoped
to entangle Fraulein Rauch forever’, few writers make us more
aware of the seductive powers of language. Sebald’s literary
enticements seek to achieve an intimacy that will not be so
destructive as other follies: the direct encounter, the hunter’s
knife. This truly is a ‘madness most discreet’.
All of which leads us to the only possible objection that I can
imagine being raised against this remarkable author. That to
succumb to his seduction is to resign oneself to more of the same:
the broken lives, the coincidences, these unhappy men and
enigmatic women. Is it a problem? With his accustomed blend of
slyness and grim comedy, Sebald tackles the issue himself in a
section from the last piece of Vertigo. Sitting in the hotel in the
village of his childhood, he observes a gloomy painting depicting
woodcutters at work and recalls that the artist Hengge was
famous for his pictures of woodcutters: ‘His murals, always in
dark shades of brown, were to be seen on the walls of buildings
all around W. and the surrounding area and were always of his
favoured motifs.’
The author sets out to tramp around the surrounding woods
and villages to rediscover all these paintings, finding them ‘most
unsettling’, which is to say, for Sebald, good, since only what is
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unsettling attracts his attention, heightens sensibility, warns of
life’s dangers, recuperates its horrors in pathos. He then gives us
the following comment on Hengge’s tendency always to paint
the same subject, ending with a moment of alarming but also
amusing vertigo, that dizzying empty space that Sebald finds at
the core of every intensity.
Hengge the painter was perfectly capable of extending his
repertoire. But whenever he was able to follow his own artistic
inclination, he would paint only pictures of woodcutters. Even
after the war, when for a variety of reasons his monumental
works were no longer much in demand, he continued in the
same vein. In the end, his house was said to have been so
crammed with pictures of woodcutters that there was scarcely
room for Hengge himself and death, so the obituary said,
caught him in the midst of a work showing a woodcutter on a
sledge hurtling down into the valley below.
As long as Sebald shows this kind of resourcefulness, then my
only regret, when his task obliges him to repeat himself, will be
the tendency of the new book to eclipse the old.
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A bilingual student of mine made the following observation.
During a period of study in England, she had become an admirer
of Milan Kundera, reading his work in English. Later, back in
Italy, she had picked up an early novel of his, in Italian this time,
that she didn’t know. She remarked: ‘It was only when I was
three-quarters of the way through that I realised it was the same
novel I had read first of all in England. I knew the plot was the
same of course, but the book was so completely different that I
was convinced it couldn’t be the one I had already read.’
Checking recently through the Italian translation of an early
novel of my own, a noir I suppose you would call it, scribbled in
my second year in Italy, I was disturbed to find the following
remark. The hero, a young Englishman in Italy who is about to
turn to a life of crime, recognises that this has something to do
with the change of language.
. . . the only thing he had truly gained these last two years was
the ability to speak a foreign language near perfectly and the
curious freedom that ability now appeared to give him in the
way he thought. As if he had shifted off rails. His mind seemed
to roam free over any and every possibility. He must make a
big effort always to think in Italian as well as to speak it
(certainly he had been thinking in Italian when he stole the
document case). It could be a way out of himself, he thought,
and out of the trap they had all and always wanted him to fall
into.
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I wrote this – and promptly forgot it – in my late twenties,
some years before I started translating anything with literary
pretensions and many years before I began to read more seriously
about language and linguistics. In the meantime, however, I have
discovered the Italian proverb, ‘Inglese italianizzato, inglese
indiavolato’, which would have been such an appropriate quota-
tion to have placed on the title page. Just as that proverb
translates poorly into English, so my comment on the hero’s
sense of moral liberty in a foreign language, which seemed
convincing enough in the original English, appears much less so
in the Italian translation, where the reader is doubtless all too
aware that his language is drenched in Catholic morality. The
liberty Italian gave my hero had to do with its novelty, his
unawareness of its implications, his being uninitiated in the
culture it supports.
What I want to do here is to ask if there is any useful
connection to be made between my bilingual student’s surprise
on reading Kundera in a different language, and my hero’s
perception that his appropriation of the Italian language would
open the way to his appropriation of other people’s property. And
again whether there is a connection between these two events –
one real, one fictional – and my own growing conviction that a
very great deal of literature, poetry and prose can only be truly
exciting and efficacious in its original language. It is a conviction
that goes hand in hand with my decision not to write any more in
Italian, never to translate into Italian, and never to translate
poetry in any direction at all, except perhaps to put beside the
original as a crib. This is a personal decision I should stress, not a
prescription.
It is amusing, of course, that my student should have
discovered the shock of the difference between the same text in
different languages, with, of all people, Milan Kundera. For
perhaps no other contemporary writer has been so ferociously
attentive to the translations of his own work, nor dedicated
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himself to such scathing polemics at the expense of lazy and
‘unfaithful’ translation, polemics underwritten, it sometimes
seems, by a belief in the possibility of a near identity between
original and translation. Kundera speaks of having left a publisher
because he changed semicolons into full stops. He speaks of a
natural tendency of translators to reject repetition, to use richer
and more literary vocabulary where the original text was lean and
simple, and above all to return all ‘stylistic transgression’ to the
most conventional prose.
Kundera is not alone, of course, in finding such shortcomings
in translations, nor in identifying an author’s stylistic transgres-
sion with his originality and indeed the raison d’eˆtre of his work.
Explaining his own habitual use of repetition, D.H. Lawrence
remarked: ‘the only answer is that it is natural to the author’. Less
defensively, Proust spoke of style as ‘the transformation that the
author’s thought imposes on reality’, suggesting an essential
equivalence of style and vision. In this regard, I suspect we would
all agree that the mark of a ‘poetic prose’ is its consistent and
internally coherent distance both from what is recognisably
conventional and indeed from the creative styles of other authors.
It has its meaning, that is, within a matrix of texts from each of
which it establishes its distance. We would thus tend to accept
Kundera’s claim that, ‘For a translator, the supreme authority
should be the author’s personal style.’ And presumably then his
complaint, ‘But most translators obey another authority, that of
the conventional version of “good French”’ (French being the
specific case he is referring to). We might then go on to suspect,
as Kundera clearly does, that if we find a work so radically
different in different languages, it is because the translator has let
us down.
But why are these translators so perversely obtuse? Is their
conventionalising tic, as Kundera would have it, an occupational
hazard, like the gravedigger’s insensitivity, the politician’s ambi-
guity? Or could it be that the recognition and reproduction of
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transgression is not, as it turns out, such a simple thing at all, not
merely a question of accepting some unusual punctuation and
repeating a word where the author does? Kundera does not
discuss the fact that since the conventions – social, moral and
linguistic – of any two cultures and languages may be, and usually
are, profoundly different, any transgression of them is not
absolute in nature, but has meaning only in relation to the
particular expectations it disappoints. It needs the context of the
conventions it subverts. Notoriously, it is in those places where
poetic prose deviates from standard usage, establishing a personal
style and creating meaning through its distance from something
else, that translation becomes tormented if not impossible. For
the ‘something else’ in French is not the same as the ‘something
else’ in Czech.
Thus when Kundera writes: ‘Partisans of flowing translation
often object to my translators: “that’s not the way to say it in
German (in English, in Spanish, etc.)!” I reply: “It’s not the way
to say it in Czech either!”’, he is being ingenuous. Translating
poetic prose, and even more so poetry, means creating the
miracle of the ‘same difference’ from different and sometimes
potentially antithetical conventions: as if the transgression of a
sixteenth-century Hindu widow in attempting to escape suttee
could be made equivalent to that of a twentieth-century Scottish
Moslem refusing to obey her husband’s order not to go out to
work.
The rare bilingual person, the person most thoroughly
grounded in two distinct conventions, is the person most likely to
be struck by the utter difference of the same text in their two
languages. They are more keenly aware of the distinct value
structures implied by the languages and the subversive force of
whatever differences from convention are there established.
Those who have merely learned another language, however well,
are not so easily disorientated. They are more like my cheerfully
criminal protagonist who shakes off the conventions and taboos
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implicit in his native tongue the better to enjoy the freedom of
what is experienced, at least at first, as not much more than a
delightful code, a mental playground. The only thing that can be
subverted for this person is the morality he was brought up with
and the language that is its vehicle.
Lawrence’s novel Women in Love is an account of the felt
necessity to escape a series of conventions which have outlived
their usefulness. The pressures of convention are dramatised in
relationships, but Lawrence immediately recognises language as
the cement of convention. ‘It depends what you mean,’ remarks
Ursula, on the first page, making a semantic problem of her
sister’s seemingly innocent question, ‘don’t you really want to get
married?’ I have long taught this book to Italian students by
inviting them to compare passages of the original with the Italian
translation, identifying the places where the two texts part
company, and then trying to establish links between those
departures. Since the translator is more than competent, these
inevitably occur where the original prose is particularly transgres-
sive: ‘Birkin shut himself together,’ Lawrence remarks. ‘Gudrun
shrank cruelly from this amorphous ugliness.’ Or again: ‘she was
destroyed into perfect consciousness’. Or of Ursula: ‘she was free,
in complete ease’. Or: ‘they could forget perfectly’. In each case,
Lawrence distorts normal usages to suggest a complex psychol-
ogy, and often to gesture to an underlying pattern of thought
that is peculiarly his own. The Italian translation shrinks from the
oxymoron of ‘shrank’ suggesting fear and withdrawal, followed
by ‘cruelly’ suggesting aggression; it has no answer to Lawrence’s
subversion of ‘pulled himself together’ into ‘shut himself togeth-
er’, it does not know what to do with the aberrant ‘into’ after the
verb ‘destroy’, nor does it catch the oddness of ‘in ease’ instead of
‘at ease’, or the peculiarity of ‘forgetting’ – but what? –
‘perfectly’. (The translations, in entirely standard Italian, are:
‘Birkin si chiuse in se stesso’, ‘Gudrun rabbrividı` ferita dalla
bruttezza informe’, ‘dilaniata, in uno stato di lucidita` perfetta’,
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‘libera e totalmente a suo agio’, ‘Erano immersi in un perfetto
obblio’).
But those who know Italian, and many who do not, will
appreciate how difficult it is to recreate such a style which gains its
meanings from idioms and usages only hinted at in the original
and unavailable in the translator’s language. What’s more,
however unusual Lawrence’s English, it should be noted that, in
these examples at least, it flows wonderfully. It deviates from
standard English, but is always attentive to the rhythms of
English prosody. The unusual locution ‘destroyed into perfect
consciousness’, for example, draws on the syntactical pattern of
‘turned into’, ‘changed into’, ‘transformed into’, introducing a
semantic shock with the word ‘destroyed’ but keeping the same
structure intact. Likewise, the preposition ‘in’ is separated from
‘ease’ by ‘complete’ to avoid the jarring of ‘in ease’ as opposed to
‘at ease’, thus creating the expectation of entirely standard usages
such as ‘in complete liberty’, ‘in complete harmony’, only to
surprise us with ‘ease’.
Hence, to go back to Kundera, his suggestion that it is the
‘partisans of flowing translation’ who are hostile to creative and
original writing is again ingenuous. Lawrence’s prose flows well
enough and presumably one would wish to be faithful to that
fluency. It is part of his style. It is natural to the author. The
problem is that the author is deviating from English in a manner,
he has seen, that English allows, perhaps even suggests. In the
same way, his characters find unconventional solutions which
society, though not sanctioning, may well have hinted at. They
are the solutions of people escaping from these particular
conventions, not some notional idea of convention in general.
Indeed, by living on its margins, Lawrence’s characters define the
society they wish to escape, as his own work defines the
conventional novel he no longer wishes to write. To put it
another way, when writing in English, there is no way of being
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entirely outside Englishness (or American-ness, or whatever the
underlying linguistic context may be).
At the end of Women in Love, when one of the protagonists
chooses the most drastic form of escape by walking out into the
Alpine snows to die, Lawrence remarks on how close he was to a
path that led over the Alps into Italy. ‘Would that have been a
way out?’ he asks. ‘No, it would only have been a way in again.’
My contention is that translation itself is always ‘a way in again’:
anything we write in a translation will always be understood in
terms of the world, the conventions, the general literary context
of the language we are working into, usually our native tongue.
To imagine one can transport transgressions or deviations from
other conventions and reproduce them in the same way and in
the same place in the translation, thus generating the same
meaning, is to be dangerously naive. So it happens that, rather
than embarking on a transgression that in their own language
would come across as no more than an oddity, many translators
feel obliged to revert to the conventional. This hardly seems
perverse. It does, however, have serious repercussions for our
understanding of the status of a translated text.
I came to Italy at twenty-five, translated commercial and
technical material for several years, then moved on to translating
novels and I suppose we could say creative and transgressive prose
in my early thirties. In those days, when choosing whether to
accept a translation or not, I went very much on the question of
what I call voice. If I felt I could mimic the voice of this prose in
English, I would accept the book. If not, not. Since money was
an important factor at that time, I should stress that these
decisions did not always coincide with taste. I sometimes felt that,
alas, I could not mimic a book I liked and would have to turn it
down, or that I could manage a book I didn’t like and, to make
ends meet, would do well to translate it. Only years later, reading
Goethe, and then Humboldt, did I come across the idea of
‘elective affinity’. One can have an affinity with something one
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doesn’t like, just as one can find areas of one’s own personality
less than desirable.
In my first translations, when it came to faithfulness, it seemed
enough to me to shadow in my English, so far as I could
understand it, the text’s relationship with its own language. Later,
however, as my knowledge of Italian and above all Italian
literature broadened and deepened, I became aware that my
understanding of texts I had translated in the past was being
altered by my growing appreciation of the context in which they
had been written. My translation, while attractive, could not,
within an English context, transmit many of the book’s gestures.
On the contrary, the books would be understood in relation to an
English literary matrix, perhaps suggesting meanings not appa-
rent or even remotely intended in the original. This does not
mean I would now translate these books very differently, only
that I would be more aware of the various areas of loss. On the
one hand, then, long immersion in another culture brings
empowerment – we understand things better – on the other, it
becomes a handicap – we begin to doubt whether some texts are
translatable at all. Perhaps I am approaching my bilingual
student’s perception of absolute difference.
While I was working on my first literary translations and
immediately before my first novel in English was accepted for
publication, I wrote a novel in Italian with the odd title, I nani di
domani, which, literally translated, means ‘Tomorrow’s Dwarves’.
Unlike any of my other novels, this was a straightforwardly
rumbustious comedy, an innocuous version of the evasion that
characterises the English teacher turned criminal I mentioned
earlier on. For both of us, the escape from English was an escape
from moral seriousness. I was pleased with what I’d done, proud
of having managed to write in Italian, albeit with a great deal of
help from my wife, and began to send the typescript around, but
although an agent took the book on, it wasn’t published. I
hazarded a translation into English, but with every sentence the
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book shed its charm. Indeed, it seemed infinitely more difficult to
translate than the work of other writers. The reason, perhaps, was
that the driving energy of the book had been the evasion of
writing in Italian. I could not be interested in this material in
English. Fifteen years on, a reputable house offered to publish the
novel. They declared it charming, even hilarious. I went back and
read it. What charm it had lay entirely in its naivety. Its frequent
deviations from standard Italian were as innocuous and random
as its satire of provincial life was superficial and caricatured. I felt
it would be best not to publish it since it represented neither what
I feel now nor even what I truly felt then. Its real meaning was its
escape from something else, something the Italian reader
wouldn’t be able to understand because it wasn’t available in the
text: Englishness. Ironically, at about the same time, the early
noir describing a character’s move into crime sparked off by his
transplantation into another culture was also accepted. This book,
Cara Massimina, I am more or less happy with. It presents that
evasion of a new language within the moral framework of the old.
I mention this episode because it offers the opportunity to
make two reflections: first that, aside from economic reasons, a
writer will change language successfully only when the particular
aesthetic he has drives him to it. Not otherwise. One can see how,
obsessed as he was by the compulsive nature of language, our lack
of individual control over it and its distance from our experience
of reality, a writer like Beckett would choose to work in a second
language where any alienation he might feel, or lack of expertise
he might fear, would play to his poetic. Joyce, on the contrary,
whose project was exactly the opposite of Beckett’s – an attempt
to use all the resources of language to recover our experience of
place and time, to make the text, as the young Beckett described
it, ‘not about something, but that something itself’ – remained
anchored, despite all his experiments and all his years abroad, to
Dublin and to English.
The second reflection that arises out of the otherwise trivial
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episode of my Italian novel, is that the very notion of ‘stylistic
transgression’ may have a very different value in different cultures.
I nani di domani was accepted because its trangressions, even
when intended and aimed at some particular target, could
nevertheless be seen as the amusing shortcomings of the learner,
of one seeking to become an initiate on the same level as the
reader. In this sense, far from being subversive, the book was
actually reinforcing convention. And Italian is a language where
there has been very little seriously transgressive prose of the
Lawrence or Beckett variety, and much extremely attractive
writing within generally accepted, and in the end by no means
despicable, conventions. This, after all, is a country where one of
the leading satirical magazines will still reject an article because it
too aggressively attacks Catholic sensibilities, a country where a
famous writer and translator like Elio Vittorini could openly
defend the radical cuts and changes he made to Lawrence’s work
on the grounds that not to make them would ‘damage the beauty
of the prose’. Certainly – for example – there is nothing
transgressive that I can see in the Italian translations of Kundera’s
work.
Italy is thus a country with very different sensibilities from
England, where these days a novel with even the most modest
literary pretensions is obliged to be openly transgressive at the
linguistic level, something that has led to the tedious multiplica-
tion of idiosyncrasies and the wholehearted, often uncompre-
hending, acceptance of different forms of English from all over
the world. The quirky is at a premium. Thus, in a sense, to write
in a rigidly ‘conventional’ prose becomes itself a form of
transgression.
Shortly after winning the Booker Prize, Kazuo Ishiguro, the
Anglo-Japanese writer, gave an interview to Time magazine in
which he criticised his British contemporaries for writing in ways
that made translation difficult. His rigidly austere prose, which so
effectively expresses the emotional limitations of his protagonist
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in The Remains of the Day, was, he claimed, partly the result of his
attentiveness to eventual translations. He pared his English down
to what a translator in any language could easily handle. What
Ishiguro could not have appreciated is that the underlying
menace of that precise conventional voice disappears entirely in,
say, Italian where such a controlled form of expression is
common in prose fiction. The distance Ishiguro establishes from
other writers in English has gone. What is disturbing, if one
wishes to be disturbed by such things, is with what appetite the
public laps up translated literary works whose essential cohesion
has all too often been lost in translation. Might it be, I sometimes
wonder, precisely that loss of depth that makes translations
attractive?
And yet I translate and people tell me they enjoy my
translations. So I would like to wind up by considering my
relationship with one of the Italian authors I have translated and
to look at a paragraph of his work in original and translation.
Roberto Calasso is about as different from myself as a writer
could be. A meticulous scholar, admirably intellectual, he sternly
avoids any autobiographical material. His creative reconstructions
of Greek and Indian mythology have the advantage, from the
translator’s point of view, that they contain little that is culture-
specific to Italy in terms of semantic content. They are attempts
to enter and regenerate different mindframes, though of course
they do so from an Italian starting point and in the Italian
language. If my own writing has matured and changed radically
over the last few years, it is largely due to my reflections on
Calasso’s work and on what it has meant to translate it.
Sometimes, however, it occurs to me that I have come closer to
putting him into English in the echoes of his writing in my own
than in my translations. But here he is, introducing the god
Apollo in The Marriage of Cadmus and Harmony:
Delo era un dorso di roccia deserta, navigava seguendo la
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corrente come un gambo di asfodelo. Nacque lı` Apollo, dove
neppure le serve infelici vanno a nascondersi. Su quello scoglio
perduto a partorire, prima di Leto, erano state le foche. C’era
pero` una palma, a cui si aggrappo` la madre, sola, puntando le
ginocchia sulla magra erba. E Apollo apparve. Allora tutto
divenne d’oro sin dalle fondamenta. D’oro anche l’acqua del
fiume, anche le foglie dell’ulivo. Quell’ oro doveva espandersi
nel profondo del mare, perche` ancoro` Delo. Non fu piu`, da
allora, isola errante.
As I suggested, Calasso’s book involves a daring recreation of
Greek mythology and one is struck throughout both by the vatic
authority of the tone and the presentation of myth as real event,
or at least as something that requires no apology. The voice
combines certain poetic or archaic elements, particularly of
diction and focusing, with the short, even terse sentences that we
tend to associate with modern prose. That is, while it draws on
literary resources from previous periods, it does not appear to be a
pastiche, but rather uses them to acquire a peremptory authority
that is all its own. Since not everyone reading this will understand
Italian, let me try, however unsatisfactory this approach may be,
to give you a brutally literal translation so that you can grasp, in
however crude a form, the content offered.
Delos was a spine of deserted rock, it sailed about following
the current like a stalk of asphodel. Born here was Apollo,
where not even the unhappy servant girls go to hide
themselves. On that lost rock to give birth before Leda were
the seals. There was, however, a palm tree to which the mother
clutched, alone, bracing her knees on the sparse grass. And
Apollo appeared. Then everything became gold right from the
bottom. Of gold also the water of the river, also the leaves of
the olive tree. That gold was to expand into the depth of the
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sea. Because it anchored Delos. It was no longer, from then
on, a wandering island.
From the purely semantic point of view, this is a faithful
translation. The Italian is not standard Italian and this likewise is
very far from standard English. The focusing, particularly, is
bizarre in both texts, most notably in the flourish, ‘Born here was
Apollo . . .’ (‘Nacque lı` Apollo . . .’) But one transgression is not
equivalent to the other. Where the Italian elegantly and fluently –
for there is rhythm and alliteration in plenty here – gestures back
towards archaic forms to acquire its lofty tone, the English drifts
aimlessly about the syntactical currents of the original; and if it is
not incoherent semantically, it certainly is so in terms of register
and thus risks drawing more attention to its own vagaries than to
its content (in a way the Italian does not).
So the English will have to be changed. But how? A standard
modern English would be banal and inappropriate. The only
solution would seem to be to draw on the resources of an older
English as Calasso has drawn on those of an older Italian. But
notoriously these resources are not equivalent. In short, to be
faithful to Calasso’s strategy and the reading experience it
generates, which I so enjoy, I shall have to appropriate – that
awful word – the text into an English context. But any notion of
translation without appropriation is nonsense. The only way not
to appropriate a text is to leave it in its original language. Here is
the published translation:
Delos was a hump of deserted rock, drifting about the sea like
a stalk of asphodel. It was here that Apollo was born, in a place
not even wretched slave girls would come to hide their shame.
Before Leda, the only creatures to give birth on that
godforsaken rock had been the seals. But there was a palm
tree, and the mother clutched it, alone, bracing her knees in
the thin grass. Then Apollo emerged, and everything turned to
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gold, from top to bottom. Even the water in the river turned
to gold and the leaves on the olive tree likewise. And the gold
must have stretched downward into the depths, because it
anchored Delos to the seabed. From that day on, the island
drifted no more.
There is neither time nor space here to go through this
translation line by line: suffice it to say that when I have invited
students to compare these passages they invariably remark on the
very different syntactical structuring of the two texts, and the
more generous lexicon of the English. Thus ‘Nacque lı` Apollo’
has become: ‘It was here that Apollo was born . . .’, the English
retaining the focus on ‘here’ at the expense of a much longer and
more regular locution. And the rhythmic, alliterative ‘Su quello
scoglio perduto a partorire, prima di Leto, erano state le foche’ (On
that lost rock to give birth before Leda were the seals) has
become: ‘Before Leda, the only creatures to give birth on that
godforsaken rock had been the seals.’ Once more the fore-
grounding of the place and, in this case, the focus on ‘seals’ at the
end of the sentence, has been kept at the expense of a certain
expansion. The Italian is powerfully elliptical, in a way that much
poetic material in Italian gestures back to Latin ellipsis. While this
is sometimes possible in English, it is rarely so when the content
is determined by another language.
Meanwhile in lexical terms, one notes how ‘serve infelici’
(unhappy servant girls) has become ‘wretched slave girls’ ‘perdu-
to’ (lost) has become ‘godforsaken’, ‘nascondersi’ (hide them-
selves), has become ‘hide their shame’, and the word ‘seabed’ has
been introduced to offer an anchor to ‘anchored’ which in
English seems to require an indirect object.
How long it would take to discuss each one of these and all the
other decisions involved in the translation of this brief text! How
complex it all is, not just syntactically, but in terms of the larger
literary context. At first sight, it would appear that I offer the
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perfect example of Kundera’s obtuse translator, substituting one
sentence for two at one point, using more literary words, entirely
reorganising almost all the sentences. But Italian is not English
and the spirit guiding these decisions is clear enough. The
English is groping for a rhetorical tone, a register, comparable to
that of the Italian, drawing on an archaic, perhaps biblical
language with which my vicarage youth makes me all too familiar.
Given the larger and more layered lexicon of English, the move
away from ‘unhappy’ to ‘wretched’ is dictated by the need to
gesture to the classical world through the use of a slight archaism
(‘infelice’ in Italian sits happily with either a modern or archaic
register). In English a ‘servant girl’ would normally be a ‘maid’,
which would tend to make us think of the British upper classes,
hence the switch to ‘slave girls’. ‘Hide themselves’ is as inelegant
as third-person plural reflexives tend to be in English and, what’s
more, not immediately comprehensible here, hence the interpre-
tative introduction of ‘hide their shame’. The ‘lost rock’ would
not easily give the Italian sense of ‘far away from anywhere’, nor
would it, as does the word ‘perduto’, offer alliteration (‘perduto a
partorire, prima . . .’). The choice of ‘godforsaken’ does give that
sense and offers a rhythmic alliteration with the earlier ‘gives’,
albeit at the risk of introducing a concept not present in the
Italian. The last sentence of the translation, ‘From that day on,
the island drifted no more’, completely rearranges the Italian to
discover a poetic register complete with alliteration that matches
the original in gesture if not in exact semantics.
So the text is now in English. It is faithful in that it suggests a
consistent, coherent relationship between this voice and a literary
past, not unlike that of Calasso’s text. It includes much of the
same alliteration, rhythm and peremptory fluency. Am I happy
with it? Yes and no. The main failing comes in the translation of
‘E Apollo apparve. Allora tutto divenne d’oro sin dalle fondamenta.’
This is clearly the climax the text has been working towards. And
here I lost my nerve. Having already used an ‘and’, rather than a
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relative, to link the previous sentence, I chose to begin this
sentence with ‘Then’. This would be all very well if the next
Italian sentence didn’t begin with ‘Allora’. Unable in the
translation to start a second sentence with ‘then’, I thus chose to
run the two sentences together. Looking at the whole thing in
Italian and English we have:
E Apollo apparve. Allora tutto divenne d’oro sin dalle fonda-
menta.
Then Apollo emerged, and everything turned to gold, from
top to bottom.
Clearly the English loses drama by not introducing a fullstop
after ‘emerged’. Worse, it loses the now extravagant alliteration of
‘Apollo apparve’ (an alliteration then echoed, as it were, in
‘Allora’). Why? I was worried about the semantics of ‘appeared’
as a description of birth, thinking that this word might be more
acceptable in Italian than English. I also felt the alliteration was
now overly heavy. I thus settled for ‘emerged’ which, on
reflection, seems no more appropriate than ‘appeared’, since one
does not, I don’t think, speak of babies as ‘emerging’, though
technically one might see that this is a more accurate choice. But
my real mistake here was not to think in terms of the relation of
style and content, not to understand what Calasso was up to.
Apollo is the god of ‘appearance’, of beauty, of art. With him,
appearance, as it were, appears, for the first time. And with this
sentence the alliteration, the artifice of the paragraph, now comes
to the surface in a way that no one can ignore. Had I been aware
of all this, I would surely have had the courage to write: ‘And
Apollo appeared.’
But even assuming I made this correction, my difficulty here
does little more than suggest a deeper loss that takes place in this
translation. We have noted that almost all the changes I have
made to adjust register and rhythm involve a slight loss of
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concision, a slight expansion. But perhaps the best way I can
explain my misgivings is by quoting the next paragraph from the
original.
L’Olimpo si distacca da ogni altra dimora celeste per la
presenza di tre divinita` innaturali: Apollo, Artemis, Atena.
Irriducibili a una funzione, imperiose custodi dell’unico,
hanno stracciato quella lieve cortina opaca che la natura tesse
intorno alle sue potenze. Lo smalto e il vuoto, il profilo, la
freccia. Questi i loro elementi, non acqua o terra.
Here Calasso begins his presentation of the Greek obsession
with appearance and aesthetics, the sharp line, the fine profile, a
love affair with clarity, the territory of Apollo. And clearly it is to
this that his prose is aspiring. Indeed we could compare the
sharpness of Calasso’s focusing with the clarity of gesture on
those black-on-white designs that characterise the pictorial vases
of the early Hellenic period. A literal translation will be so ugly
and clumsy as to give only a vague idea of this intention. But here
it is:
Olympus detaches itself from every other celestial dwelling
through the presence of three unnatural divinities: Apollo,
Artemis, Athena. Irreducible to one function, imperious
custodians of the unique, they tore away that flimsy, opaque
screen that nature weaves around its forces. The enamel and
the void, the profile, the arrow. These their elements, not
water or earth.
Once again it is clear that this will not do. The intention is lost
in the extravagant unusualness of the English which seems to
have no point of contact with the rhythms of any known English
prosody. Once again, as we shall see, the published translation
seeks a rhetorical gesture similar to that of the original, but at the
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expense of that concision that welds the style of the Italian to its
subject. Note in particular what heavy weather is made of that
crucial and crucially brief sentence, ‘Lo smalto e il vuoto, il profilo,
la freccia.’
If Olympus differs from every other celestial home, it is thanks
to the presence of three unnatural divinities: Apollo, Artemis,
Athena. More than mere functions, these imperious custodians
of the unique stripped away that thin, shrouding curtain which
nature weaves about its forces. The bright enamelled surface
and the void, the sharp outline, the arrow. These, and not
water or earth, are their elements.
The problem in this case is that one simply cannot translate the
semantic freight of ‘smalto’ or ‘profilo’ as used here in Italian with
just one word. And then of course there are questions of rhythm
and balance to consider, two aesthetic qualities as dear to Apollo
as clarity. Yet precisely because one appreciates how much
Calasso’s text is doing, one fervently wishes one could have
followed the Italian more closely. Perhaps the most dangerous
moments for a translator are those when he so admires the
original, so understands its surrounding context, that he wishes
his own language were the same as the language he is working
from, and then stubbornly tries to make it so. This is the territory
of Nabokov’s translation of Pushkin, which is all but unreadable;
it is the experience of the bilingual person who is shocked by the
idea that the same text can be so radically different in two
different languages, as different indeed as those two languages are
from each other. It is the starting point of all Kundera’s criticism.
It also explains, I hope, why I have decided never to translate into
Italian. And never to translate poetry. The more poetic, or
transgressive, a text is, the more it departs from familiar usage, so
the more it comes to be about the language it is written in, not in
a narrow linguistic sense, but in the sense of all that language
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stands for and supports. While I feel I can manage this
conundrum with prose, where content still plays its very large
part, I find poetry, not being a poet, quite beyond me.
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Sentimental Education
[Vikram Seth]
Salman Rushdie’s novel The Ground Beneath Her Feet is to be
‘supported’, we hear, by a new release from the rock band U2. As
if in coy echo, the promotional blurb to Vikram Seth’s An Equal
Music tells us that ‘bookstores have invited string quartets to
perform during his readings’. Simultaneously? While the phe-
nomenon of celebrity publishing has accustomed us to the idea
that the book itself may be the least exciting part of an overall
package, it is disturbing to find two authors with such literary
ambitions allowing our eyes, or indeed ears, to be distracted from
the pleasures of the text. The multimedia experience may be
fashionable, but in literature distinction and discrimination are of
the essence. One reads, for preference, in a quiet place.
There are uncanny parallels between Rushdie’s and Seth’s latest
efforts. Like chalk and cheese it seems impossible not to mention
them together. Both books are by hugely successful, male,
anglophone, Indian-born authors now in early middle age. Both
feature musicians as protagonists. In each case those protagonists
are involved in a love triangle. In each case the musician-lovers
lose sight of each other for ten years allowing a third to slip in.
Both first-person narrators seem driven to tell their story out of a
sense of loss, the need to overcome pain and disillusionment.
Much, very much, is made of the intimacy generated by creating
music together and in both cases the music played comes to be
seen as a manifestation of a transcendental realm of feeling. But
while Rushdie, with his usual spirited bluster, seems set on giving
back to the world only the cacophony the mind is anyway subject
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to these days, Seth is after more calculated and harmonious
effects. The distance between the rock band in Central Park
pushing amplification to the limits to drown out helicopters and
sirens, and the tail-coated quartet entertaining a scrupulously
silent, if somewhat dusty middle-class audience beneath a
baroque ceiling rose, will serve well enough as an analogy for the
distance between these two novelists’ performances.
Vikram Seth’s reputation began with The Golden Gate. Here,
some light-hearted satire and a series of sentimental relationships
were rescued from banality by being presented entirely in tightly
rhyming tetrameter. The effect, at least in the opening cantos, is
charming. Unlike Rushdie, when Seth approaches his readers, it is
always to seduce, never to accuse, even less to browbeat. But he is
careful not to challenge either. Despite occasional lapses into
doggerel, The Golden Gate slips down like a well-made ice cream.
It would be churlish to raise objections and simply unkind to
hazard comparison either with Pushkin, whom Seth names as his
model, or Byron, of whom the reader, despite the different verse
form, may more often be wistfully reminded. Even returning to
the book today, one cannot help but take one’s hat off to
someone who had the resources and tenacity to bring such a
project to a conclusion and convince a publisher it would work.
That hat-doffing admiration – the critical faculty forestalled by
wonder – is something Seth once again sought and largely
obtained with his second work of fiction, A Suitable Boy. Much
was made at the time of its publication of the distance the author
had travelled from The Golden Gate, from a good-humoured
satire of contemporary California in chiming verse, to this vast,
meticulously researched drama of India in the 1950s, the crimes
and loves of four extended families in over 1,300 pages. But with
hindsight the similarities between the two ventures are evident
enough: first, the decision to ignore current experimental trends
in literary fiction, particularly Anglo-Indian fiction, in this case by
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resorting to a conventional narrative prose that offered a tried and
tested vehicle for pleasure; then, the gently satirical delight in
social trivia with here the exoticism of the mainly Hindu milieu
standing in for the wit of clever rhyme, and the sheer scale and
intricate extension of the plot serving to generate that same gasp
of disarmed surprise.
At the thematic level, too, there was a similar concentration on
affairs of the heart, again with an awareness of the dangers of
passion and the virtues of traditional, in this case even dynastic,
common sense. Unpleasantness and indeed horror are not
excluded, but, as Anita Desai acutely remarked in her assessment
of the book, Seth tends to hurry over the brutal and lurid as if
such things were really too distasteful to occupy much space on
his pleasurable pages.
Since a great deal of contemporary fiction seeks primarily and
often solely to shock, this decision to restrict unpleasantness to a
minimum will hardly raise hackles. If a problem does arise it is
when we begin to feel that Seth’s designs upon us are all too
irksomely evident. There are readers whose antennae go up
before succumbing to charm. Various Indian critics in particular
suggested that A Suitable Boy’s complacent vision of Indian
society verged on the grotesque. The desire to seduce must
always be in complex negotiation with the spirit of truth. In this
sense the decision, in An Equal Music, to encourage us to look
unhappiness long and hard in the eye might be seen as an attempt
on Seth’s part to redress the balance.
Narrator and protagonist Michael Holmes describes himself as
‘irreparably imprinted with the die of someone else’s being’.
Unable, in his mid-thirties, to get over his first love of ten years
before, he ‘lives in a numbed state of self-preservation’, in a tiny
attic apartment to the north of Kensington Gardens, eking out a
barely adequate living playing second violin in a string quartet
and teaching the trade to a variety of unsatisfactory students with
one of whom he pursues an affair that offers no more than
117
Hell and Back
physical relief. The book’s three brief opening paragraphs, which
also form a separate section of their own, strike a melancholy and
decidedly minor chord that is to be sustained, with variations,
throughout.
The branches are bare, the sky tonight a milky violet. It is not
quiet here, but it is peaceful. The wind ruffles the black water
to me.
There is no one about. The birds are still. The traffic slashes
through Hyde Park. It comes to my ears as white noise.
I test the bench but do not sit down. As yesterday, as the
day before, I stand until I have lost my thoughts. I look at the
water of the Serpentine.
Immediately we recognise the familiar sadness of the lonely
man in the urban scene, trapped in empty repetition, eager to
forget, clearly attracted to and menaced by that black water the
wind blows at him. There is nothing remarkable here. We might
even want to call it creditably low key. Gone the springy step of
The Golden Gate, gone the sprawling exoticism of A Suitable Boy,
the style now spare, sometimes wilfully limp, Seth thus renounces
the visiting card of virtuosity. When we discover that his hero is
not only white and English but that he hails from the town of
Rochdale, a declining industrial satellite on the edge of the
Manchester conurbation, the kind of place that tends to be the
butt of dismissive jokes in the sophisticated South, it becomes
clear that if there is to be a gasp of surprise this time around, it
must be at Seth’s boldness in placing himself right in the
mainstream of English fiction, doing exactly what the English do.
Michael, then, is marooned in the past, ‘with inane fidelity
fixated on someone who could have utterly changed’. Ten years
ago, studying in Vienna, he fell in love with another student,
Julia, a pianist. For a year things went well, but Michael’s music
teacher was a harsh master and dissatisfied with his achievements.
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Despite Julia’s insistence that he see the experience through,
Michael fled, leaving both girlfriend and the possibility of a solo
career behind. When, two months later, he began to write to her,
she did not reply.
The exact dynamics of this break-up, the reasons for Julia’s not
replying to Michael’s letters, for his not simply returning to see
her, are never clear to the characters themselves and even less so
to the reader. What evidently matters to Seth, however, is that it
should appear an unnecessary separation in a relationship of
enormous potential. Michael is thus more understandably in
thrall to his sense of what might have been. To make matters
worse, since he and Julia used to play together in a trio, his very
vocation constantly brings him up against the memory of her. In
particular there is a Beethoven trio they used to perform – opus 1
number 3 – that he often listens to but cannot play either
privately or professionally for fear of being overcome by emotion.
Informed, significantly enough by Virginie, his student girlfriend,
that Beethoven in later life prepared a now obscure variation of
this early work as a quintet, Michael becomes obsessed with
tracking the piece down and getting his quartet to perform it with
the help of an extra player. This will both remind him of Julia,
but at the same time be different from the past. ‘I know,’ he
thinks excitedly, ‘that, unlike with the trio, nothing will seize me
up or paralyse my heart and arm.’
Instead, then, of seeking a more appropriate sentimental
variation with Virginie, Michael sets out to find this different and
improbable version of what he remembers all too well. We are
thus treated to one of those episodes, now so familiar in
contemporary fiction, where someone searches for the crucial but
elusive text in specialist libraries and second-hand shops, meeting
with the predictable mixture of obnoxious obtusity and unhelpful
helpfulness. Ironically, it is just as – at last successful – he boards a
bus to bring home an old vinyl recording of the piece, ‘so
desperately sought, so astonishingly found’, just as he prepares a
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decidedly sentimental, indeed potentially masturbatory (not a
word Seth would use) evening with this variation – ‘I’ll come
home, light a candle, lie down on my duvet and sink into the
quintet’ – that the lovelorn Michael sees, after ten years, who but
Julia herself going by on a bus in the opposite direction. The
variation, we immediately understand, is to be with the loved one
in person. When Michael’s quartet do play the piece with a fifth
artist, that artist will be Julia.
But before considering how Seth tackles the revival of lost love,
let’s turn aside a moment to look at his handling of the
protagonist’s provincial boyhood, since this strand of the narra-
tive offers in naked miniature an example of the writer’s aesthetic
at work.
Home of the Industrial Revolution, the north of England has a
long and spirited tradition in socially engaged fiction. From
Gaskell’s Mary Barton to the novels of contemporary writers like
Pat Barker and Jane Rogers, first the ascendancy of the brutal
factory owner, then the desolation of industrial decline, finally the
gloom of government cuts and, throughout it all, the plight of
the poor, have all been passionately documented. Seth is aware of
this of course and as the dutiful Michael goes to visit his ageing
father at Christmas, he offers us a number of pages in line with
the tradition, portraying a disadvantaged boyhood in a decaying
landscape.
The handsome town hall presides over a waste – it is a town
with its heart torn out. Everything speaks of its decline. Over
the course of a century, as its industries decayed, it lost its work
and its wealth. Then came the planning blight: the replace-
ment of human slums by inhuman ones, the marooning of
churches in traffic islands, the building of precincts where once
there were shops. Finally two decades of garrotting from the
government in London and everything civic or social was
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choked of funds: schools, libraries, hospitals, transport. The
town which had been the home of the co-operative movement
lost its sense of community.
The only other colonial outsider I can think of who took on
the industrial North was the Australian Christina Stead in Cotter’s
England. With fantastic energy and mimetic resources, Stead
achieved the astonishing feat of giving us a believable British
working class chattering, suffering, living, laughing, loving and –
she never forgets – hating as hard as could be. This is not Seth’s
project. He does not risk the local dialect. Aside from these few
pages, his hero displays no interest in politics or the condition of
England. Nor does Seth. Why then bother with this reductive
and potentially platitudinous picture of the North? Is it necessary
for authenticity?
Certainly Seth works hard to intertwine the history of the town
with that of Michael’s family, mainly in order to present the latter
as victims. His father’s butcher’s shop was appropriated to make
way for a road which was never built. Bereft of his profession, the
father fell ill. Nursing him, the mother suffered a fatal stroke.
Over Christmas, Michael plans ‘to lay a white rose’ on the
parking lot that eventually replaced the shop and family home:
‘the flat and I hope snow-covered site of my mother’s life’.
Political and again poignant considerations also come into the
account of Michael’s early education on the violin:
Because the comprehensive I went to had been the old
grammar school, it had a fine tradition of music. And the
services of what were known as peripatetic music teachers were
provided by the local education authorities. But all this has
been cut back now, if it has not completely disappeared. There
was a system for loaning instruments free or almost free of
charge to those who could not afford them – all scrapped with
the education cuts as the budgetary hatchet struck again and
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again . . . If I had been born in Rochdale five years later, I
don’t see how I – coming from the background I did, and
there were so many who were much poorer – could have kept
my love of the violin alive.
Cursory research is being made to work very hard here.
Michael expresses commonplace views frequently fielded in the
‘Letters to the Editor’ section of British newspapers. But to
respond with the standard objection that in the same period the
people of Lancashire have equipped themselves with cars, TVs
and computers, that the consumption of beer, cigarettes and junk
food could never be described as negligible, that though one
would always applaud a government that provided violins to its
people, the people themselves are hardly screaming for them – to
raise this objection would simply be to miss the point. Seth
doesn’t want to get us interested in the politics or economics of
the situation. He himself is not at all interested in the question of
how the north of England (where I was born and spent my
infancy and sang indifferently in a marvellous choir) is to
continue to produce musicians. He is careful never to give
Michael any individual or thought-provoking views on the
subject (Stead’s characters, on the contrary, always have excit-
ingly personal views). No, the whole ‘northern thing’ has been
taken over – Seth is adept above all at taking over old forms to his
special purposes – only for the opportunity it offers to strike
further chords of poignancy, further variations on the theme, or
rather mood, so clearly announced in the book’s opening lines.
Deprived as it may or may not be, the North is certainly
generous in this regard: it gives our author, among other
poignancies, the ageing, beaten father attached to his decrepit
cat, the image of Michael as a boy lying on the Pennine uplands
listening to the larks, and the wholesomeness of the dying
benefactress who introduced Michael to music and who lends
him her extremely valuable Italian violin, without which he
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would be hard put to do his job. At the end of the book he will
crumble some home-made Christmas pudding onto the snowy
moors in her memory.
Admiring, if we will, the cleverness of this appropriation, we can
now turn to the main plot with a proper sense of what Seth is up
to. Everything will be arranged to generate the maximum
poignancy: ‘issues’, whether moral, social or existential, will – like
the decay of the North – be drawn on only in so far as they
sustain the note on the heartstring, then rapidly dropped. Vienna
will be the venue where it would be disastrous to fluff a concert.
Venice will perform its traditional service as the right place to
have a romantic interlude that is only an interlude. Even music
itself, ostensibly the book’s great theme, will be understood first
and foremost as a vehicle of sentiment. Thus, after the vision of
the long-lost Julia on the bus, Michael, rehearsing the now highly
significant quintet, remarks:
For me there is another presence in this music. As the sense of
her might fall on my retina through two sheets of moving
glass, so too through this maze of notes converted by our arms
into vibration – sensory, sensuous – do I sense her being again.
The labyrinth of my ear shocks the coils of my memory. Here
is her force in my arm, here is her spirit in my pulse. But where
she is I do not know, nor is there hope I will.
Wrong! Michael is wrong. For though on crowded Oxford
Street he fails to catch up with Julia’s bus in time (Seth’s research
letting him down here a little, one feels), the dear lady will turn
up of her own free will at the end of the quartet’s concert at
Wigmore Hall. There are tentative, poignantly uncommunicative
meetings. We discover that Julia is married, loves her husband,
and has a son who goes to school only a stone’s throw from
Michael’s flat. Thus understandably hesitant, nevertheless – for
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the old magic is at work and the plot must move on – she
succumbs and the couple makes love. As they prepare to do so,
watch how cleverly and tenderly the moral question is fielded:
She smiles a little sadly. ‘Making music and making love – it’s a
bit too easy an equation.’
‘Have you told him [the husband] about me?’ I ask.
‘No,’ she says. ‘I don’t know what to do about all this
subterfuge: faxes in German, coming up to see you here . . .
but it’s really Luke [the son] who I feel I’m . . .’
‘Betraying?’
‘I’m afraid of all these words. They’re so blunt and fierce.’
Indeed they are. But Julia need not worry, irony wouldn’t fit in
with the particular effects Seth is after here. He will do his best to
make sure that both characters remain not only sympathetic, but
somehow innocent. That way we can savour their sadness
without any irritating distractions. After all, this is not the
ordinary affair where Dionysus bursts on to a tranquil scene and
the hitherto placid weavers discover a dark side to themselves that
they never imagined. The sex is toned delicately down. The Bach
is turned decorously up. The lovers play music together. And are
they not anyway entirely justified – if justification is required (they
both seem to feel it is) – by the fact that this is old and unfinished
business between proven soul mates? ‘I am not seeing anyone
new,’ Michael truthfully tells the worried Virginie.
Without recounting the whole story, there remains – as far as
the plot is concerned – Seth’s masterstroke to consider, the ploy
that allows him to sustain his melancholy medley for the full 382
pages (the book makes much in musical terms of the problems of
sustaining notes and intensity). Those awkward first meetings
between Michael and Julia are suddenly explained by the fact that
our heroine is going deaf, indeed is already on the brink of total
soundlessness. Against all odds, she is trying to keep this disability
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a secret in the hope that she will be able to pursue her career
regardless. Aspiring novelists will be able to profit from consider-
ing how this desperate response to personal tragedy, together
with a great deal of other preparatory stage-setting, allows Seth to
get away with the extraordinary coincidence of its being Julia –
Julia whose whereabouts, we remember, Michael was unable for
ten years to trace – who is suddenly, and without his knowledge,
invited to substitute for a sick pianist who was to support the
quartet at its crucial performance in of all places Vienna, where
the lovers originally met.
In his author’s note Seth acknowledges help from ‘those who
understand the world of the deaf – medically, like the many
doctors who have advised me, or educationally, in particular my
lip-reading teacher and her class, or from personal experience of
deafness’. Fascinating here, and alas typical of so many contem-
porary novels, is the way the solemn appeal to research and
veracity in some specialist field is actually used to mask the failure
to engage a more interesting but arduous and less immediately
glamorous subject. The idea of a couple with special talents and
sensibilities rediscovering each other many years on and finding
that their original bond does indeed challenge relationships made
since, is most intriguing and immediately presents itself as a
vehicle for all kinds of drama, reflection and moral dilemma.
What might such a plot have become in the hands of Lawrence,
or James, or Moravia, or Elizabeth Bowen? But as soon as we
discover that Julia is afflicted with deafness, we have moved into
the realm of kitsch. Can the film, we wonder, be far behind those
quartet-accompanied readings?
Now a party to his lover’s terrible secret, Michael is inevitably
brought into conflict with his quartet colleagues who will be
risking their reputations when they play with Julia in Vienna. The
reader grows anxious over the big night. It all works splendidly in
terms of narrative tension. We are well manipulated. Some will
have to pull out their handkerchiefs. The downside is that it
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allows Seth to get away without developing the characters of the
lovers or the dynamic of their relationship, which, as a result, can
very adequately be summed up thus: at best diffident initially,
Julia briefly indulges a tediously insistent Michael to the extent of
agreeing to a few days together in Venice after the Vienna
concert, then sensibly and predictably withdraws, leaving him in
much the position we found him at the beginning of the book.
Of the characters in A Suitable Boy, Anita Desai remarked: ‘They
come to us extremely well equipped with easily recognisable
characteristics.’ The same is true of those in An Equal Music and
in particular of Michael’s fellow members in the quartet, though
it has to be said that their rehearsals offer by far the best reading
in the book. The ever irritable and aggressive, but also gay and
vulnerable, first violinist Piers, his winsomely accommodating
sister Helen, the overly diligent cellist Billy – eager to pose
problems the others haven’t noticed – and Michael himself,
pragmatic, gruff, always in danger of distraction: this is a force
field that works, and offers welcome relief from the heady
monotony of the love affair. It is also the element that comes
closest to evoking the uniting power of music, this picture of four
people who have no special desire to spend time together
nevertheless sharing the transport of the work they are playing,
enjoying the pleasure of a communication beyond words, beyond
deafness, and to a certain extent beyond the grave. As they
perform Bach together, Michael reflects: ‘Our synchronous
visions merge, and we are one; with each other, with the world,
and with that long-dispersed being whose force we receive
through the shape of his annotated vision and the single, swift-
flowing syllable of his name.’
Leaving aside the swiftness or otherwise with which the syllable
‘Bach’ (yes, I know it means ‘stream’) might be said to flow, how
seriously are we to take this idea and its latent transcendentalism?
Does it convince? There is a determined intertextuality to Seth’s
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book. ‘Under the arrow of Eros I sit down and weep,’ Michael
tells us in Piccadilly Circus having failed to catch up with Julia’s
bus. London’s monuments and the protagonist’s desperation are
thus fused in an echo of Psalm 137 and its many subsequent
literary adaptations. Having been treated to some gruesome
Rochdale gossip on deaths, births and divorces, the sensitive
Michael’s mental wince is registered in a one-line paragraph: ‘For
better or worse, unto us a child, ashes to ashes.’ Later, as he faxes
Julia in German to bamboozle the husband, Walter Scott is on his
mind: ‘It is a tangled web that I am weaving,’ he comments,
reminding us of Marmion.
These frequent echoes, literary or biblical, are invariably
deployed at moments of emotional intensity and seek to establish
with the reader a community of sensibility similar to that
experienced by the musicians as they play. It is a community from
which the insensitive – the bank employee who refuses Michael a
loan to buy a new violin, his benefactress’s nephew who selfishly
seeks to repossess the expensive violin – will necessarily be
excluded. Towards the end of the novel, as Michael’s suffering
grows more intense, the literary references become more frequent
and are now accompanied by a fragmentation of thought in what
amounts to a stops-out pastiche of modernism. In the following
passage Julia has just ushered her unwelcome ex-lover out of her
house with a very decisive goodbye. The little dog mentioned is a
reference to the knowing creature in Carpaccio’s St Jerome cycle
that the couple saw together in Venice. Shakespeare and Eliot are
also present and, who knows, perhaps Mark Twain as well.
The door opens, closes. I look down from the top steps.
Water, full fathom five, flows down Elgin Crescent, down
Ladbroke Grove, through the Serpentine to the Thames, and
double-deckered red vaporetti sputter like Mississippi steam-
boats down its length. A small white dog sits on the sneezing
prow. Go, then, with the breathing tide, and do not make a
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scene, and learn the wisdom of the little dog, who visits from
elsewhere, and who knows that what is, is, and, O harder
knowledge, that what is not is not.
In John Coetzee’s novel, Disgrace, the protagonist becomes
aware that the literary project he is engaged in is going badly
wrong, it ‘has failed to engage the core of him. There is
something misconceived about it, something that does not come
from the heart.’ We are thus given to understand that if, on the
contrary, Coetzee’s story is electrifying from beginning to end –
and it is – then that must be because it is extremely close to its
author’s heart (in the same way that, for all kinds of reasons,
industrial England was close to Stead’s heart when she wrote
Cotter’s England). That there be something at stake in a
narrative, something that engages the core of an author’s being,
does not of course guarantee that a reader will be convinced, but
it does seem to me a sine qua non of such conviction. However
eager to entrance us Seth may be, derivative artifice of the kind he
is deploying here looks like no more than a tiresome literary
exercise. If the subject does matter greatly to him, he has not
found a way of expressing it.
Which brings us at last to the title of the book and to John
Donne. Seth seeks to tie together literary reference, musical
experience and metaphysical consolation by prefacing his work
with a quotation from the great dean and poet:
And into that gate they shall enter, and in that house they shall
dwell, where there shall be no cloud nor sun, no darkness nor
dazzling, but one equal light, no noise nor silence, but one
equal music, no fears nor hopes, but one equal possession, no
foes nor friends, but one equal communion and identity, no
ends or beginnings, but one equal eternity.
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Modern ears cannot help but wonder at such confident and
eloquent declarations of faith. Yet overcoming for a moment our
sense of awe, it is interesting to see how the term ‘equal’ emerges
here as the result of Donne’s systematically denying all those
tensing polarities – cloud/sun, darkness/dazzle, noise/silence,
hope/fear – that make our mortal life what it is. In short, ‘equal’
becomes a word that we can use to evoke the unimaginable,
something beyond tension, beyond life, beyond individuality.
This is rather more radical than Michael’s sentimental sense of the
presence of others, even the dead, when he plays his violin: ‘The
attendant ghosts press down on me . . . Schubert is here, and
Julia’s mother. They attend because of the beauty of what we are
re-making.’ All the same, in the last pages of the book, when
Michael has gone to hear Julia giving a solo performance of one
of the pieces of music that once united them, Seth boldly
attempts to clinch all his interconnections thus: ‘There is no
forced gravitas in her playing. It is a beauty beyond imagining –
clear, lovely, inexorable . . . the unending “Art of Fugue”. It is an
equal music.’
But of course it is not, not in the sense Donne meant it, which
is the only sense one can think to ascribe to this odd expression.
What else could it mean? Only a moment later, in fact, Seth,
himself all too familiar with forced gravitas, is remarking that the
human soul ‘could not sustain’ too much of this music, whereas
Donne was affirming his belief in a music that will delight the
soul for all time. On closer examination, Seth’s ‘beyond imagi-
ning’ turns out to be the merest inflation. Here we have a deaf
woman playing Bach superbly, and though that may stretch the
imagination, a good performance of Bach, wherever it comes
from, is far from beyond imagining.
Once again, then, we have an inappropriate appropriation. Seth
needs his vague transcendentalism, his lyricism and literary
gesturing, his sense of community in pathos, to sugar this long,
but in the end far from hard look at unhappiness. I was thus
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mistaken when I supposed that this work might mark a radical
departure from the previous two books. It is another careful
exercise in crowd-pleasing. As such, the sickly music it generates
is one with which the ever vigorous, sometimes vicious Donne,
the Donne for whom so much, in love and in religion, was always
at stake, would have had nothing whatsoever to do.
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A Chorus of Cruelty,
[Giovanni Verga]
‘Cruelty,’ wrote Emil Cioran, ‘is a sign of election, at least in
literature. The more talented a writer is, the more ingeniously he
puts his characters in situations from which there is no escape; he
persecutes them, he tyrannizes them, he traps them in dead ends,
he forces them to run the whole gamut of their agony.’
Of no writer could this provocative intuition be more true than
the great Sicilian novelist Giovanni Verga. Yet eighty years after
his death the author of the ‘Cavalleria rusticana’ continues to be
presented to the public as first and foremost a humanist worthily
celebrating the passions of the ordinary man and drawing
attention to his difficult lot through well-documented description
of changing social conditions. G.H. McWilliam concludes the
introduction to his new translation of Verga’s Sicilian novellas
thus:
Verga’s great merit lies in his ability to arouse compassion
whilst avoiding completely all traces of sentimentality, and this
is because he presents life as it is, free from the distortions of
idealistic perspectives. His narratives are an unfailing source of
interest, not only to those who care about good literature, but
also to the historian, for whom his novels and short stories
provide an invaluable record of social conditions at a critical
stage of modern Italian history.
Reading such reassuring words one is bound to ask whether there
mightn’t be some taboo that prevents us from saying what it
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really is that draws us so powerfully to this man’s violent and
irretrievably pessimistic stories.
Yet if much of the literature on Verga is at best uneasily half
true, the author himself is always the first to set us on the wrong
track. Rarely has a great writer’s work been so unwittingly
uneven, his long and earnest reflections on his various endeavours
so mysteriously distant from their impact on the reader. Sensing,
at some deep level, perhaps, that the impulses driving his writing
were such that they would require considerable disguise before
they could be allowed to circulate in polite society, Verga’s
critical efforts seem to have been largely, if unconsciously,
devoted to developing that disguise, not only for the world, but
for himself too.
That he never managed to settle on any particular cover,
ducking in the space of a long creative life from the elegant
society novel, through various forms of worthy social realism, and
finally to a formulation that anticipates absurdism, suggests that
the real inspiration lay he knew not where. He poured his genius
into many bottles, haphazardly it sometimes seems. Only in the
one he initially most despised, the short and shamelessly regional
novella, did it yield its full and explosive flavour. Only there,
albeit with all the insipid decanting of translation, can it still
produce its decidedly intoxicating effect outside the Italian
language.
Born in 1840 into a family of impoverished gentry in the
Sicilian city of Catania, Verga learned early about the importance
of maintaining a certain reputation, the difficulty of doing so
when resources are scarce. Wealthy Uncle Salvatore had inherited
all the family estates on condition that he remain unmarried and
use the income to assist his younger brothers and sisters. Life,
Giovanni would have realised, is a tangled web and contracts are
often notoriously different in letter and in spirit. Few people are
naturally generous. Money was not forthcoming. His two spinster
aunts, miserly beyond belief, became known as ‘the mummies’.
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Still, things can sometimes work out in the most unexpected
ways. By the time Giovanni’s elder brother Mario married Uncle
Salvatore’s illegitimate daughter Lidda, differences had been
resolved. And this was just as well, since money doesn’t serve only
to keep up appearances. In 1854 a cholera epidemic forced
Giovanni’s parents to flee Catania to the safety of the family’s
country estates. Others of course were not so lucky. Years later
Verga’s writing would be full of figures fighting tooth and nail for
the good opinion of others – their very identity depends on it –
only to be defeated by illness, drought or, worse still, some
irresistible passion that destroys them from within. Beneath it all
runs a ferocious sense of outrage. But about what exactly?
In 1860 Garibaldi arrived in Catania. The Bourbon regime was
collapsing; the state of Italy was born. Verga, who had already
written a novel with the heady title Amore e patria joined the
new Guardia Nazionale and started a political weekly under the
slogan, ‘Roma degli Italiani’. But far from a glorious struggle for
national unity, the young novelist found himself involved in the
repression of popular revolt. The harrowing story ‘Liberta`’ tells
how the people in a small village on the slopes of Etna,
misunderstanding the meaning of the ‘liberty’ the Piedmontese
state was bringing them, butchered the local nobles and began to
fight over who should get what land. A few days later Garibaldi’s
troops arrived to restore order and butchered the villagers. In a
fascinating article written in 1970, Leonardo Sciascia reveals how
even Verga, the least squeamish of novelists, played down the
cruelty of the soldiers of unification.
In any event, by 1865, and availing himself of another of
money’s advantages, Verga had bought himself out of the
National Guard and sailed to Florence, then capital of Italy. D.H.
Lawrence, who first discovered Verga for the English-speaking
world and gave us the earliest translations, speaks of him leaving
Sicily ‘to work at literature’. Like everything else in Lawrence’s
brief introduction to Little Novels of Sicily, the words are
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wonderfully apt. Verga was a worker. Avid, anxious, for money
and fame, he laboured at his literature, as so many of his
characters would labour doggedly in field or quarry or fishing
boat. All the same, it would be many years before he found the
form that could most successfully channel his remarkable energies.
Verga later disparagingly described his early novels as tales of
‘elegance and adultery’. ‘Real Italian novels,’ Lawrence gener-
ously calls them, ‘a little tiresome, but with their own depth’.
Casting about for something more satisfactory, Verga even had a
shot at the Gothic. But in the middle of the ‘Castello di Trezza’ a
hopelessly complex story of betrayal, multiple murder and ghosts
who may not be ghosts, the second wife of the cruel baron, on
hearing of the tragic death of her predecessor, finally addresses
these prophetic remarks to her terrified maid: ‘Even if you took
away the ghosts, the clock striking midnight, the storm that slams
open doors and windows, the creaking weathercocks, this would
still be a terrifying story.’ Whether or not the illumination came
to Verga when he wrote that snippet of dialogue, his project from
now on would be to strip the ‘terrifying story’ that was ever inside
him of its melodramatic mechanics and give it to us straight.
Published in a fashion magazine in 1870 ‘Storia di una
capinera’ (‘Story of a Blackcap’) was halfway there. We have the
underlying play of forces, but not the milieu. Briefly: the young
Maria is taken out of her convent school to escape a cholera
epidemic and goes to join her family in the country. Her mother
died young. Her weak father remarried a rich woman who will be
interested only in the fate of her own daughter. There is no
money for Maria’s dowry. She must take the veil. But during this
brief stay in the country she falls in love with rich neighbour Nino
and he with her. Needless to say Nino is intended for the sister
with the dowry.
Presented as a one-way epistolary novel, Maria writes to a
convent friend of her awakening to love, then her brutal
segregation after the romance is discovered. Heartbreaking
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chapters have her shut in her room listening to merry-making
down the passageway. In one brief, breathless appearance at
Maria’s window, the handsome Nino lets us know that he
understands the cruel injustice of it all. But he does nothing to
break the social ties so efficiently woven around him. Maria
herself sees her love as an indulgence and a sin against her fate.
Later, when she has taken the veil, she will be granted a view
through the cloister grating of Nino and her half-sister who have
come to announce their engagement. A final letter from an older
nun tells of Maria’s sickness, insanity and death.
Flawed as it is, the novel is fascinating for the contradiction at
its core. Maria yearns with all her heart for society, company,
love. Her essential experience is that of isolation. But the society
she longs for is supremely cruel and only united in its exclusion of
the individual it has no time for. Maria is poignantly attractive in
her need for others, but it is this that destroys her. The reader can
only conclude that she needs to get tougher. Always ready to
have his work travel with forged papers, Verga allowed the first
volume edition to be published with a preface by the proto-
feminist Caterina Percoto who presented it as a protest against
the exploitation of women. It was a big success.
But is Verga straightforwardly on the side of the victim? A few
years later the short story ‘Spring’ would tell the simpler tale of a
love affair between an ambitious but indigent young musician
and a shop assistant. When the man finally gets a valuable
contract, he drops the girl, who is heartbroken. The cruelty is
now presented as an inevitable part of life; the man’s interest in
career, artistic fame and money are entirely natural. This is his
destiny. One can no more quarrel with it than with a mother’s
desire to marry off her own child rather than her stepdaughter. Is
there a sniff of justification in the air here? Or rage at life itself?
One of the few salient events in Verga’s hardworking life would
be his affair with a woman married to a wealthy man in Sicily. In
embarrassingly naked first person, the story ‘Beyond the Sea’ tells
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of just such an affair and of the woman’s return, despite all the
love that has been sworn, to Sicily, and to her husband. The lover
is appalled, betrayed, but, like Nino in the earlier novel, does
nothing to keep her, and so he also betrays love. Verga wrote the
story before his mistress, Giselda Fojanesi, in fact went back to her
husband. He knew this would happen. He had a career to think
of. He must ‘work at his literature’. How fascinating all this must
have been to Lawrence whose presence in Sicily in 1919 and
consequent discovery of Verga was largely due to his having made
the opposite gesture: he had run off with the married Frieda and
abandoned society altogether.
In any event it seems only appropriate that when Verga at last
found his voice, money was the stimulus, together with the felt
need to maintain a social fac¸ade. It was 1874. His publisher had
just turned down not one but two novels. Verga considered
giving up, then fought back. A literary magazine invited him to
contribute a story, something he was not in the habit of doing.
But ‘in order to resolve economic problems resulting from his
desire to cut a fine figure in Milanese society’, writes critic Carla
Riccardi, he accepted. In three days he wrote ‘Nedda’. ‘The
merest trifle,’ Verga remarked, and made a point of insisting he
had only written it for money.
To come to ‘Nedda’ after reading the earlier works is to savour
the surprise of seeing the competent craftsman transformed into
the great artist. Something has happened. But what? The story is
simple. Nedda is a young Sicilian peasant girl travelling the
countryside for work to support a dying mother. Verga, it seems,
has gone back, not so much to his own childhood, but to the
poverty-stricken world that surrounded it, that threatened it, a
world at the furthest remove from fashionable Milanese society,
and somehow a rebuke to it too, as the poor left behind to die of
cholera while the rich flee the city might well present themselves
to a child as a silent rebuke, and a warning.
Verga now proceeds to torture his character, and does so all the
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more ingeniously for the complete lack of that elaborate plotting
and melodramatic language that had characterised the earlier
books. In the end it takes very little to torture a Sicilian peasant
girl of the mid-nineteenth century. The cards are stacked against
her.
The mother dies. Nedda has exhausted her resources paying for
medicines. She is criticised by the villagers for going to work
immediately after the mother’s death. Clumsily courted by the
poor but honest Janu, she becomes pregnant. He works hard to
get the money to marry her. But the most fertile fields below
Etna are also those damp areas where malaria is rife. Janu falls ill.
Fruit picking with a fever, he falls from a tree, dies. The girl goes
through with her pregnancy, winning the scorn of the village.
Refusing to give her baby to the nuns, she nurses it in the most
abject poverty. As the story closes, she has a corpse in her arms:
‘Oh blessed you who are dead,’ she cried, ‘Oh blessed the Holy
Virgin who has taken away this creature so as not to have her
suffer like me!’
So many elements recall ‘Storia di una capinera’. The lonely
individual dreams of access to society. Society is ugly and cruel.
Religion is a sop and a whip. Love is sweet but always imprudent
and quite unequal to economic forces and illness. Even the
landscape is an enemy. Yet the story never becomes forced or
formulaic. Overnight, it seems, Verga has learned the secret of
narrative dispatch, of naturalness, and above all of a swift and
terrible irony:
The next day being Sunday there was the doctor’s visit, since
he conceded to the poor the day he couldn’t devote to his
farms. And what a sad visit it was! for the good doctor wasn’t
used to beating about the bush with his customers, and in
Nedda’s poor cottage there was only the one room and no
family friends to whom he could announce the real state of the
invalid.
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The sudden shift of viewpoint within an apparently spoken
narrative would be a staple in Verga’s armoury from now on.
‘And what a sad visit it was!’ We expect this to be followed by
some compassionate remarks about the sick mother or Nedda’s
grief, only to be invited to sympathise with the ‘good doctor’ and
his distaste at having to deal with patients who have neither spare
rooms nor friends. The reader’s reaction can only be one of
protest. And so much is left unsaid. Has the doctor told Nedda
the truth or not? And the mother? It doesn’t matter. Knowing he
has got his effect, Verga moves directly to extreme unction, the
next paragraph ending: ‘The priest left and the sexton waited in
vain by the door for the usual offering for the poor.’
The success of the story, and of those that would follow, clearly
has to do with its fusion of setting and voice. It is not that Verga
is writing in Sicilian dialect, for that would be incomprehensible
to his readers. But he has put together a weave of dialect
inflections and colloquial mannerisms that at least suggest the
speech of the poor and above all, through the narrator, the voice
of a peasant community. A comparison of Lawrence’s recently
republished translation and McWilliam’s new one will suggest
how central the effect is to delivering Verga’s vision and how
difficult it is to reproduce.
Usefully, McWilliam’s introduction quotes Lawrence as
observing that a translation of Verga would ‘need somebody who
could absolutely handle English in the dialect’. ‘Probably I shall
never do it,’ Lawrence says. ‘Though if I don’t, I doubt if anyone
else will – adequately at least.’ Remarking on the acuteness of
observation, McWilliam then lists four or five howlers Lawrence
made as evidence that his ‘immodesty’ was misplaced and his
version not ‘adequate’. But there are few translators, McWilliam
included, who do not make occasional mistakes, and in any event,
what matters here is that the voice be consistently and convinc-
ingly integrated with the characters; in short, the handling of
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‘English in the dialect’. The wonderful story ‘Black Bread’ opens
thus in Lawrence’s version:
Neighbour Nanni had hardly taken his last breath, and the
priest in his stole was still there, when the quarrel broke out
between the children as to who should pay the costs of the
burial, and they went at it till the priest with the aspersorium
under his arm was driven away.
McWilliam gives:
No sooner had Nanni closed his eyes for the last time, with the
priest standing over him in his stole, than his children were at
one another’s throats over who should foot the bill for the
funeral. The priest was sent packing empty-handed, with the
aspergillum under his arm.’
Lawrence stays with the original by trying to find some
solution for the Sicilian Compare Nanni (compare is a southern
Italian term of address and respect) and above all by keeping the
paragraph down to one loosely articulated sentence. But he also
makes various departures with ‘the last breath’ being introduced
for ‘the closed eyes’ of the original and the priest being driven off
more by the quarrel than by direct command.
McWilliam also makes changes. He has the priest standing over
Nanni, and introduces both ‘for the last time’ and ‘empty-
handed’ neither of which are in the original. But the main
difference is in the handling of idiom, and here, perhaps
surprisingly, we see McWilliam using idiomatic expressions more
frequently than Lawrence. We have ‘at one another’s throats’,
‘foot the bill’ and ‘sent packing’ in just a couple of lines. At this
point perhaps I can offer the nearest thing to a literal translation
of the original.
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No sooner did Compare Nanni close his eyes, and the priest
still there in his stole, than war broke out between the children
over who should pay the costs of the funeral, so that the priest
was sent off with his aspersorium under his arm.
It’s breathless stuff, colloquial, immediate, delivered by a narrator
who is so much part of the scene that he explains nothing.
Despite some reservations as to whether this is the kind of milieu
where the implied context of ‘foot the bill’ is appropriate, one has
to say that McWilliam’s idiomatic approach makes sense. The
next sentence reveals all its dangers: ‘For Nanni had been sick a
long time, with the sort of illness that costs you an arm and a leg
and the family furniture too.’
Here the idiom ‘costs you an arm and a leg’ collides with the so
far mysterious illness creating one of those alarmingly comic
effects Beckett liked to produce to show just how ridiculous
language can be: ‘I have no bone to pick with graveyards’ is the
example that comes to mind. Needless to say it isn’t what Verga
was after here. Lawrence hugs the original and gives us: ‘For
Neighbour Nanni’s illness had been a long one, the sort that eats
away the flesh off your bones and the things out of your house.’
The illness is malaria. Flesh, bones and eating are the subject of
the story. Peasant fare. ‘Furniture’ sounds like an extravagance.
Nanni caught malaria because, like Janu in ‘Nedda’, he needed
money and went to work on the most fertile ground where the
mosquitoes are. His neighbours had warned him. McWilliam
gives: ‘The neighbours told him over and over again “You’re
bound to snuff it, Nanni, on that Lamia farm.”’
Of course everyone has his idiolect, but for myself the
expression ‘snuff it’ recalls the films or playground talk of the
1960s. Again Lawrence stays close to the original, doing no more
than to substitute the standard idiomatic Italian ‘lasciare la pelle’
(‘leave your skin’) for ‘leave your bones’: ‘In vain the neighbours
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said to him, “Neighbour Nanni, you’ll leave your bones on that
half-profits farm.”’
Less than a page into the story, then, it’s evident that the
problem is one of finding a credible voice. McWilliam does some
excellent work, but his ear lets him down and we regularly find
words and expressions that are out of place. A few lines further
on, when the eldest son Santo goes to live in his dead father’s
house, we hear that he ‘shifted in his movables’. Lawrence gives,
‘carried across his things’. Verga wrote ‘robe’, ‘stuff, belongings’.
Meanwhile, as far as the younger son is concerned, McWilliam
tells us, ‘if he wanted to eat, [he] would have to go and find work
for himself away from home’. Lawrence, whose Italian was
sometimes shaky, nevertheless knew well enough that Verga had
written something rather different: ‘Carmenio, if he wanted to
have bread to eat, would have to go away from home and find a
master.’ One finds a ‘master’ in nineteenth-century Sicily, not
work. The implications are considerable.
But the most amusing moment comes two pages later. With
great delicacy, the narrator is telling us how it came about that
Santo made the terrible mistake of marrying a penniless woman,
thus compounding his family’s woes. It was of course because she
was beautiful, with red hair and full breasts. These features are
mentioned more than once, above all at the crucial moment just
before Santo declares himself, when, as McWilliam effectively
puts it, the girl tucks ‘in her chin above those gently heaving
breasts’.
At this point nature becomes complicit with romance, the air is
seductive with the scent of herbs, the mountainside red in the
sunset. McWilliam finishes the description: ‘She then turned to
listen to the great-tits singing merrily in the sky.’
Now, it’s true that the dictionary gives ‘great-tit’ for ‘cinci-
allegra’, but chirping up as the creature does just seconds after
the description of those ample breasts there’s a problem here.
Great tits indeed! Is it a howler, then, on Lawrence’s part that he
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gives: ‘Then she stood listening to the night crickets rattling
away’? After all, Verga’s ‘le cinciallegre facevano gazzarra’ does
not mean they were ‘singing merrily’, but that they were ‘making
a racket’. These stories are never pretty.
More than just a question of conviction, Verga’s choral narrative
voice, as Italian critics came to call it, is central to the peculiar
pathos behind his stories. He writes in an age now well aware of
the atomising and alienating nature of a modern industrial
society, an age already deep in its dream, at once nostalgic and
futuristic, of the ‘good community’, the place where the
individual would no longer feel alone, just another contender in a
capitalistic free for all. What was the nation-building enthusiasm
that had taken Garibaldi to Catania if not part of a growing desire
to establish a community based on race where ties would be
strong and a shared identity recovered?
By setting his stories in the Sicily of his youth and adopting this
‘choral voice’, Verga might appear to be making the double
gesture of yearning for the past and at the same time helping to
forge a united Italy in the present by bringing the Sicilian
experience into the national consciousness. But ironically it is
precisely the voice of traditional community that turns out to be
the most cruel, the most resigned to the fact that a doctor is a
busy man with no time for people who can’t pay, that to marry a
girl without a dowry is madness, that if having sex with your
master will allow a servant girl to get the money she needs to
marry her boyfriend and help her poor relatives, it’s not a bad
idea. While in the earlier work, reader and victim at least have the
narrative voice of modern compassionate consciousness on their
side, here the voice itself excludes all hope. To use Cioran’s
terms, Verga has found a new way of persecuting his characters.
This chorus of cruelty would ultimately be heard at its most
consistently callous in the novel I Malavoglia: ‘You have to be
friends with everyone and faithful to no one,’ remarks one of
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those who remain entirely unmoved by the catastrophe that
overwhelms the Malavoglia family when their boat is ship-
wrecked, ‘that’s why each of us has his own soul and everyone
must look after himself.’ Never perhaps has the word ‘soul’ been
used in such an unchristian and uncharitable sense. Indeed one of
the central ironies of Verga’s work is that a society so steeped in
biblical vocabulary and church tradition could have remained so
impervious to Christ’s message of compassion. The usurer who
lent the Malavoglias the money to buy the cargo they were
carrying (which he knew to be rotten), and whose insistence on
being repaid despite the family’s imminent ruin and despite the
fact that he has no legal right, is generally known in the
community as ‘Zio Crocefisso’ (Uncle Crucified). He constantly
remarks, ‘They’re doing to me what they did to Christ,’ even
when it is evident to everyone that the real victims are the
Malavoglias. Disquieting as ever is the absence of any serious
opposition to this kind of inhumanity. Although knowing that
they are not legally bound, the Malavoglias nevertheless feel that
Zio Crocefisso is right to demand his money at once. They take
pride in upholding a vision of honour so crude that it hardly bears
inspection. And thus are ruined.
Like a child at a computer game who finally clicks on the secret
door that leads to a higher level, Verga, in writing ‘Nedda’, had
blundered into a new world, a place at once of reality and
imagination, as Wessex for Hardy, or Yoknapatawpha for Faulk-
ner. Yet before he could explore it, he needed an alibi. For the
implications of what was flowing from his pen now were
scandalous indeed. It is at this point that verismo, or realism,
comes to his aid.
Zola was in vogue. Literary circles were chattering about an
objective, documentary narrative style, that might help bring
about progress and social change. So in the wake of the French
writer’s Histoire naturelle et sociale d’une famille sous le Second
Empire, Verga now announced that he was planning not one but
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five novels, each covering a different social class, in a ‘cycle’ to be
called I vinti, The Defeated. This was a worthy and most
ambitious project. Meanwhile, the short stories he was putting
together for money, in the wake of ‘Nedda’ ’s success, could be
considered mere studies for the great epics to come. In fact they
are his finest work. ‘Rosso Malpelo’, a story assigned to my
adolescent children at school in Verona as an account of the
unhappy conditions of working children in the nineteenth
century, shows how acutely Verga understood the tragic contra-
dictions that still tense our modern experience today.
A boy with red hair, and hence known as Malpelo (evil-haired),
works in a sand mine on the slopes of Etna. He has no other
name but a great reputation for violence and surliness. His father,
a dogged labourer, known as ‘the donkey’, dies in a mining
accident. The engineer in charge, a theatre enthusiast, is watching
Hamlet when it happens and reluctant to leave his seat. The
mother remarries and has no time for her difficult son who will
get his first decent clothes when his father’s body is unearthed
some months after his death.
Somewhere between Browning’s Caliban and Beckett’s Mol-
loy, Malpelo differs from Verga’s female victims in glorying in his
alienation. Physically strong despite all deprivation, he takes
beatings and gives them, to man and beast. His philosophy is as
brutal as it is appropriate: when you hit, hit hard enough so that
you won’t be hit back. In any event you will end up like the pit
donkey whose corpse the boy likes to visit, dumped in a ravine,
eaten up by dogs and rats, beyond suffering. The world after
death holds no secrets, no terrors, ‘because nobody who has to
live alone should ever be afraid of anything’. His favourite
expression in the face of any adversity is the proudly solipsistic, ‘I
am Malpelo.’ This, one feels, is how Maria or Nedda would have
had to become if they were to survive. They lacked Malpelo’s
brutal selfishness, which in the end is no more than a grotesque
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escalation of the gesture the young musician made when he
abandoned his shop-assistant girlfriend.
But Malpelo does have one weakness: a residual sentiment of
solidarity. A cripple is put to work beside him in the tunnels.
Malpelo beats him brutally: ‘if you haven’t the spirit to defend
yourself from someone who isn’t against you, you’ll let your face
be stamped on by anyone.’ But he helps the boy when the work
gets too much for him. And when the cripple is dying of
consumption, Malpelo goes to visit him. The mother is weeping.
Malpelo doesn’t understand and asks the boy why the woman is
crying over someone who earns less than it costs to feed him.
Ultimately, the pathos of Verga’s stories is not the individual
suffering and death of this or that person, but the collective
failure – is it Verga’s failure too? – to imagine the world as
anything other than a long and ruthless power struggle. The
victims see nothing unnatural in the avarice and cruelty of those
who destroy them. Compassion is reduced to the dubious
aesthetic experience of the engineer who hurries back from
mining disaster to theatre to be able to see his favourite scene in
Hamlet: Ophelia’s burial.
Once we have established that he distrusts ideals and ideolo-
gies, considered as vehicles of hidden interests . . . one may
wonder whether there was anything he really cared about,
anything he believed in unshakeably. To which one answers
that there was at least one thing he believed in: the struggle of
everybody against everybody else.
These words were written by the French anthropologist Louis
Dumont. The man described is Hitler. But had Malpelo had an
education he might well have written Mein Kampf. Certainly he
would have made a good squadrista in Fascist Italy. Verga’s deep
sense of outrage has to do with the fact that the fine sentiments of
life, love and compassion intersect with reality only when art
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turns them into money. ‘The cheers of the triumphant drown the
cries of the trampled. But seen close up, isn’t the grotesque
gasping of those faces inevitably artistic to the observer?’ These
frightening words were written as part of the preface to the novel
I Malavoglia, then cut. They would hardly encourage sales.
For Verga needed the money. He liked to cut a figure. In his
mid-forties he was still borrowing from whoever would give him
credit. So the terms of a loan would always be important to him.
He never married, either a poor wife or a rich. But he was
determined not to join ‘the Defeated’, not to be the object of a
mining engineer’s aesthetic appreciation. Denied the royalties for
the opera Cavalleria rusticana, based on a script Verga himself
adapted from his own short story, he fought a long court case and
won. At last he had fame and cash together. But now the writing
was going badly. He couldn’t get past the second novel of the
projected five-work cycle, and though those first two, I Malavo-
glia and Mastro Don Gesualdo, were to become classics of Italian
literature, and are indeed rich and remarkable narratives, still the
extraordinary impact of the short stories, novellas so-called, is
dispersed in their huge accumulation of detail.
Then, in his fifties, it occurred to Verga that the principles of
verismo were false. It was impossible to represent reality. The
whole thing was a farcical charade in which words were always
manipulative. All a writer could do was to explode life’s fictions
and be a fool to no man. So his last collection of published
stories, Don Candeloro & Co., gives us a grotesque rereading of
the earlier work where love triangles, betrayals and the rest are
now seen as the merest and most cynical manoeuvrings. But
Verga had been most effective when the yearning that the world
not be absurd was still intact; it had reached its greatest intensity
in stories like ‘Rosso Malpelo’, where the boy’s humanity,
expressed in his compassion for his crippled companion, is still
just there, but only as something residual, anachronistic, quite
mysterious in the modern world. In ‘Don Candeloro’ compassion
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has finally been eliminated. It may be a relief, but the narrative
loses its force. If, as Cioran maintained, cruelty is a sign of
election in a writer, we now discover that it is so only when held
in tension by its opposite.
‘Poor old Verga went and died exactly as I was going to see him
in Catania,’ wrote Lawrence. The Sicilian was eighty-two. He had
spent the last twenty years sensibly looking after the family estates
in grumpy isolation, writing very little, perhaps because he could
no longer find any cover for his distressing vision. Made a senator
in 1920, he succumbed to a stroke in January 1922. Just nine
months later, the terrifying combination he had ever described, a
ruthless will to power dressed in grotesque rhetoric, stepped out
onto the world stage in the stalwart form of Benito Mussolini.
But young Malpelo perished thus: ordered to explore a
labyrinth of abandoned mine shafts under the slopes of Etna, he
boldly took up his father’s pick and lantern. ‘I am Malpelo, if I
don’t come back, no one will look for me.’ And no one did.
Defiantly alone, he disappeared for ever, as though swallowed up
at last in the dark logic of pure individualism and commercial
exploitation. Needless to say, his ghost haunts.
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Voltaire’s Coconuts
[Ian Buruma]
As I set out to write this piece on Ian Buruma’s book Voltaire’s
Coconuts, Italy has just come to the end of another referendum
campaign. Two general elections ago a new system of voting was
introduced. Instead of the extreme form of proportional repre-
sentation in force since 1948, a first-past-the-post system was
introduced for 75% of the seats in the lower house, while 25%
would continue to be allotted on a proportional basis. The recent
referendum proposed to eliminate that 25% and base voting for
the lower house entirely on the British system.
The idea behind these changes is the same that was dear to
Voltaire’s heart and that inspires the title of Buruma’s book: the
notion that those institutions that have proved successful in one
country, in this case Britain, might, like coconuts, be transplanted
elsewhere with the same positive results. Dogged by a combina-
tion of chronically unstable governments and long-term political
paralysis, the Italians hoped that by importing the British system
they might also import the opposite and, as they perceive it,
peculiarly British combination of stable governments coming
alternately from different sides of the political spectrum.
As yet the scheme hasn’t worked. Rather than being reduced,
the number of parties has considerably increased. The pattern of
unstable and shifting alliances, of governments held to ransom by
small minorities in hung parliaments, has remained much as it
was. The pressure for this new referendum, then, came from
those who feel that this failure is due to the fact that the British
system was not introduced in all its brutal extremity. The 25% of
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seats still handed out on a proportional basis, they claim, has been
used to keep tiny parties alive and unpresentable members of the
old guard in parliament. Its elimination will finally produce
British results.
Those who opposed the referendum and voted against its
proposal (or in most cases did not vote at all, since without an
overall 50% turnout a referendum is declared void) maintain that
British stability has little to do with the British electoral system
and may rather come in spite of it. The first-past-the-post system,
they insist, encourages a low turnout, as those who know they
can’t win in any given constituency don’t participate, and this
alienates them from the democratic process. A totally British
system, they conclude, could lead to serious unrest in Italy.
Astonishing and certainly ingenuous is the assumption, on
both sides of the debate, that the results of such major changes
would come sufficiently rapidly as to be perceptible after just one
or two elections. For if Voltaire chose, of all plants, the coconut
for his analogy of transplanting institutions, it was precisely
because the coconut takes so very long to bear fruit. All the same,
the lapse of time – how much time? – allows the debate to rage:
are institutions universally applicable, or are they intimately
related to circumstances of history and race, or to what is more
vaguely referred to as ‘national character’?
In Voltaire’s Coconuts Buruma sets out to present us with the
visions of a number of European intellectuals who have come to
Britain over the last three centuries and reflected on its traditions
and institutions. In doing so he finds himself almost obliged at
some point or other to define them either as ‘universalists’ who
believed in the possibility of exporting the best they found in
Britain, or ‘nativists’ who either did not believe things British
could be successfully exported or, perhaps more commonly, did
not wish them to be so. Pierre Coubertin, founder of the modern
Olympic Games, saw no reason why the ethos of the Arnoldian
public school could not be profitably transported to France and
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indeed all over the world. The Games, for him, were to be an
expression of that ethos. His ideological and anglophobe enemy,
Charles Maurras, present at the first of Coubertin’s Olympics in
Athens in 1896, rather than acknowledging defeat, rejoiced in the
observation that ‘when different races are thrown together and
made to interact, they repel one another, estranging themselves,
even as they believe they are mixing’.
Dreaming of a future Jewish homeland, Theodor Herzl
charmingly imagined it as having British institutions, an English
style upper class and even Jewish cricket on trim Palestinian, or
indeed – did it matter? – Ugandan lawns. This was at a time when
significant sections of continental Europe were engaged in
identifying Jews as alien, hostile and by nature unassimilable to
the German or French cultures (logically, the extreme nativist no
more believes in the possibility of someone’s assimilating another
culture than he does in transplanting its institutions elsewhere).
The British were thus to be stigmatised for their perceived
sympathy with Jewish positions. ‘L’anglais est-il un Juif ?’
Buruma quotes one French tract as demanding in 1895. Clearly
the danger of arguing against Voltaire and his optimistic
universalism is that one may open the way to the merest and most
obtuse racism. It is the lure of this trap that makes it so important
for us to understand what we mean by national character.
Buruma’s book is largely and unapologetically anecdotal. He
introduces us to a cast of prominent Europeans from Voltaire and
Goethe in the eighteenth century to Nikolaus Pevsner and Isaiah
Berlin in the twentieth, with the central (and best) chapters
dedicated to the revolutionaries and dreamers of the mid-
nineteenth century, so many of whom were to find themselves
obliged to flee to the safe if perplexingly unrevolutionary climate
of London. Each character’s association with Britain is briskly
sketched in, Buruma astutely pointing out that their positive or
negative visions of the country can only properly be understood
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in relation to the circumstances they are coming from. Indeed
much of the comedy he is eager to offer arises from observing
how difficult it is for those who stay in Britain for any length of
time to sustain a view initially prompted by a personal agenda
elsewhere. Unable to publish an anti-clerical poem in France,
Voltaire praises the English for their love of reason and liberty,
their respect for the artist, but he will later be obliged to leave the
country in a hurry after some ambiguous money transactions.
Inspired by Tom Brown’s Schooldays, Coubertin will need all his
considerable reserves of enthusiasm to overlook the less attractive
aspects of the British public schools he visits. The intellectual
traveller, and even more so the refugee, lives in a constant tension
between his desire to abstract what he finds abroad and use it in
an argument with those back home, and the pull to engage in the
society that surrounds him on its own terms. Accordingly, the
long-term immigrant’s vision of his host country will very largely
depend on whether he genuinely chooses to stay there, or is
merely physically present while spiritually embattled abroad. One
of the most touching pictures in Voltaire’s Coconuts is that of the
ageing Russian revolutionary and idealist Alexander Herzen
finding himself after all not so unhappy in the mercantile and
irretrievably bourgeois stability of Victorian London.
Buruma’s sketches, for the most part in chronological order, are
interspersed with complementary anecdotes about his own family
– an intriguing Anglo-German-Dutch-Jewish mix – anecdotes
which allow us to understand where he is coming from and why
the characters he speaks of are important to him. Nothing in this
personal and generally engaging approach need detract from
serious consideration of the matter in hand, especially since, with
the present acceleration of moves towards a united Europe, the
question of national character is one that is of general, even
urgent, interest. Buruma has frequently shown himself to be a
formidable essayist on this subject. Yet something in the whole
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slant of the project seems to prevent him from giving his book
real weight, or even coherence. As if writing the script for some
Channel Four documentary, he appears to be more interested in
popping up in prima persona at Fingal’s Cave, or Prince Ludwig’s
Walhalla, or Highgate Cemetery, than in seeking to define his
terms, or push his argument on.
With regard to the debate announced by his title, Buruma’s
sympathies are clearly with the universalists. He rightly criticises
nativists for their tedious use of the ‘native soil’ analogy, the idea
that institutions have grown naturally from the organic inter-
twining of race and place. It is a ploy that precludes argument
and leads at best to immobility, at worst, as has been said, to
racism. Conversely, he enjoys much humour, though always
kind-hearted, at the expense of the wilder universalist dreamers,
those who would see Tom Brown in Paris, or the aristocracy of a
Jewish state sipping tea at four and being nice to the servants.
But despite his brilliant asides and exciting intuitions – and
they are many – he seeks to offer no reasoned middle ground
between the two camps, even when the authors he quotes,
Tocqueville and Pevsner in particular, seem to be inviting him to
do so. Less forgivably, he himself has a habit of slipping into a use
of national stereotypes which inevitably detracts from establishing
a more sophisticated approach to the conundrum of national
character. Thus of Hippolyte Taine we read: ‘In his twenties,
Taine was attracted to German idealism: Hegel, Herder and so
on. He grew out of that, however, and turned to more practical
English ideas instead.’
Whether the disparaging ‘grew out of’ is to be attributed,
ironically, to Taine or, more problematically, to Buruma is
unclear and perhaps unimportant. To many readers it will pass
unobserved. We are in the realm of received ideas where the use
of ‘national character’ amounts to no more than a hasty appeal to
presumed experience and shared sentiments before the argument
is hurried along elsewhere.
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A few pages later the need to define terms becomes even more
urgently evident. Rightly remarking how Taine’s nativism – his
refusal to believe that one country could be a model for another –
allowed him to be more candid than other anglophiles about
England’s shortcomings, Buruma concludes: ‘He could observe
the stability of the British government and contrast it to the
violent upheavals in France, but if national character was indeed
the key, such observation could serve no political purpose: The
world is what it is, because it grew that way, like a tree, and there
is nothing much we can do to improve it.’
Here it seems that national character is being used almost as a
synonym of race – or at least as something necessarily immobile –
with the implication that the universalist cannot admit the
existence of a national character at all. ‘The definition of national
identity,’ Buruma announces elsewhere, ‘is largely the project of
intellectuals and artists who wish to find a role for themselves.’
When these sweeping statements are seen together with the
previous comment on German ideas – a comment that accepts
not only the stereotypes regarding British and German thinking
but also the spin the British like to put on them – our author
presents himself as a confirmed, even dogmatic universalist who
occasionally falls into a use of nativist national stereotype, perhaps
because in the end it is so attractive. Like caricature, national
stereotype contains an element that is immediately recognisable
or felt to be so, and again like caricature it allows for the rapid
establishment of a topography – Teutonic efficiency, Anglo-
Saxon pragmatism, Gallic passion – within which the various
parties concerned can enjoy a sense of immediate and mutually
confirming identity, together with the security, which is also the
comedy, of predictability: when the Brits do this, the Krauts will
undoubtedly do that and the Frogs, of course, the other.
Although this oscillation between opposing positions – universal-
ism, nativism – is understandable (in the way we understand
perfectly when someone says it’s only caricature, while at the same
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time enjoying a secret complicity in its reductive panache), it does
not really help clarify the issues under discussion.
Why has the introduction into Italy of a British inspired electoral
system not given the desired results? It cannot be merely because
of this or that trait in ‘the Italian character’, since, despite the
popular image of the excitable, talented, unreliable Italian, the
country clearly has as wide a range of personality types as any
other. The expression ‘poles apart’ would seem entirely appropri-
ate to describe such pairs as Cavour and Garibaldi, Mazzini and
Victor Emanuel II, or to bring things up to date, D’Alema and
Berlusconi. Thus one can no more – the reflection is obvious – be
Italian (or English or French) on one’s own, than one could be
human, or indeed inhuman, on one’s own, or a son without a
mother.
To the extent, then, that we perceive different patterns of
behaviour in different countries this would appear to have to do
with a certain dynamic in the way people behave together. After
all, what is usually most perplexing in our experience of a foreign
country is not the pleasant conversation with any one individual –
in that scenario we tend to be struck by how like us they are, how
easy it is going to be to understand each other – but the way they
behave in relation to each other. Drawing on the culture’s
available role models, they become themselves in a play of forces
that may be very different from that pertaining in our own
country. Rather than one immediately recognisable type, what
we’re up against is a constellation of possible types whose
mutually tensing and defining energies may be even more
difficult for us to grasp than those in the night sky.
Ex-prime minister Giulio Andreotti, to hazard an example, is
often referred to as quintessentially Italian for his particular
mixture of piety and mystery, of astuteness and ambiguity. Yet
the man could only function as he did and become what he was
within the special environment of Italian politics, and most
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particularly post-war politics, something dependant on a huge
number of external circumstances. Brought up in Liverpool or
Lisbon it is reasonable to suspect that Andreotti would have
developed very differently.
If we accept this premise, it isn’t difficult to see how we can
have a ‘national character’ – or a series of behaviour patterns –
that perpetuates itself through education (the word used here in
the broadest possible sense), without assuming that this is an
inevitable product of the race or the soil and without imagining
that it is necessarily impervious to outside influence. By the same
token, it is clear that any institution exported to another country
will necessarily be absorbed into the local dynamic, perhaps be
transformed by it. The end results are not easy to predict. This is
what makes the experiment so exciting. And perhaps dangerous.
In any event, there is no need for us to be either strictly nativist or
strictly universalist.
When the Italians introduced something approaching the British
electoral system, they did so after the traumatic years of mani
pulite had led to the disintegration of the broad-church Christian
Democratic Party that had dominated since the war. The decision
of the old Communist Party to distance itself from the past and
become the Partito Democratico della Sinistra also led to splits on
the left. On the right the fascist-inspired Movimento Sociale
Italiano had likewise made a move towards the democratic fold,
changing its name to Alleanza Nazionale. Again this led to splits.
The new system was thus introduced at a moment of maximum
flux when the formation of two clearly dominant parties of the
kind that would thrive in a first-past-the-post system was
particularly difficult.
Immediately campaigning began, it became evident that an
electoral tradition is far more than the legal machinery of its
voting system. The Italians have a long history of complex
electoral alliances of the variety that tend to nullify the clarifying
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effect of the first-past-the-post system. While in England one
might indeed find, say, the Liberals and Labour agreeing not to
stand against each other in certain seats, it is unlikely that one
would see scores of parties allying with all kinds of different
partners in a huge and complex mosaic designed to give each of
them more or less the proportion of representation they hold
across the country. Far from shunning such complications, the
Italian electorate is at home with them, or at least inured. Fatta la
legge, trovato l’inganno goes the proverb (‘no sooner is a law
made than the way round it discovered’). It’s an old observation
that a history of despotic foreign rulers has led, in Italy, to the
exaltation of the anarchical model. A certain pleasure is taken in
demonstrating that a system imposed by the centre doesn’t work.
There is nothing racial or genetic about this, nor any reason why
it shouldn’t change. But, as Voltaire himself accepted, it takes
time.
The existence of proverbs which seem to sum up aspects of
national character naturally leads to a reflection on the relation-
ship of that character to the language its people speaks. Here
Buruma is dismissive. ‘The Geist of language,’ he announces, ‘is
one of those foggy concepts that swirl around like dry ice on
Wagnerian stage sets.’ Later he takes Pevsner to task for
suggesting that the difference between the English word ‘chop’
(as in pork chop) and the Italian word ‘costoletta’ shows an
English love of understatement and the Italian predilection for
the florid. Here one can only agree and smile. But without any
further consideration, Buruma then sums up his position thus:
‘The notion that some essence of Englishness, running from the
middle ages to the present time, can be identified in the national
language is to put it mildly dubious.’
If we imagine any group of people as organising their
behaviour around available role models and a consequent
hierarchy of values, it is reasonable to suppose that those values
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will be reflected in the language they speak and the way they
speak it. This must have been even more evident when societies
were smaller and more homogeneous. So while one would hardly
wish to make much of the sound or length of a single word, it
would equally be hard to deny that, say, the more elaborate
nature of Italian sentence structures might reflect different habits
of thought. And clearly there are some words ‘Geist’ is one – that
Buruma himself will not translate because he knows that they are
the product of a pattern of thinking which would be lost in
translation. This is why Europeans do not translate such words as
‘gentleman’ and ‘hooligan’, or why a notion like ‘omerta`’ needs
more than a little explanation in English. What have our non-
conformist writers always done, after all, if not sought to expose
the pattern of thinking implicit in the language itself? When
Lawrence wrote a sentence like ‘she was destroyed into perfect
consciousness’, he was eager to subvert the normally positive
loadings afforded to the concepts of both perfection and
consciousness. The translation of the sentence into Italian – ‘era
dilianiata, perfettamente consapevole’ – rejecting as it does the
oddly transformative ‘into’ of the English, is suggestive of the
Italian resistance to provocative subversion of the language within
the field of belles lettres, something everywhere evident in Italian
translations of British modernists.
Clearly the phenomenon of translation offers an intriguing
instance of the extent to which any culture may or may not be
open to influence from another. Again, the question is complex
and ultimately impossible to resolve. Again Buruma’s thinking is
cloudy. At the beginning of a chapter dedicated to Goethe and
the German appropriation of Shakespeare, he remarks of his own
early bilingualism: ‘Such a background effectively cuts off all
routes to linguistic nativism.’
Buruma, then, a universalist, believes in translatability. Appa-
rently, languages are interchangeable. But a few pages later,
discussing Schlegel’s translation of Shakespeare, he is offering the
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following typically nativist and entirely reasonable qualification:
‘His brilliant translation may have been the most accurate version
of Shakespeare in German to date, but it also contained echoes of
Goethe’s classicism and Herder’s poetry. It was, in short, a
German text.’
Having made this observation, Buruma would now appear to
be in a strong position to make a truly pertinent statement about
the way cultures may indeed be open to each other, yet
transform, without necessarily nullifying, what they absorb
according to their own dynamic: yes, this is Shakespeare, but
Shakespeare in German. Instead, his closing remark merely
betrays how little he has been enjoying his reading in this
particular field: ‘A famous German Shakespeare (and Goethe)
scholar tried to explain this [Schlegel’s translation] in the
following rather tortured formulation: the universal genius of
Shakespeare could be reborn in Germany only after the universal
genius of Goethe had infused the German language with a
German Geist equal to the English spirit of Shakespeare.’
Though the lofty diction of the scholar’s observation may not
be to everybody’s taste, it is hard to see what is ‘tortured’ about
this. That the way in which certain writers have enriched their
languages then makes it possible for translators to find solutions
to hitherto insoluble problems seems self-evident. How could
translations into Italian of English novels be the same after
Manzoni had written I promessi sposi? How could one not draw
on Eliot for a translation of the French symbolists?
Freshly arrived in England, Voltaire thoroughly enjoyed an
afternoon by the Thames and at the races; but introduced the
same evening to court society his enthusiastic report was met with
disdain: ‘the young women he had admired so foolishly were
maidservants, and the jolly young men mere apprentices on hired
horses.’ A century later, Tocqueville is bewildered to find that his
English friends are ‘still convinced that extreme inequality of
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wealth is in the natural order of things’. When will these people
have their revolution? the Frenchman wonders. Why are they
obsessed by class? Visiting the Poet Laureate Alfred Austin,
Theodor Herzl was unimpressed by the man’s grasp of inter-
national politics but terribly taken by his respectful manners. In
general, Buruma comments, Herzl made a point, ‘of mentioning
that the Grand Duke of this or the Marquess of that had helped
him into his coat or showed him to his coach’. How could the
Jewish immigrant fail to love a country where a Jew had not only
been made prime minister, but an earl too . . .
The most exciting aspect of Voltaire’s Coconuts and its very real
contribution is the way – with all the attractive diversity of the
anglophiles and anglophobes it presents – nevertheless and across
three centuries, a very clear consensus begins to build up as to
what the conundrum of British national character amounts to, for
a European. We are allowed, that is, a growing insight into how
the dynamic of our own national life puzzles our neighbours.
Inevitably the difficulty is not with any single element but with
the way in which they stand in relation to each other. On the one
hand there is the high value put on reason and on political and
religious freedoms: the Britain of the last two centuries was
indeed freer than its European counterparts. On the other, and
however much it may now be under attack, there is the strong
sense of class belonging that continues to enshrine social and
economic inequalities. There is a great and progressive drive in
the areas of trade and industry, coupled with ancient, ludicrous,
even Gothic traditions, usually in those areas where privilege is
sacred. There is a notable lack of support for, or even interest in,
extremist ideological positions, together with the most vociferous
and tasteless gutter press anywhere imaginable. Above all – and
on this point it seems all the bickering revolutionaries, from
Ledru-Rollin to Herzen, Marx and Mazzini agreed – England
was dull, was mediocre. Buruma never quotes Nietzsche but that
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philosopher’s denunciation of the ‘English-mechanistic stultifica-
tion of the world’ never seems far from the visiting European’s
lips.
Naturally, the more astute thinkers were eager to guess at the
secret that kept these apparent opposites in equilibrium. Tocque-
ville noted that for all the starkness of class distinctions,
nevertheless there was a possibility of upward mobility in
England, something that was not true in France. ‘A man could
become a gentleman,’ Buruma glosses, ‘but you had to be born a
gentilhomme.’ The English avidity for trade and money is thus
peculiarly different from the American, in that the Englishman
aspires to use his cash to buy into a world of mystique and
privilege, to change class. As a result he isn’t eager to have his
aristocracy abolished, while the aristocracy in turn is, yes,
snobbish – how could it be otherwise? – but does not entirely
turn up its nose to new money and new celebrity. In this regard
Buruma offers some convincing remarks on the alliance between
Thatcher and the Tory party.
There appears, then, to be a curious alchemy by which, in
certain circumstances, the English mind turns the water of money
into the wine of nobility. Intriguingly, Buruma draws on his own
experiences to remark that most anglophiles are snobs. They see
the English social world as offering a recognition that elsewhere
neither money nor celebrity can buy. Convincingly, he points to
the great many foreigners who have become English lords and
gentlemen. England offers this odd opportunity. After twenty
years in Italy, I have yet to see the phenomenon in reverse.
Herzen’s observations on English mediocrity may at first sight
seem some distance from Tocqueville’s musings on the perme-
ability of the British class system. Taken together, however, and
with the help of an observation or two from Giacomo Leopardi,
who was neither anglophile nor anglophobe, perhaps we can
hazard a guess as to the deeper nature of the quarrel, or love
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affair, between England and mainland Europe, both a century
ago and still today.
Herzen reflected that ‘the only countries in Europe that are
tranquil are those in which personal liberty and freedom
of speech are least restricted’. However, not being oppressed by
their governments, the British and Swiss were not obliged to
develop a spirit of private disobedience and thus tended to
become duller. What was more, freedom of speech actually
opened the way to a different kind of tyranny, that of public
opinion as expressed in a scandal-mongering press. Herzen
wrote: ‘The freer a country is from government interference, the
more fully recognised its right to speak, to independence of
conscience, the more intolerant grows the mob: public opinion
becomes a torture chamber; your neighbour, your butcher, your
tailor, family, club, parish, keep you under supervision and
perform the duties of a policeman.’ In short, Tocqueville’s
upwardly mobile industrialist, eager to buy into a world of British
privilege, will not only have to accumulate a great deal of money,
he must also avoid scandal so as to keep the public respect.
So far so good. But what was this dullness, this supposed
mediocrity that Europeans, particularly the revolutionaries and
above all Marx, despised? What did it amount to? Did Mazzini,
for example, honestly imagine that in the Utopia he proposed –
ultimately a free, democratic, one-world state – people would be
more interesting? Surely when no longer obliged to disobey in
private they too would become ‘dull’.
Herzen’s reaction to a representation of the battle of Waterloo
is telling here. Wellington and Blu¨cher, he complains, ‘had
turned history off the high road and up to the hubs in mud’. For
these European revolutionaries excitement and romance had to
do with a particular and basically Hegelian vision of history in
which they saw themselves as high-road prophets of a future
transformation at once inevitable and positive. From this they
derived importance and self-esteem. It is a curiosity of the British
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mindframe that it has remained largely indifferent to this
particular delirium, and it was this indifference that so irritated
nineteenth-century revolutionaries, as today it irritates those in
Europe who are eager to construct, with a similar vision of history
in mind, the single European Community. Rather than appreciat-
ing, with Tocqueville, that the British, and so many of those who
have been attracted to Britain, were perhaps locked into a
different project, the acquisition of prestige through style and
money – what we often refer to in the pejorative as snobbery –
they chose, and choose, to dismiss them as mediocre.
Leopardi was among the first to suggest that in the great wreck of
noble illusions brought about by rationalism and the retreat of
religion, national mores would play an important part in helping
the individual develop a strategy for dealing with the now
evident, as he saw it, meaninglessness of life. Written in 1824, his
Discourse on the Present State of Italian Customs presents
‘Italianness’ as almost a special condition of the spirit. In other
countries public morality had survived the collapse of metaphysics
thanks to a more highly developed sense of society. In England or
France a gentleman ‘would be ashamed of doing wrong in the
same way as he would be ashamed of appearing in conversation
with a stain on his suit’. As in Schopenhauer’s aphorisms on
honour, it is the search for the respect of one’s peers, coupled
crucially with the knowledge of how that respect is to be
obtained, that holds society together. Leopardi thus envies the
British the ridiculously high opinion they afford to each other,
seeing in it a guarantee of moral behaviour.
In Italy, however, the poet claims, no such society had replaced
the illusions of the Middle Ages; Italians conceded no respect to
each other, indeed took pleasure above all in exchanging insults,
with the result that it was clear to everyone that ‘there was no
reason for not behaving exactly as one wished’. Leopardi
concludes by prospecting the need for collective illusions on a
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large scale to combat a sense of meaninglessness and the resultant
cynicism. He speaks of the idea of nationhood, prophesies, long
before Coubertin, that sport and its associated pageantry will
become an important spiritual resource. He can hardly be blamed
if Italy’s great collective illusion, when it did finally come, was to
take such unfortunate turns.
Ever since the Enlightenment, continental Europe has been busy
producing grander and grander projects to compensate for the
collapse of feudal authority and shared religion, to cover up
underlying doubt and existential anxiety. Infinitely preferable to
communism or fascism, the European Community is the most
recent of these projects. Unlike empires seized or rigid systems
merely imposed, it possesses a novel and perhaps decisive asset: a
scope for seemingly endless complication, endless accommoda-
tion of minorities, interminable negotiation with new members.
Not for nothing have all the national languages been maintained.
Not for nothing are various tiers of membership envisaged. Quite
simply, this project, which can easily be believed in as inherently
good and historically inevitable, will take up all the time there is.
Not a moment will be left for feelings of futility. At present one
sure way to gain prestige in Europe is to work tirelessly to keep
this ideal on the high road of history, out of the mud.
Meanwhile, and at the deepest level, the British are not so
much opposed as disinterested. They have other ways of keeping
meaninglessness at bay. Wasn’t the fate of Diana, Princess of
Wales, the possibility of her introducing a wealthy Middle Eastern
playboy into an extended royal family, a much more interesting
story than anything the bureaucrats of Brussels have dreamed up?
And the British agony is that while they would be content to stay
out of the European project, this might lead to a loss of wealth
and, ever associated with wealth, the prestige they chase. But it’s
only a might. For, alas, the further agony is that participation and
the corresponding surrender of sovereignty could equally well
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lead to a loss of wealth: those hellish complications the
continentals keep generating are not conducive to the accumula-
tion of capital. We’ll wait and see, the British say about the Euro,
blissfully unaware that this approach is as contemptible to the
contemporary European with the Grand Idea as British diffidence
to liberal revolution was for Mazzini and Herzen 150 years ago.
Yet in or out, like it or not, Britain is part of the larger dynamic
that makes up European character. It is, as Buruma’s book very
convincingly shows, the place where people can go when,
whether as leader or victim, the Continent’s grand ideas let them
down.
How did the Italian referendum end? At midnight on election
day, forecasts suggested 52% of the population had voted, 91% of
whom supported the British system. Little over an hour later, the
official result came. Only 49.6% had voted. The referendum was
void. The following morning the government announced that it
would persist with a project to introduce the French system of
two ballots. At once, and across the political spectrum, smaller
groupings announced their opposition, preferring the German
proportional system with a 5% threshold. The Northern League
immediately declared who they would ally with to be sure of
overcoming the threshold. Even when bombarded with promis-
ing foreign coconuts, a national mindframe, it seems, dies hard.
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Literary Trieste
[Svevo, Joyce, Saba]
Trieste is hardly on the beaten track for Italophiles. Almost a
hundred miles east of Venice and on the wrong side of the
Adriatic it seems to gaze back at the bel paese, instead of being a
part of it. It has no great art galleries, museums or monuments.
The weather is notoriously harsh. Even identity is a problem: a
windswept stone’s throw from the Slovenian border, Trieste is
home to three distinct ethnic groups: Slav, Germanic and Italian.
‘I am Slavic-German-Italian,’ wrote Scipio Slataper, the first
writer to claim (around 1910) that there was in fact a ‘Triestine
type’.
From my Slav blood I have within me strange nostalgias, a
desire for novelty, for abandoned forests, a sentimentality (or
sensibility) that demands caresses, praises: an infinite limitless
dreaming. From my German blood I have my mulish
obstinacy, my dictatorial will and tone, the certainty of my
plans, the boredom I feel at having to accept discussion, my
desire for domination, for exertion. These elements are fused
in the Italian blood which seeks to harmonise them, to balance
them out, to make me become ‘classical’.
The local intellectual Roberto Bazlen was more sceptical,
writing:
A melting pot is a utensil into which are put the most disparate
elements, which are then melted; what is produced is a
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homogeneous fusion, with all its elements proportionately
distributed, with constant characteristics. But in Trieste, as I
know it, a fused type has never been produced, nor any type
with stable characteristics [. . .] And since a unique Triestine
type does not exist, so a Triestine creative culture does not
exist either.
His contemporary and fellow citizen Giani Stuparich agreed:
there is something in this city of mine that blocks any initiative
designed to give it a cultural character or physiognomy, not
only in its disintegrative atmosphere but in its individuals, who
willingly isolate themselves or go elsewhere. It has a bitter
air . . .
Yet in the early years of the twentieth century, the small and
troubled town of Trieste was home to three writers who would
later be designated great: Italo Svevo, James Joyce and the poet
Umberto Saba.
Of course writers and above all groups of writers tend to
encourage mythologies about themselves, their lives and achieve-
ments: Gertrude Stein and her school, Ezra Pound, Ernest
Hemingway. And readers too are often eager to surround the
texts they love with anecdotes, and to attribute remarkable
qualities to the authors they admire.
In Trieste, a port city with an uneasy history of difficult
allegiances and blurred racial boundaries, the question of identity
and ethnicity was bound to play a part in the formation of such
mythologies. Hence it’s hardly surprising, for example, that both
Svevo and Saba are pseudonyms, and that the names should be
the starting point for a great deal of literary speculation. Was
Ettore Schmitz, alias Italo Svevo, who was educated in German,
grew up speaking Triestine dialect and indeed lived most of his
life under Austrian rule, really an Italian writer? Was his style, as
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some contemporaries suggested, perhaps more Slav than Italian?
Would he have done better, as Umberto Poli, alias Umberto
Saba, thought, to have written in German? And did Saba’s own
problems of identity (he changed pseudonyms more than once)
arise not only out of the early desertion of his father, but partly
from the curiously mixed ethnic origins of the Jewish mother and
aunts and the Slovenian nurse who brought him up, and from the
uncertain identity of a city he was so determined should be
Italian? Finally, could it have been precisely the uneasiness of this
local situation and the fierce desire of the local people to be
liberated from an imperial power that made the Irish exile, Joyce,
feel at home in Trieste for ten long years?
These are questions that loom large in Joseph Cary’s book, A
Ghost in Trieste. Behind them lies the more general but ever
intriguing conundrum, How much does the spirit of a particular
place at a particular time inform and shape the novels and poems
written there, and how anyway could such influence be measured
and savoured?
Yet Cary’s book is slow to home in on its subject. As a guide
and critic he proceeds on the principle that indirections will
eventually find directions out, and although some of the
consequent meandering does have its charm, it must be said that
much is sentimental and self-regarding. ‘I went to Trieste because
I hoped to find my business there,’ he tells us in his ‘preliminary’.
A notion for a book, Literary Trieste, was in my head, and I
felt that going there would translate this notion into a clear
and spurring idea . . .
I drew a beautiful equilateral triangle in my notebook
Saba

Svevo Joyce
and wrote ‘Trieste 1905–15’ beneath it. Trieste was the key.
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All too soon, however, he discovers that Trieste is a modern town
not unlike many others, that Joyce and Svevo’s relationship was
not after all very much more than that between any young
language teacher and his older pupil, that Svevo met Saba only
rarely and with no more than tepid cordiality, and that Saba,
so far as we know, never met Joyce at all. His desire for an
easy mythology, or literary salon to exhume so immediately
thwarted, Cary then embarks on pages of wistful self-irony which
tell us little about either Trieste or the writers whose relation to
the city we are interested in, and rather more than we would
care to know about Cary’s sense of himself as travel writer
manque´:
In the Cinema Eden I sat through 101 Dalmatians wondering
what they made of it in Dalmatia. Ghost-wise I petered past as
a pretty blonde peered through a crack in the green canvas at a
tennis match on the court behind Villa Necker. For hours and
hours, the louvers of my darkened hotel room cut street-lamp
light into thin orange stripes across the ceiling. They rippled
when a car passed.
Finally, it occurs to him to see himself as a ghost wandering
through Trieste in search of an ever elusive literary past, a
quaint image but hardly an encouraging one for those of us
expecting to hear more of Saba, Svevo and Joyce. At other
moments Cary seems to forget his literary interests altogether:
‘This is a book about Trieste: its curious history, some of its
residents, some of my stumbling steps to get a view of it.’ How
long exactly did this adventure last? ‘My three weeks in
Trieste have been distributed over five years with long intervals at
home . . .’
If readers were puzzled by the adjective ‘beautiful’ used to
describe the hand-sketched equilateral triangle earlier on, they
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will no doubt be even more perplexed by that ‘long intervals at
home’. More surprising still is the way it does not occur to Cary
that to acquire the kind of deep sense of place and local character
which might shed some light on the way the city influenced its
writers, a critic might want to stick around for three months, or
three years, rather than three weeks.
These irritations have to be mentioned, but fortunately, once
Cary has got his self-indulgent comments on travel out of the way
and begun to concentrate on this history of the city and the
relationship of that history to its artists and writers, then his book
becomes fascinating. We hear of Trieste’s early development as a
Roman garrison town, its struggle to survive through the Dark
Ages and its unusual decision to offer itself to the Austrian crown
in return for protection. We discover that it was the enlightened if
never altruistic strategy of successive Austrian emperors that led
to the city’s rapid development as a southern port of central
Europe, to the point where, in the late nineteenth century, it was
second only to Marseilles. Most of all, Cary gradually and
thoroughly establishes the huge irony that whereas Trieste’s
economic prosperity depended on its connection with Austria
and the north, the predominantly Italian identity of its people
and the rising tide of nationalism which swept through Europe in
the mid-nineteenth century inevitably pushed the city towards
union with Italy in the west.
Thus the first decade of the twentieth century, when Joyce and
Saba and Svevo were all in the city at the same time, was a
fascinating one. Trieste was at the height of its commercial
success, but the very energy generated by that wealth went to
feed a passionate Italian nationalism which, in achieving its end,
would ultimately destroy the city’s wealth by cutting it off from
Austria and its hinterland. Cary is at his best here, weaving
together an excellent series of quotations to show how artists,
poets and novelists reflected this nationalism in their writing.
From Carducci through the predictably flamboyant D’Annunzio,
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the rumbustious critic Scipio Slataper and the futurist Marinetti,
what is extraordinary is the vehemence, eloquence and, some-
times, thank God, wit, with which this nationalism was expressed.
Slataper, who died fighting on the Austrian-Italian frontier in
1915, is particularly attractive when he imagines Trieste’s
discovery of its national and cultural identity as that of an
ingenuous young Parsifal,
who awakened one day between a crate of lemons and a sack
of coffee beans thinking that, for his own good, he ought to
modulate his life to another rhythm than that of a snorting or
puffing engine, treat it to another melody than that of silver
clinking in the pockets of some capacious waistcoat.
That is, he should look to Italy. Marinetti, on the other hand, is
merely frightening. In the amazingly titled War, Sole Hygiene of
the World (1910), he apostrophises Trieste as follows:
You are the scarlet, violent face of Italy, turned toward the
enemy! . . . Trieste! you are our sole shield! . . . Do not forget
O Trieste, that the Italian peninsula has the form of a
dreadnought, with a squadron of torpedo-boat islands.
The passage vaguely echoes, D’Annunzio’s notorious ‘Ode To a
Torpedo Boat in the Adriatic’ written almost twenty years earlier:
Steel ship, straight, swift, flashing
beautiful as a naked weapon,
alive, palpitant
as though metal enclosed a terrible heart.
By the end of the poem D’Annunzio leaves us in no doubt that
that naked weapon is pointed in the very specific direction of
Austrian-controlled Trieste.
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But it is not so much the warmongering of the literary
intelligentsia that is surprising and sobering here as the realisation
that only a hundred years ago European culture was still based
primarily on the written word, and a poet could still see himself as
having a formidable and immediate political part to play. Just a
few years before the movies would become ubiquitous, a few
decades before television, the time of Joyce, Saba and Svevo in
Trieste marked the last years of the word as unrivalled manipula-
tor of public feeling. As if in valedictory homage to that power, or
demonstration of the prophetic and political vocation of the poet,
the transfer of Trieste from Austrian to Italian sovereignty was
effectively confirmed by the arrival in the port of a torpedo boat,
the Audacious.
So much for the fervid literary and political scene. Yet as we
read through Cary’s carefully chosen quotes we gradually become
aware of the absence of any contribution from Joyce, Saba or
Svevo. True, Joyce, while in Trieste, gave one or two lectures on
Irish history where clear parallels were drawn between Britain and
Austria as imperial oppressors. True, Svevo remarked that it was
the coming of Italy to Trieste that gave him the inspiration to
write his last and greatest novel, La coscienza di Zeno. True, Saba
later spoke of having ‘married [Trieste] to Italy for ever with my
song’, but he was clearly speaking more of having been the first to
write poetry on the city in a ‘proper’ Tuscan Italian than of
having contributed to nationalist propaganda. For the fact is that
none of these writers had anything at all to say in their creative
work about the political issues that were exciting the other writers
round about them.
In his indirect style Cary thus appears to stumble on the central
point of his book when remarking that a literary history of Trieste
and Istria, written in 1924 by a professor at the newly established
University of Trieste, includes neither Saba nor Svevo. Cary
comments: ‘It is the total absence of anima patria in the novels
173
Hell and Back
of Svevo . . . and in the poetry of Saba . . . that accounts for their
absence from the pages of Storia letteraria di Trieste e dell’Istria.’
Exactly. And we begin to see that it was the creative isolation
of these three writers that distinguishes them. For all their living
in a very particular place at a very particular moment, they had
nothing in common with the local literary scene and very little
with each other. For Joyce, the most important thing about
Trieste was that it was not Dublin. He arrived there by accident.
He found he was able to borrow money and to work (teaching
English). It was enough. He was obsessed with words, with style,
with the extent to which words can evoke a world, create a world,
many worlds, most of all the world of Dublin, where he never
wanted to live again. To a very great extent he must have lived in
those worlds of words (since in another way he never left Dublin
at all). Svevo’s description of his teacher, written as an English
homework assignment, is pertinent here:
When I see him walking on the street I always think that he is
enjoying a leisure, a full leisure. Nobody is awaiting him and
he does not want to reach an aim or to meet anybody. No! He
walks in order to be left to himself. He also does not walk for
health. He walks because he is not stopped by anything. I
imagine that if he would find his way barred by a high and big
wall he would not be shocked in the least, he would change
direction and if the new direction would also prove not to be
clear he would change it again.
Thus, when Trieste was closed to Joyce with the arrival of the
First World War, he continued his walks in Zurich, and later
Paris. Nor is there any indication that leaving Trieste affected his
writing. If Molly could say of Leopold just before she decided to
take him, ‘well, as well him as another’, certainly Joyce could
have said the same of the cities he lived in after Dublin.
For Svevo, on the other hand, as Cary sensibly points out,
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Trieste was merely home, a place he had no quarrel with, a place
above all for work. If the city comes through at all in his novels,
which despite being set in Trieste rarely mention or describe it, it
is in the world of work, the shipping and commerce that all his
characters are involved in, as indeed was Svevo himself. The
observation points up the fine irony underlying the now
traditional linking of Joyce and Svevo’s names. For the two could
scarcely have been more different: the Irishman living in Trieste,
but meticulously describing, recreating his home town of Dublin,
the Triestine happily at home but apparently uninterested in the
city round about him. Joyce, the avant-garde aesthete, the stylist
par excellence, was searching for new techniques, new games,
new languages. Svevo, for his part, is quite embarrassingly inept
as a stylist, to the point where, on reading him in Italian one
occasionally has to look at a sentence very hard indeed before
understanding it, and this is not because of some effect the writer
was aiming for, but out of sheer clumsiness.
Was this perhaps the essential aspect of the Triestine influence
on Svevo, this writing in a language that was not really his own?
Certainly, of all the serious novelists I have read, Svevo seems the
least interested in drawing deeply on the resources of language to
enrich his vision. Rather, Italian is a medium he uses as best he
can to get across a brilliantly comic and perceptive succession of
thoughts and actions that continuously unravel the perversity of
his characters. When Joyce apparently told Svevo that ‘there are
passages in Senilita` that even Anatole France could not have
improved’, he was either lying (to flatter) or simply had not
appreciated why he liked the book, or has been misreported. And
if La coscienza di Zeno is Svevo’s best book, it is perhaps because
by adopting the first person he makes the clumsiness of his
Italian, and the constant strain in it, a reflection of Zeno’s own
curious mix of effort and buffoonery, the confusion of a man who
tries so hard, and so hopelessly, to be morally healthy. The final
irony, however, of all the fashionable criticism of Svevo’s Italian is
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that he is now by far the most readable, and particularly in
translation, of all his Italian contemporaries. Their D’Annunzian
grandiloquence seems so egregious beside his simple, if occasion-
ally awkward, dispatch.
Saba (1883–1957), a lyric poet who moved to Florence to
improve his Italian, but then wrote many of his poems about
Trieste and eventually returned to live there, is a very different,
perhaps even ‘opposite’ case. Towards the end of his book Cary
offers translations of extracts from the writers he has talked about,
plus two of Joyce’s Pomes Penyeach, translated into Italian by
Montale. One is struck how well Svevo and Slataper come across,
how poorly Saba. ‘Poetry,’ as Paul Celan said, ‘is the fatal
uniqueness of language,’ and for Saba the exact register and
semantic range of each word, the exact rhythm of the line and
arrangement of the syntax are all-important. Read in the Italian,
which Cary wisely leaves alongside, the spareness and hard-earned
intensity of his verse is immediately apparent. Transferred into a
would-be poetic English, it disappears. The subject of the poems
Cary chooses to quote is Trieste, its streets, its bars, its people,
but one soon appreciates that the city is above all a mirror of the
poet’s mood, a source of consolation for his suffering, material
for the constant reinvention of that wisely dying fall which is
Saba’s voice.
Apart from the space and time of Trieste and Triestine politics
in the early twentieth century, another source of influence was, of
course, the less provincial, more elusive world of European ideas
in general. So, as Cary remarks towards the end of his book, each
of the three writers was more influenced by, and influencing of,
incipient literary modernism than the city they lived in. ‘Con-
science’, ‘consciousness’, or the Italian catch-all ‘coscienza’ are
useful words here. In his poet’s manifesto, Quello che resta da fare
ai poeti, Saba speaks of the poet’s responsibility as lying precisely
in coscienza, his ‘moral awakeness’ as Cary puts it, his determina-
tion to write nothing and use no technique that is not profoundly
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felt. Hence the hard-won precision of his language, the difficulty
of translation.
Svevo, on the other hand, in La coscienza di Zeno, seems to be
engaged above all in revealing, sincerely, the impossibility of such
sincerity. Every resolution his hero takes is immediately over-
whelmed by an opposing appetite, every appetite is thwarted by
moral awareness. In this tragicomic demonstration language need
not be precise, on the contrary all the better if, being the writer’s
second language, it is inherently mendacious. Commenting on
his analyst’s ingenuousness in imagining his confessions sincere,
the hyperconscious Zeno remarks: ‘With every Tuscan word we
use we lie. If only he knew how much we enjoy saying those
things we know the words for and how we avoid anything that
would oblige us to resort to the dictionary.’
Meanwhile, Joyce was inventing his ‘stream of consciousness’,
amorally following thoughts wherever they and language would
lead, during his Trieste walks perhaps. Behind all three writers
one can’t help feeling the presence of their near contemporary,
Freud. Svevo translated him and presented Zeno as an exercise in
self-analysis. Saba got himself analysed, discovered all about his
identity crisis and dedicated a book of poems to his analyst. Joyce
pooh-poohed Freud and confirmed his importance in everything
he wrote. Trieste, as Cary points out, for the obvious reason of its
daily commerce with Vienna, was one of the main entry points by
which Freud’s ideas came to Italy.
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Party Going
[Henry Green]
We should be familiar with the scene. A major railway station in
central London. It’s early on a foggy evening. The office workers
are returning home, a party of England’s most privileged are
about to board the boat train for a continental holiday. The date
must be sometime in the late 1920s. Apparently we are at the
very heart of the declining Empire. Waugh territory. Yet no
sooner have we read a paragraph of Green’s prose than we know
that this is not the case. On the contrary, we feel completely
disorientated, as if we had been mysteriously spirited off to some
far-flung outpost, some improbable possession we could never
imagine had been annexed to the Crown. Kipling in India,
Lawrence in Mexico, Joyce in Trieste, they are all and immedi-
ately more central to what has become English Literature, what
we expect when we open a book, than this bizarre and beautiful
comedy that is Henry Green’s great masterpiece.
More reassuringly cliche´d, you would have thought, than the
thick fog of pre-war London, one cannot get. Yet, as if the
ghostly material had seeped into the writer’s mind and syntax,
obliging him, and us, to advance with hands outstretched in
constant fear of some unexpected obstacle, we soon appreciate
that Green is using exactly this meteorological commonplace as
image and abettor of our disorientation. One grey matter has
invaded another and everybody is bewildered. Instructing a
chauffeur to deal with her many suitcases, the fabulously wealthy
Julia Wray sets out to walk across the park to the station.
Immediately she is in the fog.
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Where hundreds of thousands she could not see were now
going home, their day done, she was only starting out and
there was this difference, that where she had been nervous of
her journey and of starting, so that she had said she would
rather go on foot to the station to walk it off, she was
frightened now. As a path she was following turned this way
and that round bushes and shrubs that hid from her what she
would find she felt she would next come upon this fog
dropped suddenly down to the ground, when she would be
lost.
What are we to make of this sequence of relative clauses: ‘that hid
from her what she would find she felt she would next come upon this
fog dropped suddenly down’! Julia is not alone in being lost. What
can the sentence mean? How strangely and rapidly its monosyl-
labic rhythm with barely a word unstressed plunges us into
confusion. As we begin to read, we expect something like: As she
went this way and that round bushes that hid from her what she
would find on the other side, she felt . . . lost. But no, for
immediately after the word ‘felt’, the sentence speeds up and
complicates in an alarming way. The problem then becomes,
where are we to put the comma that ends the temporal clause and
introduces the main clause? Could it be: As she went round bushes
that hid what she would find COMMA she feared (felt) that she
would come upon this fog dropped down (rather than staying up in
the trees) in which case she would be lost. Certainly that’s possible.
But ugly. It also prevents us from reading ‘this fog dropped
suddenly down’ as a strong indicative end to the sentence.
Alternatively we might read the main clause as beginning with
‘she would next come upon’ thus: As she went round bushes that
hid what she would find COMMA or so she imagined (felt)
COMMA she would come upon this fog dropped down, and then she
would be lost. But again the thing seems unwieldy and the
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attractive rhythm set up in ‘what she would find she felt she
would next come upon’ disappears.
Only after a double or even triple take and some careful
attention to those shifty ‘would’s, ever ready to switch from
imperfect to conditional and so keep us from separating the wood
from the trees in this foggy park, do we come upon a reading that
gives a deeper sense to that extraordinary succession of verbs at
the core of the sentence: Julia went round bushes that hid from her
what she thus discovered (‘would find’) that she had been expecting
(‘felt’) to come upon on the other side, but didn’t. To arrive at this
reading is to appreciate that nothing so much as disorientation
will help you discover what you expected but didn’t find. This
isn’t a book like any other.
But we mustn’t be put off by a little confusion! A little
disorientation. One would never, surely, break off a promising
conversation merely because something the other person said
didn’t quite or immediately make sense. Then bewilderment can
be exciting. For even if what you are going to come upon in
Party Going is not what you expected either from this or any
book, it may all the same turn out to be very beautiful and very
seductive. Even illuminating. And it might even be the case that
the disorientation Green imposes on us is a state that will make us
peculiarly receptive to beauty, perhaps a necessary precondition of
our discovering it. Would somebody so self-obsessed and silly as
Julia Wray ever have noticed the beauty of leaves lit up at night if
she had not been lost in fog? Here is the next paragraph.
Then at another turn she was on more open ground.
Headlights of cars above turning into a road as they swept
around hooting swept their light above where she walked,
illuminating lower branches of trees. As she hurried she started
at each blaring horn and each time she would look up to make
sure that noise heralded a light and then was reassured to see
leaves brilliantly green veined like marble with wet dirt and
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these veins reflecting each light back for a moment then it
would be gone out beyond her and then was altogether gone
and there was another.
Green must be the most highly praised, certainly the most
accomplished, of twentieth-century novelists not to have made it
into the canon, not to be regularly taught in universities, not to
be considered ‘required reading’. The celebrated critic Frank
Kermode gives us the key to why this is so. Delivering the Norton
Lectures at Harvard University in 1977, he chose Party Going as
an example of a work that perversely frustrated every analytical
tool in the hermeneutic workshop. Brilliant as it is, Kermode
insists, Party Going cannot be made to make sense as a whole. Is
this fair comment? Would it matter if it was? ‘Life after all,’ Green
remarked, ‘is one discrepancy after another.’
Max Adey, unpardonably rich and notoriously handsome, has
invited, all expenses paid, a gaggle of bright young things to a
winter house party in France. But barely an hour before departure
Max himself is not quite sure if he will go. For he hasn’t invited
Amabel. He is trying to break up with her, beautiful, wealthy and
fabulously pampered as she is. All the same, it was unkind not to
invite her. Perhaps he should stay behind, then. Should he? Max
has difficulty making up his mind. Actually, he has difficulty
thinking at all. He invites Amabel to dinner, then leaves for the
station, then phones from the station to cancel dinner explaining
that he is at the airport. Then, discovering that the train has been
delayed by the fog, he books one room in the station hotel for his
party and another for himself on the floor above to which he
immediately takes Julia with whom he plans to replace Amabel
while a third girl Angela is to be kept waiting in the wings. As he
and Julia settle down to possible lovemaking, Green tells us:
If Julia had wondered where Max was taking her as they went
upstairs together, Max, for his part, had wondered where she
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was taking him. With this difference however, that, if she had
done no more than ask herself what room he was taking her to,
he had asked himself whether he was going to fall for her.
Again, while she had wondered so faintly she hardly knew she
had it in her mind or, in other words, had hardly expressed to
herself what she was thinking, he was much further from
putting his feelings into words, as it was not until he felt sure
of anything that he knew what he was thinking of. When he
thought, he was only conscious of uneasy feelings and he only
knew that he had been what he did not even call thinking
when his feelings hurt him. When he was sure then he felt it
must at once be put to music, which was his way of saying
words.
Being brutally reductive, one might say that the twentieth
century excelled in two manners of representing character. There
is the flattery of Joyce and Woolf, who give us a vision of
individual minds constantly generating poetry, perpetually seek-
ing to expand the spirit. How encouraging it is when we find we
can identify with them! And there is the more traditional
approach, perhaps of Graham Greene or Anthony Powell, that
sees character primarily in terms of its response to moral struggle
in scenarios social, sentimental and political. This too, like any
call to duty, has its reassuring and flattering aspect, even when, as
in the early and hilarious Waugh, it means pillorying people for
not being what writer and reader know they should be. One
could never say of such books that they do not ‘make sense’.
But Green offers neither of these, nor one of the derivative
combinations typical of the average novel today. Though all
perfectly believable, all presented with a psychology that is
ruthlessly and comically convincing, his characters are not
immediately distinguishable and the reader may have a little
difficulty at the beginning of Party Going sorting out Claire,
Angela, Evelyn and Julia, not to mention Robert, Robin, Alex
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and Max, as if obliged, as I have been on various occasions, to
watch a game of football in the fog. It’s hard to see who’s got the
ball. But much of the pleasure of reading Green comes from just
this struggle to distinguish – it seems we’re being teased – and the
resulting recognition that any clarity in human relationships will
be a fiction won from heavy clouds of incomprehension.
The description of Max and Julia as they head towards first
intimacy gives us a clue to Green’s vision. The words he uses for
them, symmetrically repeating ‘wonder’, ‘take’, ‘thought’,
‘knew’, suggests that they are tangled together, mutually interact-
ing – who takes whom where exactly? – just as their similar
manner of speaking when their wonderful dialogue begins makes
it very clear that they are the product of the same society, they
share the same prejudices, the same memories almost. Yet the
substance of the paragraph is their ignorance, not only of what is
going on in the other’s head, but of their own intentions likewise.
And the conversation when it gets going will be that of two
people missing not only each other in the dark, but themselves
too. ‘All and always alone’, as Green believed we are, he does not
allow his characters the consolation of a Dedalus or a Dalloway
that they are special individuals, or even ‘individuals’ at all in the
way we give status to that word. They don’t possess themselves.
Often both action and speech come as the result of the merest
compulsion. And if it is hard to ‘identify’ with them, this is
perhaps because Green more than any novelist of his time had
appreciated that ‘identity’ and ‘character’ were convenient and
somewhat overgenerous fictions. ‘“What do we know of any-
one?” said Julia,’ and Green adds, ‘thinking of herself ’.
But do these people have a moral duty at least? Is the book a
satirical account of their inadequacy? Our party gathers in the
station. The fog is impenetrable now. No trains are leaving and
the press of homeward-bound commuters is becoming a suffocat-
ing and potentially dangerous throng. Well-connected, pockets
well-lined, Max and company take refuge (for the whole of the
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novel) in the station hotel whence, when gossip and flirtation
flags, they can gaze down on the crowd beneath. Then at a
certain point, the hotel doors are locked and barred and the
building sealed off from the outside world.
The management had shut the steel doors down because when
once before another fog had come as thick as this hundreds
and hundreds of the crowd, unable to get home by train or
bus, had pushed into this hotel and quietly clamoured for
rooms, beds, meals, and more and more had pressed quietly,
peaceably in until, although they had been most well behaved,
by weight of numbers they had smashed everything, furniture,
lounges, reception offices, the two bars, doors. Fifty-two had
been injured and compensated and one of them was a little
Tommy Tucker, now in a school for cripples, only fourteen
years of age, and to be supported all his life at the railway
company’s expense by order of a High Court Judge.
‘It’s terrifying,’ Julia said, ‘I didn’t know there were so many
people in the world.’
Class distinction, social privilege, couldn’t be more clearly
established. Green, himself a communist sympathiser from the
moneyed classes, has no illusions. Yet, there is never any
suggestion that Max and company should or even could do
anything about the situation. Nor do the crowd ever put them to
some awful test. The words, ‘peaceably’ and ‘most well behaved’
are telling here. The classes are as tangled together in an overall
society, mutually engendering, mutually uncomprehending, as
are Max and Julia, men and women in general. The conflict and
moral dilemma that a hundred years of a certain kind of literature
has led you to expect won’t occur. The rich young folks get on
well with their servants who appear to think kindly of them in
return. No, if Julia and company try to ignore the crowd locked
outside it is not because of any rejection of social duty, but
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because the sheer anonymous size of the throng in the foggy
plaza makes them think of death. ‘Like a view from the gibbet,’
says Alex looking down on the scene. ‘Cattle waiting to be
butchered’ says another. Here and there in the gloom suitcases
lean this way and that like headstones in ‘an exaggerated
graveyard’. Max steps back from lace curtains.
The perversity of Party Going, Kermode claimed in his Norton
Lectures, was that while the core of the book is a series of
dazzlingly complex dialogues, hilarious social manoeuvrings and
tawdry sex games among the rich in the hotel, these bear no
relation at all to a possible political interpretation of the book,
which is nevertheless flung in our faces in the presentation of rich
and poor inside and outside the hotel, and even less to a possible
‘mythical’ interpretation, equally shamelessly flaunted when the
novel opens with the description of an elderly woman, aunt of
one member of our party, finding a dead pigeon, washing it in
the public lavatories and wrapping it in a brown paper parcel.
Purification rituals? Funeral rites? The book teems with poten-
tially symbolic figures and events: the mysterious man who
despite locked doors seems able to pass in and out of the hotel,
his accent changing from Birmingham to cockney to Oxbridge
every time he opens his mouth; the goddess-like Amabel whose
bath, after she too inexplicably penetrates the hotel’s defences, is
followed with awe by the other members of the party, as if she
were no less than the huntress Diana herself. Then there are
Julia’s talismanic toys, the egg with the elephants in it, the little
wooden pistol, the spinning top, not to mention Robert’s
memories of buried treasure in a thicket of bamboo. And yet,
Kermode complains, while in Joyce or Eliot such manifestations
would offer the key to an overall interpretation, this does not
seem to be the case in Green.
All the same . . . if we stop fussing over explanations,
interpretations, and if, while enjoying the thickly planted maze of
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Green’s dialogues, we keep our eyes on the references to death,
the characters’ anxieties about death, all will become, if not clear,
then at least fatally, fantastically familiar.
Where did the dead pigeon fall from? Out of the fog.
Disorientated it flew into a beam. Miss Fellowes, Claire’s aunt,
picks it up, then, ‘everything unexplained’, falls ill herself, buys a
whisky, she who never drinks whisky, collapses, is perhaps even
dying. Thoughtful and embarrassed, Max arranges for her to have
her own and separate room in the hotel. Two nannies ‘dressed in
granite’ sit outside it, like Fates ready to cut the mortal thread. At
this point, the geometry of the novel is at once more complex
and more recognisable. To defend what fragile identity they may
have the group has separated itself from encroaching anonymity,
as any society might set up a palisade between itself and the
wilderness. But before the gates could be shut the fog had slipped
in from beyond the pale, in the form of the dead pigeon, the sick
auntie. So the pigeon is hidden in a parcel and then the auntie in
her separate room. But how to stop thinking about them: the
dying soul within, the amorphous world without? Everybody is
fascinated by the idea that Miss Fellowes may be dying and at the
same time all hope against hope that her eventual deterioration
won’t prove an even greater obstacle to their escape to the
‘paradise’ of southern France than that ‘pall of fog’ which has
paralysed them in this hotel where the problem is, alas, ‘there’s
nothing to do.’
In this scenario, what is the marvellous fizz of shenanigans that
makes up the bulk of the novel, if not a heroic attempt to keep
death at bay? It’s a situation where the abilities to flirt, to preen
and to start pernicious rumours are not qualities to be lightly
dismissed. Other writers, Green seems to be telling us, have not
given these achievements their due. The conversation must go
on. We must not be obliged to think. For at every misunder-
standing, every ‘strangling silence’, every hiccup in the conversa-
tion (and with the amount these people can afford to drink the
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slip-ups will be many), it’s as if the fog had made a further
advance into the hotel, creeping into booze-befuddled heads and
threatening to have them crashing into a beam to drop down
damp and lifeless. Fortunately our party are well trained. The
finishing schools have not been in vain. Here is Amabel listening
to Alex relaying some hot gossip through a closed door while she
has her bath:
When Alex came to an end she had not properly heard what he
had been saying so she said something almost under her
breath, or so low that he in his turn should not catch what she
had said, but so that it would be enough to tell him she was
listening.
Never, not even in Beckett’s Endgame, has there been a greater
communal complicity in that vital game of keeping the ball
rolling.
An atmosphere of mockery hangs over Party Going, seeps into its
every nook and cranny. It is the fog. It is the grey matter of
the artist’s mind. Both have a peculiarly corrosive quality that
dissolves identity, disconnects things, above all, puts everything
on the same level – people, objects, images, different parts of
speech, political readings, symbolic readings – as if in some
primeval soup, something far older (and if Green is dated, as
some complain, the date goes back many thousands of years)
than any empire or class distinction. The oddly compelling
rhythms of the prose with its elimination of weak stresses and
frequent use of demonstratives, reproduce the dismembering
effect at the auditory level. Everything is fragmented, displaced.
She bent down and took a wing then entered a tunnel in front
of her, and this had DEPARTURES lit up over it, carrying her
dead pigeon.
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Departures indeed! It’s a state of decomposition that cannot
help but remind us of our mortal precariousness. Yet at the same
time it is also the warm and fertile sea from which all life once
crept. No wonder we felt we were far from home! Everything
interrupted, sense perceptions blocked, the ancient archetypes are
free to rise up quite naturally like dreams in a Jungian sleep. So
Alex, driven through dense fog in a taxi, is transported far away
from central London:
Streets he went through were wet as though that fog twenty
foot up had deposited water, and reflections which lights
slapped over the roadways suggested to him he might be a
Zulu, in the Zulu’s hell of ice, seated in his taxi in the part of
Umslopogaas with his axe, skin beating over the hole in his
temple.
All Green’s work is inspired by his perception of a complicity
between composition and decomposition, between the creative
and corrosive powers of the mind, or again by the way a disability,
a misunderstanding, can unleash powerful and vital forces, or a
dying auntie have the most astonishing hallucinations. He left us
but one precious hint of the method this perception led him to. It
comes in almost the only interview this very private man ever gave
and is disguised in a sly remark that has been more often quoted
than understood.
INTERVIEWER: I’ve heard it remarked that your work is ‘too
sophisticated’ for American readers, in that if offers no scenes
of violence – and ‘too subtle’, in that its message is somewhat
veiled. What do you say?
GREEN: Unlike the wilds of Texas, there is very little violence
over here. A bit of child-killing of course, but no straight
shootin’ . . .
INTERVIEWER: And how about ‘subtle’?
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GREEN: I don’t follow. Suttee, as I understand it, is the suicide
– now forbidden – of a Hindu wife on her husband’s flaming
bier. I don’t want my wife to do that when my time comes –
and with great respect, as I know her, she won’t . . .
INTERVIEWER: I’m sorry, you misheard me, I said ‘subtle’ – that
the message was too subtle.
GREEN: Oh, subtle. How dull!
Subtle it was! Deaf in one ear though he may have been, Green
could not have imagined that his interviewer, Terry Southern,
was talking about ‘suttee’. Indeed Southern’s notes suggest that
parts of the interview was as much written as spoken. In any
event, Green uses the exchange to show, with typical playfulness,
how from a misunderstanding, a moment of mental limbo, an
ancient religion with its terrible ritual may suddenly flare up
again, and immediately we are thinking of our own death and
simultaneously trying to forget it with the wonderfully wry
remark about the wife. After which we can safely return to the
duller world of literary discussion.
It will be pointless, then, to ask what this or that image in Party
Going means, or how this or that conversation might be
interpreted. Quite simply, these are the things that people say to
each other, and these are the images the mind has ever produced.
You can’t help recognising them. So it is that Green, unlike
Waugh or Wodehouse or Wilde, can allow even the most witless
characters moments of extraordinary and completely convincing
beauty. Here, to close, are the incorrigibly faithless Max and
Amabel nodding off to sleep together after what may or may not
have been a reconciliation. As always with Green, beauty has to
do with birds, with dissolution, and with death.
Lying in his arms, her long eyelashes down along her cheeks,
her hair tumbled and waved, her hands drifted to rest like
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white doves drowned on peat water, he marvelled again he
should ever dream of leaving her who seemed to him then his
reason for living as he made himself breathe with her breathing
as he always did when she was in his arms to try and be more
with her.
It was so luxurious he nodded, perhaps it was also what she
had put on her hair, very likely it may have been her sleep
reaching out over him, but anyway he felt so right he slipped
into it too and dropped off on those outspread wings into her
sleep with his, like two soft evenings meeting.
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The Enchanted Fort
[Dino Buzzati]
‘Now a book lives,’ wrote D.H. Lawrence, ‘as long as it is
unfathomed. Once it is fathomed . . . once it is known and its
meaning is fixed or established, it is dead.’ He uses the remark to
launch an attack on allegory, indeed on all stories that offer a neat
equivalence between their characters or settings and abstract
qualities. ‘A man is more than a Christian,’ he protests, ‘a rider on
a white horse must be more than mere faithfulness and truth.’
Written in 1938, The Tartar Steppe is the story of a young
officer dispatched to do service in a remote mountain garrison
overlooking a vast northern desert. At first desperate to escape
and return to the pleasures of normal life, he nevertheless falls
under the spell of the place to the point that he will spend the
next thirty years there, sustained only by the vain hope that one
day an enemy attack will offer a moment of glory and fulfilment.
Buzzati commented: ‘The idea of the novel came out of the
monotonous night shift I was working at Corriere della Sera in
those days. It often occurred to me that that routine would never
end and so would eat up my whole life quite pointlessly. It’s a
common enough feeling, I think, for most people, especially
when you find yourself slotted into the time-tabled existence of a
big town. Transposing that experience into a fantastical military
world was an almost instinctive decision.’
Is the book, then, a mere allegory of equivalences? Buzzati had
originally called his story ‘The Fort’ and the title was only
changed on the insistence of the publishers who were keen to
avoid allusions to the sensitive military situation in Europe. One
193
Hell and Back
Italian critic remarked: ‘The “desert” of the novel is thus the
story of life in the “fort” of the newspaper which promises the
wonders of a solitude that is both habit and vocation.’ You can
already hear Lawrence muttering, ‘Fathomed and dead!’
But if it’s a commonplace that something explained is very
largely explained away, it is also true that faced with any
phenomenon the mind instinctively sets out to construct an
explanation. Here is an irony Lawrence doesn’t follow up.
Confronted with a story, any story, we immediately seek to
fathom it out, to know it, even though we realise that if we
succeed it will no longer be interesting, it will die. Oddly, then,
the greatest pleasure we can get from a story only comes when
the smaller satisfaction of having explained it away is thwarted.
The mind discards, as it were, the chaff of the explicable to find
real repose, or real excitement, in a kernel of enigma.
The Tartar Steppe is one of those precious novels that take the
enormous risk of throwing down a gauntlet to the reasoning
mind. Explain me if you can or dare, it says. Fathom me out.
Provocative and frightening as the book is, we feel we must
accept this challenge, put this disturbing story behind us. Who is
this man who tosses away his life for a chimera, why does he seem
so recognisable? Fortunately, the extraordinary clarity of the
narrative, its elegant structure and straightforward execution,
persuade us that it is that manner of thing for which explanation
is surely available, a puzzle we can solve. Yet in the end, twisting
and turning this way and that, mocking and infinitely ironic,
Buzzati’s story somehow denies us what we always felt was within
our grasp. No, on putting the book down we cannot honestly say
that we know what it meant. Quite the contrary. In this way it
succeeds in evoking in its reader the central experience of its main
character: in every sense life, not only his own but the whole of
life, eludes his grasp.
One September morning, Giovanni Drogo, being newly
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commissioned, set out from the city for Fort Bastiani; it was his
first posting.
And his last . . . There is a ruthless dispatch to these opening lines
which is typical of the way Buzzati works. Already he knows
exactly what he is doing. In a way the whole novel will be written
on the first page. Given no details of his past life, no sense of
geographical or cultural location, Drogo is immediately and
inevitably Everyman. He has waited for this day, this departure,
the beginning of his ‘real life’, ‘for years’, but looking in the
mirror now he doesn’t ‘find there the expected joy’. His early
youth is gone, tediously consumed in books and study, but
fortunately adulthood promises new satisfactions, new hopes.
For the next two hundred pages, Buzzati will show us how
resourcefully and how cruelly such hopes will ever sprout from
the interminable erosion of Drogo’s wasted days, their punctual
disappointments. The wonder is that a writer should display such
merciless control in elaborating a scenario of frustration and
impotence.
Far from resembling the editing room of a big city newspaper,
Fort Bastiani is located on the highest and most inaccessible of
mountain terrains. This is Buzzati’s masterstroke, the decision
that more than any other will give the book its rich elusiveness.
How can we not think of a medieval knight embarking on a
spiritual quest as we watch Drogo urge his horse up winding
paths beneath rock face and waterfall, lie down for the night
wrapped in his cloak, emerge the following morning at an
altitude immeasurably higher than anything he expected, onto a
narrow plateau where the yellow walls of the fort rise in the cleft
between towering peaks? The scene is set for some apocalyptic
trial. We are anxious that our hero perform well.
But no trial presents itself, or at least none of the variety we
expect. Drogo is not going to war. Nor is there a grail to recover.
He will never meet the enemy, let alone be given a chance to slay
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an ogre or a giant. Only in routine regimental rituals will his sabre
be bared, only at the endless changing of a meaningless guard will
the stirring trumpet sound. This is a story of drama deferred,
catharsis denied. To compensate, there are the mountains.
It is important here to say a word on what the mountains
meant for Buzzati, and indeed on the place they occupy in the
collective imagination of Italy in general, northern Italy in
particular. Brought up in Belluno at the confluence of the Ardo
and Piave rivers immediately below the majestic Dolomites,
Buzzati was ten years old when Italy joined the First World War
and became involved in the one military campaign of modern
times that Italians will still refer to as glorious. Defending a line
that ran across the very peaks of the Alps from the Swiss border to
the Adriatic, the Italian troops hacked trenches in stone and
snow, lived in caves and igloos at frightening altitudes, attacked
machine guns in terrain where the only grave was a heap of
shards. Finally routed at Caporetto in the east with the loss of half
a million men, they nevertheless fought a desperate rearguard
action to hold a line behind the Piave, a river north of Venice,
whence the tide was eventually turned and the enemy chased
north again. For an Italian the northern mountains are the locus
par excellence of military glory.
And so much more than that of course. In his early teens
Buzzati began to climb in the Dolomites. It would be a lifelong
passion. A competent artist, he drew and painted the mountains.
He never tired of it. His first literary effort, at fourteen, was called
‘La canzone delle montagne’, (‘The Song of the Mountains’). In
his first novel, Barnabus of the Mountains, the Dolomites were
already assuming a role at least as important as that of the people
in the book. So while the initial inspiration for The Tartar Steppe
may indeed have come out of the fear that a mindless office
routine was eating up his life, Buzzati nevertheless chose to set
that routine in a landscape that was his chief recreation, and also
something he was clearly in thrall to, a limit-experience for him, a
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drug almost, an endless source of exhilaration. The effect is
double-edged. Against the vast backdrop of pink peaks and dark
gorges, dazzling ice fields and dizzying gulfs, the rigid routine of
the garrison in the puny human geometry of the fort becomes
more meaningless than ever. But it also takes on a borrowed
sublimity. The mountains are that place where the sheer
extravagance of nature’s waste and emptiness becomes sublime.
And there is something sublime about the way a group of soldiers
can waste their whole lives observing the severest of rules as they
wait for an enemy who never materialises. Inexplicably, in the
night, snow slips from a roof, a landslide alters the shape of a
crag, freezing water splits a rock. There is an obscure complicity
between this alpine erosion and the web of wrinkles spreading
across the stony faces of the guards as they gaze out across the
desolate steppe to the north. The mountains, we discover, offer a
marvellous view of the void.
To read The Tartar Steppe is to be asked to take the idea of
enchantment seriously. Young Drogo knows that he must not
stay in the fort. It is isolated, futile. No sooner has he arrived than
he is asking to leave. He understands perfectly that there is no
hope of ordinary human fulfilment here, or military glory for that
matter. Reassured by the smiles and blandishments of older
officials – he doesn’t want to let the side down – he agrees to stay
a few months, at least until the first medical when he will be
pronounced, they promise him, unsuitable for service at high
altitude. Immediately we are terribly anxious for him. He slips
into the routine. We feel it happening. The narrator will even
insist that it is this cosy, easy, empty existence that will persuade
Drogo not to leave when the medical comes along and the doctor
gives him his chance. A moral failing, we are told. But we know it
isn’t so. Or it isn’t just that. Drogo is enchanted. It is a spell that
has something to do with the meeting of human vanities and
mountain landscape, a fatal complicity between aspiration and
emptiness. As the doctor who could send him back home speaks,
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our hero cannot even bring himself to listen, intent as he is on the
view from the window: ‘And it was then that he seemed to see
the yellow walls of the fortress courtyard soar up toward the
crystal sky, while, above them and beyond, higher and ever
higher, snow-topped bulwarks rose obliquely to solitary towers,
tiny redoubts and airy fortifications he had never noticed before.’
Drogo cannot tear himself away. He is doomed, seduced by
this hubristic and fantastical vision of some vast engagement
between man and mountain. At bottom it is an aesthetic
enchantment, the terrible sorcery of the magnificent gesture.
Once, when there were real enemies, bloody battles to be fought,
such magnificent posturing could serve a social purpose. The
glorious endeavour – swords brandished over the dramatic
landscape, fortifications built with tremendous sacrifice – was still
connected with the more mundane life down in the city. The
military hero protected that life. Now the gesture is entirely cut
off from any other reality, it lives only in the mind, entirely
absurd, and paradoxically all the grander and more seductive for
being so.
A pitiless psychology drives the development of the novel from
this point on. Again and again, in his dealings with his fellow
soldiers, with the mountains, the desert and with time itself,
Drogo is outflanked, outwitted and fantastically ingenuous.
Again and again he fails to understand either the manoeuvrings of
those around him or the changes in his own body and psyche.
There are moments when we can’t help wishing that this
blindness, this cruelty would stop. Yet everything that happens,
every trick played by comrades, nature and fate, is entirely
believable, even normal. Never do we feel that Drogo has been
singled out for special punishment. At one level we even suspect
that he is not entirely unhappy with his unhappy destiny. This is
the book’s perplexing core.
Much, far too much, has been made of Buzzati’s debt to Kafka.
True, he flirts with symbolism and surrealism; true, his writing is
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suffused with a sense of life’s absurdity (‘a most stupid landscape’,
the major assures Drogo on his arrival at the fort), but the same is
true of so many of his contemporaries, Calvino, Beckett and
Thomas Mann to name but three, all writers whose stories
achieve verisimilitude precisely in their refusal to grant the drama
we crave. What Buzzati does not share is the all-pervading
paranoia that characterises Kafka’s writing; as a result the horror
and humour that Buzzati evokes is one, I suspect, that will prove
more recognisable to the general reader than Kafka’s, closer to
the grain of common experience.
If asked to name the writer with whom Buzzati has perhaps the
greatest affinity, one is tempted to say, Giacomo Leopardi, Italy’s
great poet of a hundred years before. Leopardi, an early atheist,
was obsessed by the role of hope in human life, a hope he
remorselessly exposed as the product of illusion, yet saw, and
occasionally celebrated, as ever ready to flower again even in the
most barren places, the most unexpected forms. This incorrigible
inclination to hope, Leopardi felt, was both the curse and
salvation of the race: it guaranteed that the defining experience of
human life would be disappointment, and allowed us to press on
regardless.
Buzzati’s intuition is that with the collapse of the great
collective illusions – religion, national destiny – and the conse-
quently intensifying sense of absurdity (there is no common
enemy to sustain the fort’s purpose), the individual mind can only
react with ever more frenetic attempts to generate hope, the most
preposterous hopes, out of nothing, to enchant itself with
whatever desert terrain is available. Certainly the final chapters of
The Tartar Steppe present Drogo as somehow in complicity with
novelist and reader to drag out a vain illusion, perhaps even a
whole tradition of literary fiction, far beyond the limits of reason.
There is one marvellous moment in particular when the author-
ities ban the use of telescopes. With the help of a powerful lens
Drogo and a friend had managed to identify some tiny specks on
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the very edge of the visible horizon and had built around this
mirage the fantasy of an approaching army that would at last
bring to the fort the catharsis of war. Denied the collective
pursuit of this fantasy by order of their superiors, Drogo
nevertheless goes on staring into the empty desert until it seems
his busy imagination, or Buzzati’s, or perhaps ours, at last wills
the enemy into existence.
For at the very end of The Tartar Steppe, the prospect of real
war finally does present itself. What a huge relief! How pleased,
busy, even joyous everybody is! How eagerly the rusty military
machine is set back in motion, how bright the faces of the young
men as they march up the gloomy valleys to the fort! And the
reader is implicated too. Because you too are relieved, happy that
war has come, that the wait is over. Yes, the reader too has been
enchanted by the mirage of release, the fantasy that it might all
have meant something.
Buzzati’s typescript of The Tartar Steppe was submitted to the
publishers in January 1939. There is no need to comment on
what followed. In any event the book still serves as an alarming
reminder that the century that discovered nothingness would go
to any lengths, however catastrophic, to fill that nothingness up.
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In the Locked Ward
[Jay Neugeboren]
‘Throw away your Sigmund Freud, Mrs. Neugeboren . . .
because I am going to cure your son!’
It is 1968 and Dr Cott is offering massive doses of vitamins
B6, B12 and C. One of the first of a score of psychiatrists to take
charge of the schizophrenic Robert Neugeboren, whose story is
told in Imagining Robert, Cott’s confidence is, alas, unwarranted.
Still, the same could be said of most of those who follow him,
each with his own favourite wonder cure, whether it be
electroshock, insulin, Adapin, Mellaril, lithium, Stelazine or any
number of others. When one doctor announces with great
excitement that he is going to try ‘the brand new’ anti-convulsant
Depakote, Robert’s brother Jay, who is telling the story, has to
remind him that actually Robert has already been on Depakote.
He responded briefly, then relapsed.
Jay, however, is ever willing to hope and in the early nineties
when a psychiatrist decides that Klonopin is the way forward, the
author welcomes the decision. A little later, however, he discovers
that this is the same drug that has just been prescribed to their
eighty-two-year-old mother who suffers from Alzheimer’s. Is it
likely, then, that this will prove the promised ‘magic bullet’ for
schizophrenia?
In the meantime Robert is frequently deprived of his phone
privileges. Why, Jay complains, ‘what possible medical reason can
there be for depriving him of any contact with the world beyond
the ward?’ Invariably he is told that ‘the staff like Robert’ but that
he can be ‘impossible’ and even ‘dangerous’. ‘He curses loudly,
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screams at telephone operators, keeps demanding refunds from
the phone company, spits at aides, scratches them, strikes other
patients.’ Reading Imagining Robert, it soon becomes apparent
that dealing with the schizophrenic from day to day is far more of
a problem than the choice of his new medication.
A novelist by profession, Jay Neugeboren is a constant thorn in
the flesh of those who have treated his brother over almost forty
years of mental illness. It is not that he has an axe to grind. On
the contrary, he displays an exemplary openness to a wide range
of points of view. No, Jay’s behaviour is irksome first because he
just will not leave be. He continues to visit his brother, even
when those visits leave Robert more agitated than they found
him, and he always insists on knowing what medication is being
offered, what therapy proposed.
‘Stop being so concerned about your brother,’ advises Dr
Laqueur, a great advocate of coma-shock therapy (this back in
the early sixties). ‘You should get on with your own life.’ From
time to time – as the years go by, the dashed hopes, the violent
crises – readers of Imagining Robert may be inclined to agree
with Laqueur. Yet at the same time they would have to
acknowledge the author’s constantly implied objection: ‘but how
can my “own” life be separated from my brother’s? They are
inextricable.’
For another quality of Neugeboren’s that psychiatrists find
unsettling is his memory. Not only does he recall every wonder
drug and improbable therapy that has been tried on his brother,
but he also remembers how his brother was before his illness and
the dramatic family scenario in which the two of them came to
consciousness. This is the story he tells in Imagining Robert and
we cannot come away from it without reflecting that narrative
and contemporary psychiatry are implacable enemies. With all its
mess, waywardness and ambiguity, the well-documented narra-
tive reminds readers of everything they intuitively know beyond
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psychiatry’s austere vocation for separating things out into
demonstrable fact and repeatable results.
The book begins with a crisis. Invited to attend his nephew’s
high-school graduation ceremony, the fifty-year-old Robert
(schizophrenic since twenty) disappears, stays out all night,
returns distraught and belligerent, and two days later has to be
forcibly hospitalised. The author then goes back half a century to
give us the childhood of the Neugeboren brothers and proceeds
by switching back and forth from past to present throughout.
The method is dense with implication. Though the author never
insists on links between now and then, it is clear that he finds it
hard to uncouple his brother’s mental illness from the more
general madness experienced in the family as a child. Is this a
failing, or merely common sense?
Born in 1938, Jay is five years older than Robert. The parents
are Brooklyn Jewish. Relatives are legion, likewise arguments. In
thrall to a shared vision of the happy family, Mother and Father
are nevertheless in permanent conflict. Mother is strong, gener-
ous, impulsive, insatiable; Father, whining, intelligent, incompe-
tent. Infallibly, his businesses fail. Jay must remove debtors’
letters from the mailbox before Mother sees them. Does she
know he is in league with Father? ‘Robert is my love child,’ she
declares cruelly. ‘That one,’ she points to Jay, ‘who could ever
love that one?’
A hospital nurse, Mother works night shifts to pay the bills, but
also finds time to be involved in charities. She is greatly admired
in the community, bitter and irritable at home. ‘What can I do to
make Momma happy?’ Father asks. ‘You’re a bright boy, Jay . . .
Please tell me what to do.’ The man is desperate. He goes down
on his knees before the whole family, crawling across the floor to
lick his wife’s shoes. ‘That’s how much I love her.’ But why does
she insist on coming to the dinner table topless, fondling her
breasts with her free hand? Why does she parade around naked?
Jay watches enraged as Mother paints little Robert’s nails red, his
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mouth pink. Jay can’t play in the football team because that
would dishonour the Sabbath. Jay must not date a goy! It will kill
Mother if Jay dates a goy.
Crushed by his wife’s imperious hysteria, the father neverthe-
less refuses to get a steady job. Anything to please, but not that.
So there is always something for her to demand that won’t be
granted. The tension is extraordinary. The arguments escalate.
Confused but compos mentis, Jay gives up trying to win his
mother’s love and starts to detach himself. He’s an adolescent
now. More amenable, darling Robert is entrusted with the task of
keeping his parents together. Shall I divorce your father? Mother
asks. No, you mustn’t! Robert learns to play the clown, to do
music-hall acts. He performs in public. What has he spent his life
doing if not watching one splendid performance after another?
When he puts on a show everybody laughs, everybody claps their
hands. The Neugeborens are a happy family with a charismatic
child. It’s exhausting.
In short, here is a group of people who thrive on what has
come to be called in the mental health profession an excess of
‘expressed emotion’. Interested readers may find it instructive to
turn for a moment to Julian Leff and Christine Vaughn’s book
Expressed Emotion in Families where they can observe a research
team ticking off boxes on interview sheets to establish the
number of times the relatives of schizophrenics speak critically of
each other, or make direct eye contact, or use coercive impera-
tives. Although a psychologist of the systemic school, which
originally developed out of Gregory Bateson’s reflections on
interpersonal relationships and mental health, Leff is one of those
who accept that schizophrenia is basically an organic disease, but
nevertheless notes that the sufferer’s families of origin tend to be
characterised by high levels of confrontation and conflict,
something that may trigger a crisis. In this scenario, the
therapist’s role is thus to seek first to measure, then reduce that
level of negative engagement by teaching relatives to avoid
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excessive eye contact, verbal criticism, and the like. Of one young
woman who had a psychotic crisis only days after returning from
the hospital to live with her mother, he remarks that the decision
to spend the weekend on the family’s small cabin boat was fatal.
Think of the constancy of eye contact in the cramped cabin of a
boat!
The subtext of Leff and Vaughn’s book is optimistic: this side
of the schizophrenia problem is quantifiable and hence, we
immediately assume, manageable. It can be tackled in an
organised fashion if teams of researchers and social workers are
sent out to train families to deal with their loved ones. But
Imagining Robert reminds us that this is no ordinary form of
stress whose reduction we might reasonably plan for. Here every
expression of emotion is generated within the inexorable dynamic
of the parents’ relationship which is also the crucible in which two
young personalities are now being formed. Past decisions have
determined present dilemmas. Entrenched positions have been
assumed. Above all the emotions expressed frequently reveal
contradictory states of mind. ‘How make sense of what made no
sense?’ Neugeboren wonders, reflecting on the way declarations
of love came simultaneous with gestures of cruelty. What
behaviour can one learn in such an environment?
Shortly after Jay manages to leave home – against his mother’s
will – Robert begins to buckle. His schoolwork becomes erratic.
He leaves home, declares he is homosexual, lives with an
assortment of dropouts, does drugs. Then comes home again.
Then leaves again. Intriguingly it is the mother who first suggests
he go to mental hospital. What but mental illness could explain
her darling boy’s sexual inclinations? Perversely eager to see what
the inside of such an institution is like, Robert confides to his
brother that he faked a test to be admitted. Jay insists he takes
another. Now the doctors say Robert’s fine. No problem at all.
Shortly afterwards he has his first psychotic breakdown. ‘You and
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Mother put me here,’ he tells Jay from his hospital bed in a
locked ward.
‘While I am not surprised,’ Neugeboren remarks in a second
book on his brother’s fate, ‘that mental health professionals
disagree strongly with one another, I am startled, occasionally, by
the virulence with which they attack each other.’ Having
completed Imagining Robert with the compelling story of his
brother’s slow decline into chronicity, Transforming Madness
poses the question: regardless of the aetiology of schizophrenia,
what if a new drug were to return Robert, and others like him, to
a stable state of mind? How can such people resume ‘normal life’
when their identities are now so entwined around their illnesses,
when, in particular, they have never formed an adult personality?
Inevitably, as Neugeboren travels the United States looking at
a variety of different rehabilitation programmes, this question
brings the author up against the heated controversy: therapy
versus drugs, which matters most? And this in turn, like it or not,
cannot but reflect back on the problem of the aetiology of the
illness (organic, relationship-based, or both) and indeed on our
whole sense of what it is to have a self, to be a person.
One anecdote will suffice to suggest the complexity of the
issue. In 1997, fifty-four now, Robert is given the new wonder
drug Clorazil. Albeit marooned in the locked ward of the Bronx
Psychiatric Center, he has, mainly thanks to brother Jay, a new
doctor and a new social worker. There is dedication and
excitement. Fifty per cent of patients respond to Clorazil, a new
generation of more carefully aimed and milder dopamine block-
ers. Some months into the treatment, the doctors remark ‘that
Robert is making “slow and steady” gains – he is learning to
control his rages, he is interacting more easily with others, he is
not starting fights, he is being “realistic” and “appropriate” about
most things’. Neugeboren himself notes that his brother seems to
have overcome his ‘total self-absorption’ and is now sharing food,
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cigarettes and money with others on the ward and showing
interest in their health. Encouraged by this progress, Robert’s
social worker concentrates on preparing him for the move to the
open ward and relative freedom. Everything seems set for at least
partial recovery. But two weeks before that move is due, the
social worker is abruptly transferred. Despite continuing with the
drug, Robert rapidly deteriorates. He now refuses to consider
moving to the open ward and becomes manic and enraged,
particularly with his brother. When Jay phones, he shouts, ‘You
put me here, so you get me out of here, you goddamned son of a
bitch cocksucking bastard!’ and hangs up on him. Even when not
enraged, Robert’s talk degenerates into streams of childlike
associations. ‘When I visit him,’ Neugeboren writes, ‘and bring
him the food he has requested, he refuses to eat it. “You eat it,
Jay!” he yells, “I don’t want it. You eat it. Mother made it. Can’t
you tell? Mother made it!”’
Questions: If the drug works, why does it appear to stop
working on the departure of the social worker? Was it partly the
atmosphere of ‘the great attempt’ that brought about Robert’s
improvement? Might that explain the drug’s only 50% success
rate? Or is the brain learning to rewire itself around the
transmitters the drug blocks? Then, is the departure of the social
worker the real cause of the relapse, or is this rather an excuse for
Robert to avoid going to the open ward and a freedom he is
afraid of? Does Robert want to demonstrate to his brother Jay, of
whose authorial success he is openly jealous, that no amount
of fraternal string-pulling will save him, either from the vagaries of
the institutions, or his own self-destructive impulses? He is his
own man. ‘This is my home, Jay,’ Robert insists referring to the
closed ward with its harsh regulations and frightening inmates.
‘Why should I go anywhere else?’
To return to Neugeboren’s surprise at the vitriolic exchanges
between mental health professionals, the quarrel he is referring to
is, of course, that between those who support exclusively organic
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approaches to schizophrenia, and those who would like at least to
include reflections on family dynamics and other environmental
factors. Curiously, the development over the last twenty years of
the theory of neural plasticity would seem to have eliminated the
need for this head-on (to risk a pun) collision. This is the idea,
now supported by a large body of research, that while the brain is
indeed subject to genetic factors (how could it be otherwise?), it
also responds and changes according to environment and
experience, the latter often being crucial in the triggering and
even transformation of particular genes.
In a recent paper delivered in Venice, Glen Gabbard, Callaway
Distinguished Professor at the Menninger Clinic, speaks of
experiments indicating how psychotherapy can be shown to have
altered both the chemistry and gene expression of the brain.
Referring to work by Steve Hyman, Director of the National
Institute of Mental Health, Gabbard goes on to suggest that
gene-environment interactions give rise to a sort of ‘hall of
mirrors’ in which it is far from easy to establish a single source for
the multiplying reflections. He looks forward to the day when an
awareness of the brain’s plasticity – its tendency to change in
response to experience – might finally erode the ‘reductionism’
that has divided the mental health world into two hostile camps,
the psychosocial and the neuroscientific.
Yet the conflict continues as bitterly as ever. The disagreements
are so heated, one suspects – and it is the great merit of
Neugeboren’s books that they prompt the reader to ponder the
matter at length and with plenty of material to chew over –
because at the deepest level the non-organic approach threatens
to undermine the very basis on which the advocate of the
exclusively organic approach operates. Why so?
Neugeboren quotes Harvard Professor of Psychiatry Leston
Havens as remarking that despite their reputation for vanity,
many mental health professionals and medical students in
particular, fail to recognise their own importance. They ‘come
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and go among patients as if their knowledge and skills were all
that counted, not their persons at all’. The remark is pertinent,
for it points to the underlying vision that drives the profession.
The medical students are not looking for personal engagement
with the patient. They don’t really want their ‘person’ to make a
difference. That is not the ‘importance’ they are after. Rather they
want to learn (why not?) to heal the patient with a precise and
controlled intervention, the exact dosage of the exact drug
chosen after an exact diagnosis based on meticulous and exact
analyses of spinal fluids and brain scans. They are in thrall, that is,
to the great and creditable dream of Western medicine, a dream
most powerfully represented in the image of the perfect surgical
incision made in sterile conditions by the absolutely steady hand.
It’s an idea that never fails to stir our imaginations. Not for
nothing did we arrive at the aberration of lobotomy.
But to make the perfect incision one must be operating from
an absolutely stable vantage point. By suggesting that the self,
patient’s and doctor’s, is constantly both product and producer of
a group dynamic (family, workplace, society, nation) and never
(even with all its chemistry in place) an objective given, to imply,
that is, that in the long run a patient may respond as much to a
‘good morning’ as to a drug, that a doctor’s judgement may be
unsettled by a schizophrenic’s antagonistic behaviour, is to shift
the ground from under the feet of those who would heal the self
with a perfect intervention from a detached position without.
Again and again in Neugeboren’s account of his brother’s
vicissitudes one senses the importance of the element of taste.
Quite simply, Robert’s psychiatrists retreat (and understandably!)
from what would be the very bad taste of becoming involved in
the patient’s messy life. They don’t want to know about the ugly
incidents that took place some months or years or days before a
psychotic crisis. They don’t want to decipher the patient’s
incoherent obscenities or know how often he masturbates. A
lower-paid social worker can be assigned the unpleasant task of
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sympathising and encouraging the patient to ‘behave’. Mean-
while, in the gleaming laboratory of the collective imagination,
through years of tasteful dedication (and massive financial
investment), a cure is being prepared. The magnificent gesture of
the decisive intervention is at hand.
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Fascist Work
[Mario Sironi]
Translating A Manual of Mythology by the English pedagogue the
Reverend George W. Cox, Ste´phane Mallarme´ made one
extraordinary and surely deliberate mistake. Inverting the sense
of the original, he wrote: ‘If the gods do nothing unseemly, then
they are no longer gods at all.’ This disturbing formula that turns
Christian morality on its head, nevertheless seems quite familiar
when applied to painters, poets and musicians. The sins and
excesses of the artist confirm his genius rather than the opposite.
We do not abandon Byron because he abandoned his daughter,
not to mention the other women. Our admiration of Caravag-
gio’s stormy intensity is not marred by the reflection that his
temper was such that he once killed a man over a game of tennis.
Nor do we shy away from Picasso because he obliged a wife to
share his house with a mistress. These men are demigods.
All the same, there is one crime that is not forgiven. The Italian
artist Mario Sironi painted on behalf of the Fascist regime. That a
pope should commission a painting and call the tune does not
perturb us. Likewise when the patron is a rich merchant, from
Florence, or from Amsterdam. But that a man should have
dedicated his art to a totalitarian state, to the point of being
largely responsible for creating the iconography by which we
remember it, this is anathema. How should we think about
Sironi? What are we to make of his paintings?
Moravia’s novel The Conformist offers a character study of the
typical servant of Fascism. Marcello is frightened by violent
instincts which he fears set him apart from others. Taking
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precautions, he does everything to conform, marries a sensible
girl, settles down in the civil service; only to find one day that the
state is inviting him to murder someone, asking him to indulge
exactly the dangerous instincts he sought to repress. It’s a
stereotype Susan Sontag develops in her essay, ‘Fascinating
Fascism’. And, as Emily Braun shows in her intriguing account of
art under Mussolini, it is entirely inapplicable to its greatest
exponent, Mario Sironi. This man was no conformist. On the
contrary, he was independent and controversial even when most
engaged in promoting the regime. Nor, so far as we know and
despite the fiercest of tempers, was he ever involved in any act of
political violence. He did, however, indulge in the delirium that
his art might change the world. Are not painters, along with
Shelley’s poets the ‘unacknowledged legislators of the universe’?
Rightly, Braun sets out to show what kind of world it was and
how he imagined he might transform it. Context is all.
Born in 1885, Sironi was eleven when his father died. Enrico
Sironi had been a civil engineer. Mario’s maternal grandfather
was an architect. The idea that a man can shape the environment
was thus available to him from early on. Despite reduced means
and six children to bring up, Mario’s mother didn’t forget the
family’s cultural pretensions. The house in Rome was always open
to painters and writers, and one of those who came was Filippo
Tommaso Marinetti, philosopher of Futurism and author, years
later, of the notorious manifesto War, Sole Hygiene of the World.
Was it in this adolescent period that Sironi learned, partly from
a mother’s desire to fare bella figura, partly from the revolution-
ary opinions of her guests, that hatred of the borghesia that would
accompany him all his life? But many brought up quite differently
were to profess the same hatred throughout the first half of the
twentieth century, extremists of both the right and the left, and
even people who were not extremists at all. So much so that one
sometimes suspects that this contempt for the bourgeoisie so-
called had less to do with class and money than with a deep fear
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of spiritual complacency, of merely material well-being. The
world had to be made new, because it had been found to be
empty. ‘Take out your pickaxes,’ wrote Marinetti, ‘your axes and
hammers and wreck, wreck the venerable cities, pitilessly.’
Having begun a degree in engineering, the young Sironi fell
into a profound depression and gave up the university for
painting. A succession of nervous breakdowns stretching from his
late teens to his mid-twenties would lead him to destroy almost
all his early paintings and frighten his family into considering the
possibility of a sanatorium. In 1910 his friend and fellow painter
Umberto Boccioni would write: ‘Sironi is completely crazy, or at
least neurasthenic. He is always at home and closed off in himself.
He doesn’t move, speak, or study any more: it is truly painful.’
Needless to say the young, unhappy and, it must be said,
handsome artist was reading Nietzsche, playing Wagner on the
piano and modelling innumerable Greek heads in gesso. Signifi-
cantly, his mental illnesses came to an end when he became a
regular and successful illustrator for a cultural magazine. Sironi, it
seemed, was looking for a yoke that would harness his energies.
He needed a purpose that ‘bourgeois’ life couldn’t give.
Emily Braun’s Mario Sironi and Italian Modernism is the
remarkable story of how that yoke was found; or, to put it
another way, it is an account of the gradual meshing of a
particular political and artistic context with a peculiar and
potentially unstable psychology. Sironi himself was well aware
that something was up. In 1914, almost thirty now, he wrote to
Boccioni: ‘In Rome there has been a general strike for two days –
a violent and anarchic atmosphere – a revelation of beauty in
unison with my disfigured “ego”. Also, your article, the “Circle”,
I liked it, and the rough tone was like a caress.’
A few months after that strike, desperate to overcome another
depression, Sironi finally left the family home, moved to Milan
and began working alongside Boccioni and other Futurists who,
together with Mussolini, were campaigning to have the ever
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uncertain government intervene in the war. Not that they cared
particularly for one side or another. But they wanted action. They
felt Italy needed action, in order to become herself. By the
autumn of 1915 they had got what they wanted. They were in
the trenches together. They had volunteered. But, alas, it was a
world quite different from the glamorous vision of national
virility depicted in their magazine illustrations. Sironi was
frequently ill. Nobody was prepared for the harsh conditions of
the Alpine front where machine guns cancelled each other out
across a desolate landscape of stone and ice. The troops tunnelled
in the snow and were often buried there. Boccioni records how
on one freezing night, ‘around midnight Sironi came to me, and
together, with our legs entwined, we tried to sleep’.
With this anecdote in mind it is with some emotion that one
stands in Il Museo del Novecento in Milan letting the eye move
from a Boccioni canvas to a Sironi. There are many Boccionis,
few Sironis, in inverse proportion to their output of course. For in
1916 Boccioni was dead, a death that exempted him from future
sins and criticism, while Sironi was destined to survive not only
this war but the next and was ever as prolific as he would remain
unrepentant.
Boccioni’s canvases are full of colour and bear bold, ingenu-
ously didactic titles: Perpendicular spiral construction: woman
sitting, reads one; Dynamism of a human body, claims another.
Both paintings are seductive shakes of the artist’s kaleidoscope, a
splendid whirl of bright wedges in which the moving figure is
almost lost in the exhilaration of its own or the painter’s
excitement.
In stark contrast, Sironi’s one Futurist canvas on show, Self-
portrait (1913), is irretrievably gloomy, a fierce stare hidden
beneath the most extravagant application of chiaroscuro. Rather
than the dynamic movement Futurism was supposed to hail, here
the familiar technique of breaking up the image into intersecting
planes is used to generate the utmost stasis and a fierce
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psychological tension. As always with Sironi, the catalogue
photograph does all it can to make the picture look brighter than
it is. But in the gallery the sense of an enormous and doomed
effort of will is entirely compelling. Whence, in 1918, would that
will be turned?
Emily Braun is efficient and informative as she describes Sironi’s
early commitment to socialism, his disenchantment with the left
and adherence to the more exhilarating if directionless icono-
clasm of Futurism. She gives a good picture of the general
frustration with Italian parliamentary politics in the early years of
the century, the growing desire for a gesture of nation-building
and the way this desire was exacerbated rather than quelled by the
calamities of the First World War. Her descriptions of the
paintings, too, are never less than excellent, particularly the way
Sironi just would not leave that chiaroscuro be, modelling
figures, faces, trucks, buildings and chimneys out of a thick paste
of black and white (but mainly black), and then, later in life,
creating mosaics that seemed to be painted in chiaroscuro and
even sculpting figures so encased in a sort of shell, or even coffin
perhaps, as to create a marked chiaroscuro effect, the figure ever
looming from a pool of black. The dark dynamism of the artist’s
psyche is clear enough. Yet nothing she says quite prepares us for
the turn events were to take after Sironi came back from the
trenches: his total commitment to Mussolini’s camp. Here,
perhaps, it may be worth reflecting for a moment on a trait that
still divides the Italian mind from the Anglo-Saxon.
In 1915, claims a note in the Galleria d’Arte Moderna, the
collector Riccardo Jucker made Sironi an offer for a small
painting entitled La piccola danzatrice. He was astonished when
Sironi agreed to sell but insisted on lowering the price. The artist
did not think his painting was worth so much (notably it is one of
the few Sironis that is not gloomy). And throughout his life
Sironi showed scant respect for his own work, signing very little
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of it, often walking over discarded temperas on the floor, not
bothering to catalogue it. Needless to say, his opinion of his peers
was even lower. Life in Rome, he remarked, immediately after
leaving the city, was ‘a hell full of misery and conflict . . . where I
placed everyone and everything in a heap of insult and loathing’.
Going back almost a hundred years, Giacomo Leopardi in his
Discorso sopra lo stato presente dei costumi degl’italiani paints a
picture of his country that, in concentrating on the problem of
self-regard, in many ways looks forward to Fascism, and indeed is
not without its appropriateness in Italy today. Leopardi starts
from the premise that ‘the massacre of illusions’ that has swept
away religion and philosophy in Europe has left no other basis for
morality than the ‘good taste’ of ‘society’, by which, he makes
clear, he means high society. This society existed, he felt in France
and in England, where a man is ‘ashamed to do harm in the same
way that he would be ashamed to appear in a conversation with a
stain on his clothes’. But Italy, after centuries of poverty and
division, found itself without such a society, without this taste,
without self-respect. Thus if ‘the principal basis of the morality of
an individual and a people is the constant and profound regard it
has for itself’, Italy, where conversation was no more than a
‘school for insults’, is an entirely immoral place where people do
what they do out of the merest habit, laziness or selfishness, and
in the most complete indifference, or even scorn, for the public
gestures they make.
Leaving aside the virulence of Leopardi’s attack, which is not
without a certain personal bitterness, what is striking about his
reflections is the value they give to illusion, above all collective
illusion, at the expense of truth, and the way this value is
connected with self-respect. Anticipating by many years Nietz-
sche’s argument that morality was fundamentally a question of
aesthetics, he praises the English in particular for the ludicrously
high opinion they have of themselves. This illusion – for there is
no real reason why the English should have such a high opinion
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of themselves – allows them to treat each other with great
respect.
The Italians, on the other hand, living in the truth of total
disillusionment, do nothing but sling mud at each other, each
antagonist holding even himself in the lowest possible regard.
Leopardi remarks: ‘thus not only does life in Italy have no
substance or truth at all, something it doesn’t have elsewhere
either, but it doesn’t even have the appearance of the same, so
that we might be able to think of it as important.’
In one sense backward (they are without a homogeneous polite
society), in another very important way the Italians are hence
obliged to be the avant-garde: they must create a collective
illusion deliberately and consciously, something that has never
been done before. This is the direction in which, whether
intentionally or not, the whole of Leopardi’s Discorso tends. A
huge effort of will is required, a great act of collective self-
deception. Bereft of religion (‘Nor should anyone object that the
Italians too have their religious practices, since in Italy, as I have
said, these are usages and habits not moral customs and
everybody laughs at them, nor do we any longer find real fanatics
of any kind in Italy’), lacking the kind of benevolent social inertia
that makes life possible in England or France, Italian society must
enchant itself with its own imagined worth. Such a vision can
only put enormous pressure on art and on the artistic elite from
whom any such act must originate.
Back from the war, Sironi was by now all too aware of the need
for self and mutual regard. Nor was he alien to enormous efforts
of will. How else had he overcome his depressions? How else
survived the trenches? Living in subsidised housing in the
depressing suburbs of a rapidly industrialising Milan, he painted
gloomy cityscapes where great masses of barren commercial
architecture, windows remorselessly black, open up into deep
canyon-like streets, at the bottom of which, in determined patrol,
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moves a tiny tram, or a small black truck. Alternatively, there are
imposing nude figures in classical landscapes. The celebrated
Melancholy (1919–20) shows a seated nude in an impossibly
dramatic scenario. Like the trams or trucks of the urban pictures,
she is at the bottom of a vast canyon with, in this case, a viaduct
spanning distant peaks beneath a stormy sky. Knees covered with
a drape so modelled in chiaroscuro as to seem carved in stone, she
stares in grim determination at a marble sphere on a pedestal.
It is with some amusement, in the gallery, that one moves from
Sironi’s rendering of this theme to Achille Funi’s Melancholy
(1930), only a couple of canvases away. Here, despite the
generous fleshiness of the seated nude, we have only a pretty
wistfulness, a sweet girl who for all her colourful bulk might float
away at any moment. Certainly there appears to be something
like a halo above her head. Turning back to the Sironi, the
essential ingredients of his vision become clear: on the one hand
the immense and desolate heaviness of existence, represented
either in the flesh or the landscape, whether natural or urban; and
then the equally immense effort of will, visible in furious face or
dark truck, needed to focus it, to impose on it, to overcome it.
Later, Sironi would be ridiculed for the huge feet that began to
appear in his paintings. So much so that he would be known as ‘Il
piedone’ – big foot. Braun quotes as sarcastic the advice given to
Sironi by the Minister of Education Giuseppe Bottai: ‘Tell your
critics you make the feet of your figures so big so that they can
kick them in the ass.’ Sarcastic he might have been, but close to
the truth one suspects. Ever ready to kick out, those huge feet
bring together the heaviness of the painter’s vision, and the effort
required to overcome that weight.
In 1919 Sironi married Matilde Fabbrini. ‘Their mutually
abrasive relationship,’ writes Braun laconically, ‘would continue
until his death.’ Marriage too, then, was to be a conflict requiring
a constant exercise of will. At the beginning Matilde didn’t even
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want to leave Rome to be with her husband in Milan. But Sironi
won this first round and soon she had borne him a daughter,
Aglae, whom Mussolini managed to sit on his lap and promptly
drop. For the little girl’s father was moving in very particular
circles now. He was a close friend of Margherita Sarfatti, art critic
of Mussolini’s newspaper Il popolo d’Italia and companion of his
bed. How fitting that the first man to come to power through a
modern use of propaganda should have an art critic for his
mistress! Sironi, as sole and daily illustrator for Il popolo d’Italia
from August 1921 through to 1923, was to be an essential
instrument of that propaganda in the moment of crisis that
brought Mussolini to power.
They were heady years. The First World War had brought the
country to the brink of collapse. In a wave of industrial unrest the
socialists were trying to push it over that brink. The workers
occupied the factories. The Fascists claimed to represent the
working class, but opposed the socialists, the factory occupations
and the government. Theirs would be a ‘third way’ between
capitalism and communism. The Futurists sided with the Fascists,
then broke with them. It was all very confusing. Of his
illustrations in that period, Sironi wrote to his wife just before she
came to Milan:
The dance has begun again and so has the nausea [. . .] Every
time it becomes more difficult – and I have the same sensation
this time – darkness and complete emptiness and I know well
where it comes from! To do philosophy in caricature! And not
knowing where to begin. For control or none, for the end of
the world or for Turati [the leader of the socialist party]? Total
mystery and indecision. In addition, to think about all of these
present and future problems makes me anxious, bewildered
and sick to my stomach!
Clearly the situation demanded someone who knew his mind.
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The flamboyant poet D’Annunzio had shown the way, taking, on
his own initiative, a small private army to occupy Fiume on the
northern Adriatic coast, a territory the allies had denied to Italy
after the war. Though the mission ultimately failed, it captured
the imagination. Sironi, in a rare concession to the occasional,
dedicated a painting to the event. One of his typical industrial
scenes is just readable as the docks at Trieste, thanks to the masts
of a ship rising above a wall. In what is a shallower canyon than
most of his streets, a powerful figure sits on a vigorous white
horse in, as always, dramatic chiaroscuro. For the first time one
has the impression of the effort of will being superior to the
weight it opposes. This is heroism. For the first time Sironi’s
private preoccupations are clearly identifiable with a contempo-
rary political figure.
Very soon, after the March on Rome, it would be Mussolini
who embodied that heroic gesture. In the huge mosaic of 1936,
Fascist Work, for example, the big foot definitely belongs to the
Duce. As for the ubiquitous black truck of the earlier paintings,
all too soon it would be unmistakably the vehicle of the Fascist
squadristi, the thugs. And however complicated Sironi might
have found politics throughout two decades of Fascism, he would
never have any difficulty in offering a positive image of the
exercise of will, the imposition of a decision, whatever it might
be. In the thousands of pugnacious political illustrations he
produced, the gesture is triumphant, almost an infantile fantasy of
domination and control. In the paintings, it is for the most part
thwarted, at best gloomily steadfast. ‘Will to power, will to life,
will to grandeur,’ he wrote in 1933, ‘these passwords, these
majestic words of Fascism, also express the style of our art.’ The
private and political worlds had meshed.
But what was that style? Only a year after Sironi wrote those
words, the musician Ildebrando Pizzetti commented:
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Every time I come across a book, a brochure and article about
Fascism and Fascist art, I read it from top to bottom, carefully,
applying my intelligence to the utmost, and every time with
renewed desire, the renewed hope, that I will come away from
it having finally understood what is meant by Fascist art. No
doubt it’s my own fault if I haven’t quite grasped what I read,
but that desire, that hope, remains unfulfilled.
The question as to the existence or not of a Fascist style
occupies the central pages of Emily Braun’s book and is
intimately tied up with the question: How far was Sironi’s work
the result of political expedience, acceptance of a group line, and
how far was he his own man creating his own work? Did he really
believe, as he claimed, that artistic genius was ‘the foremost
quality of our race’ and Mussolini ‘the Man who will know how
justly to esteem the force of our world-dominating art’? Or were
these statements part of an exercise of group self-deception of the
kind foreshadowed in Leopardi’s Discorso, though Leopardi, no
doubt, would have found them even more grotesque than we do?
Some facts must be briefly stated, if only to grasp how
complicated the issue becomes. Sironi supported Mussolini from
beginning to end, from the March on Rome to the sad puppet
show of Salo`. He was personally responsible for the artwork at the
huge Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista which turned the tenth
anniversary of Fascist power into a quasi religious festival and
deliberately distorted the facts about how Mussolini had come to
power (Braun gives impressive and frightening photographs).
Sironi was likewise responsible for official Italian pavilions at
international exhibitions in Paris and Milan. By 1933, he had
actually renounced easel painting as ‘too monotonous and trite
for the complex orchestrations of modern life, too weak to
capture the attention of men in this age of great myths and
gigantic upheavals’. In short, by turning to the large-scale mural
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and mosaic, he identified even his ‘serious’ work, as opposed to
the merely journalistic illustrations, with the Fascist cause.
On the other hand, it must also be said that his work for Il
popolo d’Italia became sporadic after the alliance with Germany.
He never publicly supported (but never spoke out against) the
anti-Semitic campaign. Incredibly and inexplicably, he did not
become an official member of the Fascist Party until 1936. He
did not grow rich through his support of the regime, was always
underpaid, took no bribes. He was never admitted to the Reale
Accademia d’Italia, an honour Mussolini extended to both
Marinetti and Pirandello. Throughout the thirties he was con-
stantly under fire from the right-wing Fascists, notably the arch-
xenophobe Farinacci, who accused Sironi of polluting Italian art
with foreign and Jewish influences.
Above all, though, it has to be said that there is a remarkable
continuity to Sironi’s painting that seems to go beyond immedi-
ate political circumstance, or indeed artistic fashions. For
although a cursory glance through the illustrations in Braun’s
book will make it clear how much Sironi owed to the major artists
and movements of his time, from Futurism, through metaphysi-
cal painting and the various phases of Picasso’s work, nevertheless
to look at the paintings more carefully is to appreciate how
completely his personal vision transforms each of these
approaches into something immediately recognisable as his own.
So much so that in its description of the canvas Drinker with
Cup, the catalogue of the Museo del Novecento is unable to
decide whether it was painted in the early 1930s or the 1950s
(when Sironi returned to easel painting), so consistent is it with
the artist’s manner throughout his long career. Which brings us
back to the question of Fascist style: when there is no gesture to
the iconography of Fascism it appears there is no distinctive
Fascist style to help date the work.
The secret to these apparent contradictions no doubt lay in the
ambiguous nature of Fascism itself, an ambiguity that suited
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Sironi. At first revolutionary, then reactionary, formed by
socialists who became conservatives, Fascism prided itself on
being an ‘anti-ideology’ whose only raison d’eˆtre was the
grandeur of Italy. It spoke of breaking decisively with the past,
but also of a return to the greatness of Rome. Essentially, it was
gesture without content, tension without consummation.
This vagueness was never more evident than in the establish-
ment of the so-called Novecento movement into which Margher-
ita Sarfatti gathered a number of the country’s foremost painters,
including Sironi, immediately after the First World War. The
declared inspiration of the movement was the desire to shift from
criticism to construction. Futurism had been merely iconoclastic.
Now the artist would play a privileged part in building a new
social order, shaping a new and united national consciousness.
But it was never clear what that order or consciousness would be
and there was little homogeneity between the painters involved.
‘True Italian tradition is that of never having any tradition,’ was
the kind of equivocal explanation often given, ‘since the Italian
race is a race of innovators and constructors.’
There is a curious mixture of authoritarianism and anarchy
here, elitism and laissez-faire. Thus Sironi would have agreed
with Gentile, Mussolini’s minister for education, when he
declared that the artist needed to be involved in the moral,
political and economic life of the nation, creating myths and
building consensus, putting in motion ‘the forces of sentiment
and will’. But it was equally important that the content of what
one painted never be imposed. And indeed Sironi met the stiffest
criticism of his career over his organisation of the mural paintings
at the 1933 Milan Triennale exhibition, with the critic Papini
claiming that the sheer variety he had admitted created a ‘sense of
anarchy’ giving the impression that nineteenth-century individu-
alism was alive and well at the expense of Fascist discipline. But
hadn’t Mussolini himself declared that he had no intention of
creating an ‘art of the state’ since art was ‘the domain of the
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individual’. ‘It would have indicated a scarce awareness of the
aesthetic phenomenon,’ Sironi answered his critics, ‘to have
demanded the representation of a given obligatory subject.’
Thus Sironi could invite De Chirico to paint a fresco in which,
as was De Chirico’s way, the juxtaposition of classical and
modern iconography generates an amused irony about the
possibility of absolute meaning, while only a room away Sironi
himself produced a fresco which, taking its title from Hesiod’s
Works and Days, sought in a huge amalgam of classical and
industrial figures to weld together past and present in a positive
and emphatic dynamic. Alas, the impression of monumental
permanence that Sironi always sought was belied by the very poor
preparation of the murals’ surfaces. Before the exhibition was
over the images were already flaking off.
But technical problems aside, was it really possible to separate
style and content in this way, something no other totalitarian
regime has ever tried, to allow freedom of content and insist only
on a certain ‘style’ that, after all, no one could define, to the point
that Mussolini ultimately stated that all he wanted of artists was
that they produce works that were ‘strong and beautiful’?
Braun, along with others, suggests that this non-insistence on
content was Mussolini’s astuteness. He gave artists enough
freedom, not to mention subsidies and sweeteners, to prevent
them from attacking him. And certainly there is an element of
truth in this. After all, it was precisely the lack of any content
behind Fascism’s gesturing that allowed even such an astute
commentator as Benedetto Croce to say, as late as 1928 and after
the assassination of Matteoti, that he saw in Fascism only ‘an
episode of the post-war period, with some juvenile and patriotic
traits, which would be dissipated without doing any harm, but on
the contrary leaving behind some positive effects’. All the same, it
is also true, I suspect, that the fact that no strict content was ever
imposed on artists, tells us something about the ultimate
weakness of Italian Fascism as compared with its tougher Nazi
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counterpart. The point can best be understood when we come to
the perplexing question of the Fascist ‘exploitation’ of myth.
A myth, of course, is a story. It distinguishes itself from other
stories by forming part of a larger group of intertwining narratives
that, taken together, form the spell, as it were, under which a
community lives. Nobody in particular invented these stories,
rather all are in their thrall, until, with Leopardi’s ‘massacre of
illusions’ they are cast off. Significantly, when the unhappy idea
occurred that mythology might be at our beck and call and that it
might be conjured up again to ‘manipulate the masses’, what is
notably lacking is the narrative element. Sironi, but not only
Sironi, created endless images suggesting the primacy of Italy and
drawing on mythic figures and symbols. But all is static. The
figures are rigidly separate. We can never say, this is the story
where St Peter did this, or this is the story where Apollo did that.
Thus Fascist Work, the impressive mosaic for the 1936
Triennale gives us a huge central figure of Italy – seated,
powerful, determined – and then two tiers of symbolic figures:
above are images from an antique past, an Etruscan priestess, a
Roman horseman; below are representatives of modern Italy, a
mother and child, a helmeted soldier. The only figure to break
the division between the layers is a stalwart Mussolini busy with a
spade. While the sense of awe, and solemnity, the ‘aesthetic aura’
Sironi said he sought to communicate, is certainly present and
powerful, there is no narrative here, nor any sense of where all
this might be going. It is rather as if we had a group of figures
waiting for a story to happen to them. Or alternatively, for
someone like De Chirico to alter one symbol, introduce just one
incongruity, and reveal the whole thing as ironic. My Italian
father-in-law assured me that nothing was more common, on the
parade ground, than for a word or two of a Fascist song to be
replaced by some rhyming absurdity, so that everyone could burst
out laughing. The eventual narrative, on the other hand, when
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someone finally put these static figures in motion, would be no
laughing matter.
Less than two years after Sironi completed Fascist Work, the
Racial Laws were introduced, armies began to march, Mussolini
was under Hitler’s thumb. In one of the strangest gestures of his
life, when his close friends Carlo and Eloise Foa decided to flee to
the States, Fascism’s official artist gave the departing Jewish
couple his private papers for safekeeping. Despite ‘Italian suprem-
acy’ Sironi was not convinced of victory in the forthcoming
conflagration. Of reality and illusion, he wrote: ‘All of the Italians
represent a centuries-old vortex of wilfulness, so much so that
one can well say that they have generated an antinatural nature, a
creative reality outside of and contrary to common reality.’ But
now it seemed the dream of Italian Fascism and the reality of
European history were on a calamitous collision course.
The papers Sironi gave to his friends told mainly of his unhappy
marriage. Separated from his wife in 1930, only two years after
the birth of a second daughter, he had begun an affair with the
much younger Mimi Costa. Sironi was a misanthrope, Mimi a
flirt. During preparations for the 1933 Triennale he locked her in
his car for several hours rather than have her meet his colleagues.
Painting murals for the masses now, he worked alone at night
because he didn’t want the masses to see him. How hard to be
the lonely genius underwriting a populist regime! Meanwhile the
passion with Mimi couldn’t last. And the argument with his wife
could never end. ‘I’ve told you over and over again,’ he writes to
her in 1936, ‘that I just don’t earn very much.’ Proclaiming the
innate genius of the Italian spirit, he despaired of incompetence
all around him. ‘Why aren’t all Italians like me?’ he demands in a
letter to his daughters.
Throughout the war he continued to be a vegetarian, wrote of
his love of animals, most particularly his dog, and condemned
hunting, an activity he must have seen endlessly revered in the
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ancient artworks he ransacked for images of a noble Italy. So it is
not surprising that he was carrying his exhausted dog when he
was finally hunted down himself; he had walked thirty miles to
Como from a heavily bombed Milan. Lined up for execution with
other loyal Fascists, he was recognised by a young art student
among the partisan executioners. Having preached since early
socialist days that the artist was no different from any other
worker, his special semi-divine status was recognised at just the
right moment. They couldn’t kill a painter. Freed, he sketched his
fellow Fascists’ execution.
Or perhaps it was just the wrong moment. For it is with some
awe that one tries to imagine what Sironi’s inner life must have
been in those post-war years. He was sixty now and everything
had changed. In 1948 his second daughter committed suicide.
Partly as a result, the first daughter broke off all communication.
His reputation was gone, his very name a scandal. But doggedly
he painted on, appropriating abstract expressionism now, the
same way he had previously appropriated every other style. As
steadfast and isolated as the figures he had always painted, there
were no confessions and no explanations. When he died in 1961,
he used his will for one last act of will. His wife Matilde was
barred from attending his funeral.
To see the mosaic Fascist Work, one has to make a telephone call.
Transferred to the wall of an upper room in the Palazzo dei
Giornalisti, Piazza Cavour, Milan, it looks down on a conference
hall run by the Hilton Hotel organisation, representatives, surely,
of that international bourgeois capitalism Sironi so hated. How
solemn and gloomily powerful his figures are! And how strange
to think of this thing being created for the masses to unite the
Italian people and being seen now mainly by privileged foreign
businessmen glancing up from their lists of statistics.
When I ask a disgruntled Hilton executive if people often ask
to see the mosaic, he tells me ‘fortunately not’. Clearly he hardly
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notices it himself. But out on the street a Benetton advert
showing a man on death row continues the Italian tradition of a
radical split between rhetorical gesture – this sham international
piety – and banal reality – a manufacturer’s need to sell its
products. And in the Stazione Centrale too, one of Fascism’s
finest pieces of architecture, the old imperial insignia high up on
the lofty arches are barely noticed beside the bold and colourful
images society now raises one after another in extravagant and
solipsistic praise of itself. A boy’s huge grim frown on the left is
altered, by a particular brand of sunglasses, to a huge bright smile
on the right. As Emily Braun remarks in laconic conclusion to
this excellent book, when it comes to creating social cohesion and
shared vision, Sironi and company simply hadn’t grasped ‘the
power of consumerism, whose persuasive myths would prove far
more effective than Socialism or Fascist ultra-populist nationalism’.
Ferreting through my bag on the train I find the glossy Hilton
brochure someone put in my hand as I left what is now called ‘Lo
spazio Sironi’. ‘For an unforgettable stay,’ it invites me, ‘in an
oasis of refined efficiency’. Above an illuminated computer
screen, a beautifully stern face from Sironi’s Fascist Work
dominates the cover. The title of the mosaic is not mentioned.
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Sightgeist
[Jose´ Saramago]
How many proverbs and cliche´s would have to change if
everybody went blind? Could you say, ‘I know the place like the
back of my hand,’ if the back of your hand were something you
never saw? Could one usefully speak of ‘the blind leading the
blind’, if other options were no longer available? Such considera-
tions, you might think, would hardly be of the highest priority in
a world suddenly and terribly afflicted by a loss of sight, yet of all
the obstacles that Saramago has his characters blunder against in
the dark world of his novel Blindness, language is perhaps the
most frequent and the most perplexing. ‘Just imagine,’ remarks
one girl stumbling in the entrance to her old apartment block,
‘stairs I used to go up and down with my eyes closed . . .’ In
radically changed conditions, the inertia of common usage
constantly generates absurdities. Not only is the shin scraped in
contact with cement, but the mind humiliated as its mindless
habits are exposed.
That standard visions of reality are enshrined in standard
language is itself a commonplace. Saramago, along with a
multitude of writers past and present, is eager to increase our
sensitivity to the contingency of the one upon the other, and the
contingency of identity on both. A major change occurs in the
world: people go blind, or the Iberian peninsula detaches itself
from the European mainland, or some key historical fact is
reversed, or the central tenets of our religion inverted. In
dramatising the aftermath of such upheavals, Saramago merci-
lessly satirises those whose investment in the old status quo makes
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it impossible for them to adapt or even understand how obsolete
their vision of the world has become. In this respect, his political
sympathies as a Portuguese communist come predictably to the
fore. The reaction of the government to the epidemic of
blindness in the novel, suggests nothing more than the brutal
clumsiness of thirties Fascism. On only the second day of the
epidemic, sufferers are locked in a disused hospital without so
much as a shovel to bury their dead. No radio, no medication.
Anyone venturing more than a few yards from the door is
summarily shot. One frequently feels one is reading a book about
the death camps. In The Stone Raft, American and European
capitalism become the butt for ridicule as the Pyrenees split from
east to west and Spain and Portugal drift away into the Atlantic.
The rich abandon hotel for helicopter, the US president wonders
if he will be able to include the ex-peninsula in an American
sphere of influence, the European Community is glad to be shot
of two of its poorer members, etc. In The Siege of Lisbon, when a
humble proof-reader radically alters Portuguese history by negat-
ing a verb in the book he is checking, the bewildered indignance
of the publishers again suggests the inflexibility of a status quo
that would gladly dispense with the unpredictability inherent in
life itself, indeed that finds any manifestation of the will outside
the conventional (here enshrined in the rules of proofing)
distasteful.
Fortunately, satire is only one of Saramago’s many suits and
hardly his strongest. He lacks the accuracy in establishing his
target that makes the ruthlessness of a Cervantes, Swift, or in
modern times and different ways Beckett, not only acceptable,
but admirable, even necessary. Faced with a recognition problem
– is this target really so guilty? – the reader begins to suspect an
excess of rancour in relation to the misdemeanour (so much so
that the placing of that rancour becomes one of the most
intriguing challenges in reading Saramago’s work). Meanwhile,
though, as the powers that be behave badly and in such a way as
230
Sightgeist
to keep the reader ever aware of the circumstantial nature of old
certainties, others – notably the humble and the womenfolk – are
adapting to change and all kinds of positive developments are
occurring.
Saramago is not a simple author, but such simplifications will
perhaps allow us to get a grasp of what is a repeated structure in
his novels. Thus the upheavals caused by the Iberian peninsula’s
sudden vagrancy lead the protagonists of The Stone Raft to
discover love of the most traditional and romantic variety, and the
same is true for the hero of The Siege of Lisbon: his apparently
perverse impulse in altering received history attracts the attention
of an intelligent woman who, in encouraging him to reflect on
what he has done and to write an imaginative history of the siege,
allows him to discover a vein of creativity he never imagined.
Again, the two fall in love and are splendidly happy in bed and
out. More movingly and far more convincingly, the atrocious
experiences of the central characters in Blindness lead them to a
profound and generous awareness of their now radical interde-
pendence which is very beautifully portrayed in the closing pages
of the book.
To understand the link between these negative and positive
sides of Saramago’s work, the satire and the generous sentiment,
may be the swiftest way to get a fix on a writer who will
frequently seem professionally elusive, cheerfully, often wittily
stating everything and its opposite in a very short space,
sometimes retelling an anecdote that he used in another book,
but in such a way as entirely to invert the values it appeared to
propose. Such an understanding may even help us to explain the
relationship between his portrayal on the one hand of a realistic
and immediately recognisable world and then his introduction of
those provocatively unrealistic events that criticism has come to
refer to as ‘magical’.
Saramago is on record as saying that, ‘I cannot save anything
but what I can do is write about what I think and feel and the
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anguish of seeing a world that could already have resolved a large
portion of its humanitarian problems, but which not only has not
solved any, but which in fact aggravates many of them.’
Surprising here is the opening gesture. Did anybody expect or
imagine that Saramago could ‘save anything’? ‘Nobody saves
anybody,’ Cioran reminds us in one of his caustic corrections of,
as he puts it, ‘the obligatory optimism’ of modern political
thought. Clearly Saramago, like many genuine political idealists
of whatever persuasion suffers considerable disappointment at
having observed over the years how the development of increas-
ingly sophisticated technical skills has not made it possible to
resolve all ‘humanitarian’ problems. (One presumes here that he
is referring above all to diet, disease and conflict, since the word
‘already’ suggests a reference to progress in time, whereas it is
difficult to imagine that our deeper existential problems will ever
be susceptible to resolution.)
Our author gives us the impression, then, of a man reluctantly
emerging from the peculiarly Western delirium that a perfection
of technique at the service of good will might lead to the triumph
of happiness. And like anybody disappointed, he tends to
exaggerate. It is surely not true, for example, that we have ‘not
solved any’ of our humanitarian problems. All kinds of things
have been achieved. On the other hand, who could disagree that
the race has a perverse habit of generating problems where none
need exist and how confident can we feel of our powers of dealing
with them if even our sense of self and identity, as Saramago
insists, and with it our whole moral make-up can easily be shown
to be contingent on merest circumstance? ‘Do you love your
husband?’ one character asks another in Blindness, ‘Yes, as I love
myself, but should I turn blind, if after turning blind I should no
longer be the person I was, how would I then be able to go on
loving him . . .’ Though he never says as much, it is hard not to
feel, as the bleak scenes of this book get bleaker and bleaker, that
Saramago is approaching, albeit kicking and screaming, the
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position Thomas Bernhard’s hero reaches in Concrete when,
suddenly weary of oppressive feelings of socialist guilt, he
brusquely declares, ‘Poverty can’t be eradicated, and anyone who
thinks of eradicating it is set on nothing short of the eradication
of the human race itself and hence of nature itself.’
Whose fault is this? In The Siege of Lisbon, with his realist and
political satirist’s cap on, Saramago remarks, ‘it is always the
same, we blame the gods for this and that, when it is we who
invent and fabricate everything, including absolution for these
and other crimes.’ But elsewhere he offers us the despairing
formulation: ‘God does not forgive the sins he makes us commit.’
While the statements are contradictory, the world they refer us to
is at once recognisable and grim: a place where men and women
are locked into ever repeating cycles of crime and guilt. Often
one feels that the departures into the ‘magical’, which usually
occur around those falling in love, indicate a yearning at once to
remove the debate from the merely political arena, where hope
has proved a cheat and satire become routine, but without as a
result finding oneself trapped in a gloomily deterministic, perhaps
theistic vision where there is nothing to be hoped at all. (In this
respect it may be worth noting that most ‘magical realists’ come
from an area of communist or socialist persuasion, their political
positions as predictable as their fictions are fantastic.) ‘The
possibility of the impossible, dreams and illusions, are the subject
of my novels,’ says Saramago. The attentive reader will notice the
sleight of hand by which the contradictory, indeed meaningless,
first entry in that list, optimistically shifts the status of the second
two. Perhaps the word ‘love’ would have done for all three, since
again and again it is love and only love that redeems human
experience as presented in Saramago’s world.
Let us take the example of the two novels that are at once the
strongest and, since they make no reference to the Iberian
experience, the most accessible to the reader with little specialist
knowledge: The Gospel According to Jesus Christ and Blindness. As
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a retelling of the Bible story, the curiosity of The Gospel is that,
while setting out with intentions clearly hostile to established
religion, Saramago does not merely debunk the supernatural by
giving us a realist or psychological account of Christ’s life. Rather
he invents all kinds of supernatural occurrences that are not
present in the Bible story as we have it. In rapid synthesis: at
Jesus’s decidedly non-virgin conception God mixed his seed with
Joseph’s. There is thus some ambiguity as to who actually
fathered the boy. Jesus’s youth is drastically conditioned by the
fact that his father, who had got wind of Herod’s planned
slaughter of the innocents, saved his own baby, Jesus, but did not
warn the other parents. His guilt over this terrible failing will lead
him, Joseph, to pointless self-sacrifice and ultimately meaningless
crucifixion at the hands of the Romans. When Jesus discovers all
this he is deeply shocked and feels profoundly guilty for being
alive at all.
Saramago is extremely able, here and elsewhere, in the way he
takes, twists and weaves biblical events into a narrative that now
fits together in an entirely different way. But if this opening
prepares the reader for a psychological explanation of Jesus’s
fascination with guilt and sacrifice, it is immediately contradicted
by the introduction of the figures of God and the Devil, who are
revealed as in cynical collusion in a plot to use Jesus to extend
their mutually enhancing influences outside the limited area of
Judea and ultimately over the whole world. The powers given to
Jesus must serve to convince the world that he is the Son of God,
in order that his sacrificial death can then create the illusion of a
loving and caring divinity who gave himself for others. Any
benefits accruing to those healed or helped are entirely incidental.
In the event, most of the miracles backfire. In helping one group
of fishermen rather than another, Jesus upsets the market for fish;
in exorcising the man with many demons by sending them into
the Gadarene swine who promptly jump over the cliff, he
deprives a number of swineherds of their legitimate livelihood.
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And so on. In this grotesque comedy of evil and errors, whether
on the political plane or the metaphysical, the only real miracle to
emerge in the story is the love between Jesus and Mary
Magdalene, or again the love of Jesus’s mother for her children,
the love of the disciples for their leader.
The technique the book deploys is that of making us constantly
uncertain what reality Saramago wishes to attribute to any
character or event. While the debate revolves resourcefully but
interminably around the old chestnut that if God exists he must
be fallible or evil, the narrator never allows us to settle on a
particular point of view, or reading of his text, or even vision of
the characters. This can be stimulating and meshes perfectly with
a voice that demands that the reader be constantly exercising
discrimination at every level. The lack of paragraphing and
absence of any punctuation aside from the comma and fullstop
(typical of all Saramago’s fiction) oblige you to work hard to keep
track of who is speaking to whom, while at a higher level the
narrator’s tendency to fall back on received ideas, or to engage in
bizarre speculation, or wander off into the most inconsequential
rambling, serves both to entertain and to keep us on our toes.
These lines come from the period when Jesus is living with Mary
Magdalene and the fishermen beside the sea of Galilee:
How true, the saying which reminds us that there is so much
sorrow in this world, misfortunes grow like weeds beneath our
feet. Such a saying could only have been invented by mortals,
accustomed as they are to life’s ups and downs, obstacles,
setbacks, and constant struggle. The only people likely to
question it are those who sail the seas, for they know that even
greater woe lies beneath their feet, indeed unfathomable
chasms. The misfortunes of seafarers, the winds and gales sent
from heaven, cause waves to swell, storms to break, sails to rip,
and fragile vessels to founder. And these fishermen and sailors
truly perish between heaven and earth, a heaven hands cannot
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reach, an earth feet never touch. The Sea of Galilee is nearly
always tranquil and smooth, like any lake, until the watery
furies are unleashed, and then it is every man for himself,
although sadly some drown. But let us return to Jesus of
Nazareth and his recent worries, which only goes to show that
the human heart is never content, and that doing one’s duty
does not bring peace of mind, though those who are easily
satisfied would have us believe otherwise. One could say that
thanks to the endless comings and goings of Jesus up and
down the river Jordan, there is no longer any hardship, not
even an occasional shortage, on the western shore . . .
What a genial little minefield of propositions this is: the naive
quotation of an old saying, ‘misfortunes grow like weeds beneath
our feet’, the bizarre reflection that such a saying could only have
been invented by mortals, thus begging the question, by whom if
not by mortals? Do we believe in immortal beings? Have we ever
reflected on how inappropriate our proverbs would be for their
happy state? The complacent description of our difficult lives:
‘obstacles, setbacks, and constant struggle’. Then suddenly the
mad decision to take ‘weeds beneath the feet’ literally, leading to
the odd thought that there is a category, that of sailor folk, who
might reasonably take issue with this saying. So now we get the
leisurely account of what we already know very well, the
precariousness of the fisherman’s life, but with the ominous
suggestion that ‘gales [are] sent from heaven’ – deliberately? –
this culminating in the wonderful ‘sailors truly perish’, as if there
were any other way to perish, or as if perishing were the only
truth, followed by the rhetorically savoured and again otiose, but
also confusing, ‘between heaven and earth, a heaven hands
cannot reach, an earth feet never touch’. Oddly, we are
reminded, there are indeed occasions when we refer to the sea as
the earth. This digression on the sailing life, or death, naturally
returns the narrator to the Sea of Galilee, pronounced normally
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tranquil, ‘like any lake’ (but those of us familiar with other climes
will know of lakes that are rarely tranquil), yet occasionally, the
narrator then remembers, dangerous, indeed vicious. And here
we have the marvellous non sequitur: ‘and then it’s every man for
himself, though sadly some drown’, where the word ‘sadly’ in
particular parades all its inadequacy. Then, out of nowhere, we
have a direct address to the reader ‘But let us . . .’, followed by
the depressing aside that doing one’s duty (but what is one’s
duty?) doesn’t bring peace of mind – this now an attack on
received ideas rather than their repetition – and finally the
speculative ‘One could say’ (but presumably one might well not)
introducing an entirely economic appraisal of Jesus’s fishing
miracles, the benefits of which, we notice are limited (sadly?) to
the western shore . . .
All this is at once extremely astute and very good fun; the
protean nature of the narrator forces the reader to work at
establishing his own position, the echoes of Beckett’s droll
narrative voices, at once pedantic and perplexed, are clear and
welcome. Unfortunately, the project breaks down at those points
where Saramago is so sure of what he knows, and feels so strongly
about it, that instead of leaving the reader this space for
discrimination and for the relishing of life’s mysteries, he plunges
us into the most crude and coercive of satires. Here is the long
delayed ‘annunciation’ when, with Jesus now a man, an angel is
finally sent to inform Mary of the details of his conception.
Know, Mary, that the Lord mixed his seed with that of Joseph
on the morning you conceived for the first time, and it was the
Lord’s seed rather than that of your husband, however
legitimate, that sired your son Jesus. Much surprised, Mary
asked the angel, So Jesus is my son and also the son of the
Lord. Woman, what are you saying, show some respect for
precedence, the way you should put it is the son of the Lord
and also of me. Of the Lord and also of you. No, of the Lord
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and of you. You confuse me, just answer my question, is Jesus
our son. You mean to say the Lord’s son, because you only
served to bear the child. So the Lord didn’t choose me. Don’t
be absurd, the Lord was merely passing, as anyone watching
would have seen from the colour of the sky, when His eye
caught you and Joseph, a fine healthy couple, and then, if you
can still remember how God’s will was made manifest, He
ordained that Jesus be born nine months later. Is there any
proof that it was the Lord’s seed that sired my firstborn. Well,
it’s a delicate matter, what you’re demanding is nothing less
than a paternity test, which in these mixed unions, no matter
how many analyses, tests, and genetic comparisons one carries
out can never give conclusive results.
While one agrees that the Bible story is absurd (but then so do
many Christians, starting with the Apostle Paul), it is difficult not
to feel that Saramago is falling into the merest flippancy here,
something hardly distinguishable from a Monty Python script or
a new and only slightly more daring episode of The Hitchhiker’s
Guide to the Galaxy. This occurs with every divine manifestation
in the book causing an unevenness that seriously mars the whole
effect and leaves us with the disturbing impression that for all the
ostentatious rhetoric of epistemological doubt, Saramago, unlike
others who have reflected on the biblical absurd – Kierkegaard,
Nietzsche, Lawrence, Beckett, to name but a few – feels entirely,
even smugly sure of himself when it comes to matters religious
and metaphysical. The problem may go some way to explaining
the curious reaction that this reader at least had on approaching
the end of The Gospel: that of agreeing entirely with Saramago’s
sentiments, admiring much in his writing, yet feeling a deep and
growing antipathy to the project as a whole.
The first achievement of Blindness is to be rid of all this, of all,
or nearly, those mannerisms of method that dog the earlier books
and have didacticism and satire descending into empty verbosity
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or worse still facetiousness. From page one, Blindness takes itself
entirely seriously, and rightly so. A man sitting in his car at a
traffic light goes blind. His blindness seems to pass from person
to person, at a glance, as it were. Within a few days everybody in
the city, which in this book is the world, is blind. Everybody, that
is, but one woman, the wife of the optometrist who examined the
first blind man. It is on her and the group who gather around her
that the narrative focuses, and it is through her eyes, for there are
no others, that the drama is observed.
Curiously, the phenomenon of universal sightlessness quickly
clarifies the question of how much we can expect of political
intervention and how far human suffering is inevitable. While the
optometrist repeatedly comments on the need ‘to organise’, it
becomes clear, as the narrative catalogues the painstaking efforts
needed to achieve even the simplest ends, that no amount of
organisation will ever be enough to guarantee the most basic
requirements of food and hygiene. Blind, the human race can at
last be forgiven for not solving all its humanitarian problems. The
optometrist’s wife observes, ‘here no one can be saved,’ and
continues, ‘blindness is also this, to live in a world where all hope
is gone.’
In such crisis conditions, as The Gospel reminded us, ‘it’s every
man for himself’. So the novel sets out to chart, effectively
enough, that descent into anarchy and bestiality that we have all
read about and shuddered at elsewhere: the thefts, the rapes, the
gang terror, the humiliation, the murder, and this in a world
where every technical aid has failed, where every room and street
is swamped in excrement and filth. A dignified sense of self, we
are made to see, prerequisite of moral behaviour, has very much
to do with our being able to keep an eye on each other.
But what distinguishes Saramago’s story from other cataclys-
mic tales of human degradation is the quality of the drama that
builds up around the one seeing character, wife of the optomet-
rist. The account of how the dynamic of the marriage alters, how
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her personality grows as she assumes both political and moral
authority, is at once psychologically convincing and rich with
possible analogy. She becomes willy-nilly a mother and a god to
her companions, husband included, and as such is faced with
appalling choices: in particular, her discovery that there comes a
moment when it is a moral obligation to kill another human
being is daring and in narrative terms totally gripping. But finest
of all is the way, despite the growing distance between the minds
of the sighted and the blind, despite the horror and filth to which
she is constantly exposed, this woman develops a growing
physical tenderness towards the other members of the group, a
sort of desperate respect for the human body, her own and
others’, which she transmits to her companions by simple acts of
practical love.
Towards the end of the book, when in the derelict city,
without power, water or food, the group has finally found an
empty apartment to sleep in, the wife is woken in the middle of
the night by the sound of rain. She rushes out onto the balcony:
‘Don’t let it stop, she murmured as she searched in the kitchen
for soap and detergents, scrubbing brushes, anything that might
be used to clean a little, at least a little, of this unbearable filth of
the soul. Of the body, she said, as if to correct this metaphysical
thought, then she added, it’s all the same.’ She gets the two other
women in the group to help her wash the clothes – ‘we are the
only woman in the world with two eyes and six hands’ – and then
themselves.
there are three naked women out there, as naked as when they
came into the world, they seem to be mad, they must be mad,
people in their right mind do not start washing on a balcony
exposed to the view of the neighbourhood . . . my God, how
the rain is pouring down on them, how it trickles between
their breasts, how it lingers and disappears into the darkness of
the pubis, how it finally drenches and flows over the thighs,
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perhaps we have judged them wrongly, or perhaps we are
unable to see this the most beautiful and glorious thing that
has happened in the history of the city, a sheet of foam flows
from the floor of the balcony, if only I could go with it, falling
interminably, clean, purified, naked. Only God sees us, said the
wife of the first blind man, who despite disappointments and
setbacks clings to the belief that God is not blind, to which the
doctor’s wife replies, Not even he, the sky is clouded over,
Only I can see you. Am I ugly, asked the girl with the dark
glasses. You are skinny and dirty, you will never be ugly, And I,
asked the wife of the first blind man, You are dirty and skinny
like her, not as pretty, but more than I, You are beautiful, said
the girl with the dark glasses, How do you know, since you
have never seen me, I have dreamt of you twice . . . I too see
you as beautiful, and I never dreamt of you, said the wife of the
first blind man, Which only goes to show that blindness is the
good fortune of the ugly, You are not ugly, No, as a matter of
fact I am not, but at my age, How old are you, asked the girl
with the dark glasses, Getting on for fifty, Like my mother,
And her, Her, what, Is she still beautiful, She was more
beautiful once, that’s what happens to all of us, we were all
more beautiful once, You were never more beautiful, said the
wife of the first blind man.
More daring and more disturbing here than all the metaphysi-
cal high jinks of The Gospel is the notion that full humanity is
achieved only through suffering, which thus becomes, and this
idea is provocative and entirely alien to Western political idealism,
necessary. When shortly after these and other manifestations of
tenderness, people begin, one by one, to see again, it is both a
relief, and not so. Do we really have to pass through every sort of
horror, before we can open our eyes?
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A Prisoner’s Dream
[Eugenio Montale]
Concluding his poem ‘To Silvia’ in 1828, Leopardi turns on the
abstraction that had been his childhood companion: hope. The
lines of that bitter address were to become some of the most
quoted in Italian poetry:
All’apparir del vero
Tu, misera, cadesti: e con la mano
La fredda morte ed una tomba ignuda
Mostravi di lontano.
When the truth dawned
You faded wretchedly; and raising
A hand showed me cold death
In the distance and a dark grave.
Dwarf-like, ugly, hunchbacked, the figure of the unhappy
Leopardi dominates his country’s poetry throughout the nine-
teenth century, and the central intuition of his work, its driving
force, is his compelling awareness of the nothingness behind all
human illusion, the fact that if there is one thing that will not
help us to live it is the naked truth. His writing fizzes with the
excitement of what may best be described as negative epiphany –
a horror made a little less unbearable only by the thrill of its
revelation, the eloquence of its articulation.
A scholar of immense erudition, Leopardi wrote frequently of
the need to elaborate some collective illusion that might save
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society from the corrosive effects of a futility now evident, he
imagined, to all. But he was too clear-headed a man to offer
illusions himself, nor in the end could he admire the susceptibility
of others. One of the last entries in his enormous diary suggests
three things humankind will never accept: that they are nothing,
that they achieve nothing, that there is nothing after death.
Born in 1896, Eugenio Montale begins his work in the
immediate shadow, not of Leopardi, but of a poet who did have a
vocation for illusion on a vast scale, a man whose fantastic
pantheism and extraordinary mastery of the Italian language
produced the most purple celebrations of the world, humanity,
nature and above all himself. It is not surprising that D’Annunzio
would find himself in tune with the aberration of Fascism, nor
can Leopardi be blamed if the enthusiasm for collective illusion
that characterised the first half of the twentieth century should
end so badly. Growing up in provincial Genoa, writing his first
lines in the atmosphere that would bring Mussolini to power,
Montale’s first concern, then, is to establish his distaste for the
still rising star of D’Annunzian grandiloquence and the grotesque
complacency that is its inspiration. Perhaps necessarily the young
poet looks back to Leopardi, as much on a personal level as
anything else. He feels alienated, where D’Annunzio epitomises
not so much integration as the very spirit that coalesces the
crowd. Montale hates crowds. Like Leopardi, he feels emotion-
ally, perhaps sexually inadequate where D’Annunzio likes to
appear as the nearest thing to Pan himself. But what Montale
cannot share with his role model Leopardi, or indeed with a poet
like Eliot to whom he has frequently been compared, is the thrill
of that negative epiphany. He will not indulge in grand gestures
of apocalyptic despair. Rather he begins on the stoniest of
ground, carefully measuring his distance from those who precede
him, rejecting intoxications whether positive or negative. As can
happen with the greatest of artists, voice and direction are all
there in the first stanza of the first poem of the first collection.
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Enjoy if the wind that enters the orchard
brings back the tidal flow of life:
here, where a dead
tangle of memories sinks under,
was no garden, but a reliquary.
Deprecating, apparently trapped in a domestic backwater,
oppressed by a moribund past, the young Montale is frequently
obliged to define his early vision by negatives. The second stanza
of this poem ‘In limine’ (‘On the Threshold’) warns, perhaps
reassures: ‘The whirr you’re hearing is not flight.’ The collec-
tion’s closest thing to a manifesto tells us:
Don’t ask us for the phrase that can open worlds,
just a few gnarled syllables, dry like a branch.
This, today, is all that we can tell you:
what we are not, what we do not want.
(‘Non chiederci’)
Cuttlefish Bones was published in 1925. Its arid landscape is
oppressively illuminated, bleached even like the bones of its title,
by the scorching sun of Ligurian summers. The sound of the sea,
in turns threatening and reassuring, is never far away. Inside the
confining walls of his orto – the Italian kitchen garden, locus of
unchanging domestic subsistence – the protagonist is starved of
life; outside, along the seacoast, he is thrilled, overwhelmed,
frightened, humbled. At first glance, the subject matter of the
collection would appear to be a yearning for epiphany, for some
way out of confinement that would not mean destruction.
Barriers suggest a beyond and thus encourage yearning, but turn
out to be insuperable. Montale differs from his nineteenth-
century predecessors, however, in his implicit acceptance of this
condition. He never rails. The underlying stupor at the nature of
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existence that informs the whole collection could never be
characterised as angry surprise. He seems old beyond his years.
And walking in the dazzling sun,
feel with sad amazement
how all life and its torment
is here in following this wall
topped with broken bottle-shards.
(‘Meriggiare’)
Rapidly, the poet establishes a variety of approaches to the idea of
limits and epiphany, approaches which, with endless ingenious
variations, will be the staple of a lifetime’s production. Another
figure is in the kitchen garden, a girl, a loved one perhaps. Is
epiphany possible for her if not for him? Can he help her escape?
In this scenario the protagonist’s life might at least have the sense
of an oblatory gesture:
Look for a broken link in the net
that binds us, you jump through, run!
Go, I’ve prayed for this for you – now my thirst
Will be mild, my rancour less bitter.
(‘In limine’)
Or again:
Before I give up I’d like
to show you this way out,
unstable as foam or a trough
in the troubled fields of the sea.
And I leave you my scant hope.
I’m too tired to nurse it for the future;
I pledge it against your fate, so you’ll escape.
(‘Casa sul mare’)
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One young female figure does escape, it seems, with a splendid
dive into the sea while the poet, at once too dreamy and too
rational can only yearn, admire, reflect:
At the end of the quivering board
You hesitate, then smile,
And, as if plucked by a wind,
Plunge into the arms of your friend
And god who catches you.
We look on, we of the race
Who are earthbound.
(‘Falsetto’)
Later, it seems that the beloved figure can offer as well as
receive, help rather than just escape. ‘Pray for me then/that I
may come down by another route/than a city street/in the
wasted air, ahead of the press/of the living.’ (‘Incontro’) But
more often than not, at least in this early collection, the yearning
for epiphany is temporarily appeased by a fleeting Keatsian
experience not so much of ceasing ‘upon the midnight’ but of
feeling one’s confined selfhood dazzled out of its limits in a flood
of Mediterranean light.
Like that circle of cliffs
that seems to unwind
into spiderwebs of cloud,
so our scorched spirits
in which illusion burns
a fire full of ash
are lost in the clear sky
of a single certainty: the light.
(‘Non rifugiarti’)
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‘Disappearing is the destiny of destinies’, the poet tells us in
another poem, apparently aspiring to the inanimate peace of his
cuttlefish bones on the beach, and he concludes:
Bring me the plant that leads the way,
to where blond transparencies
rise, and life as essence melts in haze;
bring me the sunflower, crazed with light.
(‘Il girasole’)
At such moments, it becomes evident that Montale’s deeper
subject is the relationship of self to other, the possibilities of some
real exchange, perhaps even communication, between the two,
which would be epiphany. His concern is how far it is really
possible to speak of such things, in Italian, at the moment he
writes; for beneath the surface of his enterprise lies a fear that
speech itself may generate the limitations he wishes to overcome.
‘Don’t ask us,’ he says, ‘for the word that squares/our shapeless
spirit on all sides.’ (‘Non chiederci’). Elsewhere he declares with
the angst of a Beckett or Cioran: ‘The deeper truth belongs to
the man who is silent.’ (‘So l’ora’). Hence, along with the
vocation ‘to wring the neck of the eloquence of our old aulic
language’ as he once put it, there is also a fascination, if not for
imprecision, then for all that must elude precise definition, all
that must be allowed to remain shadowy, Protean, on the borders
of self and other. Everything is in flux, above all consciousness;
and poetry, Montale claims in his essay ‘Intentions’ is ‘more a
vehicle of consciousness than of representation’.
The genius of Cuttlefish Bones, then, and indeed much of the
poet’s later work lies in an ever denser play of delicate, indefinable
but always convincingly authentic states of mind, which record an
individual spirit’s long negotiation with the other: the world,
women, poetry, the past. Needless to say this will lead commenta-
tors into all kinds of difficulty when it comes to establishing the
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content of many of the poems, while presenting translators with
what often looks like a worst-case scenario. Here is one of the
‘easiest’ lyrics from Cuttlefish Bones as it appears in Jonathan
Galassi’s new translation.
Haul your paper ships to the seared
shore, little captain,
and sleep, so you won’t hear
the evil spirits setting sail in swarms.
In the kitchen garden the owl darts
and the smoke hangs heavy on the roofs.
The moment that overturns the slow work of months is here:
now it cracks in secret, now bursts with a gust.
The break is coming: maybe with no sound.
The builder knows his day of reckoning.
Only the grounded boat is safe for now.
Tie up your flotilla in the canes.
We have an address to a boy launching paper boats, apparently
in danger from evil spirits at large. That familiar kitchen garden is
full of ominous portents. The last stanza is ambiguous as to
whether grounding those boats will prevent the disaster occurring
or not. Is the builder the boy who built the boats? Probably not.
But at least sleep will guarantee unconsciousness. Here is an
earlier translation by William Arrowsmith.
Haul your paper boats
to the parched shore, and then to sleep,
little commodore: may you never hear
swarms of evil spirits putting in.
The owl flits in the walled orchard,
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a pall of smoke lies heavy on the roof.
The moment that spoils months of labour is here:
Now the secret crack, now the ravaging gust.
The crack widens, unheard perhaps.
The builder hears his sentence passed.
Now only the sheltered boat is safe.
Beach your fleet, secure it in the brush.
Aside from the cohesion of assonance, rhythm and diction
which is very much on Galassi’s side (and this is true throughout
his new translation), actual differences are minor, though
sometimes intriguing. Presumably Galassi goes for the unusual
‘paper ships’ to achieve alliterative effects with ‘paper’, ‘seared’
and ‘shore’. Arrowsmith’s standard collocation ‘paper boats’ sits
closer to the familiar tone of the opening address. But these are
the inevitable small swings and roundabouts of translation.
Something of the same thing is going on with the apparently
irreconcilable versions ‘putting in’ and ‘setting sail’, to describe
the activity of those evil spirits, Galassi concentrating once again
on achieving assonance (notice also ‘seared’, ‘hear’, ‘here’, or
again ‘sound’ and ‘grounded’). But what are these evil spirits up
to, are they arriving or departing? Are they only going to ‘spoil’
the work of months, as Arrowsmith’s version weakly suggests, or
‘overturn’ it altogether, as Galassi more dramatically announces.
And looked at syntactically, what is the ‘it’ of Galassi’s ‘now it
cracks in secret’ – the work, or the moment? What, overall, is the
poem about? Here is the original.
Arremba su la strinata proda
le navi di cartone, e dormi,
fanciulletto padrone: che non oda
tu i malevoli spiriti che veleggiano a stormi.
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Nel chiuso dell’ortino svolacchia il gufo
e i fumacchi dei tetti sono pesi.
L’attimo che rovina l’opera lenta di mesi
giunge: ora incrina segreto, ora divelge in un buffo.
Viene lo spacco; forse senza strepito.
Chi ha edificato sente la sua condanna.
E’ l’ora che si salva solo la barca in panna.
Amarra la tua flotta tra le siepi.
Even those who cannot read Italian will immediately be aware
of the poem’s careful rhyming, almost chiming, which finally
breaks with the very last word ‘siepi’, the boat, the lyric, being
brought to prosaic ground at last. Montale loves to end on a
dying fall and Galassi is astute here to close not with Arrows-
mith’s alliterating ‘brush’ but with a word quite outside his
translation’s sound pattern: ‘canes’. The original also has a great
deal of internal rhyming, some of it at least potentially,
significant: cartone – padrone (cardboard – master), rovina –
incrina (destroy – crack), and the weighty half-rhyme, svolacchia
– fumacchi. These latter words are difficult to translate. The rare
‘svolacchiare’, borrowed perhaps from D’Annunzio, whom Mon-
tale at once rejected and ransacked, suggests sudden clumsy
flight, while a ‘fumacchio’ is a fumarole or a smouldering log, the
one suggesting an infernal connection with those evil spirits, the
other giving us a picture of the domestic roofs as themselves
alight, the houses slowly burning themselves out from within, as
almost everything in Montale’s world consumes itself in fire.
While you can’t expect a translation to measure up to a rhyme
pattern, it’s odd that both English versions ignore the implica-
tions of ‘fumacchi’. In any event, internal rhyme is ubiquitous in
Montale’s verse and usually in combination with enjambment. It
transmits an uneasy sense of an imprisoning mesh, or a series of
short circuits, the poem being brought to sudden halts, often in
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mid-line. The reader will frequently have the disorientating sense
that something connects, while remaining uncertain as to where
and with what, for often the inner ear picks up the rhyme without
immediately finding its earlier partner.
There is no place here to examine the complex mix of
Montale’s diction, its weaving back and forth between literary
and prosaic, but one or two observations on how the poem
achieves its deprecating resonance are apropos. For consistency of
metaphor, ‘fanciulletto padrone’ – ‘little boy master’ – has to be
translated as ‘little captain’ or ‘little commodore’, but read in
Italian the line cannot help but recall the Wordsworthian idea
that the child is father to the man. The lines invite the boy to
retreat, to sleep, not to risk it, not to grow up perhaps. For those
spirits are not just ‘evil’ they are ‘malevolenti’, they wish him evil.
And the ‘tu’ of the first stanza is important. Redundant in
standard Italian syntax, the personal pronoun is introduced (in
the most prominent of positions) for emphasis and contrast. The
idea is ‘sleep, so that at least you may not hear those ill-wishing
spirits’, who, rather than ‘setting sail’ or ‘putting in’, ‘veleggia-
no’. This is a word that can mean to ‘soar in flight’ or to ‘sail
about’ and it allows Montale to maintain his nautical image while
increasing the sense of menace: the air is full of swarming spirits.
But if the boy is to be spared hearing those spirits, who will hear
them? The poet? The builder? Or the adult whom the child will
give birth to as he sleeps? Even with this simplest of lyrics, the
essential nub winds off into a cloud of possibilities.
There is more. A few pages earlier, in a poem dedicated to
fellow poet Camillo Sbarbaro, Montale imagines his friend as a
boy launching paper boats – his poems – and invites a kind
passer-by to pull them safe on shore with his walking stick. So this
later lyric cannot help but gather whimsical associations from the
first. Is Montale suggesting that these early years of Fascism are
not a moment for poetry, but for keeping one’s head down?
Delicate verses have little chance out there. Haul the boats in,
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they’re only paper. Or is he talking about youth coming to
consciousness, addressing his younger self perhaps? Or simply
expressing a momentary loss of confidence?
Whichever way we read the poem, the line that takes on the
most rhetorical and rhythmical force, to a large extent lost in the
translations, is the very last line that rhymes: ‘E’ l’ora che si salva
solo la barca in panna’ (literally: the hour has come when only the
grounded boat will be saved). This pessimistic invitation to
inaction pulls together the odd collage of images which, while
still refusing to be pinned down, establish an all too recognisable
cocktail of emotions: fear, inadequacy, desire to sleep, desire to
spare another’s disappointment, or see one’s own disappointment
destroy another. From all of which Montale extracts himself with
the quiet skill of one who knows that the poem’s poignancy is
generated precisely by its refusal to insist too much, its capacity to
remain as light and precarious as a paper boat. The translations,
which are probably as good as translations can be of such a poem,
remind us that for all Montale’s determination to distance himself
from Italian’s aulic vocation, a poem nevertheless remains a
felicitous event above all in its own language. The little boat bobs
and dips and is eventually beached into prose rather more
convincingly, more attractively, in the original.
It is generally agreed that the core of Montale’s work consists
of three major collections: Cuttlefish Bones (1925), The Occasions
(1939) and The Storm, etc. (1956). Galassi chooses to publish all
three together, separating them from a body of work of almost
equal length that came later. He defends this decision in an
inspired afterword that offers the best short account I have yet
come across of the nature, import and elusive content of
Montale’s work. Above all he has a firm grasp of its bewildering
interconnectedness both inside itself and within Italian and
European culture as a whole. This is the key not so much to
understanding Montale – ‘understanding’ is the wrong word –
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but to appreciating his vision of what contemporary poetry might
be and do.
The passage from Cuttlefish Bones to The Occasions is crucial. At
its simplest, Montale drastically reduces a first-person presence in
the poems together with any obvious autobiographical reference,
concentrating on constructing small groups of images, events,
exhortations which will generate a complex emotional state
without revealing the personal situation that sparked it off.
Since the poet is living in Florence now, the vivid coastal
landscape that gave an easy homogeneity to the first collection is
gone. Everything is more fragmented, harder to get the mind
round. The change in direction inevitably led to accusations of
hermeticism, while critics, and for that matter Montale himself,
theorised at length about objective correlatives and the like.
Such talk seems less interesting now than reflections on the
whys and wherefores of the change and the direction it would
ultimately lead Montale to take. Perhaps if poetry is to be a
vehicle of consciousness and if the poet’s own consciousness is
the only one immediately available to him, the twin problems of
retaining privacy and of making the poems carry weight for a
wide audience were beginning to make themselves felt. Montale
is older. There are various relationships. Poems are addressed to
different women. Then political considerations are growing daily
more serious: while preparing this collection the poet would lose
his job for failing to join the Fascist Party. So one might remark
that any artist whose form of expression requires a semantic
content will take steps to preserve that double life without which
it often seems any life at all is impossible. Certainly in his essays
on Dante and D’Annunzio Montale is attentive to such prob-
lems, pondering at length on the extent to which poets hide or
fail to hide the biography behind the verse. No doubt his
decision, as the work progresses, to draw on the Renaissance
convention of a sequence of poems to an ideal beloved is taken
partly because it will serve to cover tracks. Actually, I can think of
254
A Prisoner’s Dream
no major figure who, without resorting to the provocative,
almost showy secrecy of contemporary writers like Pynchon or
Salinger, has more successfully and unspectacularly kept the exact
nature of his private life out of the public domain. Although we
now know their identities, the roles played by the two women
addressed in his poems as Clizia and Volpe, or by the woman
with whom he lived while addressing poems to those others,
remain quite obscure.
Such reflections are, I hope, appropriate, but inevitably
reductive. Montale remarks that in writing Cuttlefish Bones, ‘I felt
I was close to something essential. A subtle veil separated me
from the definitive quid. Absolute expression would have meant
breaking that veil . . . but this remained an unreachable goal.’
Yet, referring to The Occasions, he then claims, ‘I wanted to go
deeper.’ How can one go deeper if, while being able to think of
the world as a veil, one can never penetrate it? What does
Montale understand by ‘going deeper’?
Galassi’s afterword presents Montale’s work as an autobio-
graphical novel. What initially are relatively simple constructs in
which man or woman are seen as involved together in a search for
some form of overcoming, become progressively more complex.
Montale loves a Jewish American, Irma Brandeis, a Dante
scholar, who leaves Italy at the outbreak of war. The poems to
her, or to her memory, slide from intense personal pain and
pleasure to visions of individual, then even universal salvation,
drawing on the symbolism of centuries past and Christian and
Jewish traditions, not to mention relatively obscure heresies such
as Nestorianism.
Here, in a constant construction and deconstruction of
fantastic allegory, clearly fuelled by the catastrophic events
occurring all around him, each poem is built on those that have
gone before, to the extent that it is hard to read any one of them
separately. Later, arriving at the work addressed to Volpe, a
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younger woman whose sensuality usurps, though never com-
pletely, the position of the more spiritual Clizia, it will be
impossible to read the poems without a thorough knowledge of
all that has gone before and indeed without some wonderment as
to the nature of the poet’s relationship with Mosca, the lifetime
companion he eventually married.
Meanwhile, Montale’s contact with Florentine and later Mila-
nese literary circles, his enviable familiarity with a huge range of
European and American literature, his personal difficulties with
Fascism and mass culture in general, are all drawn together in
work that, in his role as translator, Galassi despairingly describes
as characterised by a remarkable ‘over-determination’. That is, a
single reference may take us back to Dante and Browning, or
Baudelaire and D’Annunzio, another to the contemporary
inferno of war and a girlfriend, or compound of girlfriends, while
almost everything will gain resonance from its connection with
any number of earlier poems.
Thus intensity is achieved not through revealed meaning, or
lyric flight, but via a prodigious density that encourages the
reader to grope for ever more complex levels of consciousness,
evoking the finest shadings of emotion coloured by every variety
of thought. This is what the poet meant by going ‘deeper’. The
strategy and its effects are difficult to summarise and if Montale is
always interesting but never exceptional when he writes about
poetry in prose, it is no doubt because he senses that poetry
presents ideas which, as he laconically puts it in ‘A Dialogue with
E. Montale on Poetry’ ‘are acceptable only in that form’. As a
result the following brief lyric, ‘The Fan’ from the collection The
Storm, etc. merits more than a thousand words in Galassi’s
excellent notes.
Ut pictura . . . The confounding lips,
the looks, sighs, days now long since gone:
I try to fix them there as in
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the wrong end of a telescope,
silent and motionless, but more alive.
It was a joust of men and armaments, a rout
in smoke that Eurus raised, but now the dawn
has turned it purple and breaks through those mists.
The mother of pearl gleams, the dizzying
precipice still swallows victims, but
the feathers on your cheeks are whitening
and maybe the day is saved. O raining blows
when you reveal yourself, sharp flashes, downpour
over the hordes! (Must he who sees you die?)
The notes begin:
Another highly allusive ‘pseudosonnet’ (Montale to Contini,
June 6, 1942) (Op, 943), its title drawn from the ‘e´ventails’ of
Mallarme´ (Greco, 142–43, finds parallels with Mallarme´’s first
‘e´ventail’ – Avec comme pour langage, which is also an
Elizabethan sonnet). Its occasion is another ‘Petrarchan’
attribute of Clizia’s, drawn from her war chest of jewelry ‘a
holy relic in time of war’ (Cary, 312). (According to Macrı` – 2,
11, the poem describes the disastrous rout of Italian forces at
Caporetto in October 1917.)
I quote this snippet with no satirical intentions, but in an
attempt to tease out what the experience is of reading this
collection, what it might mean for someone to have composed
the original work over the course of a lifetime, for another to
have dedicated years of his life to the unbelievably painstaking
and ill-paid task of translating and annotating it. Like Arrow-
smith’s translations, and indeed most serious contemporary
translation of poetry, Galassi presents his version side by side with
the original. This is no more than an honest admission of defeat
from the outset. ‘Poetry is the fatal uniqueness of language,’
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Celan remarked. Montale himself spoke of the untranslatability of
poetry in essays that Galassi himself has translated. Here nostalgia
for the original is overwhelming. Yet bravely the translator
proceeds. Indeed, precisely as poetry in this century has become
more cryptic, more private, more untranslatable, translations have
multiplied. Why?
In Montale’s case it is very much as if the translator were
seeking to continue and expand the poet’s work of interconnec-
tion, introducing into another language and tradition, with all the
new connotations this inevitably opens the way for, the immense
spiderweb of the man’s thought. And the voluminous notes
Galassi provides – absolutely indispensable for a fruitful reading of
Montale – the frequent quotations of critics and sources and
letters, make us aware of a huge joint effort in which the reader is
invited to take part, an effort to put everything together, to
understand it all in a flash. It is in this way that the yearning for
epiphany is exorcised. With each new lyric the mind is momentar-
ily appeased, dazzled out of limits, not by the Mediterranean
light, but by the complex expression of its own and by extension
everybody else’s experience.
In his book Ka, Roberto Calasso tells how the first Indian god,
Prajapati, did battle with Death. On the point of succumbing, he
was consoled by the reflection that if he went under the
connections his mind had made would nevertheless survive, for
how can a web of thought be killed? Later, when his body had
been broken and dispersed into all existence, the same Prajapati
taught the younger gods that to overcome death they must
construct the altar of fire. The bricks required numbered the
hours of the year. It was a task that would take all the time there
was. So much so that, moving onwards to historical time, the
brahmans of the Vedic texts were still involved in the same
enterprise. Calasso comments: ‘By creating an edifice of such
connections, the brahmans imagined . . . they had beaten Death
. . . And thus died the more serene.’
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Reading Montale, watching with what admirable stubbornness
he sets out to arrange and rearrange the same elements over and
over again, to thicken his web, and then observing the translators
and critics as they minister about him with the commendable
solemnity of priests, one cannot help feeling that the altar of fire
is still under construction. Why not? And as the eye moves from
original to translation – Arrowsmith’s, Galassi’s, but Charles
Wright’s too, and Edith Farnsworth’s, an uncanny connection
floats to mind. The original stands to these translations as the
impossible communion of self and other to the young Montale.
Each translation re-enacts the yearning the poet expressed, the
frustration of another attractive but not quite successful attempt
to overcome barriers – in this case that between Italian and
English.
Yet the absence of the definitive version at least allows us to fill
our time by trying again. One of the great pleasures of reading a
bilingual edition is that you can allow yourself the liberty (as I
have in the first quotations in this essay) of imagining different
approximations to the impossible perfect solution. Montale’s
third and most ambitious collection, The Storm, etc., closes with a
poem whose title, ‘The Prisoner’s Dream’, might well be applied
to all his work. In Galassi’s version the last lines are as follows:
Slow-witted, sore
from my sharp pallet, I’ve become
the flight of the moth my boot
is turning to powder on the floor,
become the light’s chameleon kimonos
hung out from the towers at dawn.
I’ve smelled the scent of burning on the wind
from the cakes in the ovens,
I’ve looked around, I’ve conjured rainbows
shimmering on fields of spiderwebs
and petals on the trellises of bars,
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I’ve stood, and fallen back
Into the pit where a century’s a minute –
And the blows keep coming, and the footsteps,
And I still don’t know if at the feast
I’ll be stuffer or stuffing. The wait is long,
My dream of you isn’t over.
In 1985 Arrowsmith offered:
I’ve risen only to fall back
into that gulf where a century’s a second –
and the beatings go on and on, and the footsteps,
and I don’t know whether I’ll be at the feast
as stuffer or stuffing. It’s a long wait,
and my dream of you isn’t over.
In 1978 Charles Wright tried:
and still I don’t know when the banquet is finally served,
if I shall be the eater or the eaten. The wait is long;
my dream of you is not yet over.
In 1970 Edith Farnsworth hazarded:
The waiting lasts a long time, my dream
Of you has not yet found its end.
It often seems translations tell us more about poetic sensibility
in our own language than in the original. What about:
and still I don’t know who’ll be eating whom
when I get to the table. Time is long,
I’m not through dreaming of you yet.
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Unlocking the Mind’s Manacles
[Gregory Bateson and Valeria Ugazio]
The paths by which one mind may come to influence another are
curious indeed. Thus a new book by Italian psychologist Valeria
Ugazio exploring the family backgrounds of those suffering from
phobias, obsessive-compulsive disorders and anorexia begins by
drawing on observations made by the British anthropologist
Gregory Bateson during his work among the Iatmul Indians of
New Guinea in the late 1920s. Behind both authors the anti-
conformist inspiration of the English poet William Blake is
frequently apparent, while between them lies the rise and fall of
one of the most controversial adventures in psychotherapy, the
so-called ‘systemic approach’.
Bateson was born in 1904 into a family with a history of
scientific controversy. His father William, a distinguished natural-
ist, was responsible for giving the study of genetics its name and
was both translator and vociferous champion of Mendel’s work
on hybrids and heredity. Gregory was named after the Austrian
monk, no doubt with the hope that he would follow in his
footsteps. Ironically, while Bateson never sought to belittle the
study of genetics, his legacy has been to stress the importance of
the social environment in activating, or not, the potential
available in any individual’s genetic make-up.
Explaining to his disappointed father that he was giving up
zoology for the relatively new subject of anthropology, Bateson
spoke of his need for ‘a break with ordinary impersonal science’.
He had grown up in a house where Blake’s pictures hung on the
walls, where art and poetry were revered as the acme of human
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achievement yet at the same time considered ‘scarcely in the
reach of people like ourselves’. Gregory’s elder brother, Martin,
who aspired to become a poet rather than a scientist, argued
bitterly with his father and eventually killed himself in a scenario
that might have been invented to demonstrate the limitations of
‘ordinary impersonal science’. Infatuated with a girl who never
gave him the slightest hope, he shot himself by the statue of Eros
in Piccadilly Circus, a suicide note and a poem in his pocket.
Although in her book Storie permesse, storie proibite (Stories
allowed, stories forbidden), Valeria Ugazio draws only on
Bateson’s ideas and not his biography, one can’t help feeling its
relevance to her thesis. Her title is that the way family members
talk about themselves and others, giving particular importance to
certain qualities and achievements, will make some ‘life stories’
(or ways of seeing one’s life as narrative) available to a child while
denying the possibility of certain others. Clearly, after his
brother’s suicide, an artist’s life was a ‘story forbidden’ to
Gregory. On the other hand it was the achievement to which his
family attached the greatest value, and there can be no doubt that
they were ambitious for their son. His choice of anthropology
and its specifically, as he always insisted, ‘human’ element, can be
seen as a way of combining the scientific and artistic and hence
resolving the particular career conundrum his parents had created
for him. Significantly, on the opening page of his first book,
Naven, Bateson would be reflecting on the advantages of a
novelist’s eye when it came to describing a foreign culture.
The artist . . . can leave a great many of the most fundamental
aspects of culture to be picked up not from his actual words,
but from his emphasis. He can . . . group and stress [words] so
that the reader almost unconsciously receives information
which is not explicit in the sentences and which the artist
would find it hard – almost impossible – to express in analytic
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terms. This impressionistic technique is utterly foreign to the
methods of science.
At once it was clear that Bateson’s project was to grasp, as an
artist might, a sense of the wholeness and interrelatedness of a
culture, rather than to report particular facts. But family back-
ground demanded that this be done in a scientific way. It’s not
surprising, then, that his second project, in Bali, undertaken with
his wife Margaret Mead, was the first to make systematic use of
photographs in an ethnographic study. True to his resistance to
the analytic and reductive, it was important that the photographs
not be seen separately: Bateson wrote of the book that came out
of his work in Bali,
In this monograph we are attempting a new method of stating
the intangible relationships among different types of culturally
standardized behaviour by placing side by side mutually
relevant photographs. Pieces of behaviour, spatially and con-
textually separated – a trance dancer being carried in a
procession, a man looking up at an airplane, a servant greeting
his master in a play, the painting of a dream – may all be
relevant to a single discussion; the same emotional thread may
run through them.
In the late twenties when Bateson began his career, British
anthropology was dominated by the figure of A.R. Radcliffe-
Brown who was fond of describing societies using the analogy of
the organism. The life of a people was to be viewed as an active
system of functionally consistent, interdependent elements where
social phenomena ‘are not the immediate result of the nature of
individual human beings, but are the result of the social structure
by which they are united’.
Though he originally found it exciting, Bateson had a number
of objections to this view. He felt its stress on the functional was
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reductive and left no space for the aesthetic; it also suggested that
there was no tension between the ‘interdependent elements’ of
the society, and, related to that, it deduced all individual
behaviour from social structure in a suffocating determinism, to
which Bateson with his own family experience, must have felt an
instinctive repulsion. It was in opposition to this that he
developed the first of the ideas for which he will be remembered,
his so-called ‘schismogenesis’.
Bateson had been observing the radically different behaviour
patterns of men and women among the Iatmul Indians. The
more the men were exhibitionist and boastful, the more the
women were quiet and contemplative. It was clear that the one
behaviour pattern stimulated the other in a process that led to
strong personality differentiation within an overall group ethos.
The process of reciprocally stimulated personality differentiation,
schismogenesis, could be complementary or symmetrical. Among
the Iatmul men the process is symmetrical: they are involved in a
dynamic of escalating competition, each seeking to outdo the
other. Between the men and women of the tribe, however, the
process is complementary, each becoming ever more the opposite
of the other.
Schismogenesis, as Bateson saw it, was a powerful process and
could be damaging, not only because it tended to violent
extremes, but also because it could deny an individual any
experience outside that promoted by this social dynamic. Bateson
called his book Naven because this was the name of the bizarre
series of rituals which he saw as ‘correcting’ the schismogenetic
process and guaranteeing stability. In these ceremonies men
dressed up as women and vice versa. The women now assumed,
with great excitement and relief, what was the traditional
behaviour of the men while the men were abject and passive, even
submitting to simulated rape.
What Bateson was suggesting, then, was a complex process of
interaction, which did not deny the possibility of individual
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behaviour, but nevertheless saw it as taking place within a social
process underwritten by a fundamentally conservative tendency
that would always seek to counterbalance any movement away
from the norm. Bateson had not heard of the word cybernetics
when he formulated these ideas, but when he learnt of the
concepts of feedback and closed self-corrective circuits, it was
evident that this would offer him an analogy that could substitute
for Radcliffe-Brown’s unitary organism.
Almost twenty years after Bateson’s death, Ugazio, who lectures
in psychology at the University of Turin, approaches schismogen-
esis with the same combination of respect and dissatisfaction that
Bateson brought to Radcliffe-Brown. Bateson had expected that
complementary and symmetrical schismogenesis would be found
in personal relationships, in cases of psychological disorder, in
contacts between cultures and in political rivalries. Hence there is
nothing revolutionary in Ugazio’s considering the process as
essential to personality development within the family, or
suggesting that character is formed by how people place
themselves in relation to others in a group. But what Bateson did
not do is speak of the ‘content’ of a process of schismogenesis.
For Ugazio, on the contrary, this is essential. Reciprocal
differentiation between family members, she claims, takes place
along lines of meaning, or ‘semantic polarities’.
Consider, for example, a family that tends to talk about itself
and others in terms of the polarity ‘dependence-independence’:
Family conversations will tend to be organized around
episodes where fear and courage, the need for protection and
the desire for exploration play a central role. It is within this
critical semantic dimension that schismogenetic processes will
take place. As a result of these processes, the members of these
families will feel and define themselves as shy and cautious, or,
on the contrary, courageous perhaps even rash; they will find
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companions who are willing to protect them or alternatively in
need of protection [. . .] Admiration, contempt, conflict,
suffering, alliances, love and hate will all occur around the
themes of dependence/independence. In these families there
will be some who – like the agoraphobic – are so dependent
and so in need of protection as to require that someone be
beside them in even the most ordinary day-to-day situations.
But there will also be some members of the family who, on the
opposite side of the polarity, provide examples of extreme
independence.
Every family, Ugazio maintains, will ‘converse’ and thus
‘compose itself’ around a number of semantic polarities. The
family mentioned above, for example, might also talk about
themselves and others in terms of winners and losers, or
generosity and meanness. Nevertheless, one polarity will tend to
dominate. The position a child assumes along that critical line will
be crucial for the formation of his or her personality.
Ugazio’s second addition to Bateson’s theory of schismogene-
sis is her insistence on the importance of what she calls ‘the
median position’. Bateson had seen the complementary and
symmetrical processes he described as necessarily leading to
extremes, but in a fascinating reconsideration of Naven, Ugazio
draws attention to a number of men Bateson mentions only in
passing who do not engage in male theatricals, nor become part
of the admiring audience. In the general schismogenetic process,
there will be some, Ugazio claims, who react by insistently
readjusting their position this way and that in response to the
excesses of those on either side of them. In certain polarities,
independence/dependence for example, such a process might be
positive, approaching a golden mean, but in others it could lead
to all kinds of anxiety. For where the dominating polarity is
saintly self-denial against ‘evil’ self-indulgence, there is little
middle ground to be had. Here, a child seeking a median position
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in an already established play of opposites, is likely to find himself
oscillating between a pleasurable indulgence that arouses guilt
and a virtuous denial that provokes a sense of yearning and loss.
Again, Bateson’s own background would have provided
Ugazio with a good example. David Lipset’s biography of the
anthropologist gives us an adolescent who determinedly sought
out a median position between his ‘poetic’ brother Martin and
‘scientific’ father William. In a scenario where poetry was
considered an indulgence legitimate only for the most gifted and
science a self-denying crusade to further human knowledge, an
equilibrium was hard to find, as Bateson’s frequent feelings of
guilt when embarking on his first anthropological projects
suggest. His lifelong obsession with mechanisms of self-
adjustment, transforming, as it were, his personal difficulties into
his science, would seem to confirm this reading, which also allows
apparently minor details of his working methods to take on
unexpected meaning. Talking about Bateson’s research on
schizophrenia at the Palo Alto Veteran’s Hospital, Lipset
remarks:
Although the project’s interstitial position between disciplines
and between institutions had meant a degree of financial
insecurity, Bateson often remarked that he protected his
scientific freedom in this way, sheltering it under ‘three
umbrellas’. His project was housed in a hospital, was funded
by grants from independent agencies, and these were adminis-
tered through the Anthropology Department at Stanford
University. ‘When you have three bosses,’ he was fond of
saying, ‘you have none.’ Each institution maintained that the
other was supervising. Or, as one of Bateson’s colleagues
remarked ‘Nobody knew what the hell he was doing.’
Well, what the hell was a British anthropologist doing in the
psychiatric ward of a California hospital? It’s a question to which
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Ugazio addresses herself at length, and one whose answer will
bring us to her own most important innovation in Storie permesse.
Fascinated by the relationship between his own work and the
fast developing communications theory, Bateson accepted an
invitation to join a study of ‘human communication in psycho-
therapy’. It was a period when he immersed himself in both the
harsh realities of psychiatric medicine and the theoretical com-
plexities of ‘digital’ and ‘analogic’ forms of communication in
verbal and non-verbal speech, developing the idea that all
messages imply a hierarchy whereby one element – perhaps literal
meaning – is placed in context by another – perhaps body
language. The latter allows the recipient to contextualise the
former. It was out of this area of study that his most famous
concept, the idea of the double bind, was developed.
Bateson was working with schizophrenics, who frequently fail
to appreciate the sense in which a message is to be understood. A
routine question from a waitress – ‘How can I help you?’ – might
be understood as a sexual proposition and elicit a most inappro-
priate response. Or again, to be told by the same girl that a dish
on the menu is not available might be contextualised as part of an
elaborate international conspiracy and lead to an angry scene.
Rather than looking for the cause of this disturbance in the
isolated or traumatised psyche (as psychoanalysis tends to do), or
in a specific organic dysfunction (as traditional medicine
demands), Bateson suggested that the schizophrenic has rather
‘learned’ to ‘live in a universe where the sequences of events are
such that his unconventional habits of communication will be . . .
appropriate’. His disorder, that is, is part of a larger system.
What were these ‘sequences of events’ and the system they
implied? We can imagine a child who from birth receives
contradictory messages from the figure most involved in his
upbringing, usually the mother: the content perhaps seductive,
but the body language discouraging, or vice versa. Bateson’s
example of such behaviour in the paper ‘Toward a Theory of
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Schizophrenia’ (1956) has often been quoted: a young man
recovering from an acute schizophrenic episode was visited in the
hospital by his mother.
He was glad to see her and impulsively put his arm around her
shoulders, whereupon she stiffened. He withdrew his arm and
she asked, ‘Don’t you love me any more?’ He then blushed,
and she said, ‘Dear, you must not be so easily embarrassed and
afraid of your feelings.’ The patient was able to stay with her
only a few minutes more and following her departure he
assaulted an aide.
The example is followed by a two-page analysis in which
Bateson remarks, among other things, on the fact that the
schizophrenic’s apparent state of subjection does not allow him
to comment on his mother’s contradictory behaviour. She rejects
affection, demands affection, then criticises her son for an
inhibition she herself has just induced. Ultimately, Bateson
claims, the patient is up against the impossible dilemma: ‘If I wish
to maintain my relationship with my mother, I mustn’t show her
that I love her, but if I don’t show her I love her, I’ll lose her.’
Bateson maintained that a lifetime of such behaviour would
induce a structural trauma, as if the mind were constantly put
before conundrums of the variety ‘All statements on this page are
false’. Faced with this ‘double bind’, the child himself begins to
communicate in the same way, wildly dissociating verbal and
non-verbal communication, literal and metaphorical levels. As a
result, conversations with a schizophrenic can often follow the
pattern of a bizarre series of non sequiturs where the ‘normal’
party to the dialogue frequently suspects that he is being made
fun of.
It would be hard to exaggerate the enthusiasm which Bateson’s
double bind aroused. For those in psychotherapy who had begun
to suspect the limitations of an exasperated delving into the
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individual psyche, the idea that a mental illness was part of a
system of communication and might thus be treated by altering
the way people operated together, rather than dealing with them
individually, was extremely exciting. No complex histories need
be elicited, no insight painstakingly imparted. All you had to do
was change their behaviour in such a way that the schizophrenic
response was no longer ‘appropriate’.
A school of therapy rapidly developed which involved getting a
whole family together to be interviewed by one or two therapists
while others watched, taped and even filmed the session through
a one-way mirror. After discussion at the end of the session,
members of the family would be ordered to perform some task or
follow some instruction designed to alter the way they behaved
together. A hyperactive, domineering mother, for example,
might be ordered to spend a month in bed. In 1975, reviewing a
crop of books published on the back of the movement, Elsa First
remarked in the New York Review of Books that: ‘Many in the
family therapy movement prefer to think of themselves as
anthropological consultants to very small tribes in distress, rather
than as doctors who cure individual “cases” of psychological
illness.’
Yet all was not well. As Ugazio points out, Bateson soon realised
that the connection of his theory of a special kind of communica-
tion problem – the double bind – to an illness as complex and
intractable as schizophrenia had been a mistake. The theory
didn’t suggest why one member of the family was affected rather
than another, it didn’t explain the difference between the pre-
schizophrenic and the schizophrenic, or why some double binds
might be damaging and others, as Bateson believed, therapeutic.
But the worst blow to the theory came in 1966 when the original
members of Bateson’s team were invited to consider material
presented to them by psychiatric patients and their parents and to
pronounce on any eventual double binds. Faced with numerous
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accounts and audiotapes of family conversations, their disagree-
ment was complete. Apparently, they had no criteria for identify-
ing what was a double bind and what was not.
To complicate matters, a conflict had arisen between Bateson
and Jay Haley, his most talented collaborator. Haley was a
practical therapist and eager to use the ideas the project had been
developing to get results. While Bateson would spend weeks
chatting amiably to schizophrenics and taking notes, Haley
wanted to save them, transform them. Bateson, however, was
uneasy about his manipulative and invasive methods. The whole
thrust of Bateson’s work had been that social behaviour is part of
a delicate interacting ecology and that the mistake of traditional
science was to believe that it could isolate areas of study and act
upon them from a stable position without. However well
meaning, intervention into something so complex as a schizo-
phrenic’s family might feasibly make things worse. It is hardly
surprising then that just as Haley’s hands-on manual Strategies of
Psychotherapy appeared in 1963, Bateson abandoned the Palo
Alto project to study patterns of communication among dolphins
in the Virgin Islands. Nobody could reasonably expect him to
change the lives of dolphins. His real goal in Palo Alto, he
explained rather defensively, had never been therapy, but
research.
Valeria Ugazio does not disguise the fact that she came to
Bateson not directly, but through the influence of her first
mentor, the Milan-based psychotherapist, Mara Selvini. For
precisely as the ‘systemic approach’ lost its intellectual father in
the USA, it gained a new and charismatic champion in Italy.
Selvini came to international notoriety with one of the earliest
studies of anorexia, Self-Starvation, in later editions of which she
offers a Batesonian model for ‘the anorexic family’: the disorder
was to be seen, that is, as the result of a system of relationships
and patterns of communication in the family.
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Basically, Selvini connected the rapid rise of anorexia to the
process of transition which was then so radically altering the
Italian family, eroding the old imperative of group solidarity in
favour of a philosophy of self-realisation. The situation was
particular disorienting, Selvini claimed, for women who, from
being expected to sacrifice everything for husband and children,
now saw themselves as potentially equal players on the family
stage. The result, at least in the families she was dealing with, was
a sort of covert, never-to-be resolved power struggle where each
individual was chiefly bent on self-realisation but nevertheless
obsessively determined, in deference to the old ethos, to disguise
every personal initiative as a gesture of self-sacrifice. A typical
discussion in therapy runs thus: Mother: ‘I have forbidden her
[the patient] to wear miniskirts because I know her father doesn’t
like them.’ Father: ‘I’ve always supported whatever my wife
forbade the girls in my name. I felt it would be wrong to
contradict her.’
Ultimately, Selvini claimed, the contradictory desire to think of
oneself as the person who has sacrificed most while in fact seeking
to control everybody else could lead to a situation where
authority is only acceptable when it springs from a pathology and
is thus apparently beyond the individual will. Not for nothing,
she claimed, does the refusal to eat combine an apparent gesture
of self-sacrifice with a disorder that will demand attention and
confer control as the family begins to function entirely in relation
to the patient’s symptom.
Systemic theorists never sought to explain the exact shift in the
chemistry of the brain when a neurotic or psychotic symptom is
first manifested (an achievement that has so far eluded the most
advanced medical research), but rather to look for consistent
patterns relating a disorder to the surrounding system of
relationships. Thus, aside from the general transition across the
social scene, Selvini concurred with other observers in finding
that the families of anorexics tended to be characterised by an
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extremely strong mother complemented by chronically weak
father (the dialogue above is again typical in this regard). In such
a situation the ‘sacrifice’ of not eating, a weapon directed far
more at the mother than the father, could be justified by the
anorexic at a subliminal level as an attempt to redress the balance
of power, while in fact amounting to a determined attempt to
take over the man’s role for herself.
Selvini’s work offers an effective response to Elsa First’s ironic
remarks at the expense of an ‘anthropological’ approach. Her
most brilliant book Paradox Counter Paradox presents, among
scores of others, the example of the young anorexic, Mimma,
who claims that her problem has to do with her fear of food
poisoning. In general discussion with the family it emerges that
to accommodate this fear her parents have transformed their
kitchen into a sort of operating theatre: all cutlery and utensils are
sterilised and before sitting down to eat everybody puts on a
white surgical coat, sterilised rubber gloves and a surgeon’s cap.
The therapist suggests that given this state of affairs Mimma is
perhaps not the only unbalanced member of the family. There is a
collective craziness at work here. This interpretation is immedi-
ately and vigorously denied by parents and siblings alike. Only
Mimma is ‘mad’. From a systemic point of view, however,
Mimma, in line with the general search for power, is running the
whole show and at the same time truly suffering more than
anyone else.
Selvini’s undoubted success with anorexics led to her achieving
almost guru status in the late seventies. Very much in the
tradition of Haley, she got her results by heaving a weighty
therapeutic spanner into the tortured mechanisms of such families
through a process of intuitive provocation and paradoxical
prescription. ‘At what point’ – a young anorexic might be asked
after three or four sessions – ‘did it occur to you that by not
eating you could finally show your lily-livered father how to bring
Mother into line?’ Or, at the end of another session a patient
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might be told that the therapists had come to the conclusion that
her disorder was absolutely necessary for guaranteeing the
equilibrium of the family, and that until other changes occurred
they could advise nothing better than that she continue to eat as
little as possible. At this point the patient’s spirit of antagonism
might be relied upon to function in her own interests rather than
against them.
Having emerged, then, from a study of schizophrenia, the
systemic approach was giving its best results with a quite different
disturbance. Significantly, however, when Selvini turned her
attention to schizophrenia and attempted to satisfy Bateson’s
hope that there would one day be an elaborate model describing
the family relationships underlying the disorder, she could not
repeat her success.
In ‘Toward a Theory of Pathological Systems’ (1969), Jay
Haley had sought to save the idea of the double bind by
extending it to include three players in a so-called ‘perverse
triangle’, this as a result of his observation that schizophrenics
tended to be deeply involved in their parents’ relationships. In
her book, Psychotic Games in the Family, Selvini elaborated on
this, painting a picture of stalled and embattled marriages where a
child is drawn by one parent into a covert alliance against the
other, only to realise at a moment of crisis that the favoured
parent is in fact exploiting him or her as a strategic element in the
ongoing marital struggle. Not only is the child shocked and
betrayed, but he also finds himself unable to protest, because the
alliance itself is the source of feelings of guilt.
Selvini’s innovation here was to introduce the element of
history into the systemic approach. Her portrayal of the anorex-
ic’s family had been largely ahistoric, an ongoing never-declared
power struggle across the board. Now, however, there was a
precise series of events, a development that went some way to
countering the objection that the double bind did not explain
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why a symptom broke out at a particular moment. One could not
appreciate how to alter a system of relationships and communica-
tion patterns, Selvini suggested, nor what resistance such an
attempt might provoke, until one understood what events
underlay it.
As a method both of research and therapy, Selvini proposed
that the therapist dismiss the children, including the patient, from
therapy, see only the parents and instruct them to announce to
other family members that everything that happened in therapy
was a secret they would not betray. After which they were to
begin a series of unannounced evening disappearances designed
to create the impression that a marital complicity had been re-
established.
The results of the approach were explosive. The frequency with
which members of the family would complain that they were
being excluded from the parental relationship, to the extent of
calling the police because ‘he would never go out with her
without telling me first’, convinced Selvini that the model she was
developing was accurate. She also claimed dramatic improve-
ments in patients whose parents had managed to put together at
least a fac¸ade of complicity, thus liberating the child from the
anxiety, excitement and dilemmas of involvement in their
parents’ relationship. Unfortunately, however, she could provide
few statistics for lasting transformations. Even more crucially for
the fate of her ideas, she made the mistake of describing these
relationships in ‘the schizophrenic family’ as ‘giochi sporchi’
which, translated into English, produced the even more unfortu-
nate-sounding ‘dirty games’. It seemed she was not only blaming
the parents, but accusing them of callous indifference to the
welfare of their children.
Psychotic Games in the Family was published in 1986, but even
before its appearance its preliminary presentation was violently
attacked by Carol Anderson on the pages of the Journal of
Marital and Family Therapy. Anderson (who is presently editor
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of the influential review Family Process) rightly took Selvini to
task for her cavalier approach to documentation and statistics, but
in the end her objections were more emotional than methodo-
logical. ‘I thought,’ she writes, ‘of the pain experienced by the
families I’ve known as they struggled with their problems. How
would they feel if they heard their desperate patterns of coping
being described as “dirty games”?’
The position of outrage adopted by Anderson and others was
testimony to a deep swing in opinion that no doubt went far
beyond the borders of psychiatry and clinical psychology.
However, in the particular area of family therapy, her stance
consolidated a growing alliance with mainstream psychiatry
which has always insisted, despite, it must be said, the absence to
date of any conclusive results, that schizophrenia is mainly
organic and genetic in nature. As Ugazio points out in her book,
with regard to schizophrenia the systemic approach had not
proved to be an easy alternative. It had also raised innumerable
hackles. Even if Selvini was right in her analysis of the family
systems surrounding schizophrenics (decades of literature on such
families suggest she was not entirely wrong), nevertheless, their
resistance to change, unlike that of the anorexic’s family, went far
beyond the powers of a therapist with a few spanners to throw.
For a child who from earliest consciousness has been lured into a
triangle in which the parents are perpetually at daggers drawn, it
will be hard to believe that Mum and Dad have suddenly resolved
their problems and chosen to exclude you. At a moment of
psychotic crisis, the tranquillisers and dopamine blockers, though
never a cure, are a more reassuring alternative than a long and
perhaps agonising re-examination of tangled relationships.
From this point on, then, family therapy largely threw in the
towel in the area of schizophrenia. Or at least, where such therapy
is still used, it seeks less and less to achieve a ‘cure’ through a
radical reorganisation of a family’s way of communicating, and
concentrates instead on helping families live with a symptom to
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be treated primarily through drugs. ‘Often one has the impres-
sion,’ wrote Selvini in her reply to Anderson, ‘that the times of
Gregory Bateson and his colleagues are only a glorious memory.’
It is in the light of this defeat that Ugazio’s decision to exclude
schizophrenia from her book must be understood. In recuperat-
ing and re-elaborating Bateson’s theories, as well as drawing on a
huge range of reading in psychology and philosophy, she seems
determined to give back to systemic therapy an intellectual
dignity compromised by the many books that have told scarcely
credible tales of dramatic cures, unsupported by theory or
methodology. Basically, she seeks to produce an overwhelming
combination of argument and evidence to demonstrate that the
well-defined disorders she has chosen to discuss – phobias,
obsessive compulsions and anorexia – are indeed the result of the
way sufferers have reacted to particular family situations. Her
implication is: once we have established that ground, perhaps we
can get back to ‘the stumbling stone for every psychological
interpretation of mental illness’: schizophrenia.
The crucial innovation of Ugazio’s book is the way she
combines Bateson’s theories of schismogenesis and the double
bind. It is the schismogenetic manner in which character forms
around semantic polarities in the family, she claims, that can, in
special circumstances, place certain members rather than others in
that position of intolerable dilemma known as the double bind.
Ugazio’s reformulation of the latter idea, designed to meet all
the objections described above, is complex and draws heavily on
the work of communications experts, Cronen, Johnson and
Lannamann. As well as insisting on the importance of the
personal history of the eventual sufferer, Cronen et al suggested a
certain ingenuousness in Bateson’s original formulation. It is not
that one side of a given message is true but hidden (a mother’s
antipathy) and the other false but apparent (her veneer of
affection), but rather that the ‘social reality’, and with it the very
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epistemology of the eventual sufferer, is constructed around a
lifetime of contradictory but equally ‘true’ (in the sense of
sincerely meant) messages. In this scenario there is no question
then of isolating a single message that would present a double
bind for everybody. Context is all.
Let us return to the family who put a high price on
independence. This is the kind of family, Ugazio maintains,
whose schismogenetic dynamics can lead to one member suffer-
ing from a phobia. How? We can imagine an adventurous,
entrepreneurial father, frequently absent, a mother who assumes a
‘complementary’ position, very much attached to her husband,
admiring his spirit, but thinking of herself as at the other extreme
of the polarity dependence/independence. A first son is encour-
aged to occupy a position symmetrical to the father’s and does so.
He will compete for the palm of independence. The mother at
once admires and is concerned, perhaps a little lonely. A second
son becomes extremely attached to her. She finds consolation in
his presence while never withdrawing her love and admiration
from her husband and first son. As he reaches a higher level of
consciousness, the second son senses that to win the kind of
regard afforded to the others, he must be as radically independent
of Mother as they are. But in detaching himself from her, he will
lose the privileged position he has occupied to date and around
which he has constructed his identity.
Without there being any single contradictory message, or
anybody ‘behaving badly’ in any way, an environment has been
created where both the self-esteem of independence and the
gratifications of attachment begin to seem at once absolutely
desirable yet mutually exclusive. What life story can such a person
construct for himself?
Ugazio gives detailed case histories showing the kind of
strategies a person who has grown up in such a situation will
develop: thirty-year-old Alberto has a proudly independent
lifestyle counterbalanced by a series of superficial relationships
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which allow him to put off any serious emotional commitment;
Elisa, on the contrary, has married an independent man, but has
so successfully presented herself as fragile that, despite his
ambitions, he has agreed to their living next door to her parents
where she remains very closely attached to her mother. Both of
these eventual patients can be seen to be occupying one side or
the other of the dependence/independence polarity while yearn-
ing for the other.
Ugazio describes the situations that may undermine such
strategies and lead to the development of phobias. Alberto comes
for therapy because he is no longer able to use an elevator and
suffers severe panic attacks when he travels on planes. His
claustrophobia developed shortly after the death of his father, and
his being dropped by a recent girlfriend. It is not, Ugazio
remarks, the bereavement or new responsibility resulting from the
father’s death that has led to the crisis, but the intense intimacy
that was established with the father during his sickness. This,
together with the unexpected loss of a girlfriend, is forcing
Alberto to acknowledge an intense need for attachment, but for
him to succumb to that need would bring an unacceptable loss of
self-esteem. As he seeks to ignore and repress the issue, the
claustrophobic symptoms, the horror of the enclosed space – and
in particular those enclosed spaces he needs to use if he is to
continue his independent lifestyle – become a powerful meta-
phorical reminder of his aversion to and yet need of the tightly
enclosed relationship. Though he has no plans to enter therapy
with his family, Alberto chooses a systemic therapist because he
feels that this will not involve the development of a close
relationship of the variety associated with traditional psychoanaly-
sis. Thus, even while gritting his teeth and admitting a problem,
he is simultaneously seeking to reinforce his independence. In the
first session he demands to become like ‘a tower that will not fall’.
With a ‘strategy’ diametrically opposed to Alberto’s, giving
more importance to attachment yet yearning for independence,
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Elisa’s crises are agoraphobic rather than claustrophobic. They
force her to stay at home. The first came as she stepped on board
the cruiser for her honeymoon. Ugazio remarks: ‘Going to
Greece meant a decisive move away from the protective relation-
ship with her mother . . . not to go meant damaging her marriage
and the independence and self-esteem that went with it.’ In her
case, the ensuing mental disorder does not so much resolve the
problem as remove it from discussion. Her husband will give up
the cruise, and many other adventurous projects over the decade
before they enter therapy, not because Elisa isn’t genuinely
enthusiastic and supportive, on the contrary, but because she is
ill, she can’t go out.
While those suffering from phobias face a double bind that
makes self-esteem and long-term attachment mutually exclusive,
the obsessive-compulsive, in Ugazio’s model, has the more
profound problem of being obliged to choose between opposite
and equally unacceptable visions of self. Here the patient’s family
constructs its conversation around the opposites sacrificial renun-
ciation/selfish indulgence. The sufferer is a child adopting a
median position, not unlike the position Bateson occupied
between his father and brother. A huge appetite for life,
stimulated by those in the family occupying the selfish side of the
polarity, makes a path of self-renunciation unbearable to contem-
plate. But the label of selfishness placed on almost any engage-
ment with pleasure destroys self-esteem, which, for reasons of
early attachment, largely depends on the judgement of someone
occupying the renunciatory side of the polarity.
The classic symptoms of the obsessive-compulsive are of two
kinds: compulsively repeated actions like washing hands or
checking that a door has been locked (Ugazio recounts the case
of a man who stopped his car every few hundred yards to see if he
had run over a child or an animal). These may be seen as the
neurotic reactions of one for whom every adventure into life
generates guilt. The obsessions, on the other hand, take the form
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of the invasion of highly erotic or violent images over which the
mind has no control. These can be seen as the repressed yearnings
of one who is determinedly seeking self-esteem in renunciation
and repression.
Again Ugazio offers examples suggesting how the condition
can arise in particular family scenarios and the strategies devel-
oped to deal with it. Particularly intriguing is her account of the
tendency to cultivate a hierarchical vision of ‘evil’ which allows a
‘selfish’ self to flourish just so long as it remains under the control
of a superior ‘sacrificial’ self. The case history of a hard-working
priest living with his mother but allowing himself homosexual
adventures in third world countries is instructive here. At the age
of thirty, the priest had been hospitalised for two months with an
acute obsessive-compulsive disorder. After decades of relative
health his symptoms recur when he is fifty-nine. Usually on
return from his ‘holidays’, his mother (decidedly on the renuncia-
tory side of the critical polarity), though not privy to his secret,
had been extremely severe, giving a welcome sense of punishment
and facilitating his renewed acceptance of his ‘higher’ self. But
after the most recent trip the elderly lady was indulgent and spoke
of her ‘not always being there to look after him’. Suddenly the
priest feels that the guarantee that his homosexuality will remain
strictly circumscribed is gone. The conflict between selfishness
and renunciation is renewed with obsessive erotic images,
insomnia and extreme anxiety as the result.
Ugazio makes it clear that her book is to be seen more as an
analysis of the causes of the disorders she discusses than a manual
of therapeutic approaches. There are no prescriptions, no large
claims. On the contrary, she recognises that by linking these
disorders to the very process by which the patient’s character has
been formed, her model demands that successful therapy achieve
nothing less than a reconstruction of the patient’s deepest
epistemology. All the same, and despite these sensible caveats, it
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seems only legitimate that the reader ask what hope her new
systemic model offers for the sufferers she describes.
The issue of therapy is finally, if rather unsatisfactorily,
addressed in the book’s last chapter. Ugazio clearly does not
favour the dramatic forms of intervention proposed by Haley and
Selvini. But nor does she take Bateson’s pessimistic line that such
matters are too delicate to be interfered with at all. Rather she
suggests that, having established the critical semantic polarity
which dominates the patient’s life and within which he is unable
to find a satisfactory position, the therapist can begin to look for
other polarities around which the family of origin composed
itself, since, as she insists, no family, however fierce the
schismogenetic process, will be limited to just one polarity. In so
far, she claims, as she has alleviated and in many instances
eliminated the symptoms of the patients described in the book,
this has been achieved by gradually playing down the importance
of the critical polarity and building on any others available in the
patient’s experience to generate self-esteem in different ways and
lead him or her to contemplate an entirely different life story. In
this process, the original double bind does not so much disappear
– after all, most of us are aware of, for example, a certain
incompatibility between complete independence and close
attachments – as become less urgent and all-determining.
In line with this approach, Ugazio concludes by remarking that
one of the great dangers of therapy arises when therapist and
patient concede the same importance to the same semantic
polarity. Obsessive-compulsives, she claims, will tend to go to
traditional Freudian analysts, because Freud himself saw the
world in terms of indulgence and repression. This explains why,
while offering such brilliant accounts of the disorder, Freud
himself lamented his limited success in curing it. He could not
move patients away from a vision he shared. Any inflexible
approach to mental disturbance thus runs the risk of becoming, as
Blake put it, another of ‘man’s mind forg’d manacles’, and may
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lead to situations where the therapist is actually exacerbating the
patient’s difficulties. It is with this caveat that Ugazio bows out
by suggesting that ‘With respect to this [her own] as to other
models of mental disturbance I believe the therapist must
maintain a wise irreverence.’
The modesty here is admittedly exemplary, yet after the
brilliance of her analysis of how double binds and illnesses can
occur, one cannot help wishing that Ugazio had spent longer
describing the process by which they may be eroded. And since
various asides in Storie permesse indicate that she has worked with
schizophrenics for many years, one likewise wishes that she had
thrown caution to the winds and told us straight whether or not
she believes her model is applicable to that most intractable of
disorders. But perhaps these are to be the subjects of other books.
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Christina Stead: Our Luck
[Christina Stead]
Aside from all the betrayals and broken friendships, the abortions
and depressions, and, in old age, two decades of inertia and
alcoholism, the real scandal of Christina Stead’s life, one feels on
reading Hazel Rowley’s fine biography of the Australian novelist,
is that right up to her death in 1983 she remained not only a
hard-line communist but a declared Stalinist. In the teeth of the
evidence, this brilliant and supremely gifted woman, who spent
much of her life toing and froing between Europe and the United
States, neither relented nor retracted.
The great scandal of Stead’s novels, on the other hand, at least
as seen by those who shared her political views, was that they
could not have been more damaging to the cause of communism,
or indeed any reformist position. Invariably and with lavish
ferocity these works attack the prophets and spokesmen of the
political ideals Stead claimed to hold dear. Such people are
greedy, self-serving and sexually dishonest. The very notion that
society might be organised on behalf of the masses and the weak
is blown away by the fury and rapture of individual appetite. Yet
outside the novels Stead remained a loyal Soviet Marxist and was
outraged by all defections. What is going on?
‘I don’t know what imagination is,’ says Letty Fox in the
eponymous novel, ‘if not an unpruned, tangled kind of memory.’
Though the claim comes early on in this long book, and is made
what’s more by one of the flightiest narrators fiction has ever
produced, nevertheless the reader will immediately take it as
confirmation of what he has already suspected: flagrantly
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unpruned and tangled beyond any unravelling, the six hundred-
plus pages of Letty Fox: Her Luck are the seductive and savage
reworking of an apparently inexhaustible memory, its author’s as
much as its narrator’s.
Christina Stead certainly had much to remember by the time
she came to this, her sixth novel. Born in a southern suburb of
Sydney in 1902, her literary ambitions, radical politics and
difficult love life brought her first to London, then Paris, then
New York. She had known success and failure, romance and
rejection; she had worked for the Communist Party and collabo-
rated, simultaneously, with corrupt financiers. But however
complex and contradictory her career and relationships may have
become, Stead’s memories still tended to organise themselves
around the two great stories that had shaped her life: the story of
the bizarre Australian family she grew up in, and the story of the
Jewish American community she ultimately became part of. The
first was a horror story with comic interludes, the second a
romance with recurrent nightmares. The five novels before Letty
Fox, all equally extravagant and daring, had kept the two stages of
her life apart; they dealt with either the one story or the other.
Published in 1946, after she had been resident in New York for
nine years and when her literary reputation at last seemed
established, Letty Fox: Her Luck contrives to tangle them both.
Stead’s early unhappiness is easily understood. The plain, big-
boned daughter of a pretty mother who died when she was two,
Christina soon found herself an unwanted extra in her father’s
second family. ‘My stepmother was kind to me,’ she later
conceded of Ada Stead, ‘until her first child was born.’ Five more
children would follow. From the beginning, Stead’s writing
would always convey a sense of life’s exhausting excess. ‘Living is
too much for me,’ says Letty Fox, who is herself more than a
handful for those around her. It is as if Stead were telling us that
her own explosive vitality was no more than a necessary defence
against the world’s threatening profusion.
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Self-taught biologist and pioneering socialist, a man of
immense energy and greater vanity, Stead’s handsome father
contrived to complicate his adolescent daughter’s isolation by
making Christina his confidante in what had now become the
epic struggle between himself and his wife. David Stead had made
this second marriage at least partly for money. The couple had
moved into an extravagant mansion immediately after the
wedding. But when Ada’s father died, her family was found to be
as deeply in debt as it had previously appeared to be swimming in
wealth. Reduced to poverty, obliged to make do with ramshackle
accommodation, Ada sulked. The charismatic David found her
plain and dull. Christina, on the other hand, was intelligent
beyond her years. How sad, however, as he never tired of
reminding her, that she was also ‘a fat lazy lump’.
On research trips to Malaysia and Paris, David Stead, a staunch
supporter of women’s rights and a great believer in eugenics,
wrote his daughter long letters sharing his enthusiasm for the
superior and slender beauty of the women of those countries.
Bulky Christina yearned to travel. When she was seventeen her
father fell in love with a sixteen-year-old girl, Thistle Harris, and
would eventually run off with this pretty junior. Again he made
the ugly duckling of his brood his confidante. Twenty years later,
from the distant fortress of Manhattan, his daughter took her
revenge. I know of no account of father and family more
generously observed or more irremediably cruel than the auto-
biographical novel The Man Who Loved Children. Published in
1940, it remains Stead’s most frightening and ruthless work. At
the height of her powers, she was thus able to begin Letty Fox
with the worst of that old bitterness exorcised. She was ready to
have fun.
The passage from family of origin to partner of election is the
story at the core of Letty Fox. In that sense, albeit with a
completely different milieu and a whole new gallery of characters,
the novel takes over where The Man Who Loved Children left off.
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In the earlier work the heroine leaves home only on the final
pages, here instead she is decidedly out of the fold and on the
make. For Stead herself, as one learns from Hazel Rowley’s
biography, this period of young adulthood was marked by the
most intense yearning and frustration. It was also the period in
which the contradiction that shaped her novels, or rather that
extended them beyond any immediately perceptible shape, first
becomes apparent.
Stead’s final school exams won her a scholarship to university,
but she was ineligible for an arts degree because she hadn’t
studied Latin. The daughter of a biologist and man of action isn’t
encouraged to grapple with fossil languages. She could have
chosen a science course and had her higher education financed by
the state, but decided against it, apparently because she had come
to associate women in science with dowdy and frustrated
spinsters. The Darwinist determinism she had learnt from her
biologist father had apparently convinced Stead that in the
struggle for survival, which was always a struggle to win the right
mate, a science degree would not be a winning card, for a
woman. The more biology a girl knew, it seemed, the more she
appreciated that it was not biology a girl needed to know.
This disturbing lesson was reinforced, in Stead’s case, by the
fiercest erotic longings, desires which, if only because they
couldn’t be talked about in the puritan society she grew up in,
she often feared would drive her mad. Would a plain girl find a
lover and husband? ‘Hunger of the stomach can be confessed,’
she later wrote in a note for the novel For Love Alone, ‘but not
sexual hunger.’ In Letty Fox, Christina Stead would make it her
business to be alarmingly frank about that hunger. From earliest
adolescence, Letty lusts. ‘This fox was tearing at my vitals,’ she
tells us. Hazel Rowley remarks that ‘Stead liked the hint of
bawdiness’ in the title’s combination of the words ‘fox’ and
‘luck’.
Unable to study the arts and unwilling to take up science, the
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nineteen-year-old Stead settled on teaching, making the long
journey back and forth to training college in Sydney every day.
Rising at dawn, she wrote down stories of great fantasy that
nevertheless show an acute awareness of what was the most
urgent reality of her life: she was a highly sexed young woman
after her man, a caricature almost of the traditional gal.
But she was also a socialist and a radical. Here come the
complications. At Sydney Girls High School, Christina had been
enthusiastic when a teacher told them about the Communist
revolution in Russia. Throughout the First World War she was
staunchly pacifist. These controversial positions were again things
she had taken from her atheist but far from clear-headed father.
As he saw it, you discovered the hard facts of the biological
struggle, facts that in Europe were preparing the way for a book
like Mein Kampf, but then paradoxically, idealistically, you used
that knowledge, or said you were using it, not for your own
personal fight, or even for that of your race, but to further the
cause of mankind in a spirit of solidarity. David Stead, for
example, had established which fish off the Australian coast were
fit for human consumption, where and how they could be
caught. It was an important contribution. It also made him, if
only briefly, an important man, the sort of man a bright young
girl might run away with.
There was an irony to this of course: the altruism of the
common cause had proved an efficient way for the individual
male of the species to get what he wanted: a young woman. But
would the same be true for the female? Attending a politicised
evening course at Sydney University, a course whose object,
according to one student, was nothing less than ‘the reform of
the Universe’, Christina Stead fell determinedly in love with the
left-wing lecturer Keith Duncan. Alas, she was not in a position to
offer him either what her father could offer Thistle Harris, or
what Thistle could offer her father. Perhaps it was at this point
that Stead began to appreciate the hypocrisy and contradiction in
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her father’s position. Certainly the comedy that everywhere
galvanises Letty Fox is the mismatch between the idealistic
rhetoric of radicalism and the biologically driven power game
between men and women. Both Stead and Letty dream of the
grand individual career, the generous altruistic gesture and
traditional romantic love. Since such romance notoriously
involves feminine submission, the combination proves arduous.
What was required, it seemed, was an improbable stroke of luck.
Stead failed to become a teacher. In the classroom she lost her
voice, arriving at the school gates she panicked. Again the
problem was the fear of a virginity prolonged into old age. School
was a place where ‘a woman was not a woman’. Bound over to
teaching for five years to pay for her training, she had to struggle
hard to escape without a heavy fine. She was lonely now. Keith
Duncan and other radical friends had left for England and the
wider world. They had travel scholarships. But for Stead there
were no such handouts. She worked for two years as a secretary to
save the money to follow Duncan. He wrote to encourage her,
then to put her off. Would they ever become lovers? Every day
she walked miles to save tram fares. A special kind of feminism
was developing in Stead. She wasn’t interested in rights and
equality as ends in themselves, but in relation to the struggle to
marry one’s man.
Then, at last in England, aged twenty-five, Christina Stead did
get what she would always consider her one great piece of luck in
life: she met the man with whom she could combine both career
and romance. It wasn’t Keith Duncan. Duncan had led her on,
but wouldn’t commit himself. He wouldn’t even take her to bed.
It was Christina’s new employer, ten years older than herself, who
finally relieved his young secretary of her virginity. In a letter
home announcing imminent marriage, Stead described him thus:
‘William James Blech is a German Jew of American upbringing,
small, very loquacious, very astute in business and literary affairs
and art, highly educated and original.’ Some years later, as a
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precautionary measure against arrest for fraudulent bankruptcy,
William Blech changed his name to William Blake. It was a gesture
typical of his innocent charm and considerable presumption.
In fact Blech, like Stead’s father, was entirely self-taught. Like
her father he was a radical, indeed a communist, though he
worked for a decidedly shady banking company. Like her father,
he had boundless energy and optimism. And like her father, alas,
he was married. He had a wife and daughter. Wedding bells were
far from imminent. Once again, Stead was an anomalous creature
on the edge of a family that didn’t quite know what to do with
her. The second story of her life, the second great struggle had
begun. Having gratefully given herself to this man, she must now
persuade him to persuade his wife to agree to a divorce. Stead’s
staunch communism, her unquestioning support for Bill’s
unceasing political endeavours, would be a crucial part of that
struggle.
I can think of no author for whom milieu is more important
than for Christina Stead, no author who works harder to create
the social settings of her novels and to convey the sense that
character and background are inseparable. She appreciates the
irony that although the individual struggles above all for himself,
and although his primary experience is that of being alone,
nevertheless he does not create or even possess that self, but is
very largely a product of his own milieu.
No doubt this knowledge came from being so frequently
forced to change milieu herself. Having met Blech in London, so
soon after arrival from Sydney, she at once agreed to his moving
her nearer to his wife and daughter in Paris. She loved it. In Paris,
well dressed, speaking French, she decided she was not so plain
after all. Place changes you. Over the next few years she lived in
London again, then New York, Spain, Belgium, London and – at
last a few years of stability – New York.
She made copious notes on every community she came in
contact with. She changed languages, accents. She wrote books
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set in Australia, England, France, the USA, set in the lower class,
the middle class, among expatriates. Each work was testimony to
her own determination to adapt and survive, to fit in; or perhaps
one should rather say, to shine whatever the milieu, whatever
society she chose to write about or style she chose to use. Her
first novel, Seven Poor Men of Sydney, rediscovers and reproduces
the Australia of her youth. Moving back and forth from London
to Paris, her second, The Beauties and Furies, shows an intimate
awareness of the Englishman and his relationship with France,
but also a readiness to measure herself with Lawrence, Joyce and
the most innovative fiction of the century. The House of All
Nations is entirely at home in the international banking commun-
ity of northern Europe, while The Man who Loved Children and
Letty Fox are both written in a determinedly American idiom.
Later in life, after a spell in Newcastle, Stead would produce a
completely convincing novel of the English working classes:
published in 1966, Cotter’s England, was a feat far beyond mere
mimicry and suggests an extraordinary facility for penetrating an
alien group psychology.
But in the decade that led up to the writing of Letty Fox, Stead
was above all determined to fit in with Bill Blech’s family, with
the German mother, the expensively educated American daugh-
ter, the wife whom she must never meet, and, in short, with the
whole Jewish American community and its cosmopolitan tradi-
tions. It was here that her penetrative eye must go deepest. How
else could she hope to win through, to arrive, if not at the altar,
then at least the registry office?
Letty Fox: Her Luck was the fruit of those long years of
adaptation, an exuberant muddling of Stead’s own girlhood
memories, with her meticulous observations of Blech’s now adult
daughter, Ruth, who was a frequent visitor at the Stead/Blech
me´nage in New York. Ruth becomes the model, or one of the
models, for Letty. She is given all the contradictions that formed
the core of Stead’s experience: the erotic charge, the romantic
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longings, the left-wing politics, the desire to be both beautiful
and brilliant, to be admired and feared, to love with feminine
faithfulness and submission and with masculine presumption and
promiscuity. It’s an explosive cocktail.
The relationships around Letty are likewise a retangling of
those Stead knew best. So the heroine is given a father who, like
Bill Blech, is a businessman radical, still married yet living with a
mistress, who thus becomes, at least potentially, a portrait of
Stead herself. Then Bill Blech, of course, was not unlike
Christina’s father, David Stead, another radical who left his wife
for a mistress. The book is a hall of mirrors as far as possible
identifications are concerned. Certainly when it was published all
of Blech’s extended family would see themselves in it. The only
character who was unrecognisable was Letty’s father’s mistress:
cool, level-headed, beautiful and practical, Persia was as different
from Christina as her exotic name suggests.
Wasn’t this blatant mixture of fiction and reality a risk for
Christina? Couldn’t it perhaps lead to a break-up with Bill, to
whom she still wasn’t married, particularly if his daughter was to
be presented as wild and promiscuous and Bill as an ineffectual
father who kept wife and mistress happy by lying to them both?
Reading Rowley’s biography one becomes aware of an unspoken
pact between Stead and Blech. She would never disagree with
him politically and he would never take an offence at what she
wrote in a novel. It is to Blech’s immense credit, after all, that he
was the first to appreciate Stead’s talent. Discovering his
secretary’s ambitions, he had asked to see a manuscript and, an
able writer himself, recognised at once that it was remarkable.
Her genius, perhaps, would excuse his betrayal of his family. It
must be given full reign. ‘Dear Bill said once to me,’ Stead
recounted, ‘that he would like to be to me what G.H. Lewes was
to George Eliot . . . I was not very pleased, because G.E. was not
a pretty girl.’
Stead would also one day remark that she only felt truly ‘moral’
293
Hell and Back
when writing, and again that she had only ‘felt herself’ when
writing. Perhaps what she meant was that in this supposedly
fictional space she was free not to adhere to certain ideals, not to
be coherent, to tell a truth or two. ‘Radicalism is the opium of the
middle class,’ announces an incensed Letty. Stead is enjoying
herself. What luck to be able to say such things! And if this was
the only space where she could be herself, where she could say
she loved a man but found him unforgivable, or alternately that
she loved a man but yearned for other men, or again that she was
deeply attracted to women, but found lesbianism abhorrent, then
little wonder she made the books long, and furious. The novels
would express all the wild life no orthodoxy could embrace. ‘He
had some wonderful vision of the future,’ Letty remarks of a
black man who falls in love with her, ‘where no hate would exist,
only love between peoples and races, this was fine enough, but I
live too much in the here and now; this is my great weakness.’ It
was Stead’s strength as a novelist.
The here and now of Letty Fox is overwhelmingly New York.
Stead is determined to demonstrate that she has gained full
command of Bill’s world. It opens thus:
One hot night last spring, after waiting fruitlessly for a call
from my then lover, with whom I had quarrelled the same
afternoon, and finding one of my black moods on me, I flung
out of my lonely room on the ninth floor (unlucky number) in
a hotel in lower Fifth Avenue and rushed into the streets of the
Village, feeling bad.
Letty is always flinging out of rooms, rushing across streets.
She is always full of energy and always on the edge of depression.
Above all, she always needs money. The long first paragraph
finishes:
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Beyond such petty expenses, I needed at least two hundred
and fifty dollars for a new coat. My fur coat, got from my
mother, and my dinner dress, got from my grandmother, were
things of the past and things with a past, mere rags and too
well known to all my friends. There was no end to what I
needed.
Immediately, we have the picture of Stead’s America, a place
where love and money cannot be separated, where relationships
are talked about in terms of investments and cutting losses, where
people enjoy the illusion that the marriage game can be managed,
and evaded, like an income tax return. It’s savvy, cynical, full of
corrupt life. But no sooner has Stead seduced us with the bubbly
frankness of Letty’s voice than we are to be repulsed by the brutal
consequences.
Acting on the principle that the greatest asset a girl has is her
availability (for men), Letty decides she must have an apartment
of her own. On 11th Street she sees the signs of a family moving
out. However, a haggard woman informs her that she has already
taken the place, she needs it desperately for herself, her husband
and three children. ‘I went down half a block,’ says Letty, ‘saw
the woman had left the railings and was rounding the other
corner. I, at once, went back, had an interview with the
superintendent’s wife, promised her thirty dollars (the old woman
had promised twenty dollars) to hold the place for me, agreed to
paint the place myself, exterminate vermin, and to move in in less
than a week, and so forth. It was discussed and concluded within
the hour.’
The needy woman with first claim on the apartment is never
again mentioned. No compassion is shown her. Needless to say,
Letty is a left-wing radical. America, as Stead sees it, is that place
where the struggle of everyone against everyone else is most
visible and the rhetoric of concern at its absolute thinnest. Yet it is
impossible not to appreciate the gusto with which Letty enters
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the fray. Wondering whether she should accept a job offer in
return for sex, Letty tells us: ‘I do not even see a scandal in this,
for wide-awake women. In other times, society regarded us as
cattle or handsome house slaves, the ability to sell ourselves in any
way we like is a step towards freedom.’ Later in the book the
terms are reversed, but the principle the same: ‘I had the feeling
that he could have been bought,’ Letty remarks of one reluctant
lover, ‘if I had had a little more money.’
Having given us just a dozen sparkling pages on the twenty-
three-year-old Letty’s life in wartime Manhattan, Stead then goes
back to reconstruct her narrator’s childhood. It is here that the
reader will first boggle at what Angela Carter referred to as
Stead’s ‘almost megalomaniac ambition’. The ‘almost’ was
unnecessary. It is the sheer scope of the enterprise that is so
extraordinary. Stead, an Australian, goes right back to the
beginning of the century to reconstruct the rich New England
family of Letty’s maternal grandmother, the notorious Cissy
Morgan, then the German Jewish family of her paternal grand-
mother. Uncles, aunts and cousins, marry, divorce and remarry.
We have their foibles, ambitions, views on education and endless
improprieties. None of these are mere vignettes or anecdotes, but
highly developed studies integrated in a tangled series of
interlocking stories that could well fill a book of their own. What
they establish beyond all dispute is that Letty, like so many
modern children, knows far too much far too young.
The satire is vast, fed constantly by the ancient struggle
between the sexes and the modern American woman’s discovery
of alimony. At great length we learn of the unhappily complex
relationship between Letty’s father Solander and her mother
Mathilde, then his passion for the younger woman who becomes
his mistress. Eagle-eyed, always excited, Letty wants to know
what all this means. By the time her father leaves home, she and
her younger sister Jacky have already learnt how to present
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themselves as victims and make the most of it. They know that
compassion is a harbinger of gifts, hopefully cash.
The daughters are moved in with relatives, they are taken to
England, to Paris, they write extremely long, witty, passionate
letters in highly individual voices, seeking to impress their father,
or calm their mother. Slowly and with complete conviction, Stead
shows the two sisters becoming distinct as they react first to the
overall situation and then to each other’s response to it, seeking
individuality through complementary or competitive behaviour.
We see character in the making.
Meanwhile, stories you thought must have ended, start again.
An uncle you imagined married and forgotten reappears with
debts and a mistress. He tries to seduce a niece. A cousin is
becoming a whore, or a saint. An aunt turns up with a child, but
without a husband. The book smoulders, flaring up where you
thought it extinguished, smoking where you had seen no fire.
But where is the whole thing going? If every form of narrative
representation is essentially a convention, a pact between writer
and reader as to how experience can be talked about, then it is
only natural that the finest authors should be uneasy with some
aspect of that convention, eager to bend it closer to the grain of
their own lives. What Stead most resisted in traditional narrative
was any easy formulation of shape and direction, any neatness,
‘the neatly groomed little boy in sailor collar’, she called it,
speaking disparagingly of the fiction the publishers liked most. In
contrast, the exuberance and manic extension of the world she
depicts in Letty Fox denies any possibility of order. The work is
rich and capricious, its descriptions dense, vital and highly
particularised; its only overall drift is that of Letty’s growing up.
Not surprisingly then, it is with the depiction of Letty’s
adolescence and young womanhood that Stead achieves her most
impressive effect in this book. For perhaps three hundred pages
we have been given a dazzling social satire, a tragicomic picture
of a modern society where, with all traditional hierarchy broken
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down, the only possible relationship between people, above all
between men and women, is competition and conflict; it is the
mirror image at a social level of the political war that is raging in
Europe as Stead writes her story. Yet up to this point, the reader
feels, the whole book, bar the opening dozen pages, might well
have been written in third person; for Letty is retailing stories she
has heard, or overheard, stories she understands only in the most
superficial fashion. She feels superior to these people with their
incomprehensibly muddled lives. There is a consequent narrative
distance. And, as with most satires, the reader too feels a certain
smug, if uneasy, detachment. There is something slightly grotes-
que about all these Morgans and Foxes with their interminable
passions. Letty feels sure she will do better.
But the moment Letty too becomes subject to sexual desire,
everything changes. It is as if a sane psychiatrist, chuckling over
the antics of his lunatic patients, had himself gone mad. Suddenly
it is no laughing matter. Or it is, for there is still plenty of
comedy, but the nature of the laughter has changed. It is full of
pathos, where before it was constantly on the edge of caricature.
What had appeared to be an essentially political book is overtaken
by existential concerns: the compassion Stead arouses now is not
for the victims of poverty – the usual objects of public piety – but
for those of desire.
Moods of blackness and suffering passed through me, of fierce,
fierce intercourse such as no flesh could bear. I got up and the
fever that raged through my body was intolerable. Yes, this is
the love that nymphs knew on afternoons when Pan chased
them, I thought, this is the meaning of all those stories. I
thought I was passionate; now, I know what growing up is. I
thought, if it is going to be like this, this suffering and
madness, I will kill myself now, for in the difficulty of getting
married nowadays and of getting a child, that cooling cold
stone of a child which stands in the hot belly and makes a
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woman heavy and tired, forgetting all her cruel fervours, that
thing that drags her to the doors of the death-house and away
from the intolerable ardours of the sun, in this slow world for
women, I cannot live, I will kill myself.
Letty does not kill herself. She goes out and finds another
lover. And another. Sexual conquest brings with it a gust of
energy. Letty studies hard, works hard, she goes to meetings to
discuss socialism and reform, achieving the ‘cheerful feeling that a
lot is wrong with the universe; and it’s marvellous to be able to
discuss it all over a Martini’. Political militancy thus emerges as
no more than a by-product of sexual happiness. Or as a way out
of distress: (‘Everyone forgot . . . my troubles and we all began to
discuss . . . the African problem.’) In one of the most powerful
scenes in the book, Letty seduces her father’s radical and
philandering friend, Luke Adams, while the older man is selfishly
trying to get her to take in a Hispanic orphan boy whom he
himself, in a moment of weakness, had agreed to look after. Letty
remarks: ‘One not only felt that, in love, this dangerous man
consulted his own pleasure and had no morals, but with him, all
altruism vanished like smoke.’
As fully drawn as any character in literature, Stead’s Letty is
marvellously talented, bursting with energy and youthful opti-
mism. What is to become of such vitality, the book wonders? And
so does Letty. How is it not to be spilled? In her biography,
Hazel Rowley feels that this is a question Stead could not answer.
The blurb to the Virago edition of 1982 shows all the feminist
publisher’s uneasiness with the answer that, on the contrary, the
novel very frankly offers, marriage: ‘Letty is a “powerful por-
trayal”,’ the blurb writer says, ‘of a woman who might have been
independent, but chose otherwise.’
But could she really have been independent? What Letty most
profoundly learns from her promiscuity, from her growing fear of
herself and of her appetite, is that marriage is not, as her
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profligate family had led her to believe, merely the legally
regulated collision of sex and economics. Something else is going
on in the long-term union of man and woman, something to
which she is inexorably drawn.
I sometimes wondered at the infinite distance between the
state of not being married . . . and the state of being married
. . . I couldn’t figure it out; perhaps I was too young, anyway;
but it savoured to me of magic, and I felt very miserable that in
this modern world something so primary, this first of all things
to a woman, smacked so strongly of the tribal priest, the smoky
cult, the tom-tom, the blood sacrifice, the hidden mystery. It
didn’t seem fair. We should have abolished all that with
enlightenment.
It is in the novel’s savouring, over so many pages, of Letty’s
growing belief, or obsession, right or wrong, that her energies
must be ‘husbanded’, that Letty Fox becomes more than a
brilliant satire. Watching a poor working girl give birth to her
illegitimate child, she muses: ‘I wish I were a mother too.
Cornelis and all the men I had played round with seemed far
away. This was the reality, and this was, truth to tell, what I, in
my blind ignorant way, was fighting for, trying to make shift with
one and all of them. But what chance has a smart, forward girl to
be innocent or maternal? That’s a dream.’
How are we to take this? No doubt Letty is in earnest, but then
she is perfectly capable of earnestly maintaining the opposite
point of view on the next page. All the same, as the chapters
accumulate and with them Letty’s frustrations, we sense the
growing seduction of that traditional dream, the pull of the
marriage bond and maternity. Sooner or later Letty will succumb.
In her case, it does not seem to be a question of choice.
The conclusion to Letty Fox: Her Luck is at once mockingly
traditional and strikingly new. It is, I believe, one of the first
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novels to offer what we might call catharsis through exhaustion.
Like many modern writers – Verga, Lawrence, Kafka, Faulkner,
Beckett – Stead faced the problem: if our vision of the world is
that it is perpetual struggle, if there is no state of harmony and
propriety to which we can be returned after the disturbing events
of our story (for however necessary she might have believed it was
for herself or her characters, Stead never viewed marriage as such
a state), then how is a novel supposed to end? Where can it leave
us? Her answer, like Thomas Bernhard’s after her, is to bring
characters and reader to such a state of plenitude, or weariness
with events, that the thing simply has to stop.
Letty moves from job to job, man to man. She is getting
nowhere. A fiance´ goes off to be a war correspondent, writes to
say he has married somebody else. Another suitor backs out
during the crucial discussion with her parents. She goes on
vacation for a ‘trial honeymoon’ with the perfect American,
Wicklow; it lasts five days. Men promise to leave their wives. Out
of curiosity, she seduces the elderly professor her sister is in love
with. But she is getting tired of it. She throws some extraordinary
tantrums. She is more and more manic, more frequently
depressed. She is appalled by herself. Without a husband ‘a
woman as strong as I am can also be strongly, wickedly lazy, and
for ever’.
But finally she, like her author, does get her one piece of luck.
In the summer of 1945 she meets an old lover as tired of the
game as she is herself, as tired as Europe then was with its
interminable war. Everybody is quite quite worn out. Ring the
wedding bells. It is not a Jane Austen ending. ‘Will this last?’
Letty asks. And she muses: ‘It is a question of getting through
life, which is quite a siege, with some self-respect. Before I was
married I had none.’ At last pregnant, she concludes: ‘The
principal thing is, I got a start in life; and it’s from now on. I have
a freight, I cast off, the journey has begun.’
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Are these closing words sardonic? Are they romantic? Or simply
practical? Or has Stead somehow managed to make them all
three? Rather than merely ambiguous, the novel contrives to go
beyond any possible resolution. It constantly invites the act of
discrimination, but only to repel it, to humiliate the critical
faculty. At the end of the day Letty is both a romantic girl and a
promiscuous opportunist, a happily married mother-to-be and a
left-wing militant.
However we are meant to take them, Letty’s final words must
have echoed in their author’s mind with increasing poignancy
over the coming years. All too soon after the publication of the
novel, Stead too would be embarking on a journey, casting off
from New York’s docks, but without her heroine’s long-desired
‘freight’. In the early days with Bill Stead had twice aborted.
While writing Letty she had suffered a miscarriage. Now, with the
war in Europe over, the Cold War had begun. America was no
place for people of their political faith. She and Bill were under
investigation by Hoover’s FBI. They had heard that the heroine
of Stead’s latest novel was a young communist. Evidently they
didn’t stop to read too many pages.
It was hard now to find either work or publishers. Sliding into
poverty the couple moved back and forth between Belgium,
Switzerland, England and France. They were outcasts. Afflicted
as ever by erotic yearnings, Stead sought to seduce Bill’s friends,
largely without result. She was humiliated. Critical acclaim had
brought little cash. Letty was banned in Australia. Bill wrote some
historical novels which sold well in East Germany. It was
impossible to get the money out. When, twenty-six years after
they had become lovers, the couple were finally able to marry,
they were living in slum conditions and Stead was advertising for
work in the local papers. She did not mention the ceremony in
letters to friends.
Stead, Rowley tells us in her biography, ‘had a knack of
arousing hostility’. Even in the days of first love when Blech did
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everything for her, she was uneasy with the situation. She was too
used to the battle of life. She needed to make the brutal gesture,
to assume the extremist position. Certainly, when Blech lay dying
she was not kind to him. She was scathing of his suffering. He
wasn’t really sick. Afterwards she regretted it. Living exclusively
on steak and alcohol, she defended his political opinions, now far
beyond the pale, with renewed vigour. But she couldn’t work,
she considered her life over: ‘my life was for that, wasn’t it? To
live with Bill. I didn’t know that was it, but it was.’ Needless to
say, all this complicated her eventual admission to the literary
canon. Novels as fine as those published by any contemporary
Nobel – Cotter’s England, Miss Herbert and A Little Tea, A Little
Chat – were admired but not celebrated.
It is no surprise that Stead was a very poor essayist and even
poorer public speaker, unless, that is, we are to take her novels
themselves as vast inconclusive essays, Letty Fox as the speech of
someone endlessly changing her mind. The problem was that
Stead could never isolate any particular message she had to get
across. She wanted to seduce, but also to provoke, or rather, to
seduce through provocation, the provocation that any single
message was unconvincing. The best writing, she claimed, was
driven by an ‘intelligent ferocity’ that would be able to speak all
the contradictions that could not be spoken in any essay,
friendship, or political movement, all the experience that risked
driving a person mad if it was left unsaid, and risked driving a
reader mad when it was. We must love her, in short, for telling us
things we do not want to hear.
In none of Stead’s novels does this formula work quite as
splendidly as in Letty Fox, if only because Letty herself is the
incarnation of this drive. Never are her men, or the reader for that
matter, more enamoured of Letty than when she is unfaithful and
bitchy. After her failed honeymoon with the ideal Wicklow, after
her refusing even to talk to him on the return train to New York,
he nevertheless comes back to her: ‘I scolded Wicklow when he
303
Hell and Back
came to see me,’ she says. ‘He grinned, sat down on a stool, took
off his hat, and remarked, “You’re more fascinating as a
termagant, Letty, than a sweet little wife.”’
As a writer, Stead is a termagant to whom one is always happy
to return. I would advise a more comfortable seat than a stool.
The gesture of removing the hat, do please note, is obligatory.
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We resent everybody who has ‘chosen’ to live in the same
epoch as ourselves, those who run at our side, who hamper our
stride or leave us behind. To put it more bluntly: all
contemporaries are odious.
Emil Cioran, History and Utopia
On this occasion annoyance was my inspiration and never did
richer music flow from my pen.
Rousseau, The Confessions
That artists are often animated by an intense and even rancorous
spirit of rivalry is a commonplace. That the nature of writing, as
opposed to painting or music, makes it possible for that rivalry to
emerge explicitly in the work itself is no more than a logical
consequence of certain givens. But what do we actually think
about writerly rivalry and rancour? Is it merely a foible, the stuff
of gossip columns – Lawrence versus Joyce, Amis versus Barnes,
seconds away for round thirteen of Rushdie versus Le Carre´? Can
we take Pope’s Dunciad, or Shelley’s Peter Bell the Third, or even
Paul Theroux’s recent demolition of V.S. Naipaul, with an
indulgent pinch of salt as no more than unhappy by-products of
more instructive performances, the sort of caprices understand-
able in those of great talent and ambition? Or could it be, rather,
that such rancour as these works exhibit is intimately bound up
with the creative process itself, that there is fizz of contradiction,
of aspiration and frustration, at the very heart of the writing
endeavour that inevitably leads to the harbouring of resentment
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and bitterness? Seen as an occupational hazard rather than an
unpleasant character trait, writerly rancour may have more to tell
us than we imagined.
When Samuel Beckett’s Molloy goes to the seaside he lays in a
store of ‘sucking stones’. ‘They were pebbles,’ he says, ‘but I call
them stones.’ Sixteen to be precise. He wants to suck them in
order, ‘turn and turn about’, as he puts it. For order gives him
pleasure. It’s a combination of physical and mental gratification
that Beckett is describing here, as when Rousseau in The
Confessions gives us his eulogy to the delicate and logistically
demanding pleasures of reading while eating. But if he is to have
this gratification – sucking the stones in order – Molloy has to
keep track of them, distinguishing one from the other as he passes
them from pocket to mouth, from mouth to pocket, the two
pockets of his greatcoat, the two pockets of his filthy old trousers.
It’s a complicated proposition for a muddled vagrant and in the
end he comes to the conclusion that in order to suck all sixteen
stones one after the other, rather than finding himself sucking
some twice or even three times and others never, he will have to
‘sacrifice the principle of trim’, have to keep all the unsucked
stones on one side, shifting them over to the other one by one
after sucking. This puts him off balance for considerable periods
and he feels ‘the weight of the stones dragging me now to one
side, now to the other’. And this is uncomfortable. ‘Here then,’
concludes Molloy gloomily, ‘were two incompatible bodily needs
at loggerheads. Such things happen.’
Beckett’s story offers a hilarious exposition of conflicting
impulses: the search at once for complete control and complete
comfort. As the project is repeatedly frustrated, the suspicion
grows that ultimately the one can only be achieved by sacrificing
the other, and above all by sacrificing symmetry, the which, we
should remember – and perhaps this was inevitable for a man so
fascinated by Dante – often serves in Beckett’s work as a
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metaphor for a world that has meaning, or even a surrogate for
such a world. Symmetry is the territory of the Divina Commedia
where everything is in the place God put it and nothing out of
line; hence its sacrifice is no small thing.
In any event, at the end of an immensely long rigmarole
Molloy suddenly gives up the farce, the hubristic endeavour if we
like, of trying to reconcile incompatibles, and does so in a typical
display of rancour and disdain:
But deep down, I didn’t give a tinker’s curse about being off
my balance, dragged to the right hand and the left, backwards
and forwards. And deep down it was all the same to me
whether I sucked a different stone each time or always the
same stone until the end of time . . . And the solution to which
I rallied in the end was to throw away all the stones but one,
which I kept now in one pocket, now in another, and which of
course I soon lost, or threw away, or gave away, or swallowed.
Beckett’s work is full of such scenes: somebody embarks on a
delicate and improbable project involving the reconciliation of
irreconcilables, then gives up in a flurry of anger. This in itself
might be eloquent enough of the artistic endeavour, which has
often been described as a process of reconciling opposites. But
there is more to the passage than that.
Let us imagine the writer at work as being subject to two
dominant impulses ‘at loggerheads’: the impulse for comfort, and
the impulse for truth. All of us will recognise the impulse to
comfort: as one sets out to establish a vision of the world –
something inevitable in the writing of narrative – one trusts it will
be of a variety one can feel comfortable with. I don’t mean by
that that one seeks to portray the world as a nice place to be – the
opposite might be the case – but that our vision of ‘how the
world is’ be something that enhances our own sense of self, that
keeps us content, or at least not unhappily unhappy: in short, we
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hope it will be something we can live with. In this sense, Pope’s
vision in The Dunciad of a world stifled by the dullness of his
contemporaries is a vision he no doubt feels, as the one beacon of
consciousness revealing that gloom, not entirely uncomfortable
with. Others will find self-esteem in exposing degradation and
awfulness from a presumed moral high ground; it affords the
delirium that one is being educational, even useful. Others again
find that there is a certain consolatory pleasure to be had from
insisting in one’s writing on the fragility and perhaps even
impossibility of happiness. Whatever. Psychology has plenty of
words for describing the psyche’s habit of interpreting events in
such a way as to feel less uncomfortable with them. It is a process
necessary for sanity, and we all do this, for the most part
unconsciously.
But the writer more than others is elected, or condemned, to
deal simultaneously with that other impulse, the impulse for truth.
Indeed, the less journalistic a writer’s work, the more he invents,
so the more concerned he becomes with truthfulness. For a
journalist to find and then tell a truth, in the sense of a
demonstrable fact, may sometimes be difficult, but is not
impossible, if only because limited to this or that event or
statistic. The creative writer, on the other hand, is seeking to
create verisimilitude, of one form or another, across the board, has
to give the whole truth. Indeed, the claim to have understood,
represented, demonstrated or even decided (‘legislated’ Shelley
claimed) how things truly are is part of the writer’s hubristic
enterprise.
Precisely, however, as he aspires to such verisimilitude, the
writer will simultaneously be aware of the urge to cheat – usually
in response to the impulse for comfort. Witness Dickens as he
considers the decision: does Little Nell die or not? It would be
more comfortable if she lived. The book would also be more
welcome to his public who have made it very clear they don’t
want her dead. Dickens had a very intimate relationship with his
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public. And Dickens likes Little Nell. So his sorrow as he prepares
to dispatch her must be that he knows that for a full and truthful
picture of how the world is within the frame he has set up, the girl
must die. Fortunately, Dickens has the ultimate comfort of a
Christian Paradise hovering in the wings to cover his back. Little
Nell has flown to Paradise. How often, pre-twentieth century, the
Christian solution has been wheeled in at the end to offset,
indeed to make possible, a despairing vision of how things truly
are. One thinks of Troilus’s rancour and despair suddenly
resolved as Chaucer has his eternal soul float up into the celestial
spheres. Sadly, this particular shift is no longer available to many
of us.
The compulsion to truth is present, of course, in all art forms:
all of them one way or another have to generate recognition and
conviction in their public. But the particular problem for those
dealing with words is the way they bear, aspire to bear, defined
meaning. Hence the challenge with any extended piece of writing
is that meanings accumulate, and like it or not a world view, even
a philosophical position, can be extrapolated, discussed and
criticised within the very medium – language – in which the work
was generated. The protagonist of Robert Walser’s story ‘The
Painter’ sets out to write a light-hearted, thoughtless diary to take
his mind off his painting, but to his surprise the medium doesn’t
allow this: ‘I don’t know why,’ he says, ‘but the more I write
things down, the more I am gripped by an irresistible sense of
responsibility for what I write.’ ‘Irresistible’ would seem to be the
key word. It is not what the protagonist wanted. It has to do with
the medium. Some of the things he writes down are painful to
him. Pleasure and honesty are at loggerheads. The writing
process forces the writer to become aware of that in the same way
that Molloy’s struggles with his sucking stones bring him to the
sad truth that fundamental needs may well prove incompatible.
Of course the collision between comfort and truth can occur in
any sphere of life. One of the most famous examples might be
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Darwin’s immense unhappiness when his discovery of the
principles of evolution destroyed his crudely fundamentalist
Christian faith. How rancorously then he complained of religion
not being true! How grimly he proceeded to elaborate the
principle that had destroyed his spiritual comfort. Equally
troubled, the hitherto successful naturalist, Phillip Henry Gosse,
made a heroic attempt to reconcile comfort and truth by
elaborating a theory that God had indeed created the world in
seven days, but had done so in such a way that it appeared to have
been the result of evolution over many millions of years. Here
was creativity! The critic’s objection – why would God wish to
deceive us thus – was too much for Gosse. As a naturalist he was a
discredited and broken man. But he kept his religion. Darwin lost
his hope but kept his troubled fame and his sense of having been
entirely logical.
But if others must occasionally suffer from such incompatibil-
ity, it is absolutely endemic to the writer’s aspiration to create a
world at once convincing and pleasurable. As he seeks to do that,
and particularly as he grows older and is less easily subject to
illusion, more conscious of his own motives, the impulse to truth,
or simply this enhanced consciousness, makes him irritatingly
aware of the inadequacy of his world, or creation of it, of the fact,
in short, that he is not God (anybody who feels that I am being
extravagant here has simply not understood the Promethean
nature of the artist’s aspirations).
But what further rankles is the reflection – reflection, as
Hamlet once and for all demonstrated, has a way of rankling –
that it is precisely this awareness of shortcomings, this seeing
through one’s own work, that confers on the writer a sense of
superiority and encourages him to struggle to achieve more, to
deepen his vision. That is, the writer would not actually have it
any other way, but is not entirely happy with the way it is. He has
thus attached his identity to a process which cannot bring
serenity. Indeed, he fears serenity as something that would
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detract from his capacity for creativity. Walser’s painter turned
diarist acknowledges: ‘What is happiness: to be always at ease, I
think! But artists never, or only rarely, feel at ease.’
Necessarily, the conflict between impulse to comfort and
impulse to truth goes beyond the confines of the work itself, to
the way it is received. For not only does the author want to be
happy with his vision, and have others recognise its appropriate-
ness, but he does this chiefly because he also wishes to be
recognised himself.
Here, the word ‘recognition’ requires some clarification, for I
do not just mean praise. Praise is wonderful, but not the same as
recognition. To be praised one might run a hundred metres faster
than anyone else, or one might write a genre novel of the exact
variety you suspect everybody wants. Or one might condemn
multinationals. Or Zeus, to shift the context – for who is more
obsessed with recognition than the gods – might simply help men
by adjusting the weather in their favour. But that would mean
stooping to their vision of things. It would mean pandering to
their requirements. No it is recognition one is after, recognition
of what one really is, what one really can do. There is an
existential anxiety here that if it doesn’t go beyond vanity – does
anything? – certainly represents its acme.
Cioran writes: ‘No one can renounce at least a shadow of
immortality, and even less deny himself the right to seek it
everywhere and in whatever form of reputation, beginning with
the literary. Since death has come to be accepted by all as the
absolute end, everybody writes.’
In short, this is the mind grappling with the fact of its own
extinction.
The thirst for recognition adds a further complexity to the
conflict between the impulse to comfort and the impulse to truth,
and with it a further cause for rancour. Consider Giacomo
Leopardi. Tiny, hunchbacked, ugly – in this, even worse off than
the dwarf-like Pope – the man is indubitably great, because he is
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so terribly clear-sighted about the human condition, about
human illusion and yet manages to present his unhappy intuitions
so beautifully that, at least for the period of reading, there is great
enjoyment.
But beautiful poetry or no, Leopardi’s gloomy vision to a
considerable extent denied him success in his own lifetime, at
least outside a small and clear-sighted elite. Like the older
Dickens, he was constantly being told his work was too
depressing and pessimistic (what did Dickens go around reading
to people late in life, but his early work). Leopardi thus had good
reason to feel rancorous. Not only was his clear-sightedness, his
heightened consciousness, as he frequently tells us in his diary, a
burden to him, but it denied him the consolation of success in his
lifetime.
All the same, and here we approach the core of the matter,
Leopardi knew that it was precisely this clear-sightedness, his
ability to turn it into poetry, that made his work great, regardless
of its immediate reception. So that in a way he would not have
wished to have seen things differently.
Or would he? In his diary he comments: ‘If I could not take
refuge in posterity, in the certainty that with time my work will
find its rightful place, I would have sent literature to the devil a
thousand times.’ Yet – another turn of the screw – right in the
middle of that sentence, his clear-sightedness, the impulse to
truth, forces him to introduce the parenthesis ‘(an illusory refuge,
I know, but it’s the only one and absolutely necessary to the
serious man of letters)’.
So one writes, raising consciousness of illusion to the highest
and most uncomfortable levels, but can do so only in the thrall of
another illusion: that posterity will recognise you for having so
beautifully destroyed illusion – and that this will be a consolation.
How infuriating.
When aged twenty-eight Leopardi is for the first time able to
leave his tiny provincial village of Recanati and visit Rome, what
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does he gain from it? Only the further bitterness of confirming for
himself, ‘close up, the falsity, ineptitude and stupidity of literary
judgements’. A stupidity which, like the ‘dullness’ Pope describes
in The Dunciad, could only make his place in posterity less likely.
He comments bitterly: ‘everything in this world is done out of
the simple and constant forgetfulness of that universal truth that
all is nothing’. But this was precisely the universal truth he
expended all his energies seeking to express in a beautiful way.
It’s worth noting how potency and impotency stand shoulder to
shoulder here: the stronger the mind and its powers, the more
trapped it becomes in its awareness of futility. ‘No future here,’
comments Beckett’s narrator in Worstward Ho. Then continues:
‘Alas, yes.’ Thus, contaminated, or ennobled by its philosophical
content, the writing project has a tendency to devour itself. How
many times in his diaries Leopardi wishes he could forget the
whole thing. Not for nothing he was the first poet to write an ode
‘To a Winner with the Ball’.
The possible causes for rancour then, for one who undertakes
both to represent the world and to create a work that will give
pleasure and bring recognition, real recognition, are many, and
mutually self-sustaining: rancour towards the world for being as it
is, towards oneself for having adopted a particular position;
rancour towards others for not recognising the truth of the
matter, towards oneself again for seeking the recognition of
people who are unworthy . . . (Perhaps the reason for the terrible
retribution the gods wreaked on those who could not recognise
them was simply their irritation with themselves for having
sought such recognition.)
But the most easily vented rancour of all goes on those who, as
the writer sees it, have cheated, and gained the world’s acclaim on
easy terms . . .
For the author’s quarrel with other authors – which is usually
different from a critic’s or reader’s quarrel – has intimately to do
with how they have dealt with the struggle between comfort and
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truth. The other authors have taken an easy way out, they have
lied, they have not persisted in exposing the truth of things. They
have been lazily grandiloquent, over-optimistic. Here is Montale,
brushing aside the pompous, immensely popular D’Annunzio at
the height of Fascism:
Don’t ask us for the word that squares
Our shapeless spirit on all sides
To proclaim it in letters of fire that shine
Like a lone crocus in a dusty meadow . . .
Don’t ask us for the phrase that can open worlds,
Just a few gnarled syllables, dry like a branch.
This, today, is all that we can tell you:
What we are not, what we do not want.
At its most basic the other authors have committed the terrible
crime of not having cultivated a sufficiently high level of
consciousness. And thus they have won public affection. After all,
as Schopenhauer tells us, ‘most people have . . . as the supreme
guide and maxim of their conduct the resolve to get by with the
least possible expenditure of thought’. Why should they read
writers who wake them up? What does Pope accuse his fellow
writers of if not ‘dullness’, a lack of perception, a lack of
wakefulness. Beckett picks up the theme beautifully in this
charming swipe at the British literary establishment in Molloy.
The old vagrant is speaking of his ditch-sleeping habits.
In winter I wrapped myself in swathes of newspapers, and did
not shed them until the earth awoke, for good, in April. The
Times Literary Supplement was admirably adapted to this
purpose, of a never failing toughness and impermeability. Even
farts made no impression on it.
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Tough and impermeable, insensitive to the most fundamental
realities (‘I can’t help it, gas escapes from my fundament on the
least pretext,’ Molloy says), the TLS is something to be cast off
when the world awakes ‘for good’.
An author’s attack on other authors then, however mistaken
sometimes, however self-serving, is not just pettiness, it is also a
spreading out from the struggle going on at the heart of his own
work. Here I am, the writer tells himself, struggling to reconcile
reality with some kind of acceptable form, to achieve Kierke-
gaard’s and Nietzsche’s dream of making – if only for the duration
of the work – necessity loveable, of putting the mind and the
world into some acceptable relationship, and this other person,
whether by craft or obtusity, cheats by offering the world some
candied vision, or by pretending the important problems are
soluble, are merely a question of American imperialism, or British
colonialism, or communism, or racism, or male chauvinism. If
this continues, how will I ever be recognised after I am dead?
Don Quixote is an interesting case here. We all know that
Cervantes began the book as a satire of immediately preceding
authors. What are they lampooned for? Their ludicrously untrue
presentation of reality. ‘They are all fictions invented by idle
brains . . . to pass the time.’
So far, then, the book’s inspiration has much in common with
The Dunciad, or indeed with all screams for elbow room. But as
the work progresses another and subtler source of rancour is seen
to be at work. Don Quixote, for all his foolishness, for all his
outrageous violence, is an attractive person and his desire to see
the world as an extension of his own idealistic mind, as obeying
noble rules and regulations, as being full of beautiful damsels,
etc., is a recognisable and, in the end, attractive desire. It has to
do with the mind’s ancient quarrel, its perennial struggle to come
to terms, its own terms, please, with everything that is not itself.
So that while on the one hand the silly books that nurtured Don
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Quixote’s mentality are despised, nevertheless we identify with
the yearnings for glory and control, writerly yearnings if ever
there were, and in Cervantes’ ultimately kind treatment of Don
Quixote we can’t help suspecting the ancient rancour that the
world refuses to be as we wish it, and, arising from that, the
ancient envy of the mad, of those, that is, who despite all the
evidence believe the world is as the mind wishes it to be.
‘Everything is folly but folly itself,’ says Leopardi.
Writers, then, frequently criticise authors on their telling of the
truth. But more rarely there is the alternative charge that
someone has just been brutally pessimistic, or brutally truthful
and nothing else, without turning his work into art, without
giving pleasure. This, it seems, is more acceptable when the
content deals with the condemnation of social injustice, political
tyranny and the like, for then there is the implied optimism: here
we all are concerned about injustice, eager to have things
changed. But when it comes to matters existential, what is the
point of being merely pessimistic? Thomas Bernhard is sometimes
accused of this. And in Italy, where I live, Beckett is likewise
accused. The case is instructive because it suggests both the way a
writer’s rancour may be channelled and the pitfalls of translation.
Here is a moment from the Italian version of Watt where Arsene
gives the book’s inexperienced protagonist a foretaste of how he
will feel a few years hence:
Personalmente, come’e` ovvio, rimpiango tutto. Non una
parola, non un’azione, non un pensiero, non un bisogno, non
un dolore, non una gioa, non una ragazza, non un ragazzo,
non un dubbio, non una certezza, non uno scherno, non una
voglia, non una speranza, non un timore, non un sorriso, non
una lacrima, non un nome, non un volto, nessun momento,
nessun luogo, che io non rimpianga, esageratamente. Uno
schifo, dal principio alla fine.
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For those not familiar with Italian, here is my own translation of
that translation back into English.
Personally, as is obvious, I regret everything. Not a word, not
an action, not a thought, not a need, not a pain, not a pleasure,
not a girl, not a boy, not a doubt, not a certainty, not a scorn,
not a desire, not a hope, not an anxiety, not a smile, not a tear,
not a name, not a face, no moment, nowhere, that I do not
regret excessively. Crap from beginning to end.
It is not surprising that Italian critics object that, while one may
occasionally feel like this, it hardly makes for good reading, the
only element of grim humour lying in the scandal of the excess.
But here is Beckett’s original.
Personally of course I regret everything. Not a word, not a
deed, not a thought, not a need, not a grief, not a joy, not a
girl, not a boy, not a doubt, not a trust, not a scorn, not a lust,
not a hope, not a fear, not a smile, not a tear, not a name, not a
face, no time, no place, that I do not regret, exceedingly. An
ordure from beginning to end.
Worth noting here is the way, while the translation retains the
negative content, it entirely loses the fun of Beckett’s demonstra-
tion that even the most miserable vision can be disguised by the
mode of presentation, if you so choose. With the monosyllabic,
nursery-rhyme anapaests, the symmetrical organisation of oppo-
sites, the lovely change of pace as the piece ends – ‘no time, no
place’ – and the amusing shift of register in ‘exceedingly’ and
‘ordure’, the English reader hardly notices what a miserable
statement this is.
The paragraph is in fact a parody of another and most
important consequence of the artist’s rancour about the impossi-
ble task he has set himself: his growing vocation for seduction, for
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inventing, that is, some artistic means that will allow him – at
least for the space of his narrative – to present the truth, as he sees
it – including Cordelia’s death, and Little Nell’s and the
miserable destiny of Isabel Archer and Anna Karenina’s suicide –
in such a way that people will be charmed.
There is a curious moment in The Odyssey, when Helen and
Menelaus are back in Greece and Telemachus visits them. They
wish to speak of Troy, because Troy is the most important
experience of their lives. But it is too painful. Menelaus must
remember Helen’s betrayal. Helen must remember the dead
lovers. Telemachus must remember his father missing, believed
dead. The truth is too depressing to be comfortable with. Helen
gets up, goes into another room, finds a drug she was given in
Egypt and slips it into the wine. This is a drug, Homer says, ‘that
robs grief and anger of their sting and banishes all painful
memories’. And so it is. She and her husband, and Telemachus,
have a wonderful evening recalling the unbearable truth of Troy,
and then fall serenely asleep.
The artist’s dream is to conjure that seductive drug from his
way with words and narrative. Only by presenting us with those
truths which are all-important to us, but usually too difficult to
face, can he get us entirely in his thrall, rather than merely amuse
us with a pastime. Only by getting us in his thrall can he present
those truths and leave us mostly unscathed. Otherwise he must
just amuse us with tales of gallant knights. So it is that the only
really significant reading experiences are those where one sets out
with scepticism, only to find oneself enchanted, overwhelmed by
a vision that, with Promethean peremptoriness, fired with an
ancient antagonism, demands our acquiescence.
Which allows me to come at last to Prospero. Since for
recognition of the artistic mind’s essential rancour and its
intimate relation to his genius for seduction and self-affirmation,
the greatest, the most explicit example remains The Tempest, a
title that speaks worlds.
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People like to forget what an angry, punitive fellow Prospero is.
How quickly he dismisses his daughter’s ‘brave new world’! ‘One
more word/shall make me chide thee, if not hate thee,’ he tells
Miranda when she appeals for Ferdinand’s life. And to Ariel: ‘If
thou more murmur’st, I will rend an oak./And peg thee in his
knotty entrails, till/thou has howl’d away twelve winters.’ His
magician’s spells, however beautiful, are designed to bind, not
please, to regain through the enchantment of the mind the
sovereignty he so foolishly relinquished at the political level. The
whole play is steeped in the vocabulary of sovereignty and
thralldom. One is either controlling or controlled, and the world
is of such a nature that it must be brutally manipulated if the
miracle of Miranda and Ferdinand’s love is to have any chance at
all. And if this rancorous, vengeful magician does in the end
forgive, how grudgingly and sceptically it is done! And that only
when every enemy is securely in Prospero’s power, only when the
gesture of relinquishing power provides the final claim to
superiority, the ultimate demand for recognition.
Then the wonderful final irony: the Duke, the artist, reveals –
how infuriating – all the while he appeared the sovereign, he was
in fact in his audience’s thrall, they had to be kept constantly in
mind.
Let me not,
Since I have my dukedom got
And pardon’d the deceiver, dwell
In this bare island by your spell;
But release me from my bands
With the help of your good hands.
Like Leopardi two centuries later, Shakespeare alerts us to the
contradiction at the heart of the writer’s aspirations: his strength
as magician and seducer, his weakness in needing recognition for
this strength. Prospero seems to be trapped on the very stage that
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was the scene of his triumph, the world he watched over and
made conscious for us. In the end the writer will ever be dogged
by the reflection that once the work is over, he ceases to be god.
And the work itself will ever be fuelled by the rancour consequent
on that knowledge, and the rancorous determination that
everybody else be aware they share the same limitations. Here is
Beckett’s Malone giving us a splendid combination of vindictive-
ness and awareness of the futility of seeking recognition at all:
Let me say before I go any further that I forgive nobody. I
wish them all an atrocious life and then the fires and ice of hell
and in the execrable generations to come an honoured name.
The wonder is that in taking it to such extremes Beckett can
actually seduce us with these negative emotions. The humanistic
project of generating sympathy and a sense of shared destiny is
most nearly achieved when the artist’s essential rancour is most
openly recognised.
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